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Abstract  
  
This  thesis  is  concerned  with  the  notion  of  student  satisfaction  and  its  effects  
on  the  Higher  Education  (HE)  sector.  It  takes  issue  with  two  key  features  of  
the  current  literature  on  this  topic:  that  ‘student  satisfaction’  is  taken  as  a  
given,  and;;  that  ensuring  students  are  satisfied  is  typically  accepted  as  a  
good  thing.  This  thesis  explores  philosophically  what  it  means  to  be  
‘satisfied’  with  one’s  education,  considering  what  this  implies  about  the  value  
of  HE,  and  the  potential  impact  of  this  on  universities,  academics,  and  
students  alike.  In  offering  a  new  and  original  stance  on  the  issue  of  student  
satisfaction  in  Higher  Education,  this  thesis  draws  on  the  philosophical  
works  of  Stanley  Cavell,  Henry  David  Thoreau,  Ralph  Waldo  Emerson,  
Martin  Heidegger,  and  Martin  Buber  to  inform  its  argument.    
  
Part  I  of  the  thesis  provides  a  comprehensive  overview  of  the  concept  of  
‘student  satisfaction’,  its  introduction  into  the  HE  sector,  and  how  this  is  
linked  to  other  marketised  discourses  such  as  ‘value  for  money’  and  ‘service  
quality’.  It  argues  that  what  is  currently  missing  from  the  empirical  literature  
on  student  satisfaction  is  a  philosophical  consideration  of  student  voice,  a  
questioning  of  the  value  of  student  satisfaction,  and  reflections  on  how  the  
dominance  of  satisfaction  measures  impacts  on  relationships  in  the  
contemporary  university.  Part  I  includes  an  overview  of  the  current,  mostly  
empirical,  literature  on  this  topic  and  then  discusses  the  philosophical  
‘method’  employed  here.    
  
The  thesis  then  turns  to  its  central  themes  –  an  attention  to  language,  voice,  
perfectionism,  and  ethical  relationships  –  to  demonstrate  that  the  exploration  
of  key  concepts  is  central  to  the  ‘method’  pursued  here.  Part  II  of  the  thesis  
discusses  three  issues  in  HE  that  are  inextricably  tied  to  the  student  
satisfaction  agenda:  the  collection  of  student  voice;;  the  recent  drive  to  offer  
a  kind  of  settlement  in  teaching  and  learning,  and;;  the  shift  from  academic-­
student  relationships  to  mere  customer  relations.  The  issues  investigated  
here  are  discussed  in  light  of  three  key  distinctions:  between  ‘feedback’  and  
‘voice’;;  between  forms  of  ‘un-­educative  settlement’  and  ‘educative  
-­  iv  -­  
unsettling’,  and;;  between  relationships  of  ‘exchange’  and  those  of  
‘encounter’.  In  drawing  on  the  philosophical  works  mentioned  above,  Part  II  
not  only  problematises  certain  discourses  and  marketised  practices  in  HE,  
but  it  also  considers  the  practical  implications  of  these  ideas  for  universities,  
academics  and  their  students.  
  
Part  III  of  the  thesis  returns  to  the  central  distinctions  made  in  Part  II,  such  
as  that  between  ‘feedback’  and  ‘voice’,  to  argue  that  what  is  most  
problematic  about  student  satisfaction  and  its  associated  discourses  is  the  
encouragement  of  the  former  distinctions  (for  example,  feedback)  to  the  
exclusion  of  the  latter  (such  as  voice).  While  acknowledging  that  student  
satisfaction  cannot  simply  be  removed  or  eradicated  from  the  HE  sector,  the  
thesis  offers  a  productive  way  forward  in  light  of  the  issues  raised  by  
drawing  an  original  and  significant  distinction  between  two  different  forms  of  
‘satisfaction’:  the  ‘now-­’  and  the  ‘not-­yet-­’.  The  thesis  concludes  by  laying  out  
several  philosophically-­informed  principles  for  resisting  current  iterations  of  
student  satisfaction,  and  for  embracing  a  richer  conception  of  ‘voice’,  
encouraging  educative  unsettling  in  the  classroom,  and  fostering  
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Preface  
By  the  end  of  college  I  had  come  to  realise  that  music  was  not  my  life.  
How  that  crisis  eventually  produced  the  conviction  that  a  life  of  study  
and  writing  growing  out  of  philosophy  was  for  me  to  discover  (Cavell,  
2010,  p.4,  my  emphasis).    
  
My  interest  in  philosophy  of  education  could  be  seen  as  growing  out  of  a  
similar  crisis  to  that  experienced  by  the  American  philosopher  Stanley  
Cavell.  While  Cavell’s  work  is  extremely  influential  for  the  thesis  presented  
here,  I  feel  that  there  are  certain  affinities  between  his  philosophical  ‘method’  
and  my  own.  Rather  than  the  crisis  occurring  at  the  end  of  my  
undergraduate  degree  and  after  studying  music  as  Cavell  did,  my  own  
experience  of  being  unsettled  happened  after  studying  biology  for  a  year  at  
Durham  University.  It  was  not  that  I  disliked  the  course,  but  rather  I  felt  that  
biology  was  maybe  ‘not  for  me’.  Reaching  the  end  of  my  first  year,  I  
definitely  experienced  a  crisis  akin  to  what  Cavell  discusses,  whereby  I  was  
concerned  that  maybe  a  university  education  itself  was  not  the  right  thing  for  
me  to  pursue.  So  my  choice  was  either  to  change  course  or  to  leave  Higher  
Education  (HE)  altogether.  But  in  reflecting  on  why  I  chose  biology  in  the  
first  place,  I  realised  that  this  decision  was  premised  on  more  of  an  ‘oh  well,  
I  seem  to  have  excelled  at  biology  before’,  rather  than  a  real  love  of  the  
subject  and  wish  to  have  a  career  in  science  and  industry.          
  
I  decided  to  change  course  and  thought  that  I  would  like  to  study  primary  
education  with  a  teaching  qualification  embedded  in  it  (offering  Qualified  
Teacher  Status,  QTS,  upon  completion).  However,  this  move  could  not  be  
easily  accommodated  so  I  applied  instead  for  Education  Studies  with  
Psychology.  Despite  this  decision  being  a  bit  of  a  punt  and  a  gamble,  I  
discovered  not  only  a  passion  for  education,  but  particularly  for  philosophy  of  
education.  In  contrast  to  what  I  had  studied  before,  I  revelled  in  the  
ambiguities  and  open-­ended  nature  of  questions  arising  in  philosophy  of  
education.  In  a  module  I  undertook  in  my  second  year,  we  dealt  with  such  
issues  as  ‘can  we  ever  really  “know”  another?’,  ‘what  does  the  self  consist  
of?’,  and  ‘should  philosophy  aspire  to  be  a  social  science?’.  Following  this,  I  
decided  to  write  a  philosophical  dissertation  in  my  third  year  which  
-­  x  -­  
compared  different  accounts  of  selfhood  from  philosophy  and  psychology.  
My  lecturers  in  philosophy  of  education  had  clearly  unveiled  some  passion  
and  commitment  to  philosophy  that  I  was  not  previously  aware  of,  and  this  
encouraged  me  to  study  the  subject  at  doctoral  level  and  work  toward  a  
career  in  academia,  but  what  question  or  topic  would  I  deal  with  for  the  
PhD?  
  
My  interest  in  student  satisfaction  came  about  primarily  through  my  own  
experience  of  completing  the  National  Student  Survey  (NSS)  shortly  before  
graduation  in  2015.  Having  studied  a  joint  degree,  with  very  different  
experiences  in  the  education  and  psychology  departments,  I  struggled  with  
being  able  to  accurately  represent  my  experience  as  a  whole.  The  virtues  of  
the  education  department  largely  outweighed  some  of  the  unaccommodating  
experiences  I  had  had  in  psychology,  and  so  I  based  my  responses  on  that.  
I  remember  students  discussing  the  idea  of  boycotting  the  NSS  at  the  time,  
as  it  merely  reinforces  the  marketisation  of  HE  and  academic  labour,  
although  choosing  not  to  respond  would  have  implied  dissatisfaction  with  our  
experiences.  All  students  seem  to  be  aware  that  responding  to  the  NSS  is  
like  playing  a  game,  with  both  academics  and  students  being  the  chess-­
pieces  moved  around  at  will  by  government  policy.  Hence,  refusing  to  fill  in  
the  NSS  did  not  seem  a  viable  option,  especially  as  I  was  almost  badgered  
with  email,  text  and  call  reminders  about  the  survey.    
  
Not  only  did  I  personally  experience  an  issue  with  making  my  ‘voice’  heard  
authentically,  but  I  also  realised  that  such  measures  overemphasise  the  
tangible,  and  typically  marketable,  ‘ends’  of  HE.  The  final  question  on  the  
NSS  asks  students  about  their  overall  satisfaction  with  course  quality.  While  
I  cannot  recall  whether  I  ticked  ‘definitely  agree’,  ‘mostly  agree’  or  otherwise  
for  this  question,  it  made  me  wonder  when  and  how  students  might  know  
that  they  were  satisfied,  and  by  satisfaction  here  I  am  referring  to  more  than  
the  short-­term  meeting  of  needs.  Three  years  on,  I  still  feel  unable  to  answer  
this  question  regarding  my  undergraduate  degree,  despite  my  HE  
experience  being  extremely  positive  and  transformative.  What  I  can  say  for  
now  is  that  I  know  that  studying  the  course  changed  my  life  and  shaped  my  
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future  ambitions  in  unimaginable  and  inexplicable  ways,  while  the  influence  
of  certain  lecturers  is  still  felt  today.  Of  course,  measures  such  as  the  NSS  
cannot  account  for  responses  such  as  mine,  where  the  ‘outputs’  and  
measurable  benefits  of  HE  are  not  easy  to  delineate  and  reify.    
  
Adding  to  these  concerns  over  the  student  satisfaction  agenda,  I  was  also  
witness  to  the  rise  in  tuition  fees  in  2012,  although  I  was  in  the  last  cohort  of  
students  paying  roughly  £3,500  per  annum.  As  tuition  fees  increased  to  
£9,000  the  year  after  I  entered  Higher  Education,  it  made  me  question  how  
the  price  might  impact  upon  the  student  experience  and  approaches  to  
teaching  and  learning.  Arguably,  those  entering  HE  in  2012  paying  higher  
fees  would  receive  the  same  education  as  those  paying  around  the  £3,000  
mark,  but  the  huge  increase  in  student  debt  may  have  altered  students’  
expectations.    
  
I  am  dubious  about  whether,  if  having  to  pay  the  higher  tuition  fees,  I  would  
have  entered  HE  at  all,  but  I  can  only  speculate  on  that.  Bearing  these  
concerns  in  mind,  I  became  more  skeptical  of  the  drive  to  create  what  Peter  
Roberts  calls  ‘pleasurable  and  measurable  experiences’  (as  cited  by  Gibbs,  
2017,  p.152).  I  was  also  wary  of  a  dissonance  between  how  students  
approach  such  surveys  as  the  NSS,  and  how  they  are  used  for  public  
accountability  and  to  guide  student  choice,  in  turn  shaping  the  HE  
marketplace  through  the  creation  of  institutional  league  tables.        
  
When  looking  through  the  literature  to  see  if  a  philosophical  exploration  of  
student  satisfaction  and  its  associated  discourses  would  be  valuable  and  
original,  I  was  struck  by  the  dearth  of  research  that  was  asking  such  
questions  as  I  will  deal  with  here;;  for  example,  ‘what  does  it  mean  to  be  
satisfied  with  one’s  Higher  Education?’,  and  ‘should  we  [even]  be  aiming  to  
satisfy  students?’  So  my  commitment  to  philosophy  of  education  stemmed  
from  a  questioning  of  what  I  felt  to  be  a  rather  asinine  measure  of  student  
satisfaction,  and  this  paved  the  way  for  the  research  presented  in  this  thesis.    
The  question  remains  whether  I  am  ‘satisfied’  now,  or  indeed  was  satisfied  
with  my  undergraduate  education.  But  ‘satisfaction’  is  ineluctably  tied  to  the  
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notion  of  ‘value  for  money’,  which  is  not  something  I  set  out  to  obtain  from  
university.  I  have  not  felt  the  benefits  of  the  so-­called  ‘graduate  premium’,  
with  higher  wages  gained  according  to  one’s  educational  qualifications,  
although  again  this  idea  is  tied  to  an  economic  rationality.  In  answer  to  the  
NSS  asking  about  the  quality  of  resources,  availability  of  academic  staff,  and  
promptness  of  feedback,  yes  I  am  satisfied  with  my  Higher  Education.  Yet  
student  satisfaction  measures  only  speak  to  the  economic  value  of  HE,  
without  in  any  way  explaining  its  personal  worth  to  each  student.    
  
In  contrasting  satisfaction  with  happiness,  Paul  Gibbs  writes  that  
fundamental  happiness  ‘is  not  the  satisfaction  of  exciting  preferences,  but  
the  securing  of  one’s  action  in  a  life-­plan  of  one’s  being’  (2016,  p.5).  While  
satisfaction  and  happiness  may  often  coincide,  it  is  my  contention  that  
universities  should  not  overemphasise  excellence,  efficiency,  value  for  
money,  and  competitiveness;;  in  striving  to  ensure  satisfaction,  we  may  
bypass  happiness  altogether.    
  
My  own  Higher  Education  has  not  only  given  me  a  sense  of  satisfaction  but  
also  an  immeasurable  happiness,  self-­confidence,  and  the  determination  to  
succeed.  I  do  not  have  a  neatly  laid-­out  list  of  skills  that  my  university  
education  provided,  although  I  was  often  encouraged  to  ‘audit’  and  record  
my  skills  from  induction.  Bildung1,  or  self-­cultivation,  seems  to  be  a  more  apt  
description  of  my  Higher  Education,  encompassing  the  idea  that  education  
should  enable  a  person  to  grow  into  themselves,  or  ‘a  state  of  being  content  
with  oneself’  (Gibbs,  2016,  p.3).  While  educationalists  often  write  of  the  
power  of  education  to  transform  and  change  lives,  HE  is,  and  should  be,  
focused  on  shaping  students  into  who  they  are  and  who  they  want  to  
become.
                                                                                        
1  The  term  Bildung  was  initially  used  by  German  philosopher,  Wilhelm  Von  
Humboldt.  Though  Bildung  is  often  described  as  being  
‘untranslatable’,  it  generally  means  an  individual’s  capacity  for  self-­
realisation,  or  their  ‘self-­culture’.  For  further  details,  see:  
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wilhelm-­humboldt/  [Accessed  08  
March  2019].    
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Chapter  1  
Literature  Overview  –  Policy  and  Practice  Context  of  Student  
Satisfaction  Measures  in  the  UK  Higher  Education  Sector  
  
1.1   Introduction  
1.1.1  Policy  Background  
The  rise  of  student  satisfaction  measures  and  institutional  league  tables  of  
performance  in  the  UK  Higher  Education  (HE)  sector  can  be  linked  back,  at  
least  in  part,  to  the  initial  introduction  of  university  tuition  fees  in  1998  
(Teaching  and  Higher  Education  Act,  1998).  Initially  set  at  £1,000  per  
annum,  tuition  fees  have  continued  to  rise  since  then,  and  the  cap  on  tuition  
fees  was  raised  to  £9,000  per  year  in  2012  after  the  publication  of  the  
Government’s  White  Paper  which  emphasised  that  ‘students  [should  be  
placed]  at  the  Heart  of  the  System’  (Department  for  Business,  Innovation  
and  Skills  (BIS),  2011,  p.1).    
  
To  promote  the  widening  participation  agenda  and  to  mitigate  against  the  
potentially  negative  effects  of  introducing  higher  fees,  universities  charging  
the  maximum  of  £9,000  were  required  to  submit  access  agreements  to  the  
newly  established  Office  for  Fair  Access  (OFFA,  BIS,  2011).  Such  
agreements  outlined  institutional  efforts  to  encourage  typically  under-­
represented  groups  (such  as  Black,  Minority  and  Ethnic  (BME)  students,  and  
those  from  low-­participation  neighbourhoods)  and  non-­traditional  students  to  
apply.  All  of  these  changes  to  the  HE  sector  were  reflective  of  a  broader  
commitment  to  driving  up  quality,  increasing  competition  between  
universities  (which  in  turn  is  meant  to  raise  efficiency),  and  placing  greater  
power  in  the  hands  of  student-­consumers  (Yeo,  2008;;  Blackmore,  2009;;  
Stensaker  and  Harvey,  2013).    
  
Universities  are  now  more  pressured  to  make  their  work  publicly  
accountable,  and  institutional  autonomy  is  receding  as  the  commercialisation  
of  HE  progresses.  That  Higher  Education  is  a  commodity  is  increasingly  
taken  as  a  given  (Molesworth  et  al.,  2011;;  Bates  and  Kaye,  2014),  with  
educationalists  often  debating  how  best  to  regulate  the  market  and/or  
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improve  student  satisfaction  (Rolfe,  2002;;  Blackmore,  2009;;  Sarrico  and  
Rosa,  2014),  rather  than  questioning  the  extent  to  which  HE  should  be  
considered  as  a  market.  The  marketisation  of  the  HE  sector  is  now  widely  
accepted  and  the  thesis  opens  from  this  position.    
  
As  tuition  fees  have  increased,  student  expectations  of  ‘service  quality’  have  
changed  (Rolfe,  2002;;  Mark,  2013;;  Bates  and  Kaye,  2014),  and  students  are  
now  considered  as  ‘customers’,  ‘consumers’,  and/or  major  stakeholders  of  
Higher  Education  services  (Bay  and  Daniel,  2001;;  Blackmore,  2009;;  Gruber  
et  al.,  2010;;  Mainardes  et  al.,  2013).  As  students  are  progressively  viewed  
as  ‘customers’  and  market  principles  have  encroached  on  the  HE  sector,  
measures  of  student  satisfaction  have  been  introduced  as  a  way  of  ensuring  
‘value  for  money’  for  students  (Rolfe,  2002).  Coinciding  with  this,  there  has  
also  been  a  promotion  of  greater  competition  between  institutions  which  is  
thought  to  increase  quality  and  efficiency  (Wilkins  et  al.,  2012;;  Brockerhoff  et  
al.,  2014).  The  results  of  student  satisfaction  measures,  such  as  the  National  
Student  Survey  (NSS)1  which  is  used  in  the  UK,  are  used  to  compile  publicly  
available  league  tables.  League  table  position  can  influence  the  decisions  of  
prospective  students  when  choosing  which  universities  to  apply  to  (Naidoo  
and  Jamieson,  2005),  and  NSS  results  are  often  taken  as  an  overall  
measure  of  institutional  quality  and  reputation  (Beecham,  2009;;  Bedggood  
and  Donovan,  2012).    
  
In  order  to  provide  a  broader  context  for  discussions  of  student  satisfaction  
internationally,  I  will  also  consider  literature  based  on  studies  from  America,  
Australia,  the  United  Arab  Emirates,  and  Singapore  among  others,  but  the  
                                                                                        
1  The  National  Student  Survey  (NSS)  is  completed  by  final-­year  
undergraduate  students  at  Higher  Education  Institutions  across  the  
UK.  It  consists  of  27  questions  covering  different  areas  of  provision  
such  as  academic  support,  assessment  and  feedback,  teaching  
quality,  learning  resources,  and  student  voice.  The  results  of  the  NSS  
are  made  publicly  available  in  order  to  ‘inform  student  choice’,  
‘enhance  the  student  experience’,  and  to  ‘provide  public  assurance’  
(NSS).  For  further  details,  see:  
https://www.thestudentsurvey.com/institutions.php  [Accessed  05  
January  2019].    
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thesis  as  a  whole  will  focus  on  HE  policy  and  practice  in  the  UK.  As  I  will  
discuss  further  below,  there  are  many  interesting  similarities  between  
measures  of  student  satisfaction  across  very  different  cultural  contexts,  thus  
showing  the  prolific  nature  of  the  marketisation  of  HE  and  the  emphasis  
placed  on  accountability.  The  most  prominent  measure  of  student  
satisfaction  in  the  UK  HE  sector  is  the  aforementioned  NSS,  which  was  
introduced  in  2005  and  is  conducted  by  the  market  research  company,  
Ipsos-­Mori.    
  
Measures  such  as  the  NSS  are  not  only  used  for  accountability  purposes  
(Williams  and  Cappuccini-­Ansfield,  2007)  –  to  hold  both  universities  and  
individual  academics  to  account  –  but  also  to  inform  institutional  quality  
assurance  and  management  procedures  (Stensaker  and  Harvey,  2013).  The  
increasing  marketisation  of  HE  has  necessitated  that  universities  pay  more  
attention  to  student  feedback,  in  terms  of  satisfaction  survey  responses,  and  
word  of  mouth  appraisals  (whether  students  would  recommend  their  
institution  to  friends  and  family).  This  emphasis  on  being  ‘customer-­focused’  
is  also  advocated  by  the  UK  Government,  who  have  expressed  their  
commitment  to  ‘doing  more  than  ever  to  put  students  in  the  driving  seat’  
(BIS,  2011,  p.2).    
  
1.1.2  Recent  Policy  Initiatives      
The  policy  landscape  of  UK  Higher  Education  changed  dramatically  again  in  
late  2015,  with  the  publication  of  the  HE  Green  Paper  titled  ‘Fulfilling  Our  
Potential:  Teaching  Excellence,  Social  Mobility  and  Student  Choice’  (BIS,  
2015).  In  this  paper,  the  Government  proposed  the  ‘Teaching  Excellence  
Framework’  (TEF)  to  place  teaching  on  a  more  equal  footing  with  research  in  
universities.  It  was  announced  that  judgements  of  ‘teaching  excellence’  were  
to  be  based  on  student  satisfaction  data,  with  those  institutions  achieving  
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‘gold’  being  allowed  to  further  increase  their  tuition  fees  in  line  with  inflation  
from  the  2017/18  academic  year  (BIS,  2015).2      
  
Aimed  at  improving  teaching  standards  in  universities,  the  Green  Paper  
explained  the  need  for  the  TEF  in  terms  of  providing  ‘value  for  money’  –  a  
proxy  measure  of  ‘satisfaction’  –  for  students  (BIS,  2015).  While  a  consistent  
definition  of  ‘teaching  excellence’  remains  elusive,  its  evaluation  is  broadly  
based  on  three  aspects:  ‘teaching  quality’,  ‘learning  environment’,  and  
‘student  outcomes  and  learning  gain’  (Gunn,  2018,  p.137).  The  TEF  purports  
to  measure  not  only  the  quality  of  universities’  teaching  practices,  but  also  
their  overall  ‘teaching  mission’  which  includes  direct  teaching,  and  facilities  
and  environmental  factors  that  support  student  learning  (Gunn,  2018,  p.135).  
As  Gunn  states,  ‘the  teaching  mission  includes  all  the  inputs,  processes,  
outputs  and  outcomes  of  the  student  lifecycle’  (2018,  p.135).  As  the  TEF  
focuses  on  the  student  lifecycle  from  pre-­enrolment  to  beyond  graduation,  its  
metrics  include  non-­continuation  data  from  the  Higher  Education  Statistics  
Agency  (HESA)  and  the  ‘Graduate  Outcomes  Survey’,  in  addition  to  NSS  
responses.      
  
As  tuition  fees  increased  at  universities,  so  did  the  proliferation  of  regulatory  
bodies,  such  as  the  Quality  Assurance  Agency  (QAA).  But  with  the  passing  
of  the  Higher  Education  and  Research  Act  (2017),  this  was  both  
consolidated  and  simplified.  The  newly  established  Office  for  Students  (OfS)  
assumed  the  regulatory  responsibilities  of  both  Higher  Education  Funding  
Council  for  England  (HEFCE)  and  the  OFFA,  ensuring  that  widening  
participation  was  at  the  forefront  of  the  agenda  and  that  universities  
continued  to  provide  an  excellent  quality  service  (BIS,  2016).  The  Higher  
Education  and  Research  Act  (2017)  also  sought  to  create  one  system  for  
regulating,  and  allocating  funding  for,  research  which  is  to  be  managed  by  
                                                                                        
2  The  implementation  of  financial  incentives  for  teaching  excellence,  in  the  
form  of  raised  tuition  fees,  is  now  contingent  upon  a  review  of  the  
metrics  used  in  the  TEF,  and  differential  fee  caps  are  now  set  to  
come  into  effect  from  Autumn  2020  (Morgan,  2017).  
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the  newly  formed  ‘UK  Research  and  Innovation’,  or  UKRI.  The  UKRI  
regulatory  body,  which  combined  the  previous  seven  current  research  
councils  with  ‘Innovate  UK’  and  ‘Research  England’,  is  responsible  for  
facilitating  and  supporting  new  research  in  science,  technology,  and  the  
humanities  (Higher  Education  and  Research  Act,  2017).3    
  
The  Higher  Education  and  Research  Act  (2017)  can  be  seen  as  the  
concretising  of  what  came  before  (BIS,  2011;;  2015;;  2016),  with  the  UK  
government  seeking  to  ‘reform  the  Higher  Education  system  architecture  to  
make  it  simpler  and  more  efficient’  (BIS,  2016,  p.3),  and  therefore  easier  to  
manage  and  regulate  for  modern  day  student-­consumers.  These  multiple  
processes  of  regulation,  accountability,  and  quality  assurance  can  be  seen  
as  a  direct  response  to  the  ‘customerisation’  and  marketisation  of  HE  (Love,  
2008,  p.18),  whereby  the  ‘business’  of  universities  is  now  considered  in  
terms  of  ‘service  provision’  (Clayson  and  Haley,  2005)  which  is  critically  
evaluated  by  their  ‘customers’  (students).    
  
The  extent  to  which  students  consider  themselves  as  ‘customers’  or  
‘consumers’  remains  dubious,  but  there  has  been  a  clear  shift  in  student  
expectations  over  the  past  decade  or  so,  with  a  rise  in  ‘student  entitlement’  
attitudes  (Rolfe,  2002;;  Sarrico  and  Rosa,  2014).  As  the  ‘customerisation’  of  
students  has  recently  been  formalised  under  the  Consumer  Rights  Act  
(2015),  this  inevitably  reframes  HE  as  a  commodity  which,  whether  
considered  to  be  a  product  or  a  service,  students  are  ‘entitled’  to  given  their  
high  personal  investments  in  it  (Finney  and  Finney,  2010;;  Sarrico  and  Rosa,  
2014;;  Marshall  et  al.,  2015).  This  shift  is  evidenced  from  the  very  titles  given  
to  recent  journal  articles  including  ‘I’d  be  expecting  caviar  in  lectures’  (Bates  
                                                                                        
3  The  councils  previously  responsible  for  regulating  and  funding  research  
across  the  HE  sector  were  as  follows:  the  Arts  and  Humanities  
Research  Council  (AHRC),  the  Biotechnology  and  Biological  
Sciences  Research  Council,  the  Economic  and  Social  Research  
Council  (ESRC),  the  Engineering  and  Physical  Sciences  Research  
Council,  the  Medical  Research  Council,  the  Natural  Environment  
Research  Council,  and  the  Science  and  Technology  Facilities  
Council.  
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and  Kaye,  2014),  ‘I  Paid  for  It,  so  I  Deserve  It!’  (Marshall  et  al.,  2015),  and  
‘Her  Majesty  the  Student’  (Nixon  et  al.,  2018).    
  
This  increase  in,  and  recent  simplification  of,  regulatory  bodies  should  also  
be  seen  in  light  of  the  internationalisation  agenda;;  the  UK  HE  sector  is  now  
compared  to  those  of  other  countries,  with  student  mobility  and  intercultural  
knowledge  exchange  on  the  rise.  In  order  for  UK  universities  to  attract  a  
large  number  of  international  students,  who  bring  a  substantial  income  with  
them,  there  is  a  need  for  the  UK  HE  sector  to  demonstrate  its  quality  in  order  
to  remain  globally  competitive  –  student  satisfaction  measures  and  the  
creation  of  league  tables  are  central  to  this.    
  
Thus  far,  I  have  given  a  policy  background  to  the  implementation  of  student  
satisfaction  measures  and  explained  their  rising  prominence  in  the  HE  
sector.  In  the  following  sections,  I  will  explore  some  definitions  of  ‘student  
satisfaction’  and  discuss  its  different  determining  factors.  I  will  then  move  to  
give  an  overview  of  the  literature  on  the  measurement  of  student  
satisfaction,  cultural  and  gendered  variations  in  level  of  satisfaction,  and  
then  examine  the  links  between  student  satisfaction  and  service  quality.  
  
1.2   Definitions  and  Determinants  of  Student  Satisfaction  
1.2.1  Definitions  of  Student  Satisfaction  
With  increasing  emphasis  placed  on  student  satisfaction  measures  in  Higher  
Education,  it  is  all  the  more  important  that  stakeholders  know  what  the  term  
‘student  satisfaction’  means  and  what  exactly  is  being  measured  in  such  
surveys  as  the  NSS.  However,  as  Garcia-­Aracil  states,  there  is  a  distinct  
‘absence  of  a  consensus  on  the  definition  of  satisfaction  as  a  concept’  
(2009,  p.2).  Where  student  satisfaction  is  more  clearly  defined,  the  concept  
seems  to  have  been  simply  transferred  from  the  business  and  marketing  
world.  Here,  attention  is  given  to  an  evaluation  of  ‘post-­consumption’  
satisfaction  (Guolla,  1999)  and  subsequent  consumer  behaviour  –  whether  
the  ‘consumer’  would  buy  from  that  business  again,  whether  they  would  
recommend  the  service  to  others,  and  how  likely  they  are  to  complain  
(Wilkins  et  al.,  2012;;  Wilkins  and  Balakrishnan,  2013).    
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Academic  attributes  (such  as  ‘teaching  quality’)  are  pivotal  to  students’  
overall  evaluation  of  their  satisfaction,  but  the  literature  also  highlights  the  
importance  of  social,  physical,  spiritual,  and  emotional  factors  (Elliott  and  
Shin,  2002).  While  these  socio-­emotional  factors  are  not  exactly  absent  from  
the  NSS,  the  influence  of  these  may  be  hidden  within  an  overall  judgement  
of  the  quality  of  ‘the  student  experience’.  Students’  assessment  of  their  
(dis)satisfaction  with  their  Higher  Education  was  initially  considered  to  be  the  
result  of  a  careful  weighing  up  of  their  positive  and  negative  experiences,  
and  a  retrospective  comparison  between  their  current  perceptions  of  service  
quality  and  their  initial  expectations  (Baldwin  and  James,  2000;;  Vuori,  2013).  
But  the  role  of  feelings  and  emotions  in  one’s  evaluation  of  satisfaction  is  
now  recognised  (Alves  and  Raposo,  2009;;  Bedggood  and  Donovan,  2012;;  
Bianchi,  2013;;  Sarrico  and  Rosa,  2014).  This  may  also  be  related  to  the  fact  
that  students’  satisfaction  and  subsequent  loyalty  to  their  institutions  as  
alumni  is  linked  to  their  having  ‘shared  values’  with  the  university  in  question  
(Schlesinger  et  al.,  2017,  p.2183).  Indeed,  as  Bainbridge  (2004,  as  cited  by  
Carter  and  Yeo,  2016,  p.636)  stated  in  reference  to  universities’  marketing  
strategies,  institutions  now  have  to  develop  not  only  a  Unique  Selling  
Proposition  (USP),  but  also  an  Emotional  Selling  Proposition  (ESP).  
Stukalina  defines  student  satisfaction  as:  
An  outcome  of  the  expectations  and  experiences  of  the  subject,  study  
course,  or  study  programme  as  a  requisite  element  of   the   integrated  
educational  environment  (2012,  p.92).    
  
This  stresses  that  one’s  evaluations  of  a  service  are  integrated  from  a  
number  of  different  factors,  and  as  Bianchi  states,  both  the  core  (teaching  
and  learning)  and  peripheral  (accommodation,  facilities,  social  life  etc.)  
services  of  a  university  are  ‘directly  related  to  overall  service  quality  and  
customer  satisfaction’  (2013,  p.397).  Elliott  and  Healy  define  student  
satisfaction  as  ‘a  short-­term  attitude  resulting  from  an  evaluation  of  a  
student’s  educational  experience’  (2001,  p.2).    
  
Another  commonly-­used  definition  of  student  satisfaction  is  related  to  the  
‘expectancy  disconfirmation  paradigm’,  whereby  satisfaction  results  when  a  
customer’s  expectations  are  met  (or  confirmed),  and  dissatisfaction  may  
occur  when  expectations  are  disconfirmed  (Appleton-­Knapp  and  Krentler,  
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2006;;  Alves  and  Raposo,  2009).  Thus,  customer  (student)  dissatisfaction  
tends  to  come  from  their  high  expectations  not  being  met,  or  from  their  
perception  that  the  service  quality  is  substandard.  Such  a  definition  of  
‘student  satisfaction’  is  almost  identical  to  that  for  consumers  in  other  
product  and  service  industries  (McCollough  and  Gremler,  1999;;  Clemes  et  
al.,  2007;;  Alves  and  Raposo,  2009;;  Elsharnouby,  2015);;  indeed,  it  is  
increasingly  acknowledged  in  the  HE  sector  that  students  are  now  
‘customers’,  and  that  universities  are  essentially  selling  the  services  of  
teaching  and  learning  (Guolla,  1999;;  Elliott  and  Healy,  2001;;  Gruber  et  al.,  
2010;;  Vuori,  2013).    
  
A  central  feature  of  ‘student  satisfaction’  that  makes  it  difficult  to  define  is  
that  it  is  inextricably  linked  to  other  concepts  such  as  ‘the  student  
experience’,  ‘employability’,  and  ‘service  quality’.  Students’  expectations  of  
Higher  Education  are  often  tied  to  obtaining  a  good  degree  classification  –  
increasingly  an  upper  second  or  first  –  in  order  to  benefit  from  what  is  
commonly  termed  the  ‘college  premium’  increase  in  employability  and  
earnings  (Walker  and  Zhu,  2008,  p.695;;  Mark,  2013).  The  potential  danger  
of  such  an  economic  focus  though,  is  that  students  may  be  more  passive,  
expecting  their  university  to  award  them  a  degree  because  they  have  paid  
for  it  (Rolfe,  2002;;  Blackmore,  2009;;  Bates  and  Kaye,  2014);;  an  exchange  
has  taken  place.  As  Molesworth  et  al.  describe  this  potentially  odious  effect  
of  the  student  satisfaction  agenda,  they  state  that  ‘the  current  HE  market  
discourse  promotes  a  mode  of  existence,  where  students  seek  to  “have  a  
degree”  rather  than  “be  learners”’  (2009,  p.277).  
  
1.2.2  Determinants  of  Student  Satisfaction  
The  number  of  determinants  of  student  satisfaction  varies  widely  across  the  
literature,  but  all  of  the  models  evince  both  ‘teaching’  and  ‘non-­teaching’  
elements  of  the  student  experience  as  central  to  the  level  of  satisfaction  
(Carter  and  Yeo,  2016,  p.639).  The  factors  determining  students’  satisfaction  
are  ‘academic  experience  and  faculty  quality  (teaching  elements)’,  as  well  as  
wider  contextual  factors  such  as  ‘campus  life,  facilities,  and  placement  
support’  (Carter  and  Yeo,  2016,  p.639).  The  primary  factors  influencing  
general  (rather  than  degree-­specific)  student  satisfaction  include  ‘university  
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flexibility  and  adaptability  to  student  needs,  the  university  environment,  its  
services,  student  value  in  the  employment  market,  making  new  friends  and  
academic  life,  and  personal  self-­fulfilment’  (Mainardes  et  al.,  2013,  p.369).  
Adding  to  this,  Gibson  also  identifies  ‘social  integration’  and  ‘student  
centredness’  as  important  for  ensuring  that  students  are  satisfied  (2010,  
p.256).    
  
The  current  literature  often  refers  to  the  factors  influencing  student  
satisfaction  as  ‘antecedents’  (Parahoo  et  al.,  2013;;  Carter  and  Yeo,  2016;;  
Harvey  et  al.,  2017;;  Santini  et  al.,  2017),  but  here  I  will  use  the  term  
‘determinants’,  as  using  antecedents  could  imply  that  certain  things  precede  
satisfaction  rather  than  contributing  to  it.  This  linguistic  choice  should  not  
affect  the  meaning,  but  it  is  worth  noting  that  this  kind  of  instrumental  
language  –  with  reference  to  ‘antecedents’  and  ‘consequents’  of  student  
satisfaction  –  is  used  throughout  the  literature  to  discuss  such  measures.  
  
When  considering  the  academic  experience  as  a  whole,  Parahoo  et  al.  have  
stated  that  the  following  six  factors  can  influence  student  satisfaction:    
University   reputation,   faculty   academic   competence,   faculty  
communications,   interactions   among   students,   student   interactions  
with   admin   and   IT   staff,   and   service   quality   of   electronic  
communications  (2013,  pp.147-­149).    
  
Stukalina  argues  that  students’  evaluations  of  satisfaction  are  holistic,  
encompassing  the  ‘integrated  educational  environment’  as  a  whole,  which  
can  be  considered  in  terms  of  four  main  factors:  the  ‘physical  and  
technological  environment  including  university  facilities’,  the  ‘instructional  
environment’  including  quality  of  instruction  and  availability  of  resources,  the  
‘executive  environment’,  and  the  ‘psychological  environment’  developed  
through  the  approach  to  learning  advocated  and  the  study  process  itself  
(2014,  p.130).  
  
The  literature  acknowledges  that  student  satisfaction  is  a  holistic  evaluation  
of  one’s  ‘student  experience’,  and  that  it  is  not  limited  to  academic  factors  
alone,  such  as  ‘teaching  quality’  and  ‘perceived  faculty  competence’  
(Parahoo  et  al.,  2013;;  Xiao  and  Wilkins,  2015).  As  Alves  and  Raposo  put  it,  
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‘the  dimensions  [of  student  satisfaction]  found  practically  cover  the  whole  
educational  product,  as  well  as  the  way  it  is  provided’  (2009,  p.204).    
  
Different  studies  may  use  different  terms  for  their  explanatory  models  of  
student  satisfaction,  but  they  tend  to  converge  on  factors  such  as  quality  
instruction,  university  reputation,  availability  of  staff,  social  life  and  facilities,  
and  the  market  value  of  the  degree  studied  (Elliott  and  Shin,  2002;;  Clemes  
et  al.,  2007;;  Miliszewska  and  Sztendur,  2012;;  Bianchi,  2013;;  Mainardes  et  
al.,  2013;;  Xiao  and  Wilkins,  2015;;  Harvey  et  al.,  2017).  It  is  thus  clearly  
evident  from  the  literature  that  ‘student  satisfaction’  cannot  be  easily  
separated  from  the  overall  ‘student  experience’  and/or  concerns  over  
‘service  quality’  received.  Another  interesting  feature  of  this  ‘determinants’  
literature  is  that  the  factors  influencing  student  satisfaction  are  predominantly  
related  to  university  provision  rather  than  a  student’s  own  contribution  to  the  
experience,  therefore  placing  the  onus  on  Higher  Education  Institutions  
(HEIs)  to  ensure  that  students  succeed  and  enjoy  their  experience.  This  
issue  of  students  being  passive  consumers  instead  of  active  learners  is  
evinced  in  the  recent  rise  of  student  entitlement  attitudes  (Finney  and  
Finney,  2010;;  Sarrico  and  Rosa,  2014;;  Marshall  et  al.,  2015).    
  
1.2.3  ‘Dissatisfiers’  and  Consequents  of  Student  Satisfaction  
Current  research  has  also  investigated  what  may  be  ‘dissatisfiers’  for  
students  and  the  possible  consequences  of  student  (dis)satisfaction  
(Bianchi,  2013;;  Santini  et  al.,  2017).  Bianchi  identifies  four  main  categories  
of  HE  provision  that  influence  student  satisfaction,  with  subcategories  of  
these  being  considered  as  either  ‘satisfiers’  or  ‘dissatisfiers’.  The  central  
factors  are:  ‘international  student  performance’,  ‘educational  service  
performance’,  ‘socialisation  performance’,  and  ‘living  environment  
performance’  (2013,  pp.400-­402).  The  most  important  ‘satisfier’  for  
international  students  was  found  to  be  their  own  academic  performance,  
whilst  common  ‘dissatisfiers’  were  ‘inappropriate  accommodation  and  
healthcare  services  as  well  as  feeling  discriminated  against’  (Bianchi,  2013,  
p.406).    
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When  it  comes  to  the  potential  consequences  of  student  (dis)satisfaction,  
Santini  et  al.  identify  that  in  the  Brazilian  context,  customers’  (students’)  level  
of  satisfaction  may  impact  on  their  ‘attitude  toward  the  Higher  Education  
Institution’,  their  ‘intention  to  recommend’  the  university  to  others,  their  
current  and  future  ‘involvement’  with  the  institution,  and  their  ‘loyalty,  trust  
and  word-­of-­mouth’  (2017,  p.9).  Ensuring  student  satisfaction  is  not  only  
pivotal  to  student  retention  rates  (Stewart  et  al.,  2018),  but  also  to  the  
recruitment  of  prospective  students  through  positive  word-­of-­mouth  feedback  
from  alumni  (Elliott  and  Healy,  2001;;  Khoo  et  al.,  2017).  Wilkins  et  al.  
describe  the  link  between  student  dissatisfaction,  word  of  mouth  feedback,  
and  future  student  numbers  at  international  branch  campuses  in  the  UAE.  
They  highlight  that  ‘achieving  positive  word  of  mouth  from  current  students  
and  alumni  is  a  vital  element  of  every  institution’s  promotional  mix’  (2012,  
p.544).    
  
Opportunities  for  socialisation  and  the  suitability  of  accommodation  are  
important  factors  influencing  international  students’  level  of  satisfaction  
(Bianchi,  2013).  These  factors  are  also  central  to  the  experience  of  ‘home’  
students,  but  the  effect  on  student  satisfaction  may  be  more  pronounced  for  
students  studying  in  a  foreign  country.  Cultural  differences  in  student  
satisfaction  will  be  discussed  further  in  what  follows,  but  it  is  worth  
highlighting  here  that  factors  influencing  satisfaction  are  found  to  be  
relatively  stable  across  European  countries,  where  ‘contacts  with  fellow  
students’,  ‘course  content  of  major  subject’,  ‘equipment,  and  stocking  of  
libraries’,  and  ‘teaching  quality  and  the  variety  of  courses  offered’  are  the  
primary  drivers  of  student  (dis)satisfaction  (Garcia-­Aracil,  2009,  p.3).    
  
1.3  Measuring  Student  Satisfaction  
1.3.1  UK  Context  
The  most  commonly  used  measure  of  student  satisfaction  in  the  UK  is  the  
National  Student  Survey,  or  NSS.  Consisting  of  27  questions  with  Likert-­type  
responses,  the  NSS  is  used  for  both  institutional  ranking  and  accountability  
purposes.  Administered  to  final-­year  undergraduates  shortly  before  they  
finish  their  studies,  the  NSS  purportedly  gives  students  (consumers)  greater  
power  in  the  marketplace  of  Higher  Education,  whereby  their  feedback  can  
-­  13  -­  
influence  a  university’s  league  table  position  (Wilkins  et  al.,  2012).  Generally  
speaking,  if  students  perceive  that  their  university  has  a  good  reputation  
(and  hence  their  degree  may  have  a  high  marketable  value)  they  will  be  
more  satisfied  with  their  student  experience  (Mainardes  et  al.,  2013;;  
Parahoo  et  al.,  2013;;  Elsharnouby,  2015).  But  if  students  are  dissatisfied,  
and  this  is  expressed  on  measures  such  as  the  NSS,  then  levels  of  
(dis)satisfaction  can  impact  on  the  future  reputation  of  that  university.    
  
The  NSS  is  now  such  a  high-­stakes  measure  that  Higher  Education  
Institutions  (HEIs)  increasingly  seek  to  manage  ‘the  student  experience’  by  
implementing  strategies  to  ensure  ‘value  for  money’  and  student  satisfaction,  
hence  protecting  their  institutional  reputation  and  maintaining  their  
‘competitive  advantage’  in  the  sector  (Wilkins  et  al.,  2012,  p.544;;  Parahoo  et  
al.,  2013;;  Stukalina,  2016;;  Santini  et  al.,  2017).  A  prominent  example  of  such  
marketing  strategies  and  reputational  management  is  the  increasing  use  of  
local  ‘satisfaction’  surveys  developed  by,  and  distributed  in,  individual  
universities;;  one  such  example  is  the  use  of  ‘module  evaluation  
questionnaires’  that  are  given  to  students  after  the  completion  of  each  
element  of  their  degrees  (Simpson  and  Edwards,  2000;;  Martensson  et  al.,  
2014).    
  
1.3.2  US  Context      
The  ‘Student  Satisfaction  Inventory’  (SSI)  is  the  measuring  instrument  
distributed  throughout  the  USA  by  Ruffalo  Noel  Levitz.4  The  Student  
Satisfaction  Inventory  is  arguably  more  comprehensive  than  other  surveys,  
as  it  rates  the  importance  of  items  as  well  as  the  student’s  satisfaction  with  
them;;  this  could  reduce  the  influence  of  what  is  termed  ‘indifference  bias’  
(Yorke,  2009).  Elliott  and  Shin  (2002)  have  found  that  attributes  rated  as  
very  important  include  ‘knowledgeable  faculty’,  ‘tuition  paid  is  a  worthwhile  
                                                                                        
4  Ruffalo  Noel  Levitz  is  a  technology  services,  software,  and  consulting  
company  that  works  in  partnership  with  US  universities  to  manage  
student  enrolment,  provide  retention  analytics  to  support  student  
success,  and  fundraising  efforts  through  alumni  contributions  and  
donors.      
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investment’,  and  ‘intellectual  growth’  –  such  factors  are  also  identified  as  
influencing  student  satisfaction  (Mainardes  et  al.,  2013;;  Elsharnouby,  2015;;  
Santini  et  al.,  2017).    
  
The  SSI  is  not  only  a  measure  of  student  satisfaction  but  it  highlights  which  
aspects  of  the  student  experience  are  most  influential  for  evaluations  of  
service  quality  (and  hence  satisfaction).  That  students  may  be  (dis)satisfied  
with  both  ‘important’  and  ‘unimportant’  aspects  of  their  HE  experience  
means  that  it  remains  unclear  how  these  different  factors  are  combined  to  
form  an  overall  satisfaction  rating  (Elliott  and  Healy,  2001).  Elliott  and  Healy  
advise  HE  quality  managers  that:    
[In   order   to   improve   student   satisfaction   levels]   a   university   should  
determine  the  aspects  of  campus  life  which  students  have  identified  as  
having  a  high  level  of  importance  but  a  low  level  of  satisfaction  (2001,  
p.6).    
  
1.3.3  Australian  Context  
Another  measure  of  student  satisfaction  (vis  a  vis  teaching  quality)  is  the  
Course  Evaluation  Questionnaire  (CEQ),  which  was  first  developed  by  Paul  
Ramsden  in  1991,  and  used  nationally  since  1994  (Baldwin  and  James,  
2000).  The  CEQ  is  similar  in  format  to  the  NSS  in  the  UK,  but  the  
questionnaire  is  given  to  students  after  they  have  graduated.  The  five  scale  
characteristics  of  the  CEQ  are:  ‘good  teaching’,  ‘clear  goals’,  ‘appropriate  
workload’,  ‘appropriate  assessment’,  and  ‘emphasis  on  independence’  
(Ramsden,  1991,  p.134).  Judgements  of  these  characteristics,  and  hence  
teaching  quality,  may  be  influenced  by  students’  learning  approaches;;  for  
those  students  adopting  a  ‘surface’  approach,  this  was  negatively  correlated  
with  teaching  quality  across  all  five  dimensions  (Ramsden,  1991).5  Speaking  
of  both  the  CEQ  and  the  NSS,  Wilkins  et  al.,  have  highlighted  that  ‘although  
                                                                                        
5  A  landmark  study  by  Marton  and  Säljö  (1976,  p.4)  identified  that  students  
may  process  information  in  different  ways,  adopting  either  surface-­
level  or  deep-­level  processing.  The  adoption  of  one  approach  or  
another  will  depend  on  the  intentions  of  the  student,  whether  they  
wish  to  acquire  and  understand  a  body  of  knowledge  for  its  own  sake  
(deep-­level),  or  whether  they  want  to  take  in  information  for  some  
extraneous  end,  such  as  passing  exams  (surface-­level).      
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these  surveys  have  been  (to  an  extent)  popular  with  students,  parents  and  
the  media  (for  example,  to  help  compile  institutional  rankings),  critics  often  
claim  that  these  surveys  do  little  to  improve  the  student  experience  or  quality  
in  Higher  Education  Institutions’  (2012,  p.545).    
  
1.3.4  Methodological  Issues  
As  Yorke  (2009)  points  out,  questionnaires  with  Likert-­type  responses,  such  
as  those  used  to  measure  student  satisfaction,  can  suffer  from  issues  of  
extremeness  in  responding.  Extremeness  in  responding  may  be  influenced  
by  demographic  variables  as  it  ‘tends  to  be  positively  correlated  with  age,  
and  negatively  with  education  level  and  household  income’  (Yorke,  2009,  
p.725).  Likert-­response  scales  may  also  be  impacted  by  ‘acquiescence  bias’  
(Friborg  et  al.,  2006;;  Yorke,  2009),  and  can  be  influenced  by  cultural  factors  
(Flaskerud,  2012).    
  
‘Acquiescence  bias’  occurs  when  a  respondent  answers  all  questions  in  the  
same  way  and  their  responses  are  indiscriminate,  such  as  in  the  case  of  
‘yea-­saying’  (Ipsos  MORI,  2015).  All  of  these  student  satisfaction  measures  
are  at  risk  of  presenting  inaccurate  results  because  of  different  forms  of  bias  
and  are  therefore  of  questionable  validity  and  reliability.  Indeed,  the  NSS  has  
even  been  described  as  a  ‘blunt  tool’  which  allows  only  a  general  picture  of  
satisfaction  to  develop  (Sutcliffe  et  al.,  2014,  p.79).  But  while  these  
measures  are  not  exactly  perfect,  if  indeed  any  survey  instrument  could  be,  
Beecham  argues  that  ‘a  general  picture  is  better  than  no  picture  at  all’  (2009,  
p.137).    
  
This  picture  could  be  altered  and  potentially  disingenuous  though  if  
measures  such  as  the  NSS  are  used  for  other  purposes  than  those  for  which  
they  were  designed;;  this  is  an  ethical  issue  which  is  underpinned  by  the  
opacity  of  the  concept  ‘student  satisfaction’.  As  there  is  still  no  universal  
definition  of  ‘satisfaction’  in  the  current  literature,  measures  of  it  are  often  
equated  with  being  a  measure  of  ‘quality’  (Bay  and  Daniel,  2001;;  Gruber  et  
al.,  2010;;  Pedro  et  al.,  2018),  ‘teaching  effectiveness’  (Blackmore,  2009;;  
Stewart  et  al.,  2018),  or  the  responses  can  be  misunderstood  as  a  sum  
evaluation  of  ‘the  student  experience’  (Bedggood  and  Donovan,  2012;;  
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Elsharnouby,  2015).  While  the  surveys  themselves  can  fall  prey  to  biases  –  
a  kind  of  internal  validity  must  be  guaranteed  –  there  is  also  a  potential  issue  
with  external  validity  here.  As  Lucas  explains,  ‘external  validity  refers  to  the  
generalisation  of  research  findings,  either  from  a  sample  to  a  larger  
population  or  to  settings  and  populations  other  than  those  studied’  (2003,  
p.236).    
  
Measures  such  as  the  NSS  cannot  account  for  demographic  variables,  
cultural  differences,  motivational  style,  and  gender,  therefore  the  extent  to  
which  results  may  be  nationally  and  globally  comparable  –  the  external  
validity  of  such  a  measure  –  is  highly  contestable.  Methodological  issues  
pertain  not  only  to  the  measures  themselves,  but  also  to  the  ways  in  which  
the  results  may  be  utilised  and  disseminated.  It  remains  dubious  whether,  
even  at  a  local  level,  NSS  results  can  be  grouped  together  by  institution  as  
this  would  obscure  potential  disciplinary  differences.    
  
While  universities  do  acknowledge  the  potential  biases  of  student  
satisfaction  measures  they  cannot  afford  to  ignore  the  results  as  they  are  too  
high-­stakes.  Results  from  the  NSS  can  strongly  influence  prospective  
students’  perception  of  an  institution’s  reputation  as  it  is  used  as  a  formal  
indicator  of  ‘quality’  which  is  seen  as  commensurable  between  different  
universities  (Stukalina,  2012;;  Bianchi,  2013;;  Wilkins  and  Balakrishnan,  
2013).  With  universities  increasingly  having  to  compete  for  students,  the  HE  
sector  is  rapidly  becoming  a  ‘buyer’s  market’  which  is  moulded  by  the  wants  
and  needs  of  student-­consumers  (Bay  and  Daniel,  2001;;  Rolfe,  2002;;  
Blackmore,  2009).  In  order  for  a  university  to  maintain  their  ‘competitive  
advantage’  in  the  HE  marketplace,  giving  credence  to  ‘the  student  voice’  
through  satisfaction  measures  is  essential  (Wilkins  et  al.,  2012,  p.544).    
  
1.4  Influence  of  Demographic  Variables  on  Student  
Satisfaction  
1.4.1  Gender  
Drawing  the  different  explanatory  models  of  student  satisfaction  together,  
the  determinants  generally  fit  into  two  categories:  social  and  support  aspects  
of  the  student  experience,  and  academic  dimensions  of  the  student  
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experience,  such  as  teaching  quality  and  the  market  value  of  one’s  degree.  
Bean  and  Vesper  have  found  that  relational  factors  –  ‘contact  with  advisors,  
having  friends,  and  living  on  campus’  –  are  significant  predictors  of  student  
satisfaction  for  females,  but  not  for  males  (1994,  p.1).  Male  student  
satisfaction  seems  to  be  driven  instead  by  career  factors  such  as  their  
‘choice  of  major  and  occupational  certainty’  alongside  familial  influences,  for  
example,  their  father’s  educational  level  (Bean  and  Vesper,  1994,  p.1).    
  
Adding  to  this  debate,  O’Driscoll  has  found  that  for  both  males  and  females  
‘academic  support’  is  a  significant  predictor  of  student  satisfaction,  but  that  
female  students  consider  ‘welfare  support’  as  being  similarly  significant  for  
their  satisfaction  level  (2012,  p.251).  For  males,  ‘academic  support’  had  a  
greater  impact  on  their  satisfaction  than  ‘communication’  (another  factor  
identified  as  significant),  whilst  for  females  ‘welfare  support’  was  more  
influential  than  ‘academic  support’  (O’Driscoll,  2012,  p.251).  While  most  of  
the  current  literature  on  student  satisfaction  focuses  on  final  year  
undergraduate  students,  O’Driscoll’s  study  investigated  the  experiences  of  
first-­year  students  at  a  HE  college  in  Ireland,  so  it  is  worth  highlighting  that  
these  gendered  differences  seem  to  persist  throughout  students’  Higher  
Education.    
  
These  gendered  differences  in  student  satisfaction  have  implications  for  
quality  assurance  and  enhancement  policies,  namely  that  efforts  to  improve  
the  student  experience  should  address  ‘non-­teaching  elements’  such  as  
facilities,  services,  and  social  life  (which  may  be  more  important  for  females  
than  males),  as  well  as  universities’  core  services  of  teaching  and  learning  
(Carter  and  Yeo,  2016,  p.639).  Males  and  females  seem  to  value  the  same  
aspects  of  Higher  Education,  but  judge  their  importance  differently,  so  an  
attention  to  subgroups  of  students  is  necessary,  although  typically  lacking  in  
student  satisfaction  measures.    
  
1.4.2  Internationalisation  and  Mode  of  Study  
Gendered  patterns  of  student  satisfaction  may  also  be  exacerbated  by  
students’  ages  and  country  of  study,  whether  they  are  ‘home’  or  international  
students.  As  Finn  and  Darmody  (2017)  identify,  international  student  
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satisfaction  with  studying  in  Ireland  varies  according  to  gender.  Female  
international  students  tend  to  be  up  to  three  times  more  satisfied  with  their  
studies  and  university  experience  than  their  male  counterparts  but  being  
aged  under  23  was  ‘negatively  associated  with  satisfaction’  (Finn  and  
Darmody,  2017,  p.552).  Thus,  mature  female  international  students  were  
more  likely  to  be  satisfied  than  male  international  students  and  younger  
female  students.  Mode  of  study  (international,  transnational,  or  ‘home’)  can  
also  influence  student  satisfaction.    
  
In  the  case  of  transnational  education,6  often  referred  to  as  ‘offshore  
education’,  student  satisfaction  (with  Higher  Education  provided  by  
Australian  universities)  across  multiple  Asian  countries  such  as  Vietnam,  
Singapore,  and  Malaysia  was  highly  influenced  by  ‘the  instructors’  
communication  skills,  and/or  the  local  instructors’  dedication  to  students  and  
teaching’  (Miliszewska  and  Sztendur,  2012,  pp.12-­16).  Where  a  combination  
of  local  and  Australian  instructors  were  used,  students  rated  the  Australian  
lecturers  as  being  better  and  they  were  more  satisfied  with  their  instruction  
(Miliszewska  and  Sztendur,  2012).    
  
Local  student  recruitment  and  maintaining  high  quality  standards  are  often  
seen  as  being  in  contention  when  it  comes  to  international  branch  
campuses,  but  Wilkins  et  al.  have  found  that  students  are  ‘largely  satisfied’  
across  various  factors  of  the  student  experience,  such  as  ‘programme  
effectiveness,  quality  of  lecturers  and  teaching,  student  learning,  
assessment  and  feedback,  learning  resources,  use  of  technology,  and  
                                                                                        
6  ‘Transnational  education’  can  be  described  as  any  programme  ‘in  which  
the  learners  are  located  in  a  country  different  from  the  one  where  the  
awarding  institution  is  based’;;  this  is  exemplified  in  the  recent  surge  of  
international  branch  campuses  (Miliszewska  and  Sztendur,  2012,  
p.12).  In  the  case  of  transnational  HE,  students  often  study  locally  but  
the  degree  itself  is  from  an  internationally  recognised  university  
located  elsewhere;;  the  US,  Australia  and  the  UK  are  market  leaders  
in  transnational  education  (Miliszewska  and  Sztendur,  2012),  with  
most  international  branch  campuses  established  in  the  UAE  (Wilkins  
et  al.,  2012;;  Wilkins  and  Balakrishnan,  2013).  
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facilities/social  life’  (2012,  p.543).  Across  the  literature,  students  studying  at  
international  branch  campuses  tend  to  be  satisfied  with  similar  factors  to  
students  studying  at  their  home/awarding  institution.  The  only  notable  
difference  is  that  students  at  international  branch  campuses  seem  to  place  
more  emphasis  on  effective  technology  usage  in  their  teaching  and  learning  
(Miliszewska  and  Sztendur,  2012;;  Wilkins  et  al.,  2012;;  Wilkins  and  
Balakrishnan,  2013).    
  
1.4.3  Cultural  Background  
Gender  differences  in  student  satisfaction  may  also  interact  with  cultural  
factors.  Findings  by  Parahoo  et  al.  (2013)  and  Elsharnouby  (2015)  point  to  
gender  differences  in  student  satisfaction:  they  identify  that  female  student  
satisfaction  is  mostly  influenced  by  ‘university  reputation’,  but  for  males  both  
‘reputation’  and  ‘perceived  academic  staff  competence’  are  significant  
predictors  of  satisfaction.  While  one  study  was  based  in  Saudi  Arabia  
(Parahoo  et  al.,  2013)  and  the  other  in  Qatar  (Elsharnouby,  2015),  a  great  
deal  of  the  current  literature  is  based  in  Anglo-­European  and  Asian  contexts,  
so  gender  differences  in  student  satisfaction  here  may  be  confounded  or  
exacerbated  by  cultural  factors.  As  Harvey  et  al.  state  in  reference  to  this:    
The  differences  exhibited  by  the  two  genders  in  learning  environments  
may  be  attributable  to  cultural  differences  masked  by  gender  roles  and  
societal  expectations   [especially   in  paternalistic  societies],  not  actual  
gender  differences  (2017,  p.153).    
  
Many  universities  in  Saudi  Arabia  have  separate  campuses  for  men  and  
women  (Parahoo  et  al.,  2013),  and  in  more  patriarchal  societies  in  the  Gulf  
region,  women  may  still  feel  pressure  to  conform  to  gender  stereotypes,  in  
essence,  that  getting  married  and  having  children  is  more  important  than  a  
university  education  (Harvey  et  al.,  2017).    
  
It  seems  as  if  the  determinants  of  student  satisfaction  are  relatively  stable  
across  different  cultural  contexts,  but  their  order  of  importance  may  differ  
and  gender  can  also  affect  students’  evaluations  of  universities’  service  
provision.  Factors  such  as  gender,  age,  mode  of  study,  ethnicity,  and  
cultural  background  inevitably  shape  student  satisfaction  ratings  in  particular  
ways  such  as:  social  factors  are  more  influential  for  females  than  males  
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(Bean  and  Vesper,  1994);;  mature  international  students  are  more  likely  to  be  
satisfied  than  younger  students  (Finn  and  Darmody,  2017);;  technology  use  
is  more  important  for  student  satisfaction  at  international  branch  campuses  
(Miliszewska  and  Sztendur,  2012;;  Wilkins  et  al.,  2012;;  Wilkins  and  
Balakrishnan,  2013);;  and  cultural  influences  may  mean  that  students  have  
different  instructor/instruction  preferences  (Parahoo  et  al.,  2013;;  
Elsharnouby,  2015;;  Harvey  et  al.,  2017;;  Khoo  et  al.,  2017).    
  
1.5  Satisfaction  and  Service  Quality    
1.5.1  Defining  ‘Service  Quality’  
There  has  been  a  noticeable  shift  since  1997  from  a  focus  on  quality  
‘assurance’  to  quality  ‘enhancement’  (Filippakou  and  Tapper,  2008),  that  is,  
from  assessing  the  quality  of  Higher  Education  provision  to  a  more  active  
approach  that  pre-­emptively  improves  quality  before  it  is  ‘measured’  as  such.  
This  emphasis  on  quality  assurance  and/or  enhancement  is  epitomised  in  
the  recent  surge  in  student  ‘voice’  initiatives,  both  nationally  and  within  
individual  institutions  (Hall,  2016;;  Higdon,  2016;;  Canning,  2017).  In  such  
initiatives,  ‘voice’  is  collected  in  order  to  inform  curricular  development  and  
innovations  –  in  essence,  to  provide  a  measure  of  ‘quality’  –  and  feedback  
may  also  be  utilised  for  staff  development  (Brooman  et  al.,  2015).    
  
As  with  student  satisfaction,  the  term  ‘quality’  is  utilised  widely  throughout  
the  literature  but  a  definitive  understanding  of  the  term  is  lacking.  As  
Zafiropoulos  and  Vrana  (2008,  p.34)  put  it,  ‘not  a  single  workable  definition  
of  quality  is  possible’.  Sahney  et  al.  (2004)  even  argue  that  conceptions  of  
‘quality’  may  be  context-­specific,  can  change  over  time,  and  may  vary  
between  stakeholder  groups.  Due  to  the  opacity  of  the  term  ‘quality’  and  its  
relationship  with  satisfaction  (which  I  will  elaborate  further  below),  measures  
such  as  the  NSS  are  often  taken  as  a  proxy  measure  of  ‘quality’  in  Higher  
Education  (Gruber  et  al.,  2010;;  Sarrico  and  Rosa,  2014;;  Higdon,  2016).  A  
prominent  model  of  service  quality  asserts  that  it  is  the  result  of  an  
evaluation  of  one’s  expectations  as  compared  with  perceptions  (Barnes,  
2007).  If  the  ‘service’  experienced  in  one’s  Higher  Education  is  perceived  as  
being  better  than  initially  expected,  then  this  results  in  satisfaction,  and  vice  
versa.  
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Harvey  and  Knight  identify  that  the  various  conceptualisations  of  ‘quality’  
used  in  the  literature  can  be  drawn  together  into  five  separate,  yet  interlinked  
approaches  to  the  concept;;  these  are  as  follows:  quality  can  be  viewed  as  
‘exceptional’,  as  ‘perfection  or  consistency’,  as  ‘fitness  for  purpose’,  as  ‘value  
for  money’,  and  as  ‘transformative’  (1996,  p.13).  The  ‘meta-­quality  concept’  
that  pervades  all  five  conceptions  is  ‘transformation’,  whereby  the  ‘quality’  of  
one’s  Higher  Education  is  the  extent  to  which  it  changes  the  individual  
student’s  outlook  and  empowers  them  (Harvey  and  Knight,  1996,  p.25).    
In  attempting  to  define  service  quality  in  Higher  Education,  Adina-­Petruta  
has  also  distinguished  between  the  ‘structural-­formal’  and  ‘psychological-­
cultural’  elements  that  make  up  a  shared  ‘quality  culture’  (2014,  p.3808).  
She  defines  ‘quality  culture’  as  follows:    
Quality   culture   includes   values,   beliefs,   attitude,   commitment,  
expectation,  agreement,  capacity,  negotiation,  participation,  unity  and  
trust   of   the   individuals,   groups   and   stakeholders   involved   with   the  
quality  (Adina-­Petruta,  2014,  pp.3807-­3808).    
  
So  a  ‘quality  culture’  not  only  involves  the  processes  and  measures  put  in  
place  to  assure  and  enhance  quality  (the  ‘structural-­formal’  elements),  but  
also  the  sharing  of  beliefs  and  values  (the  ‘psychological-­cultural’  elements)  
related  to  quality  among  those  involved  (Adina-­Petruta,  2014,  p.3808).  This  
highlights  that,  as  with  student  satisfaction,  conceptions  of  ‘quality’  must  
incorporate  more  than  mere  academic  concerns;;  ‘service  quality’  is  greater  
than  the  sum  of  quality  assurance  processes  in  place  at  a  particular  
institution  and  any  attempt  to  reify  the  concept  should  capture  the  ideals  of  
multiple  Higher  Education  stakeholders  engaged  in  a  shared  ‘quality  culture’  
(Adina-­Petruta,  2014,  p.3808).  
  
Student  satisfaction  and  service  quality,  as  I  will  discuss  further  below,  are  
inextricably  linked.  Both  satisfaction  and  service  quality  are  measures  of  
consumer  behaviour  and  these  evaluations  influence  students’  ‘favourable  
behavioural  intentions’  following  a  service  encounter,  for  example,  word  of  
mouth  feedback  to  others  (Khoo  et  al.,  2017,  p.430;;  Santini  et  al.,  2017).  
Parasuraman  et  al.  differentiate  ‘satisfaction’  from  ‘quality’  in  terms  of  the  
timing  of  service  encounters,  as  they  write:    
Consistent  with   the  distinction  between  attitude  and  satisfaction,   is  a  
distinction  between  service  quality  and  satisfaction:  perceived  service  
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quality  is  a  global  judgement,  or  attitude,  relating  to  the  superiority  of  
the   service,   whereas   satisfaction   is   related   to   a   specific   transaction  
(1988,  p.16).    
  
Judgements  of  ‘quality’  according  to  this  definition  are  cumulative  for  the  
student  experience  as  a  whole,  whereas  satisfaction  may  be  confined  to  
particular  ‘service  encounters’  (Elsharnouby,  2015,  p.243).    
  
Across  the  literature,  the  most  commonly  used  definition  of  ‘service  quality’  
is  that  of  the  ‘gap’  between  expectations  (of  service  quality)  and  perceptions  
(of  actual  service  quality  received)  which  aligns  with  the  expectancy  
disconfirmation  paradigm  of  student  (dis)satisfaction  (Alves  and  Raposo,  
2009;;  Stukalina,  2012;;  Parahoo  et  al.,  2013;;  Khoo  et  al.,  2017).  The  basic  
premise  is  that  meeting  and/or  exceeding  student  expectations  will  result  in  
higher  perceived  service  quality  and  greater  likelihood  of  satisfaction  with  the  
service  provision.  But  ‘quality’  is  a  multi-­faceted  concept  which  can  be  
difficult  to  tie  down.  Thus,  attempts  to  define  the  term  may  be  most  
successful  when  it  is  contextualised  in  relation  to  Higher  Education,  and  
when  operationalised  definitions  from  reliable  measurement  tools  are  used.    
  
1.5.2  Measuring  ‘Quality’  in  Higher  Education  
Measures  of  student  satisfaction  and/or  ‘service  quality’  are  increasingly  
high-­stakes;;  as  Stensaker  and  Harvey  put  it,  ‘quality  assurance  indeed  has  
become  the  core  global  accountability  instrument  in  Higher  Education’  
(2013,  p.33).  Linked  to  the  increase  in  tuition  fees  and  a  focus  on  providing  
‘value  for  money’  for  students  (Rolfe,  2002;;  Finney  and  Finney,  2010;;  
Sarrico  and  Rosa,  2014),  Higher  Education  Institutions  are  now  not  only  held  
accountable  for  assuring,  but  also  for  actively  enhancing,  quality.  Attempts  to  
define  what  is  meant  by  ‘service  quality’  in  the  HE  sector  have  been  made  
through  the  development  and  adaptation  of  the  ‘SERVQUAL’  framework  
(Parasuraman  et  al.,  1988;;  Barnes,  2007;;  Zafiropoulos  and  Vrana,  2008).    
The  SERVQUAL  framework  was  initially  developed  by  Parasuraman  and  
colleagues  in  1988  as  a  measure  of  consumer  perceptions  of  service  quality.  
The  measure  was  not  used  in  reference  to  the  HE  sector  until  recently,  while  
the  notion  of  ‘service  quality’  was  not  directly  considered  in  relation  to  Higher  
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Education  until  1995.7  Despite  being  developed  in  the  US  (with  particular  
contextual  influences)  for  more  general  consumer  environments  such  as  
retail  (with  particular  ‘consumers’  in  mind),  the  reliability  and  validity  of  the  
framework  has  been  evidenced  for  the  Higher  Education  context  specifically  
(Barnes,  2007;;  Khoo  et  al.,  2017).    
  
The  SERVQUAL  framework  is  made  up  of  five  dimensions:  tangibles  (such  
as  ‘physical  facilities,  equipment,  and  appearance  of  personnel’),  reliability  
(‘the  ability  to  perform  the  promised  service  dependably  and  accurately’),  
responsiveness  (a  ‘willingness  to  help  customers  and  provide  prompt  
service’),  assurance  (‘knowledge  and  courtesy  of  employees,  and  their  
ability  to  inspire  trust  and  confidence’),  and  empathy  (‘caring,  individualised  
attention  the  firm  provides  its  customers’)  (Parasuraman  et  al.,  1988,  p.23).    
  
Use  of  the  SERVQUAL  framework  across  the  HE  sector  is  another  
illustration  of  the  move  to  considering  students  as  ‘customers’  or  
‘consumers’  like  those  in  retail  environments.  Much  current  literature  draws  
on  this  particular  measurement  tool,  yet  it  is  acknowledged  that  definitions  of  
‘service  quality’  are  still  problematic.  As  discussed  above,  the  dominance  of  
student  satisfaction  in  the  HE  sector  is  cognisant  of  a  broader  move  to  raise  
‘quality’  and  to  put  students  ‘at  the  heart  of  the  system’  (BIS,  2011,  p.1).  
Quality  assurance  and  enhancement  seem  to  go  hand  in  hand  with  student  
satisfaction  as  both  are  representative  of  the  increasing  marketisation  of  
Higher  Education  (Gruber  et  al.,  2010;;  Khoo  et  al.,  2017;;  Santini  et  al.,  
2017).    
  
There  are  several  regulatory  bodies  which  act  as  gatekeepers  of  ‘quality’  in  
Higher  Education,  such  as  the  Quality  Assurance  Agency  (QAA)  and  Office  
for  Standards  in  Education,  Children’s  Services  and  Skills  (OFSTED)  for  
                                                                                        
7  For  more  information  on  this  shift,  see,  for  example:  Hill,  F.  1995.  
Managing  Service  Quality  in  Higher  Education:  The  Role  of  the  
Student  as  Primary  Consumer.  Quality  Assurance  in  Education.  3(3),  
pp.10-­21.  
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teacher  training  programmes  situated  in  universities.  The  newly  formed  
Office  for  Students  (OfS)  and  UK  Research  and  Innovation  (UKRI)  will  also  
be  involved  in  assuring  the  ‘quality’  of  Higher  Education  service  provision  for  
students  (to  be  evaluated  in  the  TEF)  and  the  quality  of  research  outputs  
(measured  in  the  Research  Excellence  Framework,  or  REF).  The  QAA  is  
arguably  the  most  prolific  agency  for  maintaining  standards  and  ensuring  
quality  across  the  UK  HE  sector.    
  
Whether  universities  and  their  courses  are  judged  to  be  of  an  acceptable  
standard  by  the  QAA  will  impact  upon  their  degree  awarding  powers,  future  
funding  from  HEFCE  and  other  research  councils,  and  their  ability  to  recruit  
students  whose  Higher  Education  is  essentially  funded  by  the  taxpayer  (as  
mediated  by  the  Student  Loans  Company).8  The  QAA  was  established  in  
1997  shortly  before  tuition  fees  at  universities  were  first  introduced,  so  the  
need  to  assure  the  ‘quality’  of  HE  service  provision  is  clearly  linked  to  the  
marketisation  of  the  sector,  although  it  preceded  the  recent  
conceptualisation  of  the  student-­consumer.  While  ‘quality’  can  be  measured  
and  is  typically  positively  correlated  with  student  satisfaction,  what  is  meant  
by  these  terms  still  needs  clarification.    
  
The  partnership  between  the  OfS  and  QAA  was  formalised  in  July  2018,  with  
the  QAA  obligated  to  report  to  the  OfS  on  the  quality  of  each  Higher  
Education  Institution  seeking  to  be  registered  with  them  as  well  as  providing  
ongoing  reports  of  quality.  Only  institutions  which  are  judged  to  be  of  a  good  
quality  will  be  registered  with  the  OfS  and  eligible  for  public  research  
funding.  The  OfS’s  regulatory  framework  is  based  on  a  series  of  principles  
rather  than  strict  guidelines  for  judging  whether  Higher  Education  providers  
are  meeting  student  needs  appropriately;;  these  principles  are:  ‘a  student  
                                                                                        
8  This  judgement  is  subject  to  the  QAA’s  ‘Quality  Code’  which  sets  out  
‘qualifications  frameworks’  and  ‘subject  benchmark  statements’,  
identifying  what  skills  students  need  to  demonstrate  in  order  to  gain  a  
particular  qualification  and  what  standards  are  expected  of  each  
subject  discipline.  For  more  details,  see  The  QAA  Quality  Code.  
[Online].  [Accessed  05  April  2018].  Available  from:  
http://www.qaa.ac.uk/en/AssuringStandardsAndQuality/Pages/The-­
Quality-­Code.aspx.  
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focus’  which  should  protect  students’  interests;;  ‘clarity’  of  HE  sector  
regulation;;  ‘accountability’  of  both  Higher  Education  Institutions  and  the  OfS;;  
‘consistency’  of  provision  across  the  UK;;  ‘proportionality  and  targeting’  of  
regulatory  efforts  to  high-­  rather  than  low-­risk  provision,  and;;  ‘competition’  to  
encourage  innovation,  diversity,  and  greater  student  choice  (OfS,  2018,  
p.14).      
  
The  QAA’s  Code  of  Practice  sets  out  what  is  expected  of  providers  in  
delivering  a  high-­quality  Higher  Education,  it  describes  common  practices  
that  universities  should  implement  if  they  are  to  ensure  quality  provision,  and  
it  offers  advice  and  guidance  in  these  areas.  But  in  all  of  this,  a  definition  of  
‘quality’  is  lacking;;  it  is  almost  taken  as  a  given  that  quality  can  be  measured  
and  compared  between  different  institutions  operating  in  very  different  
contexts.  But  since  the  UK  HE  sector  is  increasingly  heterogeneous,  
measures  of  student  satisfaction  and  service  quality  cannot  easily  account  
for  this  diversity.    
  
1.5.3  Relationship  between  Student  Satisfaction  and  Service  
Quality  
Measures  of  student  satisfaction  are  often  seen  as  synonymous  with  
measures  of  ‘service  quality’;;  these  two  concepts  are  difficult  to  separate  out  
and  define,  and  it  remains  unclear  how  these  discourses  are  interlinked  in  
predicting  consumer  behaviour.  The  variety  of  explanatory  models  of  student  
satisfaction  referred  to  above  include  quality  factors  –  such  as  ‘quality  of  
instruction’  (Elliott  and  Shin,  2002,  p.207),  ‘academic  experience  and  faculty  
quality’  (Carter  and  Yeo,  2016,  p.639),  and  ‘service  quality  of  electronic  
communications’  (Parahoo  et  al.,  2013,  p.149)  –  as  determinants  of  
satisfaction.  Santini  et  al.  also  identify  ‘service  quality  perception’  as  being  
an  antecedent  of  student  satisfaction  (2017,  p.4).  This  link  is  bolstered  by  
Pedro  et  al.  (2018)  who  have  found  that  while  ‘perceived  quality’  is  positively  
related  to  student  satisfaction,  the  level  of  satisfaction  can  vary  according  to  
which  teaching  approaches  or  methods  were  used.    
  
Service  quality  and  customer  (student)  satisfaction  are  often  positively  
correlated  (Khoo  et  al.,  2017);;  what  makes  students  satisfied  is  receiving  
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high  quality  service  provision,  and  if  students  are  satisfied  they  may  evaluate  
service  quality  more  positively.  What  is  still  being  debated  in  the  literature  is  
whether  service  quality  is  a  constituent  factor  of  ‘satisfaction’  or  whether  
(dis)satisfaction  is  a  dimension  of  service  quality.  While  the  recent  use  of  
student  satisfaction  data  as  a  proxy  measure  of  ‘teaching  excellence’  in  the  
TEF  sparked  controversy,  Gunn  acknowledges  that  while  ‘student  
satisfaction  is  clearly  not  the  same  as  teaching  quality…it  would  be  
erroneous  to  assume  they  are  not  related;;  student  satisfaction  is  more  likely  
to  follow  an  excellent  teaching  experience,  than  a  poor  one’  (2018,  p.138).    
  
Evaluations  of  service  quality  and/or  satisfaction  with  a  particular  service,  in  
this  case  Higher  Education,  can  influence  post-­purchase  ‘favourable  
behavioural  intentions’,  such  as  word  of  mouth  and  repeat  purchasing  from  
that  provider  (Khoo  et  al.,  2017,  p.430).  Whether  customers  stay  loyal  to  any  
particular  company,  or  university,  is  determined  by  service  quality  and  this  
relationship  is  mediated  by  satisfaction  (Finney  and  Finney,  2010;;  Stukalina,  
2012;;  Khoo  et  al.,  2017,  Santini  et  al.,  2017).  As  the  Higher  Education  
marketplace  is  increasingly  competitive,  maintaining  student-­consumer  
loyalty  is  of  central  importance,  hence  quality  assurance  and  enhancement  
policies  are  being  targeted  towards  raising  both  student  satisfaction  ratings  
and  students’  perceptions  of  service  quality  (by  improving  service  provision  
itself).    
  
Quality  assurance  and  enhancement  are  processes  of  continuous  
improvement  in  Higher  Education;;  student  feedback  is  collected,  institutional  
policies  are  audited,  and  this  enables  management  strategies  to  be  put  in  
place  to  enhance  provision  and/or  increase  student  satisfaction.  The  
European  Association  for  Quality  Assurance  in  Higher  Education  (ENQA,  
2015)  –  which  works  in  association  with  the  QAA  –  highlight  that  quality  
assurance  is  central  to  a  mutually  trusting  relationship  between  universities  
and  their  numerous  stakeholders.  Whether  students  trust  their  institution  
influences  their  commitment  to  it  (Schlesinger  et  al.,  2017),  and  this  impacts  
on  the  likelihood  of  ‘repeat  purchase’  (returning  to  that  university  for  further  
qualifications),  their  involvement  as  alumni,  and  word  of  mouth  feedback  
(Khoo  et  al.,  2017;;  Santini  et  al.,  2017).  As  Chen  describes:  
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Brand  association  [which  is  influenced  by  measures  of  quality]  has  a  
direct   influence   on   student   trust,   commitment,   and   satisfaction   in  
Higher  Education  Institutions.  Student  trust  and  commitment  also  have  
a  direct   influence  on  student  satisfaction,  and   they  are  all  mediating  
variables  (2017,  p.982).  
  
Stukalina  describes  the  link  between  quality  assurance  and  satisfaction  as  
follows,  ‘quality  function  deployment’,  that  is,  attempts  to  assure  and  
enhance  quality  can  be  used  as  a  strategy  to  ‘attain  customer  satisfaction’  
(2012,  p.90).  The  current  emphasis  placed  on  attaining  student  satisfaction  
and  positive  perceptions  of  service  quality  cannot  be  detached  from  the  
increasing  adoption  of  the  ‘student-­as-­customer’  concept  throughout  the  HE  
sector  (Watjatrakul,  2014,  p.686;;  Bay  and  Daniel,  2001;;  Blackmore,  2009).  
But  the  application  of  marketing  principles  to  Higher  Education  may  not  be  
as  straightforward  as  initially  envisaged;;  the  idea  that  increasing  competition  
between  service  providers  raises  quality  may  not  apply  to  all  Higher  
Education  Institutions  nor  to  the  student  experience  as  a  whole.  Student  
satisfaction  measures  are  used  to  develop  institutional  quality  assurance  
and  enhancement  processes;;  utilising  student  feedback  to  ensure  a  higher  
quality  of  service  provision  will  impact  on  league  table  position  and  
institutional  reputation.  As  Stukalina  notes:    
Students’   evaluation   of   the   educational   services   (that   is   consumer-­
oriented  assessment)  can  be  regarded  as  one  of  the  most  significant  
educational   management   tools   used   for   stimulating   quality  
enhancement  in  a  university  (2014,  p.127).    
  
While  ‘service  quality’  is  considered  to  be  a  global  evaluation  of  service  
provision  –  in  contrast  to  one’s  ‘satisfaction’  with  specific  transactions  –  the  
concept  is  multi-­faceted  (Parasuraman  et  al.,  1988;;  Clemes  et  al.,  2007)  and  
there  may  be  a  tension  between  raising  service  quality  and  degrading  
teaching  quality  (Watjatrakul,  2014).  The  link  between  satisfaction  and  
service  quality  is  influenced  by  the  teaching  approach  used;;  moving  away  
from  traditional  didactic  teaching,  for  example  in  the  use  of  problem-­based  
learning,  exerts  a  greater  effect  on  both  perceived  quality  and  satisfaction  
(Pedro  et  al.,  2018).  Attempts  to  enhance  service  quality  may  thus  need  to  
be  targeted  towards  different  areas  of  provision  in  order  to  increase  student  
satisfaction.    
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In  Part  II  of  the  thesis,  I  will  explore  further  whether  measures  of  service  
quality  are  suitable  and  justified  in  relation  to  the  student  experience,  and  if  
so,  whether  this  is  confined  to  particular  aspects  of  Higher  Education  
provision.  It  is  assumed  that  students  could  evaluate  the  quality  of  their  
degrees  in  the  same  way  as  they  might  review  a  hotel  stay  on  Trip  Advisor.  
Such  a  comparison  may  have  once  seemed  nonsensical,  yet  the  creation  of  
a  ‘MoneySuperMarket’  style  comparison  website  for  the  HE  sector  was  
recently  proposed  in  2018  by  the  then  Universities’  Minister,  Sam  Gyimah  
(Busby,  2018b).9      
  
1.6  Limitations  of  the  Current  Literature  
The  current  literature  highlights  that  students’  evaluation  of  their  satisfaction  
with  Higher  Education  is  holistic,  taking  into  account  the  ‘integrated  
educational  environment’  (Stukalina,  2012,  p.92)  which  is  made  up  of  both  
‘teaching’  and  ‘non-­teaching’  elements  (Carter  and  Yeo,  2016,  p.639).  While  
student  satisfaction  ratings  are  an  overall  evaluation  of  service  quality,  
students’  perceptions  may  still  be  influenced  by  their  most  recent  
experiences  and/or  particularly  significant  interactions  (both  good  and  bad),  
as  well  as  by  social  and  emotional  factors  (Baldwin  and  James,  2000;;  
Bedggood  and  Donovan,  2012;;  Vuori,  2013;;  Sarrico  and  Rosa,  2014).  
Students  receiving  the  same  service  from  a  university  may  also  perceive  it  
differently  due  to  the  influence  of  multiple  demographic  variables  noted  
above.  Whether  students  develop  ‘strong’,  ‘weak’,  or  ‘no  ties’  to  their  
university  is  related  to  their  age  and  gender,  and  the  formation  of  one’s  
student  identity  in  these  terms  subsequently  impacts  on  their  ‘attitudinal  
loyalty’  to  an  institution  and  alumni  contributions  (Koenig-­Lewis  et  al.,  2015,  
p.63).  
  
While  this  literature  is  extremely  useful  for  conceptualising  and  measuring  
student  satisfaction  in  the  HE  sector,  it  does  have  a  tendency  to  crowd  out  
other  ways  of  thinking  about,  and  researching,  these  marketised  discourses.  
                                                                                        
9  Sam  Gyimah  was  replaced  as  the  Minister  of  State  for  Universities,  
Science,  Research  and  Innovation  by  Chris  Skidmore  on  5th  
December  2018.    
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Student  satisfaction  measures  exemplify  the  current  focus  that  stakeholders  
have  on  what  is  easily  calculable  and  measurable,  but  this  focus  also  
extends  to  educational  research  more  broadly.  The  use  of  randomised  
controlled  trials,  or  RCTs,  has  acquired  a  sort  of  mythical  status  in  
educational  research,  responsible  for  generating  ‘evidence-­based’  policy  and  
practice  as  policy-­makers  are  increasingly  enthralled  by  ‘what  works’  
research  (Bridges  et  al.,  2008,  p.5).  The  ‘virtue’  of  this  method  is  seemingly  
that  RCTs  ‘have  the  potential  to  operate  at  the  same  level  of  scientific  rigour  
as  RCTs  in  medicine  or  agriculture’  (Davis,  2012,  p.568).  So  the  search  for  
empirical  evidence  is  often  reduced  to  scientism.    
  
Under  increased  accountability  pressures,  policy-­makers  want  researchers  
to  evidence  their  impact,  and  this  is  easily  captured  in  the  development  and  
testing  of  educational  interventions  targeted  towards  figuring  out  ‘what  
works’  (Biesta,  2007;;  2010;;  Smith,  2008).  This  sort  of  research  is  often  given  
greater  credence  as  statistical  analysis  certifies  it  as  ‘robust,  reliable,  and  
replicable’  (Smith,  2008,  p.191).  What  such  a  dominant  research  paradigm  
misses  out  though,  in  its  quest  for  generalisability  and  applicability,  are  the  
human  and  relational  aspects  of  education.  As  Biesta  writes,  ‘the  uptake  of  
the  idea  of  evidence-­based  practice  in  education…threatens  to  replace  
professional  judgement  and  wider  democratic  deliberation’,  which  is  aptly  
termed  the  ‘democratic  deficit’  (2010,  p.492).  In  Chapter  Two,  I  will  explain  
further  how  the  ‘method’  and  approach  used  in  this  thesis  differs  from  such  
evidence-­based,  ‘what  works’  research.  This  is  not  to  say  that  the  research  
presented  here  is  not  evidence-­based,  but  rather  that  the  ‘evidence’  
presented  here  is  a  result  of  sustained  thinking  and  critical  engagement  with  
philosophical  and  literary  sources,  as  well  as  media  such  as  film.  
  
I  find  that  there  are  three  central  issues  with  the  current  literature  on  student  
satisfaction.  First,  that  the  collection  of  student  ‘voice’  is  seen  in  much  
scholarship  as  a  means  to  an  end  (Seale  et  al.,  2015).  Second,  the  literature  
supports  the  notion  that  the  expectations  of  ‘student-­consumers’  must  be  
met  (Mainardes  et  al.,  2013;;  Khoo  et  al.,  2017),  thus  providing  students  with  
what  I  want  to  refer  to  as  a  kind  of  settlement.  Third,  the  literature  accepts  
that  academic-­student  relationships  are  increasingly  contractualised  
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(Blackmore,  2009)  and  this  discourse  of  marketised  interactions  is  rarely  
questioned.    
  
These  three  concerns  also  sit  within  a  broader,  overarching  limitation  that  I  
have  found  in  the  current  literature,  namely  that  student  satisfaction  is  
generally  taken  as  a  given  and  is  accepted  as  being  something  that  
universities  must  work  towards.  It  is  in  questioning  what  is  often  taken  as  
‘unquestionable’  –  the  legitimacy  and  pertinence  of  measuring  and  ensuring  
student  satisfaction  –  that  this  thesis  adds  to  the  current  literature.  These  
three  limitations  will  form  the  basis  of  Chapters  Three  to  Five  in  Part  II  of  the  
thesis,  but  at  this  point,  I  will  simply  outline  how  such  pertinent  questions  
remain  unaddressed  in  the  current  literature.  This  provides  the  basis  for  the  
methodological  approach  that  I  take  in  this  thesis,  which  I  will  elucidate  
further  in  the  next  chapter.    
  
1.6.1  Student  ‘Voice’  
As  ‘student  satisfaction’  is  a  relatively  opaque  concept  which  is  difficult  to  
define,  researchers  often  align  it  with  the  collection  of  feedback  via  surveys  
such  as  the  NSS.  Attempts  have  been  made  to  enhance  the  validity  and  
reliability  of  such  measurement  tools,  but  empirical  research  typically  
refrains  from  questioning  the  usefulness  of  measuring  satisfaction  in  the  first  
place.  Where  student  ‘voice’  is  discussed,  this  is  generally  confined  to  
considerations  of  quality  assurance  and  enhancement  as  outlined  above  
(Hall,  2016;;  Higdon,  2016;;  Canning,  2017).  The  eliciting  of  student  feedback  
or  ‘voice’  is  considered  as  a  strategic  imperative  for  managing  a  university’s  
reputation;;  this  feedback  goes  into  league  tables  which  are  central  to  the  
decision-­making  of  prospective  students  (Naidoo  and  Jamieson,  2005;;  
Stukalina,  2012).    
  
Measures  of  student  satisfaction  and/or  ‘voice’  contribute  to  both  institutional  
and  national  accountability  mechanisms,  whereby  student  voice  is  seen  as  
little  more  than  a  tick-­box  exercise  (Carey,  2013;;  Brooman  et  al.,  2015).  
Student  ‘voice’  is  seen  as  synonymous  and  interchangeable  with  the  
feedback  provided  in  Likert-­type  response  scales  on  satisfaction  surveys.  As  
Sabri  writes  of  the  problems  associated  with  collecting  student  ‘voice’  and/or  
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measuring  the  ‘student  experience’,  she  states  that  ‘“the  student  experience”  
homogenises  students  and  deprives  them  of  agency  at  the  same  time  as  
apparently  giving  them  “voice”’  (2011,  p.657).    
  
The  collection  of  student  feedback,  when  considered  simply  as  a  means  of  
ensuring  ‘value  for  money’,  and  contributing  to  accountability  and  quality  
assurance  procedures,  reinforces  the  ‘consumerisation’  of  students  (Rolfe,  
2002;;  Canning,  2017).  Students  are  increasingly  positioned  as  ‘customers’  
or  ‘consumers’  of  services  provided  by  universities,  so  responding  to  surveys  
evaluating  this  ‘service  provision’  can  be  seen  as  the  end-­point  of  the  
marketised  feedback  loop  of  Higher  Education  (Bay  and  Daniel,  2001;;  Mark,  
2013;;  Vuori,  2013).  The  lines  between  a  retail  consumer  environment  and  
that  of  HE  service  provision  are  becoming  progressively  blurred,  and  student  
‘voice’  is  limited  in  scope  as  a  result.      
  
1.6.2  Meeting  Student  Expectations  
Across  the  current  literature,  researchers  have  sought  to  define  and  
measure  student  satisfaction  as  a  way  of  determining  how  to  further  
increase  satisfaction  levels.  Student  satisfaction  is  commonly  understood  as  
the  sum  evaluation  of  one’s  expectations  and  perceptions,  whether  this  is  
related  to  specific  aspects  of  the  student  experience  or  the  educational  
environment  as  a  whole  (Stukalina,  2012;;  Elsharnouby,  2015;;  Khoo  et  al.,  
2017).  The  implication  is  that  universities  are  increasingly  held  accountable  
–  through  such  measures  as  the  NSS  –  for  meeting  student  expectations  
and  satisfying  students’  needs  by  enhancing  the  quality  of  service  provision  
and/or  enriching  ‘the  student  experience’  (Yorke,  2000;;  Staddon  and  
Standish,  2012;;  Jordan  et  al.,  2018).  Reflective  of  this,  talk  of  ‘managing’  the  
student  experience  is  common  in  the  empirical  literature  (Temple  et  al.,  
2016,  p.33).    
  
I  am  not  arguing  here  that  meeting  student  expectations  –  in  essence,  
settling  students  down  –  should  be  unimportant  to  educators  and  policy-­
makers  in  Higher  Education,  but  rather  that  this  should  not  be  accepted  
unquestioningly.  The  imperative  to  satisfy  students  should  be  balanced  
against  other  central  functions  of  Higher  Education,  such  as  the  
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development  of  responsible  citizens,  and  a  commitment  to  the  self-­
cultivation  and  transformation  of  students.  Such  a  critical  stance  towards  
student  satisfaction  discourses  is  what  is  seemingly  left  out  of  the  current  
literature.10  There  is  some  existing  philosophical  literature  that  is  critical  of  
the  student  satisfaction  agenda;;  the  emphasis  on  providing  a  certain  kind  of  
‘student  experience’;;  and  student  voice  initiatives  (Ramaekers,  2010;;  
Staddon  and  Standish,  2012;;  Standish,  2005;;  Fulford,  2009;;  2013;;  2017).  
However,  the  originality  of  this  thesis  lies  in  its  holistic  exploration  of  
satisfaction.    
  
1.6.3  Academic-­Student  Relationships  
Further  unquestioned  assumptions  –  such  as  the  idea  that  the  collection  of  
student  ‘voice’  and  measurement  of  ‘satisfaction’  are  valuable  endeavours  –  
also  arise  in  the  current,  mainly  empirical,  literature  when  it  comes  to  
considerations  of  academic-­student  relationships.  Here  again,  models  of  
consumer  behaviour  are  applied  to  students  and  to  university-­student  
relationships.  The  literature  draws  attention  to  the  importance  of  maintaining  
positive  and  productive  academic-­student  interactions  as  a  way  of  ensuring  
student-­consumer  loyalty  and  an  institution’s  competitive  edge  in  the  Higher  
Education  marketplace  (Naidoo  and  Jamieson,  2005;;  Yeo,  2008;;  Stukalina,  
2016).  Thus,  the  creation  of  fruitful  relationships  in  the  HE  sector  can  be  
seen  as  little  more  than  a  strategic  management  technique  (Bay  and  Daniel,  
2001;;  Stukalina,  2012).    
  
Aligned  with  the  increasing  marketisation  and  contractualisation  of  
academic-­student  relationships,  the  ‘Customer  Relationship  Management’  
(CRM)  approach  to  quality  assurance  and  enhancement  is  focused  on  
universities  becoming  more  explicitly  ‘customer-­oriented’  (Stukalina,  2012,  
p.95).  The  current  literature  seems  to  almost  accept  it  as  a  given  that  
                                                                                        
10  Where  I  refer  to  student  satisfaction  and  its  associated  ‘discourses’  in  this  
thesis,  it  is  important  to  highlight  that  my  ‘method’  is  not  a  form  of  
discourse  analysis.  Rather,  my  use  of  the  term  ‘discourse’  is  aligned  
with  Johansen  et  al.’s  definition,  that  ‘discourse  mean[s]  language  as  
a  social  practice,  conditioned  by  existing  social  structures,  such  that  
the  text,  whether  spoken,  written,  or  otherwise  presented,  is  relative  
to  and  formed  by  social  practices’  (2017,  p.265).  
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academic-­student,  and  HEI-­student,  relationships  are  something  to  be  
‘managed’  as  a  means  to  an  (economically  beneficial)  end.  But  as  I  will  
discuss  later  in  the  thesis,  the  infiltration  of  market  principles  into  
pedagogical  relationships  turns  them  into  mere  service  provider-­consumer  
interactions,  thus  debasing  these  relationships  and  removing  something  
distinctive  of  Higher  Education  itself.        
  
In  Part  II  of  the  thesis,  I  will  discuss  three  different  iterations  of  student  
satisfaction  –  voice,  settlement,  and  customer  relations.  These  concepts  are  
distinct  but  are  intricately  woven  together,  as  voice  and  settlement  could  also  
be  situated  within  the  more  expansive  notion  of  ‘customer  relations’.  
Initiatives  aiming  to  capture  the  student  voice  and  satisfy  students  are  often  
motivated  by  principles  of  the  market,  essentially  that  happy  ‘customers’  
(students)  will  positively  influence  institutional  reputation  and  income,  both  
directly  and  indirectly.  In  the  following  chapter,  I  will  explain  how  the  
methodological  approach  adopted  in  this  thesis  deals  with  these  issues,  
chiefly  by  offering  an  analysis  of  student  satisfaction  that  goes  above  and  
beyond  the  current  emphases  placed  on  marketisation  and  quality  
assurance.  What  this  thesis  will  offer  in  conducting  such  an  analysis  is  an  
opening  out  and  reframing  of  the  concept  ‘student  satisfaction’,  in  turn  
demarcating  a  way  forward  for  thinking  about  Higher  Education  in  more  than  
economic  terms.  I  will  also  suggest  ways  in  which  we  may  all  live  and  work  
productively  in  the  sector  despite  current  policy  constraints.      






Claire,  Undergraduate  student  (education  and  psychology)  
  
Richard,  Professor  of  Education  (specialising  in  philosophy  of  education)  




Richard  is  in  his  office,  reading  in  his  armchair.  A  desk  is  strewn  with  papers.  
Behind  this,  there  are  several  bookcases  filled  with  works  of  philosophy.  
From  the  window,  Durham  Cathedral  is  clearly  visible  on  the  horizon.  A  
summer’s  day.  There  is  a  knock  at  the  door.  Claire  enters.  
  
  
Claire:  Hi,  are  you  alright?    
  
Richard:  Yes,  hello.  [Claire  and  Richard  shake  hands,  she  sits  down  in  a  
chair  next  to  him.]  
  
Claire:  I  just  wanted  to  ask  you  something.  You  know  that  I  love  education,  
and  I’ve  decided  that  I  would  like  to  be  an  academic.  Well,  I  was  
wondering  if  I  could  help  out  with  your  research  over  the  summer,  like  
a  placement  sort  of  thing.  
  
Richard:  Erm,  sorry,  I  don’t  quite  know  what  you  mean…  
  
Claire:  Well,  I’ve  been  helping  one  of  my  psychology  lecturers  to  do  his  
research.  You  know,  finding  the  participants,  running  the  experiment  
with  them,  and  debriefing  them  afterwards.  I  just  wondered  if  I  could  
help  out  with  your  research  in  some  way  to  get  experience  of  it?  
[opening  her  notebook,  pen  in  hand].  
  
Richard:  Hmm,  well  you  know  I  don’t  do  experiments…how  do  you  think  you  
could  assist  with  my  research?  
  
Claire:  I  don’t  know  really…I  don’t  know  a  lot  about  what  philosophers  of  
education  do,  so  I’d  like  to  find  out.  Could  I  do  some  work  experience  
with  you  over  the  summer?  
  
Richard:  Well…erm  no,  I  don’t  see  how  you  could.  Research  in  philosophy  
doesn’t  work  in  the  same  way  as  psychology.  You  couldn’t  really  
assist  my  research  as  it  involves  me  sitting  at  a  desk  and  reading…  
  
Claire:  Oh,  right.    
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Richard:  [smiling].  I  mean,  you  could  get  books  down  off  the  shelf  for  me  as  I  
write…  
  
Claire:  Well,  I  know  your  ‘method’  in  philosophy  of  education  isn’t  the  same  
as  the  experiments  we  do  in  psychology,  but  I  just  thought  there  might  
be  some  way  for  me  to  see  what  it’s  like  before  I  commit  to  it.  To  test  
it  out,  if  you  know  what  I  mean…  
  
Richard:  Frankly,  I’m  still  testing  out  what  philosophy  of  education  is.  There’s  
not  a  particular  method,  or  set  of  methods  to  choose  from  in  quite  the  
same  way  as  the  sciences.    
  
Claire:  Oh,  right.  So  I  won’t  know  if  philosophy  of  education  is  the  right  thing  
for  me  until  I  do  it  myself…  [she  looks  away].  
  
Richard:  That’s  often  the  case  with  philosophy.  But  I  have  noticed  you  ask  
some  very  thoughtful  questions  in  the  lectures…have  you  considered  
what  you  might  do  for  your  dissertation  yet?  I  know  it’s  early,  but  it’s  
good  to  think  about  it  over  the  summer.    
  
Claire:  Well,  I  know  what  I’m  doing  for  my  psychology  project  anyway,  it’s  
experiments  with  mice,  similar  to  conditioning.  But  the  education  
dissertation,  erm,  I  don’t  know  yet…but  I  enjoyed  learning  about  the  
‘self’  in  class.      
  
Richard:  You  know  I  would  be  happy  to  supervise  you  if  you  wanted  to  ‘test  
out’  doing  something  philosophical,  just  let  me  know  what  sort  of  
question  you’re  interested  in.    
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SCENE  TWO  
Richard  is  in  his  office,  reading  in  his  armchair.  A  desk  is  strewn  with  papers.  
Beside  his  chair,  several  books  are  stacked,  open  and  bookmarked.  From  
the  window,  Durham  Cathedral  is  clearly  visible  on  the  horizon.  A  cool  
autumn  day.  There  is  a  knock  at  the  door.  Claire  enters.  
  
  
Claire:  Hi,  did  you  have  a  nice  summer?  
  
Richard:  Well,  yes,  I  got  lots  of  research  done.  How  are  you?  
  
Claire:  Alright,  yeah.  Ready  for  third  year,  well,  ready  as  I’ll  ever  be.  [Richard  
invites  Claire  to  take  a  seat,  she  takes  the  chair  next  to  him.]    
  
Richard:  Good.  Now,  you  told  me  before  that  you  were  thinking  about  a  
dissertation  related  to  the  topic  of  ‘the  self’.  What  ideas  do  you  have  
now?  
  
Claire:  Erm,  well,  I’d  still  like  to  do  something  about  the  self…and  I  would  like  
to  do  my  dissertation  philosophically,  but  I’m  not  sure  how  to  go  about  
it.  
  
Richard:  First  off,  what  is  it  that  made  you  particularly  interested  in  the  self?  I  
would  like  to  know  more  about  your  opinion  on  it.    
  
Claire:  Well…erm,  what  we  spoke  about  in  class  got  me  thinking.  I  want  to  
know  if  the  ‘self’  is  a  coherent  whole  and  if  it  stays  the  same  over  time  
or  not.  In  a  psychology  lecture  about  the  self,  they  had  a  model  with  
three  aspects  that  make  up  the  self,  but  I’m  not  sure  it’s  as  
straightforward  as  that.  [She  looks  puzzled,  deep  in  thought.]  
  
Richard:  So  how  do  you  hope  to  answer  that  question?  
  
Claire:  I’m  not  sure  really…  [She  looks  down,  avoiding  his  gaze.]  
  
Richard:  How  about  you  start  by  reading  this.  [He  hands  her  a  book].  Let  me  
know  what  you  think  of  it.    
  
Claire:  Ok,  thanks.  So  I  just  read  this  for  now,  there’s  nothing  else  to  do  for  
me  to  get  started?  
  
Richard:  Well,  you  could  have  a  think  about  your  own  ‘self’  and  what  it  
means  for  you.  Start  making  some  notes  about  why  you  want  to  focus  
on  this  topic  rather  than  others  that  we’ve  looked  at  in  the  module…  
  
Claire:  I’m  not  sure  about  my  own  ‘self’,  that  seems  too  personal…am  I  
allowed  to  put  that  in  the  dissertation?  
  
Richard:  I  don’t  see  how  you  could  really  separate  it  from  what  you’re  writing  
about,  there  must  be  a  reason  why  this  topic  has  resonated  with  
you…and  in  that  respect,  it’s  definitely  useful  to  write  
autobiographically.    
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Claire:  So  in  philosophy  of  education,  I’m  allowed  to  write  in  the  first  person,  
saying  what  ‘I’  think?  Don’t  I  need  to  put  in  loads  of  citations  and  
references  for  a  dissertation?  
  
Richard:  Yes,  you  can  write  what  you  think…this  is  your  dissertation.  As  for  
having  loads  of  citations,  that  has  no  bearing  on  the  quality  of  work  so  
don’t  worry  about  it.  In  philosophy  of  education,  we  often  use  fewer  
sources,  but  look  at  them  in  greater  depth…so  be  prepared  to  read  
that  book  at  least  three  times  [smiling].  Just  make  some  rough  notes  
at  this  point,  and  we’ll  chat  about  it  next  time.  
  
Claire:  Thanks,  well,  I  don’t  know  my  ‘method’,  but  I  at  least  know  where  to  
start  now  [laughing].  
  
Richard:  That’s  often  the  case  for  my  own  research.  Take  care,  and  I’ll  see  
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The  scenes  presented  above  are  illustrative  of  the  difficulty  that  philosophers  
of  education  often  have  when  describing  their  ‘method’  (Ruitenberg,  2009;;  
Smith,  2009;;  Standish,  2010).  The  dialogue  is  based  on  my  own  experience  
as  an  undergraduate  student  grappling  with  what  it  meant  to  ‘do’  philosophy,  
but  the  scenes  are  also  partly  fictionalised.  It  is  a  central  feature  of  my  own  
‘method’  in  this  thesis  that  each  chapter  from  here  onwards  will  start  with  a  
scenario  that  is  autobiographical  in  nature,  as  dialogue  is  integral  to  this  
work.  Engaging  in  dialogue  can  be  seen  as  both  the  goal  and  the  means  of  
this  thesis;;  the  research  presented  here  is  tasked  with  engaging  others  in  
dialogue  about  student  satisfaction  and  its  related  discourses,  and  the  
methodological  approach  adopted  is  dialogic  in  nature.    
  
The  work  of  the  American  philosopher,  Stanley  Cavell,  contributes  
substantially  to  this  thesis,  as  I  will  explain  further  below,  but  his  vision  of  
philosophy  itself  exemplifies  the  philosophical  ‘method’  used  here.  As  he  
writes,  ‘I  have  wished  to  understand  philosophy  not  as  a  set  of  problems  but  
as  a  set  of  texts’  (Cavell,  1979a,  p.3).  This  thesis  will  draw  on,  and  engage  in  
dialogue  with,  a  particular  set  of  texts  –  outlined  below  –  in  order  to  reframe  
how  satisfaction  discourses  in  Higher  Education  are  currently  conceptualised  
and  discussed.  But  first  of  all,  I  will  briefly  recap  the  main  points  to  be  taken  
forward  from  Chapter  One  as  the  empirical  literature  deals  with  student  
satisfaction  in  a  very  particular  way.  This  approach  is  valuable  in  its  own  
right,  but  there  are  numerous  philosophical  questions  underlying  these  
practical  concerns  which  remain  unaddressed;;  restating  these  problems  is  
necessary  here  in  order  to  foreground  and  explicate  the  reasoning  behind  
the  philosophical  ‘method’  used  in  this  thesis.    
  
This  chapter  follows  on  from  Chapter  One,  where  I  ended  by  offering  three  
particular  criticisms  of  the  empirical  literature  on  student  satisfaction.  The  
philosophical  ‘method’  adopted  in  this  thesis  is  designed  to  address  such  
concerns  and,  as  I  will  discuss  further  below,  to  deal  with  questions  which  
cannot  be  tackled  via  the  collection  and  analysis  of  empirical  data.  This  
chapter  will  explore  what  it  means  to  ‘do’  research  in  philosophy  of  
education,  how  this  approach  differs  from  research  in  the  social  sciences,  
and  elucidate  why  this  thesis  has  been  conducted  philosophically.  I  will  
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discuss  here  what  a  philosophical  ‘method’  may  consist  of  –  although  talking  
of  a  ‘methodology’  in  philosophy  of  education  is  deeply  problematic  –  and  
how  this  approach  is  more  suited  to  the  ‘research  questions’  being  examined  
here.  I  will  conclude  the  chapter  by  drawing  out  the  main  themes  permeating  
the  thesis,  and  explaining  how  the  philosophers  I  engage  with  contribute  to  
an  exploration  of  these,  namely  by  generating  a  dialogue  that  moves  away  
from  the  empirical  literature’s  almost  single-­minded  focus  on  measuring  and  
improving  student  satisfaction  in  a  marketised  Higher  Education  system.    
  
2.1  Themes  in  the  Empirical  Literature  
As  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  emphasis  in  the  current  literature  
is  placed  on  measuring,  and  improving  the  measurement  of,  student  
satisfaction.  This  literature  is  concerned  with  providing  explanatory  models  
of  ‘student  satisfaction’,  reporting  on  interventions  to  raise  satisfaction  levels,  
and  with  explaining  the  consumerist  behaviours  of  university  stakeholders,  
primarily  students.  Researchers  have  developed  a  ‘recipe’  for  service  quality  
in  the  HE  sector  (Yeo,  2008),  and  have  devised  strategies  for  customer  
relationship  management  that  are  applicable  to  students  (Stukalina,  2012;;  
Clark  et  al.,  2017).  The  impact  of  motivation  –  whether  students  have  an  
internal  or  external  locus  of  control  (Stukalina,  2012;;  2014;;  Kirmizi,  2015)  –  
and  demographic  variables  on  student  satisfaction  has  also  been  
investigated,  both  in  the  UK  and  internationally  (Miliszewska  and  Sztendur,  
2012;;  O’Driscoll,  2012;;  Elsharnouby,  2015;;  Carter  and  Yeo,  2016).  Student  
satisfaction  has  been  measured  and  evaluated  not  only  at  undergraduate  
level,  but  also  for  taught  postgraduate  and  doctoral  students.    
  
The  collection  of  student  feedback,  particularly  in  student  satisfaction  
surveys,  is  used  as  a  mechanism  of  accountability  and  quality  assurance.  
Student  satisfaction  figures  are  increasingly  used  as  a  measure  of  other  
facets  of  Higher  Education,  such  as  ‘teaching  excellence’  in  the  newly  
-­  40  -­  
proposed  Teaching  Excellence  Framework  (TEF)  in  the  UK.11  Student  
satisfaction  measures  not  only  influence  universities’  league  table  position,  
and  therefore  institutional  reputation,  but  they  also  relate  to  universities’  
income,  both  directly  –  those  awarded  ‘gold’  in  the  TEF  (a  measure  based  
on  NSS  results)  are  allowed  to  increase  their  tuition  fees  –  and  indirectly,  by  
influencing  prospective  students’  decisions  of  which  universities  to  attend.    
  
2.2  Originality  
The  literature  on  student  satisfaction  is  comprehensive,  research  has  been  
conducted  on  satisfaction  and  its  related  discourses  from  seemingly  every  
angle.  Research  evidence  considers  measures  of  student  satisfaction,  
service  quality,  student  engagement,  and  the  student  experience  more  
broadly.  On  one  level,  there  is  nothing  wrong  with  such  literature;;  it  is  
extensive  and  varied,  with  researchers  focusing  on  different  facets  of  student  
satisfaction.  The  literature  seemingly  provides  a  full  and  systematic  account  
of  student  satisfaction.  So  what  is  at  issue  here;;  how  is  this  doctoral  
research  original,  and  what  does  it  contribute  to  the  existing  discussion?    
  
The  originality  of  this  research  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  both  departs  from,  and  
yet  adds  to,  the  other  broadly  empirical  literature  in  a  distinctive  way.  This  
thesis  not  only  fills  a  ‘gap’  in  the  literature,  but  deals  with  a  gap  that  has  not  
often  been  acknowledged  or  even  envisioned.  The  empirical  literature  is  
extensive,  yet  there  are  fundamental  questions  underlying  such  research  
which  are  not,  indeed  cannot  be,  addressed  empirically.  To  consider  ‘student  
satisfaction’  as  another  variable  to  be  measured  or  manipulated  in  one’s  
                                                                                        
11  Proposed  in  late  2015  as  part  of  the  HE  Green  Paper  titled  ‘Fulfilling  Our  
Potential:  Teaching  Excellence,  Social  Mobility  and  Student  Choice’  
(BIS,  2015),  the  ‘Teaching  Excellence  Framework’  (TEF)  aims  to  
place  teaching  on  an  equal  footing  with  research  outputs  in  
universities.  Universities  will  be  judged  on  the  quality  of  their  teaching  
using  student  satisfaction  data,  with  those  achieving  ‘gold’  being  
allowed  to  further  increase  their  tuition  fees  (BIS,  2015).  The  
differential  fee  caps  are  to  come  into  effect  from  Autumn  2020  
(Morgan,  2017),  and  the  motivation  for  implementing  the  TEF  is  
explained  in  terms  of  providing  ‘value  for  money’  for  students  (BIS,  
2015).  For  more  information,  see:  
http://www.hefce.ac.uk/lt/tef/whatistef/  [Accessed  20  October  2017].	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inquiry  brushes  over  the  uncertainties  and  complexities  inherent  in  its  usage  
across  the  HE  sector;;  it  is  this  ambiguity  of  concepts  that  I  will  highlight  and  
address  in  the  thesis.      
  
Central  questions  to  be  considered  in  this  thesis  are  ‘what  does  it  mean  to  
be  satisfied  with  one’s  education?’,  and  ‘is  student  satisfaction  educative  in  
itself?’  I  will  also  question  whether  universities  should  be  aiming  to  satisfy  
their  students,  and  what  the  implications  of  this  might  be.  Existing  literature  
seems  to  skim  over  questions  such  as  these,  taking  the  concept  of  student  
satisfaction,  and  its  assumed  positive  effects,  as  given.  Rather  than  
questioning  the  concept  itself,  researchers  question  instead  how  its  
measurement  can  be  improved.  My  aim  here  is  not  to  devalue  the  existing  
literature  on  student  satisfaction,  but  rather  to  highlight  what  is  missing  from  
such  an  account.    
  
While  the  current  literature  tells  us  a  great  deal  about  student  satisfaction  
and  its  related  discourses,  it  never  quite  seems  to  get  to  the  heart  of  the  
matter  –  that  is,  a  consideration  of  how  student  satisfaction  relates  to  the  
purpose  and  aims  of  Higher  Education.  There  are  several  clearly  delineated  
‘research  questions’  guiding  this  thesis,  but  it  is  often  unavoidable,  and  
indeed  part  of  what  might  amount  to  its  ‘method’,  that  research  in  philosophy  
of  education  opens  out  the  initial  research  questions  onto  other,  perhaps  
broader  questions  still.  To  state  explicitly  the  research  questions  of  this  
thesis  in  advance  thus  seems  in  some  ways  antithetical  to  what  it  means  to  
‘do’  philosophy.    
  
In  what  follows,  I  will  discuss  several  philosophers’  attempts  to  characterise  
their  ‘methodology’,  but  the  questions  that  I  will  deal  with  in  this  research  
cannot  be  evaluated  at  the  end  in  the  same  way  as  tends  to  happen  in  the  
social  sciences.  It  would  be  too  simplistic  to  consider  whether  this  thesis  
answers  the  ‘research  questions’  it  posits,  and  in  fact  philosophical  
questions  are  often  ‘unanswerable’  in  the  sense  of  providing  one  definitive,  
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correct  response.12  Research  in  philosophy  of  education  is  not  as  
methodologically  formulaic  as  other  kinds  of  research;;  there  is  no  
straightforward  linear  process  that  proceeds  from  devising  research  
questions,  proposing  hypotheses,  to  collecting  empirical  data,  and  then  
answering  one’s  research  questions.  Instead,  the  research  questions  and  
hypotheses,  or  ‘propositions’,  may  emerge  as  the  research  progresses.    
  
I  intend  to  approach  the  questions  identified  above  philosophically.  As  I  will  
explain  in  what  follows  such  an  approach,  or  ‘method’,  is  suited  to  the  kinds  
of  conceptual  and  justificatory  questions  that  I  am  raising  in  relation  to  
discourses  of  student  satisfaction  in  contemporary  Higher  Education.  This  
thesis  is  primarily  concerned  with  clarifying  and  rethinking  consumerist  
concepts  in  the  HE  sector,  such  as  ‘student  satisfaction’,  ‘value  for  money’,  
and  the  ‘student-­consumer’.  This  research  will  also  investigate  broader  
questions  surrounding  Higher  Education;;  for  instance,  my  discussion  will  
touch  on  the  purposes  and  aims  of  HE,  as  satisfying  students  is  increasingly  
viewed  as  the  main  function  of  a  university  education  alongside  a  concern  
with  producing  employable  graduates.  I  have  identified  several  issues  with  
the  empirical  literature  not  merely  as  an  exercise  in  criticality,  but  as  part  of  
the  rationale  for  adopting  a  philosophical  approach  instead.  In  the  following  
section,  I  will  explain  what  philosophy  brings  to  this  thesis  and  discuss  what  
a  philosophical  ‘method’  may  consist  of.  
  
2.3  The  Turn  to  Philosophy  
It  is  not  necessarily  the  case  that  empirical  and  philosophical  research  are  
diametrically  opposed,  but  rather  that  philosophical  questions  underlie  the  
most  empirical  of  concerns.  Philosophical  questions  regarding  education  
may  often  begin  in  very  practical  concerns,  such  as  ‘how  can  I  improve  my  
                                                                                        
12  In  The  Claim  of  Reason  (1979a),  Cavell  makes  an  argument  along  these  
lines  regarding  skepticism.  Referring  to  the  work  of  the  later  
Wittgenstein,  Cavell  discusses  how  attempts  to  remove  skepticism  
and  obtain  certainty  in  our  knowledge  of  the  other  are  erroneous.  As  
he  describes,  we  can  never  claim  to  have  full  knowledge  of  the  other,  
nor  remove  skepticism  entirely,  instead  criteria  determining  what  is  
‘true’  or  ‘false’  must  be  applied  to  each  situation.  
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students’  achievement?’  But  as  Paul  Standish  describes,  these  practical  
questions  ‘usually  lead  to  “big”  questions  about  the  nature  of  knowledge  and  
the  nature  of  the  good  life’  (2010,  p.8).  It  seems  as  if  such  ‘big’  questions  are  
particularly  suited  to  being  dealt  with  philosophically;;  as  Standish  explains:    
These   [questions]   are   addressed   in   some   way   or   other   in   various  
aspects   of   educational   research.   But   they   are   the   kind   of   thing   that  
cannot   be   resolved   by   empirical   study.   They   need   reflection   and  
judgement  and  argument.  This  is  central  to  philosophy’  (2010,  p.8).  
  
Research  in  philosophy  of  education,  and  philosophy  more  generally,  
involves  dealing  with  certain  types  of  questions.  Standish  (2010)  discusses  
how  conducting  a  philosophical  thesis  allows  the  researcher  to  deal  with  
questions  that  either  could  not  be  answered  empirically,  or  those  questions  
for  which  empirical  research  would  not  be  appropriate.  The  utilisation  of  
philosophy’s  ‘method’  is  advantageous  when  dealing  with  questions  of  
conceptual  clarification,  and  also  for  tackling  questions  of  justification  and  
value  (Standish,  2010).13  The  research  questions  outlined  above  are  
questions  of  this  kind:  what  do  we  mean  by  ‘student  satisfaction?’,  and  ‘is  
satisfaction  justified  as  an  end  of  a  student’s  experience  of  Higher  
Education?’.    
  
This  research  is  non-­empirical,  so  there  will  be  no  data  collection  nor  
analysis  of  empirically  collected  data;;  instead,  the  thesis  will  involve  a  
rigorous  interrogation  of  concepts  and  ideas.  Its  ‘method’  is  to  do  this  
through  reflections  on,  and  consideration  of,  a  selection  of  philosophical  and  
literary  sources,  and,  unusually,  of  several  1940s  Hollywood  films.  As  
Fulford  and  Hodgson  (2016)  highlight,  the  ‘sources  that  inform  educational  
philosophy  need  not  only  be  works  of  literature’,  but  philosophers  may  also  
draw  on  film  (Cavell,  1996;;  2005a;;  Read  and  Goodenough,  2005;;  
Vansieleghem,  2016),  poetry  (Standish  and  Saito,  2017),  and  even  picture  
books  (Johansson,  2016)  as  part  of  their  research.  It  is  important  to  
emphasise  here  that  whilst  my  ‘method’  in  this  thesis  is  original,  other  
                                                                                        
13  Whilst  qualitative  researchers  may  also  deal  with  questions  of  value  and  
justification,  this  is  often  considered  in  more  practical  terms,  such  as  
‘what  is  the  value  of  my  results?’,  and  justifying  their  choice  of  
participants,  equipment,  et  cetera.      
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researchers  have  already  argued  for  the  legitimacy  of  an  engagement  with  
literature,  film,  and  poetry  alongside  the  more  ‘traditional’  philosophical  
works,  as  part  of  a  range  of  methodological  approaches  in  philosophy  of  
education  (Fulford  and  Hodgson,  2016).      
  
This  thesis  is  set  within  the  sub-­discipline  of  philosophy  of  education,  and  is  
in  line  with  the  continental,  rather  than  the  analytic  philosophical  tradition.14  
Unlike  empirical  research  which  is  associated  with  a  variety  of  
methodologies  and  related  methods,  for  which  numerous  research  methods  
textbooks  provide  guidelines  on  how  to  conduct  such  research  (see,  for  
example,  Newby,  2010;;  Thomas,  2013),  conducting  a  philosophical  inquiry  is  
arguably  less  straightforward.  This  is  in  part  because  there  is  no  fixed  
‘method’,  or  range  of  methodological  approaches  available  from  which  one  
can  be  selected  and  applied  to  the  ‘research  question’  at  hand.  Indeed,  there  
is  no  structured  ‘method’  to  be  used  in  philosophical  research;;  there  may  be  
as  many  different  ‘methods’  in  the  discipline  as  there  are  authors,  particularly  
in  the  continental  philosophical  tradition.    
  
Research  in  educational  philosophy  is  not  concerned  with  conducting  
experiments,  giving  out  questionnaires,  or  data  sampling  methods;;  to  put  it  
simply,  philosophy’s  ‘method’  could  be  described  as  reading,  thinking,  and  
writing  –  and  not  necessarily  in  that  order  (Smith,  2009;;  Fulford  and  
Hodgson,  2016).  As  Richard  remarks  in  the  opening  scenario,  ‘you  couldn’t  
really  assist  my  research  as  it  involves  me  sitting  at  a  desk  and  reading’.  In  
reality,  the  situation  is  much  more  complex  than  this.  Philosophy’s  ‘method’  
is  difficult  to  identify  clearly,  and  Richard  Smith  has  warned  of  the  dangers  of  
trying  to  explain  what  we  do  in  terms  simply  of  ‘having  a  method’.  As  he  
writes,  ‘in  doing  philosophy  we  need  to  be  aware  of  the  awkwardness  of  
thinking  in  terms  of  having  a  method,  still  more  any  kind  of  “methodology”’  
(2009,  p.437).  In  empirical  research,  it  is  common  for  the  methods  to  be  
agreed  in  advance  before  the  ‘research’  itself  is  carried  out,  whereas  in  
                                                                                        
14  For  clarification  of  this  distinction,  see:  Critchley,  S.  2001.  Continental  
Philosophy:  A  Very  Short  Introduction.  Oxford:  Oxford  University  
Press.  
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educational  philosophy,  it  may  be  more  difficult  to  separate  out  the  method  
from  the  research  process  itself;;  it  is  as  if  content  and  methods  are  
ineluctably  linked  (Standish,  2010;;  Fulford  and  Hodgson,  2016).    
  
Fulford  and  Hodgson  (2016)  distinguish  ‘philosophy  of  education’  from  
‘educational  philosophy’,  highlighting  that  these  terms  are  not  necessarily  
synonymous  and  interchangeable.  As  they  write,  ‘philosophy  of  education’  is  
an  approach  whereby  engaging  with  a  source  means  ‘finding  an  educational  
truth  or  principle  in  its  content  [the  source  being  drawn  on]  that  can  then  be  
applied  to  education’  (Fulford  and  Hodgson,  2016,  p.28).  On  the  other  hand,  
‘educational  philosophy’  focuses  on  how  encountering  particular  sources,  
such  as  texts,  films,  artworks  etc.,  can  be  an  educative  process.  This  thesis  
is  more  commensurate  with  educational  philosophy,  whereby  ‘education’  is  
considered  in  the  broadest  sense,  but  I  will  also  discuss  the  educational  
implications  of  certain  texts,  which  aligns  with  philosophy  of  education  itself.  
Whilst  these  terms  are  in  some  senses  distinct,  both  are  pertinent  to  the  
thesis  and  constitute  part  of  its  ‘method’.  
  
While  Standish  (2010)  draws  a  rather  sharp  distinction  between  empirical  
and  philosophical  research  (this  is  helpful  in  clarifying  what  is  distinctive  
about  research  in  philosophy  of  education),  others  are  resistant  to  
suggesting  a  clear  dichotomy  between  these  types  of  research  
(Vansieleghem,  2016;;  Vlieghe,  2016).  Vlieghe  acknowledges  that  ‘a  
qualitative  investigation  mapping  students’  real  experiences  might  do  this  job  
[investigating  what  it  means  to  ‘practice’  in  education]  far  better  than  the  
philosopher  sitting  behind  her  desk’,  but  as  he  sees  it,  the  only  difference  
between  the  two  approaches  is  who  the  researcher  engages  in  dialogue  with  
(2016,  p.62)  –  whether  this  is  the  ‘target  population’  of  a  study,  or  the  
authors  of  philosophical  works.  Both  Vlieghe’s  phenomenological  approach  
and  qualitative  research  may  be  concerned  with  the  same  questions,  but  
they  simply  arrive  at  their  conclusions  via  different  channels,  either  through  
‘philosophising’,  or  by  data  collection  and  analysis.  
  
Blurring  the  distinction  between  philosophical  and  empirical  research  even  
further,  Nancy  Vansieleghem  refers  to  what  she  does  as  ‘empirical  
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philosophy’,  as  she  writes:  ‘the  substantive  question  of  empirical  philosophy  
is  not  how  to  do  research,  but  how  to  do  difference’  (2016,  p.97).  ‘Empirical  
philosophy’  as  a  method  is  not  just  about  conceptualising  and  interpreting  
difference,  but  combining  philosophy  with  empirical  research  can  helpfully  
bring  together  theoretical  questions  with  more  practical  concerns.  So  a  
distinction  might  be  suggested  between  philosophical  and  empirical  forms  of  
research,  but  this  is  better  considered  as  a  continuum  rather  than  a  strict  
dichotomy.  While  I  am  not  conducting  empirical  research  and  collecting  
primary  data  as  Vansieleghem  does,  her  understanding  of  ‘empirical  
philosophy’  as  evincing  how  philosophical  reflection  can  be  brought  to  bear  
on  practical  concerns  is  also  pertinent  to  this  thesis.  As  my  research  involves  
reflecting  on  philosophical  and  literary  works  in  order  to  explore  further  what  
student  satisfaction  means  and  how  it  impacts  on  the  HE  sector,  it  could  
thus  be  considered  as  an  example  of  such  empirical  philosophy.  
  
2.3.1  Reading    
What  does  it  mean  to  read  ‘philosophically’  then?  Fulford  and  Hodgson  
describe  the  philosopher’s  use  of  literature  as  follows,  ‘in  educational  
philosophy,  the  nature  of  the  question,  and  so  the  potential  literature  to  
inform  it,  entail  a  greater  depth  of  reading’  (2016,  p.146).  Philosophy  may  
not  present  data  and  statistics,  so  its  argument  consists  of  the  logical  
reasoning  to  substantiate  claims,  and  the  choice  language  with  which  to  do  
it.  Arguably  the  same  could  be  said  of  qualitative  and  interpretive  enquiries,  
but  educational  philosophy  is  distinct  from  these  other  kinds  of  research  by  
virtue  of  the  sources  used  to  inform  it.    
  
A  helpful  dichotomy  has  been  set  up  between  ‘reading-­for-­research’  and  
‘reading-­as-­research’  in  order  to  distinguish  reading  in  philosophy  of  
education  from  other  disciplines  (Fulford  and  Hodgson,  2016,  pp.141-­144).  
The  former,  ‘reading-­for-­research’  (Fulford  and  Hodgson,  2016,  p.141)  
typically  involves  the  researcher  reading  a  wide  range  of  literature,  but  this  
may  be  little  more  than  skim  reading  in  order  to  ‘fillet  a  publication’  for  one’s  
own  purposes  (Silverman,  2013,  p.345).    
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In  contrast,  there  is  ‘reading-­as-­research’  which  constitutes  part  of  the  
‘method’  of  research  in  educational  philosophy  (Fulford  and  Hodgson,  2016,  
p.144).  While  philosophers  often  draw  on  fewer  sources  to  form  their  
arguments,  this  by  no  means  equates  to  a  limiting  of  what  is  read.  
Philosophers  of  education  do  not  always  stick  to  classical  philosophical  texts  
to  inform  their  research,  and  neither  are  they  necessarily  restricted  to  texts  
which  speak  directly  on,  or  about,  education  (Fulford  and  Hodgson,  2016).  
Moreover,  to  read  ‘philosophically’  is  less  so  a  ‘filleting’  of  information  
(Silverman,  2013,  p.345),  and  more  akin  to  a  ‘conversation’;;  that  is,  a  
conversation  with  the  authors  of  what  one  is  reading,  but  also  a  
‘conversation  with  oneself:  looking  at  words  and  conceptual  clarifications  
others  have  developed,  one  tests  whether  they  make  sense  for  oneself’  
(Vlieghe,  2016,  p.63).    
  
The  reading  characteristic  of  educational  philosophy  is  akin  to  a  
conversation  or  dialogue,  between  oneself  and  the  text,  and  between  
oneself  and  the  author.  As  Cavell  (1981a)  describes,  to  engage  with  a  text  
implies  a  relationship  –  between  author  and  reader  –  of  mutual  
responsibility,  for  one’s  words  and  being  convicted  by  these  words.  As  he  
explains:  
The  writer  keeps  writing  things  I  know  I  ought  not  to  have  stopped  trying  
to   say   for  myself;;   and   shows  me   a   life   there   is   no   reason   I   do   not  
live…the  writer   keeps  my   choices   in   front   of  me,   the   ones   I  am  not  
making  and  the  ones  I  am  (Cavell,  1981a,  p.49).    
  
The  initiation  of  a  relationship  between  an  author  and  their  readers,  an  
engagement  in  joint  dialogue,  is  central  to  ‘reading-­as-­research’  (Fulford  and  
Hodgson,  2016,  p.144).  
  
The  practices  of  reading  and  writing  are  not  as  distinguishable  as  they  might  
appear  to  be,  but  are  intricately  woven  together  in  the  fabric  that  is  
philosophy.  Dialogue  permeates  both  the  practices  of  reading  and  writing  in  
philosophy  of  education;;  some  classical  philosophical  works  were  written  as  
dialogues  (for  example,  Plato’s  Phaedrus),  and  current  educational  
philosophers  may  also  write  up  their  research  in  the  form  of  a  dialogue  
(Smith,  2009;;  2016).  In  this  thesis,  I  will  engage  in  several  dialogues:  with  a  
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set  of  texts,  with  the  authors  of  those  texts,  and  the  ideas  discussed  here  
were  informed  by  numerous  conversations  with  colleagues.  Part  of  the  
originality  of  this  thesis  also  lies  in  the  creation  of  a  dialogue  between  the  
authors  I  draw  on,  and  particularly  between  Stanley  Cavell  and  Martin  
Heidegger,  two  philosophers  from  very  different  traditions  and  with  
contrasting  approaches.    
  
As  discussed  above  in  terms  of  the  ‘research  questions’  guiding  this  thesis,  
definitive  answers  are  difficult  to  find  here,  and  aiming  to  do  so  seems  
almost  inimical  to  what  it  means  to  ‘do’  research  in  philosophy  of  education.  
As  Cavell  alludes  to  in  The  Senses  of  Walden,  certain  texts  may  never  
permit  ‘a  final  reading’,  or  such  a  reading  may  not  be  appropriate  (1981a,  
p.12).  The  collection  of  texts  and  sources  used  to  inform  this  thesis  are  of  
this  infinite  sort;;  philosophers  of  education  may  never  settle  on  a  single  
interpretation  of,  for  example,  Thoreau’s  Walden  (a  fact  noted  by  Cavell  
himself),  but  the  depth  of  reading  involved  and  various  approaches  to  such  
texts  can  facilitate  a  dialogue  that  is  educative  in  itself.    
  
2.3.2  Writing  
Writing  philosophically  is  a  practice  central  to  this  thesis.  Writing  in  
philosophy  of  education  often  takes  the  form  of  a  peer-­reviewed  journal  
article,  but  the  structure  of  one’s  argument  and  the  literature  used  to  inform  
such  research,  can  vary  widely  –  this  is  evidenced  in  part  two  of  Fulford  and  
Hodgson’s  (2016)  monograph,  where  there  is  no  shared  ‘method’  or  style  of  
writing  among  their  contributors.  In  explicating  philosophy’s  ‘method’,  Fulford  
and  Hodgson  have  another  dichotomy  which  is  useful  for  setting  apart  
philosophy  of  education  from  other  disciplines  –  they  have  made  a  
distinction  between  ‘writing-­as-­report’  and  ‘writing-­as-­research’  (2016,  p.5).      
  
The  distinction  between  ‘writing-­as-­report’  and  ‘writing-­as-­research’  is  
dependent  upon  the  time  at  which  the  ‘writing’  is  carried  out,  whether  it  is  
considered  as  the  final  stage,  the  writing  up  of  a  research  project,  or  is  part  
of  the  research  itself  (Fulford  and  Hodgson,  2016,  p.5).  When  considering  
‘writing-­as-­report’,  often  for  empirical  research,  the  ‘research’  itself  is  carried  
out,  data  is  collected,  and  then  the  writing  takes  place  as  a  summary  of  what  
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has  been  found  and  concluded  from  the  research.  The  process  of  ‘doing  
research’  is  implied  here  as  taking  place  in  a  linear  fashion;;  if  we  think  back  
to  the  scenes  at  the  beginning  of  the  chapter,  this  seems  to  be  what  Claire  
assumes;;  she  almost  wants  to  discover  philosophy’s  ‘method’  as  something  
discrete  akin  to  the  methodology  of  psychological  research.  In  contrast  to  
this,  writing  in  philosophy  of  education  is  more  in  line  with  what  Fulford  and  
Hodgson  call  ‘writing-­as-­research’,  whereby  ‘writing  is  the  research,  not  just  
something  tagged  onto  the  end  of  the  real  work  of  research,  of  data  
collection  and  data  analysis’  (2016,  p.151).  As  Richard  jests  in  the  first  
scene  that  opened  this  section,  the  only  way  in  which  Claire  could  assist  his  
research  would  be  to  pass  him  the  necessary  books.    
  
Although  ‘writing-­as-­research’  is  central  to  research  in  educational  
philosophy,  this  does  not  mean  that  it  is  absent  from  some  empirical  
research  (Fulford  and  Hodgson,  2016,  p.5).  Indeed,  empirical  research  may  
also  be  characterised  by  ‘writing-­as-­research’  (this  may  be  more  likely  for  
qualitative  methods),  or  a  combination  of  the  two  methods  as  they  are  not  
mutually  exclusive  (Fulford  and  Hodgson,  2016,  p.5).  In  setting  up  this  
distinction,  Fulford  and  Hodgson  (2016)  do  emphasise  that  both  
philosophical  and  empirical  research  may  accommodate  either  mode  of  
writing.  This  is  not  a  simple  dichotomy  between,  on  the  one  hand,  empirical  
research  that  is  written  up  as  a  report,  and  on  the  other,  philosophical  
research  that  is  enmeshed  with  the  process  of  writing  itself.  The  methods  
used  are  shaped  by  the  questions  guiding  the  research;;  what  marks  out  
research  in  philosophy  of  education  from  that  of  the  social  sciences  is  the  
self-­evolving  and  dialogic  nature  of  the  questions  it  addresses.  In  
educational  philosophy,  the  initial  research  questions  iteratively  open  up  
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onto  other  questions,  and  the  aim  is  not  necessarily  to  find  an  easy  answer  
to  the  initial  question.15      
  
The  practices  of  reading  and  writing  are  inextricably  linked,  and  are  
constitutive  of  this  type  of  research  (Fulford  and  Hodgson,  2016);;  they  also  
exemplify  my  ‘method’  in  this  thesis.  Writing  is  not  something  carried  out  at  
the  end  of  the  research,  but  is  part  of  the  research  process.  As  Paul  
Standish  puts  it,  ‘sometimes  you  don’t  know  what  you  think  until  you  have  
written  it’  (2010,  p.11).  The  thinking  is  not  something  ‘figured  out’  before  
writing  takes  place,  instead  writing  is  itself  an  exercise  in  thinking,  and  in  
thinking  philosophically.    
  
2.3.3  Thinking  
I  have  discussed  the  practices  of  reading  and  writing  that  are  constitutive  of  
philosophical  research,  and  have  explained  how  such  reading  and  writing  
may  differ  from  that  of  other  disciplines.  In  this  section,  I  will  explain  how  the  
‘thinking’  characteristic  of  philosophy  of  education  also  differs  from  that  of  
the  social  sciences.  Crucially,  what  sets  apart  the  ‘thinking’  of  philosophical  
research  is  that  it  is  constitutive  of  it;;  thinking  is  not  just  part  of  such  
research,  but  is  the  conducting  of  it.  The  thinking  is  the  research,  as  much  
as  the  practices  of  reading  and  writing  are.  Similar  to  the  distinction  made  by  
Fulford  and  Hodgson  (2016,  pp.141-­144)  between  ‘reading-­as-­research’  and  
‘reading-­for-­research’,  in  this  section  I  will  contrast  ‘thinking-­as-­product’  with  
‘thinking-­as-­process’.    
  
To  consider  ‘thinking-­as-­product’  in  one’s  research  implies  that  the  thinking  
happens  at  a  particular  stage  of  the  process,  such  as  in  the  writing  up  and  
                                                                                        
15  An  example  of  this  can  be  seen  in  the  work  of  Nan  Shepherd  (which  I  will  
discuss  in  greater  detail  in  Part  III),  whose  book  The  Living  Mountain  
offers  a  different  account  of  what  it  is  to  ‘know’  the  Cairngorm  
mountains.  Shepherd  (1977/2011)  urges  her  readers  to  think  beyond  
the  question  of  how  to  reach  the  summit,  instead  focusing  on  its  
recesses.  This  movement  away  from  thinking  only  of  scaling  and  
conquering  the  mountain  is  allegorical  of  the  shift  away  from  
randomised  controlled  trials  and  ‘what  works’  research  in  philosophy  
of  education.    
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analysis  of  results.  If  thinking  is  regarded  as  a  ‘product’,  then  such  thinking  
may  be  conducted  for  a  particular  purpose  and  directed  toward  specific  
ends.  There  is  nothing  inherently  wrong  with  considering  thinking  as  just  one  
methodological  tool  among  others,  as  a  procedural  element  of  research,  but  
this  is  not  the  type  of  thinking  characteristic  of  educational  philosophy.  As  
with  the  practices  of  reading  and  writing,  thinking  is  integral  to  research  in  
philosophy  of  education,  and  is  not  something  that  should  be  tagged  on  to  
the  end  of  the  process.  Thinking  is  not  something  that  we  simply  ‘do’  at  a  
certain  stage  and  then  move  on  from,  it  is  inseparable  from  the  research  
itself.    
  
If  thinking  is  conceptualised  as  a  valuable  ‘process’  in  and  of  itself,  then  
thinking  is  not  confined  to  a  discrete  stage  of  research,  but  is  rather  an  
integral  part  of  one’s  inquiry,  present  throughout.  To  consider  ‘thinking-­as-­
process’  implies  a  commitment  to  thinking  that  goes  beyond  merely  thinking  
as  and  when  research  dictates,  in  essence,  thinking  for  a  particular  end-­
goal.  Such  thinking  allows  one  to  tackle  questions  of  value  and  justification,  
to  clarify  difficult  concepts,  and  thus  constitutes  a  significant  aspect  of  my  
philosophical  ‘method’  in  this  thesis.  ‘Thinking-­as-­process’  may  also  be  
characteristic  of  research  in  the  social  sciences;;  I  am  not  suggesting  a  
dichotomy  here  which  would  match  up  different  types  of  research  to  these  
different  types  of  thinking,  but  I  am  highlighting  that  there  are  different  ways  
of  thinking  about,  and  within,  one’s  research.  The  approaches  evinced  here,  
‘thinking-­as-­product’  and  ‘thinking-­as-­process’,  can  be  considered  as  being  
on  a  continuum  (whereby  thinking  is  considered  in  more  instrumental  or  
value-­laden  terms),  with  different  types  of  research  residing  at  either  end  of  
the  scale,  and  at  various  points  in  between.          
  
The  following  processes  are  thus  constitutive  of  the  ‘method’  employed  in  
this  thesis:  ‘reading-­as-­research’,  ‘writing-­as-­research’  (Fulford  and  
Hodgson,  2016,  p.144,  p.5),  and  ‘thinking-­as-­process’.  The  philosophical  
‘method’  used  here  will  consist  of  these  practices  of  reading,  writing,  and  
thinking  which  are  inextricably  linked.  I  will  engage  in  a  dialogue  with  a  
particular  set  of  texts,  which  will  be  detailed  below,  and  will  draw  several  
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authors  together  in  a  conversation  to  reflect  on  the  educational  implications  
of  current  marketised  discourses  in  Higher  Education.      
  
2.4  My  Philosophical  ‘Method’  
The  philosophical  ‘method’  adopted  in  this  thesis  could  be  considered  as  an  
iterative  process  of  reading,  writing,  and  thinking  in  dialogue  with  a  set  of  
texts  and  their  authors.  This  research,  as  with  others  in  educational  
philosophy,  cannot  be  separated  from  the  sources  used  to  inform  it.  The  
philosophers  I  will  engage  with  in  this  thesis  may  appear  rather  tangential  in  
their  relation  to  Higher  Education,  in  fact,  they  are  not  regarded  as  
philosophers  or  theorists  of  education  in  the  same  way  as,  for  example,  John  
Dewey  or  Alfred  North  Whitehead  are.  But  the  works  and  authors  that  I  bring  
to  bear  on  this  research  do  have  an  educative  force,  wherein  ‘education’  is  
considered  in  its  broadest  sense  as  a  way  of  life,  rather  than  mere  
instruction  or  schooling.  The  pertinence  of  each  philosopher  to  this  thesis  will  
be  explained  further  in  what  follows,  but  as  Amanda  Fulford  describes,  
approaching  an  issue  ‘almost  obliquely’  can  enable  one  to  ‘gain  a  different  
perspective’  (Fulford  and  Hodgson,  2016,  p.47).    
  
The  philosophers  I  engage  with  each  contribute  to  the  discussion  in  a  
particular  way  and  thus  situate  my  work  in  relation  to  a  number  of  themes:  
an  attention  to  language,  conceptions  of  voice,  perfectionism,  and  ethical  
relationships.  In  what  follows,  I  discuss  these  central  themes,  indicating  how  
the  works  of  each  philosopher  either  add  to  and/or  transform  the  discussion  
of  each  theme.  As  noted  above,  philosophical  questions  often  have  their  
roots  in  more  practical  concerns,  the  practical  questions  being  addressed  in  
this  thesis  include:  ‘what  do  we  mean  by  student  “voice”?’;;  ‘how  does  
marketisation  affect  academic-­student  relationships?’  and;;  ‘can  we  really  
understand  students’  experiences  from  survey  feedback?’  These  very  
practical  concerns  will  be  examined  further  using  the  philosophical  literature,  
but  the  central  themes  may  be  expressed  differently  in  doing  so.  I  will  now  
outline  four  themes  that  are  pertinent  to  this  thesis,  detailing  the  contribution  
of  each  philosopher  selected  to  these  themes.    
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2.4.1  An  Attention  to  Language    
An  attention  to  language  permeates  this  thesis,  as  it  is  through  a  considered  
use  of  language  that  the  analysis  of  student  satisfaction  discourses  will  be  
presented.  At  its  most  basic,  this  thesis  is  concerned  with  how  student  
satisfaction  can  be  understood  through  the  language  used  about  it;;  an  
exploration  of  how  ‘satisfaction’  is  tied  to  concepts  such  as  ‘service  quality’,  
‘employability’,  and  ‘value  for  money’  will  be  central  to  the  research  
presented  here.  Two  of  the  philosophers  I  draw  on,  Cavell  and  Heidegger,  
share  a  concern  with  language,  with  the  way  we  ‘word  the  world’,  and  with  
how  the  world  is  disclosed  to  us  through  language.  Both  Cavell  and  
Heidegger  have  felt  the  weight  of  what  is  known  as  a  ‘state  of  
inexpressibility,  of  words  not  matching  our  [their]  needs’,  and  they  have  
responded  in  kind  by  reframing  what  it  means  to  express  one’s  voice  in  
philosophy  (Cavell,  2005b,  p.220).  Cavell  and  Heidegger  have  each  in  their  
own  way  been  forced  to  shun  traditional  philosophical  convention  in  order  to  
express  their  ideas.  
  
For  Heidegger  (1962),  in  his  seminal  work  Being  and  Time  (hereafter  BT),  
this  meant  creating  neologisms  comprised  almost  entirely  of  verbs.  The  
language  used  in  BT  is  a  language  of  activity,  and  in  developing  his  own  
compound  words,  Heidegger  enacts  the  very  structure  of  temporality  he  
discusses.  The  (re-­)invention  of  ordinary  German  words  was  for  Heidegger  
not  merely  an  exercise  in  creativity,  but  was  fundamental  to  his  project  in  
writing  BT.  For  Cavell,  the  movement  away  from  traditional  philosophy  is  
evinced  in  a  different  way,  albeit  still  in  terms  of  rethinking  what  it  is  to  write  
philosophically.    
  
Cavell’s  work  deals  with  among  other  topics,  issues  of  voice,  skepticism,  and  
language  and  community  (to  be  discussed  further  below).  Although  his  
writings  do  not  directly  address  education  –  at  least,  not  in  the  sense  of  
formal  schooling  –  the  educative  force  of  his  work  has  been  recognised  
(Fulford,  2012;;  Saito  and  Standish,  2012;;  Standish  and  Saito,  2017).  Cavell  
has  fought  for  the  legitimate  use  of  autobiography  in  philosophical  writing,  
and  in  his  own  writing  he  explains  this  as  follows:  ‘I  am  unsure  for  whose  
views  beyond  mine  I  would  be  speaking’  (1994,  p.4).  
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In  his  movement  away  from  traditional  (analytic)  philosophy,  Cavell  turns  to  
the  tradition  of  ordinary  language  philosophy  (OLP),  which  he  inherits  from  
the  work  of  J.L.  Austin  and  the  later  Wittgenstein.  OLP  can  be  briefly  
summarised  as  the  task  of  ‘leading  words  back  from  their  metaphysical  to  
their  everyday  use’;;  it  is  concerned  with  our  everyday  utterances  and  use  of  
language  (Wittgenstein,  1963,  §116).  This  concern  with  the  ordinary  explains  
why  Cavell  draws  on  examples  from  Hollywood  film,  Shakespearean  plays,  
and  the  world  of  opera  in  his  writings,  rather  than  relying  on  more  abstract  
metaphysical  examples.  While  their  concern  with  language  is  manifested  in  
very  different  ways  and  is  informed  by  different  perspectives  
(phenomenology  for  Heidegger,  and  OLP  for  Cavell),  nevertheless  there  is  a  
shared  concern  with  language,  and  this  is  reflected  in  their  innovative  
approaches  to  writing  and  doing  philosophy.  I  will  discuss  this  attention  to,  
and  creativity  with,  language  in  Chapter  Five,  where  I  will  examine  the  
effect(s)  of  introducing  market  terminology  into  pedagogical  relationships.    
  
An  attention  to  language  is  not  only  evident  throughout  this  thesis,  but  it  is  
also  influential  for  the  ‘method’  employed  here.  As  Naoko  Saito  highlights,  
both  ‘philosophy  as  autobiography’  and  ‘philosophy  as  translation’  are  
constitutive  of  Cavell’s  philosophical  ‘method’  (2007a;;  2009;;  2015).  I  have  
noted  above  that  Cavell  ardently  defends  his  use  of  autobiography  in  his  
writings;;  in  doing  so,  this  gives  credence  to  autobiography  as  a  ‘method’.  
The  scenes  used  to  introduce  this  chapter,  and  the  scenarios  composed  in  
subsequent  chapters,  are  autobiographical  in  nature,  but  fictionalised.  
Perhaps  more  fundamental  to  this  thesis  though,  is  the  use  and  embodiment  
of  ‘translation’  as  a  methodological  tool.    
  
Here,  I  do  not  mean  ‘translation’  in  the  traditional  sense  –  as  in  a  translation  
from  one  language  to  another  –  but  instead  refer  to  a  translation  within  one’s  
native  language  that  heightens  understanding  of  the  subtle  nuances  inherent  
in  language  itself.  This  can  be  termed  an  ‘inter-­discursive’  and/or  
‘intralinguistic’  translation.  As  Claudia  Ruitenberg  states,  inter-­discursive  
translation,  as  a  means  of  displacement  can  ‘arrest  thinking  about  a  text’  
(2009,  p.426).  What  Ruitenberg  means  by  ‘inter-­discursive’  translation  is  a  
shifting  of  discourses  ‘into  other  discursive  registers  so  as  to  enable  new  
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questions  about  them’  (2009,  p.428).  In  this  thesis,  I  will  be  aiming  to  not  
only  arrest  thinking  about  particular  texts,  such  as  Thoreau’s  Walden,  but  
also  to  arrest  and  disrupt  thinking  about  certain  discourses  in  universities.    
  
This  thesis  can  be  considered  as  an  act  of,  and  epitomising,  translation  in  
the  Cavellian  sense,  whereby  ‘translation’  encompasses  more  than  simply  
changing  words  from  one  language  to  another.  As  Saito  explains,  Cavell’s  
use  of  ‘translation’  as  part  of  his  ‘method’  is  one  in  which  the  act  of  
translating  a  text  implicates  the  translator  themselves.  As  she  writes  of  the  
experience  of  translating  Senses  of  Walden  (Cavell,  1981a)  into  Japanese,  
Saito  notes  that  ‘it  was  a  process  in  which  existing  Japanese  translations  of  
Walden  were  destabilised,  the  meanings  of  its  sentences  and  words  
overturned’  (2007a,  p.263).  The  difficulty  of  translation  (both  within  a  
language  and  between  different  languages)  is  not  merely  being  able  to  find  
the  right  words  to  exchange  for  one  another,  but  comes  from  a  sense  of  
alienation  from  one’s  own  language  community.  Saito  describes  this  as  a  
recognition  of  the  ‘foreign  within  the  native’  (2007a,  p.271),  and  such  an  
attention  to  language  is  provocative  of  transformation  and  conversion.  
Incorporating  a  tenet  of  Cavell’s  ‘method’  into  my  own,  the  translation  
evoked  here  will  involve  disrupting  common  understandings  of  terms  such  
as  ‘student  satisfaction’.  
  
2.4.2  Conceptions  of  ‘Voice’  
Conceptions  of  ‘voice’  are  central  to  this  thesis  and  will  be  explored  
throughout,  but  particularly  in  Chapter  Three.  Chapter  Three  will  address  a  
fundamental  concern  that  is  neglected  in  the  empirical  literature,  namely  that  
student  ‘voice’  is  conceptualised  as  the  mere  collection  of  feedback.  Drawing  
on  the  works  of  Stanley  Cavell,  I  will  argue  that  ‘voice’  consists  in  much  
more  than  the  comments  made  on  satisfaction  surveys.  Cavell  has  written  
extensively  about  ‘voice’  in  relation  to  film  (1996;;  2005a),  and  he  has  also  
expressed  concerns  that  traditional  (analytic)  philosophy  may  ‘arrogate  
voice’  (1994,  p.10);;  in  addressing  this  issue  of  the  denial  of  voice,  Cavell  
asserts  his  own  right  to  write  autobiographically  in  philosophy.    
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What  Cavell’s  work  adds  to  this  the  theme  of  ‘voice’  is  an  opening  up  of  how  
the  term  is  conceptualised,  taking  in  ideas  of  selfhood,  and  pursuing  what  it  
means  for  one’s  voice  to  be  withheld  and/or  recovered  (1994;;  1996).  This  
richer  conception  of  ‘voice’  will  be  elucidated  by  drawing  on  film,  a  ‘method’  
used  by  Cavell  himself.  The  discussion  of  ‘voice’  in  this  thesis  will  thus  be  




Another  important  theme  to  be  explored  in  this  thesis  is  ‘Emersonian  moral  
perfectionism’,  a  concept  described  by  Cavell  (1990)  through  drawing  on  the  
work  of  Ralph  Waldo  Emerson.  Perfectionism  is  a  concern  with  the  moral  
life,  with  how  one  lives  according  to  their  [one’s]  own  principles,  and  in  
communion  with  others.  Building  on  Emerson’s  work,  Cavell  emphasises  
that  perfectionism  is  not  about  ‘perfectibility’,  or  reaching  a  final  telos,  a  
perfect  state  of  the  self  (1990,  p.3)  –  in  fact,  Emerson’s  conception  of  the  
self  is  characterised  by  antifoundationalism,  the  idea  that  the  self  cannot  be  
finalised.  In  Conditions  Handsome  and  Unhandsome  (1990),  Cavell  outlines  
what  he  means  by  ‘perfectionism’  as  follows:  ‘there  is  no  one  
unattained/attainable  self  we  repetitively  never  arrive  at,  but  rather…“having”  
“a”  self  is  a  process  of  moving  to,  and  from,  nexts’  (p.12).    
  
Ineluctably  tied  to  the  concept  of  ‘perfectionism’  –  the  idea  that  the  self  is  
always  in  flux  and  in  a  process  of  becoming  –  are  themes  of  leaving,  
unsettlement,  and  crises  in  the  work  of  Emerson’s  contemporary,  Henry  
David  Thoreau.  As  I  will  discuss  in  Chapter  Four,  one  of  the  key  issues  with  
student  satisfaction  is  that  it  implies  a  certain  teleology  to  one’s  Higher  
Education,  in  essence,  that  upon  graduation  one’s  education  is  ‘complete’.  
This  teleology  relates  to  the  fact  that  settlement  is  inherent  to  ‘satisfaction’  
(etymologically),  but  in  this  thesis  I  will  explore  whether  and  in  what  sense  
satisfaction  could  be  perfectionist,  hence  always  attained  and  yet  to  be  
attained.        
  
In  his  seminal  book,  Walden  (1854/1997),  Thoreau  explains  how  leaving  can  
be  educative,  and  that  crises  are  important  for  self-­transformation/cultivation.  
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Both  leaving  and  crises  imply  a  sense  of  unsettlement,  which  Thoreau  sees  
as  a  renewal  or  rebirth  of  the  self,  contrary  to  the  commonly  accepted  
pejorative  connotations  of  these  terms.  It  is  only  in  leaving  or  undergoing  a  
crisis  that  one  is  able  to  close  that  particular  circle,  ‘around  which  another  
can  be  drawn’  (Emerson,  1841/2000,  p.252).  I  will  engage  with  the  works  of  
Thoreau  and  Emerson  in  Chapter  Four,  as  a  response  to  concerns  that  
settling  students  down  and  meeting  their  expectations  may  not  be  educative  
in  the  richer  sense  referred  to  by  these  philosophers.  Perfectionism  is  
important  throughout  the  thesis  as  it  offers  a  space  for  critique  and  
resistance  against  the  kind  of  ‘end-­stopped’  (Sturm,  2011,  p.6),  instrumental  
student  satisfaction  in  Higher  Education  that  is  currently  expected  under  the  
market  model.    
  
The  antifoundationalism  of  Emersonian  moral  perfectionism  is  pertinent  to  
both  Chapters  Three  and  Four  as  it  opens  up,  rather  than  closes  down,  the  
educative  possibilities  of  recovering/expressing  one’s  voice  and  of  being  
unsettled.  The  discourses  of  student  ‘voice’  and  satisfaction  position  
students  in  a  particular  way,  as  ‘customers’  or  ‘consumers’  (Bay  and  Daniel,  
2001;;  Blackmore,  2009),  which  constrains  their  moral  outlook  to  what  is  
expected  of  them  by  the  labour  market  (and  neoliberalism  more  broadly).  
The  impulse  to  perfectionism  begins  in  crises,  that  is,  from  an  undeniable  
sense  that  ‘either  you  or  the  world  is  wrong’  (Cavell,  2005a,  p.29).  But  in  
aiming  to  satisfy  students,  all  forms  of  unsettlement  and  crises  are  prevented  
as  they  could  lead  to  dissatisfaction,  which  is  vilified  in  the  era  of  
accountability  and  commodification.  The  theme  of  perfectionism,  and  
therefore  the  works  of  Thoreau,  Emerson,  and  Cavell,  is  of  paramount  
importance  to  this  thesis  as  it  offers  an  alternative  vision  of  Higher  Education  
to  that  exemplified  in  the  widespread  use  of  student  satisfaction  measures.        
  
2.4.4  Ethical  Relationships  
A  concern  with  the  ethical,  in  one’s  relationships  with  others  and  with  the  
world,  is  also  central  to  this  thesis.  Ethical  relationships  will  be  considered  
particularly  in  Chapters  Three  and  Five,  where  I  will  discuss  how  the  
expression  of  ‘voice’  ties  one  to  a  particular  language  community,  and  
investigate  how  the  contractualisation  of  academic-­student  relationships  
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affects  the  nature  of  dialogue  that  is  permissible  in  such  interactions.  The  
philosophers  who  contribute  most  to  an  exploration  of  this  theme  are  Cavell  
and  Martin  Buber.    
  
For  Cavell,  ethical  relationships  are  central  to  Emersonian  moral  
perfectionism,  to  what  it  means  to  ‘do’  philosophy,  and  to  how  people  
express  themselves  in  language.  As  I  will  discuss  further  in  Chapter  Three,  
conceptions  of  ‘voice’  are  inextricably  tied  to  one’s  language  community.  In  
expressing  one’s  voice,  there  is  an  extent  to  which  one  must  conform  to  the  
criteria  laid  out  by  their  language  community  in  order  to  make  oneself  
intelligible  to  others  (Cavell,  1979a).  While  these  criteria  are  often  implicit,  
one’s  agreement  in  criteria  must  be  given  freely  (and  thus  ethically).    
  
For  Cavell,  skepticism  in  ethical  relationships  is  expressed  as  the  worry  that  
one  may  never  truly  know  another.  Gaining  knowledge  of  another,  and  
hence  being  in  relation  with  them,  is  arrived  at  through  language.  While  
Cavell  acknowledges  –  building  on  the  work  of  the  later  Wittgenstein  –  that  
this  skepticism  can  never  be  fully  overcome,  building  relationships  with  
others  through  language  is  a  case  of  invoking  the  ‘we’,  creating  mutuality  by  
establishing  what  ‘we’  mean  in  saying  a  particular  word  (1979a,  p.179).  
Appeals  to  the  ‘other’  in  this  sense,  as  appeals  to  the  ‘we’,  epitomise  the  
impulse  to  ordinary  language  philosophy  (Cavell,  1979a;;  1994;;  Gould,  
1998).    
  
Ethical  relationships  are  also  important  in  perfectionism,  as  a  concern  with  
the  moral  life  is  expressed  in  how  one  understands  oneself,  one’s  relation  to  
others,  and  to  the  world.  In  Chapter  Five,  as  part  of  the  discussion  of  
‘customer  relations’  in  Higher  Education,  I  will  outline  how  one’s  
relationships  with  others,  particularly  those  who  provoke  the  impulse  to  
perfectionism,  are  central  to  working  towards  the  transformation  sought.  
Rather  than  being  transformative,  I  will  argue  that  marketised  and  
(increasingly)  contractualised  academic-­student  relationships  are  shaped  by  
an  economic  rationality  premised  upon  exchange,  with  the  lack  of  
communion  in  such  interactions  merely  reinforcing  the  individuation  of  
student-­consumers.  In  Chapter  Five,  I  will  also  draw  on  another  aspect  of  
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Cavell’s  work  (2005b)  –  his  extension  of  J.L.  Austin’s  speech  act  theory  –  to  
argue  that  genuine  ethical  relationships  between  oneself  and  the  other  may  
necessitate  confrontation,  risk,  and  exchange  (things  typically  avoided  in  
service  provider-­consumer  encounters  in  Higher  Education).    
  
This  engagement  with  the  other  as  an  ‘other’  will  be  explained  further  by  
drawing  on  the  work  of  Martin  Buber.  In  his  works,  Buber  imagines  poetically  
how  we  might  relate  to  each  other,  and  ultimately,  to  God.  Buber  then  builds  
on  these  ideas,  linking  different  modes  of  dialogue  to  contemporary  issues  in  
religious  ethics,  psychology,  art,  and  crucially  for  my  arguments  here,  
education.  The  educational  force  of  Buber’s  work  has  already  been  
recognised,  with  philosophers  of  education  using  his  work  to  discuss  the  
different  modes  of  dialogue  at  work  in  the  classroom  (Nolan  and  Stitzlein,  
2016),  and  the  format  of  academic  tutorials  in  HE  (Fulford,  2016a).  Buber’s  
ideas  on  how  we  may  relate  to,  and  engage  with,  others  are  important  for  my  
discussion  in  Chapter  Five,  which  will  be  focused  on  the  rise  of  ‘customer  
relations’  in  Higher  Education.    
  
Buber  (1947/2002;;  1970)  was  deeply  concerned  with  how  we  relate  to  
others,  which  he  explains  as  depending  on  whether  one  recognises  the  
other  as  an  ‘other’  akin  to  themselves,  or  instead  objectifies  them.  As  Buber  
(1947/2002)  argues,  one’s  relation  with  another  may  be  characterised  by  
different  modes  of  dialogue,  ranging  from  the  genuine  to  the  debased;;  this  
distinction  will  be  invaluable  for  the  consideration  of  academic-­student  
relationships,  and  the  dialogue  constitutive  of  such  relations,  in  Chapter  
Five.  The  philosophy  of  Buber  will  advance  the  arguments  pursued  here  by  
bringing  in  an  attention  to  relationships,  encounter,  and  dialogue  that  is  
currently  removed  from  the  marketised  HE  sector.  Buber’s  work  is  central  to  
this  thesis,  as  his  conception  of  ethical  relationships  offers  an  alternative  to  
the  current  proceduralisation  of  academic-­student  relationships  under  strict  
accountability  and  performativity  measures.  
  
While  the  philosophical  works  I  will  engage  with  in  this  thesis  are  aligned  
with  different  traditions,  and  the  philosophers  themselves  come  from  very  
different  backgrounds,  there  are  lines  of  connection  to  be  made  between  
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them  and  several  common  themes  emerge:  an  attention  to  language;;  
conceptions  of  ‘voice;;  Emersonian  moral  perfectionism,  and;;  a  focus  on  
ethical  relationships  with  the  other.  These  themes  will  be  explored  through  
an  iterative  process  of  reading-­as-­research,  writing-­as-­research  (Fulford  and  
Hodgson,  2016,  p.5),  and  thinking  (as-­process).  In  order  to  consolidate  this  
discussion  of  philosophical  ‘method’,  I  will  now  return  to  the  opening  
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SCENE  THREE  
Richard  and  Claire  are  having  a  supervision  meeting  to  discuss  progress  on  
her  dissertation  project.    
  
Richard:  Morning  Claire,  how  are  you  getting  on?  
  
Claire:  Alright  yes,  I  have  read  that  book  that  you  suggested  last  time.  
  
Richard:  And  was  it  helpful?  
  
Claire:  Definitely…though  I’m  still  a  bit  unsure  of  how  to  actually  start  the  
dissertation  or  what  my  ‘method’  involves.  Last  year,  we  had  a  whole  
module  on  Research  Methods  and  I  don’t  think  it  applies  in  this  
case…  
  
Richard:  Indeed.  Research  Methods  modules  do  tend  to  focus  on  empirical  
research  and  data  collection  rather  than  philosophical  research.  Have  
you  been  doing  any  other  reading  around  this  topic?  
  
Claire:  Yes,  I  have  a  few  great  books  on  ‘the  self’  and  have  started  to  make  
some  comparisons  between  how  it  is  understood  in  psychology  and  in  
philosophy…but  I’m  not  clear  on  where  to  go  from  here.  
  
Richard:  Well  the  next  step  in  our  philosophical  ‘method’,  if  it  could  be  said  
that  we  actually  have  a  ‘method’,  is  to  think  about  and  reflect  on  what  
you  have  read  so  far.  
  
Claire:  So  I  have  to  just  sit  and  think?  That  doesn’t  seem  very  productive…  
  
Richard:  While  thinking  might  not  feel  like  you  are  doing  much,  research  of  
this  kind  cannot  proceed  without  it…thinking  is  an  important  part  of  
research  in  philosophy  of  education.  
  
Claire:  Ok,  so  I  need  to  spend  some  time  thinking,  that’s  fine.  But  then  what  
do  I  need  to  do?  
  
Richard:  You  need  to  clarify  which  concepts  you  will  be  talking  about  and  
reflect  on  why  they  are  central  to  your  dissertation…then  you  might  
want  to  start  writing  so  that  you  can  think  about  the  topic  in  a  slightly  
different  way.  
  
Claire:  Writing  8,000  words  feels  very  intimidating  right  now,  I  still  don’t  know  
where  to  start…  
  
Richard:  Most  philosophers  still  experience  that  kind  of  ‘unknownness’,  in  
one  sense  it  might  be  easier  if  we  had  a  list  of  specific  ‘methods’  to  
choose  from.  But  just  focus  on  the  key  themes  or  concepts  and  start  
by  writing  about  what  made  you  so  interested  in  this  topic.  Does  that  
sound  alright?  
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Claire:  Yes,  thanks  for  your  help.  I’ll  send  you  a  draft  when  I  have  started  





This  research  opens  up  from  a  consideration  of  the  key  concepts  pertaining  
to  the  research  ‘question’  as  suggested  in  scene  three,  while  the  processes  
of  reading,  writing,  and  thinking  in  all  forms  of  research  in  philosophy  of  
education  are  iterative  and  cyclical.  In  this  vein,  I  will  now  turn  in  Part  II  to  a  
discussion  of  three  key  concepts  that  are  integral  to  the  research  presented  
here:  voice,  settlement,  and  customer  relations.      
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Part  II  
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Chapter  3  
Student  Voice:  Conformity,  Compliance,  and  Self-­Reliance.  
Scenario  1  
A  team  meeting  in  a  university  setting  is  about  to  begin.  The  teaching  team  
are  gathered  together  to  discuss  potential  strategies  for  improving  NSS  
results.  
  
Curriculum  manager:  Morning  everyone,  how  are  we  all  feeling?  I  hope  the  
teaching’s  going  well  so  far.  
  
[Some  of  the  teaching  staff  nod  but  remain  silent].  
  
Curriculum  manager:  Ok,  so  the  first  item  on  our  agenda  is  the  mid-­module  
reviews  I’ve  asked  you  all  to  do  with  your  student  groups.  How  are  we  
coming  along  with  those,  do  you  think  we  can  get  all  students  to  fill  
them  in  before  the  deadline?  
  
Academic  1:  Well,  I’ve  handed  them  out  and  the  majority  of  students  have  
filled  them  in,  but  they  do  seem  a  bit  dubious  about  filling  in  a  survey  
after  only  three  weeks  of  teaching…  
  
Curriculum  manager:  Ah  right,  yes,  I  know  what  you  mean.  It  is  collecting  
their  voice  at  an  early  stage  admittedly,  but  it  helps  us  to  make  any  
necessary  changes  before  they  come  to  fill  in  the  NSS.  
  
Academic  1:  Oh,  ok,  so  these  reviews  are  like  a  pre-­emptive  measure  of  
how  our  students  might  rate  us  on  the  NSS…  
  
Curriculum  manager:  Yes.  And  we  need  their  feedback  now  in  order  to  
tackle  any  issues  or  problems  before  they  are  able  to  voice  their  
concerns  more  formally…I’m  sure  we  all  know  what  bad  NSS  ratings  
can  do  to  an  institution  these  days.    
  
Academic  2:  I  did  have  a  question  about  these  reviews  though.  Do  they  have  
any  impact  on  staff  appraisals  and  our  job  security?  I  mean,  it  can  be  
difficult  at  times  to  please  all  of  our  students  regardless  of  what  we  
do,  and  they  often  only  think  about  negative  aspects  of  their  
experience  when  it  comes  to  filling  in  surveys.    
  
Curriculum  manager:  The  short  answer  to  your  question  is  no,  student  
feedback  at  this  point  in  the  academic  year  does  not  directly  affect  my  
and  your  line  managers’  judgments  of  how  you’re  performing.  But  
ultimately,  if  students  aren’t  happy  with  what  they’re  paying  for  this  
could  come  back  to  bite  us  further  down  the  line  in  terms  of  NSS  
scores  and  league  table  position…which  affects  job  security  for  us  all.    
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Academic  3:  But  with  these  measures  being  so  important,  do  students  even  
know  what  the  questions  are  really  asking?    
  
Academic  1:  No,  I  think  they  only  consider,  let’s  say  feedback,  in  terms  of  
our  comments  on  their  assignments,  without  taking  into  account  the  
informal  feedback  we’re  giving  them  in  class  all  the  time.    
  
Curriculum  manager:  That’s  an  interesting  question,  which  brings  me  on  to  
our  new  strategy  for  improving  NSS  ratings.  The  plan  is  that  all  staff  
will  go  through  each  survey  question  and  explain  what  it  refers  to  
before  handing  them  out  to  students.  That  way,  we  can  make  sure  
that  they  actually  read  and  understand  each  question  before  filling  it  
in,  meaning  the  institution  may  come  off  better.  How  does  that  sound?  
  
Academic  3:  I  mean,  it  makes  sense  to  me  that  it’s  worth  explaining  to  
students  what  they  are  being  asked  about,  but  I  wouldn’t  want  to  think  
that  I  had  interfered  with  their  answers  either…  
  
Curriculum  manager:  Well,  we’re  not  telling  them  exactly  what  to  say  and  
how  to  respond,  obviously  that’s  up  to  them.  However,  clarifying  what  
they  are  responding  to  is  important  I  think.    
  
Academic  2:  I’m  not  too  sure  about  this  strategy,  aren’t  we  then  ‘gaming  the  
system’  in  a  way?  
  
Academic  1:  To  be  fair  though,  University  X  is  doing  the  same.  They  even  
tell  students  that  bad  NSS  ratings  can  devalue  their  degrees  in  the  
labour  market…  
  
Curriculum  manager:  I  don’t  think  our  new  policy  would  be  considered  as  
‘gaming  the  system’,  it’s  just  a  matter  of  explaining  to  students  how  
important  these  surveys  are,  even  the  mid-­module  reviews  we  ask  
them  to  complete,  and  encouraging  them  to  spend  more  than  two  
minutes  filling  them  in.  Right,  if  everyone’s  clear  then  let’s  move  on  to  













-­  66  -­  
Scenario  2  
A  lecture  on  an  undergraduate  programme  in  Education  is  about  to  begin.  
The  students  are  in  their  final  year.    
  
Lecturer:  Morning  everyone,  I  hope  you’ve  been  getting  on  alright  with  the  
readings  I  gave  you  last  week.  Just  before  we  get  started,  can  I  ask  
you  all  to  fill  in  the  mid-­module  review  form  on  your  tables.    
  
Student  1:  Ah,  not  these  forms  again…we  had  to  fill  them  out  on  Tuesday  as  
well  with  another  tutor.  
  
Lecturer:  I  know,  you  might  have  filled  one  in  already,  but  we  have  to  
complete  them  for  each  module  separately.    
  
Student  2:  It  seems  a  bit  early  to  give  a  review,  doesn’t  it?  We’ve  only  got  
three  weeks  to  talk  about  here…  
  
Lecturer:  Yes,  it  is  quite  early  but  we’re  asking  for  your  feedback  now  so  that  
myself  and  the  rest  of  the  team  can  make  improvements  to  your  
experience  before  getting  to  the  end  and  realising  that  certain  things  
haven’t  been  working  for  you.  Now,  before  you  fill  them  out  I  just  need  
to  explain  what  it’s  asking  about  in  terms  of  feedback.  Obviously,  you  
haven’t  handed  in  your  assignment  yet  so  that  question  is  really  
asking  about  informal  feedback  that  I’ve  given  to  you  in  sessions,  as  
well  as  any  responses  I’ve  sent  you  via  email.  Is  that  clear?  So,  
feedback  is  not  only  the  comments  you  get  on  summative  
assignments,  but  it  includes  the  responses  I’ve  given  to  individual  
queries.    
  
Student  1:  [sighing]  I  feel  like  I  haven’t  got  much  to  say  on  this  module  yet…  
  
Lecturer:  Ah.  I  know  it  might  seem  odd  to  have  a  mid-­module  review  now  
and  one  at  the  end,  but  we  really  are  trying  to  capture  your  voice  and  
listen  to  it  constructively.    
  
Student  3:  Aww,  right.  I  thought  that’s  what  the  student  committees  were  for  
though?  
  
Lecturer:  Yes,  the  course  committee  meetings  are  also  a  chance  for  you  to  
make  your  voices  heard,  but  that’s  about  your  overall  experience  of  
the  programme  and  this  is  focused  on  each  module.  [3  –  4  minutes  
elapse.  Some  students  are  writing  on  the  evaluation  forms]  Ok,  have  
you  all  had  chance  to  fill  the  form  in  now?  [Students  nod  in  response].  
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3.1  Measuring  Student  Voice  
What  I  have  sought  to  illustrate  in  both  opening  scenarios  is  the  extent  to  
which  the  measurement  and  ‘collection’  of  student  voice  is  now  prolific  in  
universities  across  the  UK.  As  measures  such  as  the  National  Student  
Survey  (NSS),  the  Student  Experience  Survey  (SES),  and  the  ‘Graduate  
Outcomes’  survey  have  become  increasingly  prominent  in  the  HE  sector,  
universities  have  devised  their  own  strategies  and  policies  to  improve  
institutional  reputation  and  league  table  position.  Scenario  1  clearly  
highlights  how  the  collection  of  student  voice  is  often  motivated  by  market  
concerns  rather  than  an  encouragement  of  students’  free  expression  and  
empowerment,  with  universities  edging  ever  closer  to  what  could  be  
considered  as  ‘inappropriate  influence’  over  the  results  (Ipsos  MORI,  2017,  
p.6).    
  
The  newly  formed  Office  for  Students  (OfS)  has  been  explicitly  tasked  with  
investigating  allegations  of  ‘inappropriate  influence’  of  universities  on  the  
completion  and  results  of  the  NSS.  As  the  OfS  and  Ipsos  MORI  (the  
statistics  agency  responsible  for  conducting  the  NSS)  state,  a  university’s  
role  in  the  NSS  process  should  only  be  to  advertise  the  survey  to  the  
appropriate  groups  of  students,  namely  those  in  the  final  year  of  
undergraduate  study.  Institutional  campaigns  should  be  kept  separate  from  
NSS  activities,  with  some  examples  of  ‘inappropriate  influence’  including  
getting  students  to  fill  in  the  survey  in  mandatory  sessions,  and/or  explaining  
the  questions  to  them.  While  the  policy  proposed  in  scenario  1  may  be  an  
exaggeration  of  the  daily  practices  and  policies  of  contemporary  universities,  
I  shall  use  this  partly  fictionalised  scenario  as  a  heuristic  tool  for  exploring  
current  iterations  of  student  voice  initiatives.    
  
Scenario  2  should  seem  all  too  familiar  to  many  academics:  students  
questioning  the  usefulness  of  measures  that  are  apparently  implemented  for  
their  own  good,  and  academics  forced  to  comply  with  their  use.  Again,  this  
scenario  is  fictionalised  but  is  based  on  real  experiences  of  studying  and  
working  in  Higher  Education.  What  scenario  2  makes  clear  is  that  often,  the  
student  voice  is  collected  for  institutions’  and  policy-­makers’  benefit  rather  
than  for  students  themselves.  Interestingly,  where  students  do  seem  to  
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express  their  own  voices  in  the  scenario,  this  is  to  denigrate  the  usefulness  
of  the  survey  itself.  So,  if  we  were  really  listening  to  ‘the  student  voice’,  then  
surely  this  would  resolve  the  issue  of  ‘survey  fatigue’  (Adams  and  Umbach,  
2012,  p.579),  a  common  complaint  for  students  who  are  repeatedly  
reminded  to  complete  the  NSS  by  email,  text,  and  phone  call.  As  the  
lecturer’s  comment  at  the  end  –  ‘let’s  get  started  with  today’s  session’  –  
shows,  it  is  almost  as  if  conducting  student  evaluations  of  teaching  gets  in  
the  way  of  teaching  itself,  meaning  that  formal  measures  of  student  voice  
may  encroach  upon,  rather  than  bolster  the  value  of,  the  student  experience.        
  
In  both  scenarios,  the  idea  that  academics  should  explain  survey  questions  
to  students  before  they  fill  in  their  answers  seems  disingenuous  at  best,  and  
at  worst,  could  constitute  a  limiting  of  voice  within  certain  parameters.  While  
collecting  and  acknowledging  the  student  voice  looks  to  be  an  empowering  
ideal,  in  practice,  students  can  only  respond  to  whatever  institutions  have  
decided  to  ask  them  about,  and  then  their  responses  may  also  be  restricted  
to  Likert-­type  response  scales.  A  central  issue  to  be  explored  in  this  chapter  
is  that  initiatives  such  as  the  NSS  and  module  evaluation  questionnaires  
tend  to  ‘homogenise  students  and  deprive  them  of  agency  at  the  same  time  
as  apparently  giving  them  “voice”’  (Sabri,  2011,  p.657).  That  attempts  to  
collect  and/or  ‘measure’  the  student  voice  often  result  in  a  limiting  of  voice  is,  
as  I  will  argue,  largely  due  to  the  fact  that  such  measures  are  typically  
imposed  on  students  from  without,  and  that  they  stem  from  institutional  
objectives  rather  than  student  concerns.    
  
While  this  is  not  directly  referred  to  in  the  two  scenarios  above,  it  is  also  a  
common  practice  for  students  to  be  rewarded  in  some  way  for  filling  in  
numerous  surveys.  Incentives  may  include  free  printing,  tea  and  coffee,  
chocolate,  entry  into  a  prize  draw  etc.  But  in  effect,  offering  inducements  in  
exchange  for  student  feedback  can  reduce  the  whole  process  to  a  mere  
financial  transaction,  rather  than  a  meaningful  interaction.  If  the  collection  of  
student  voice  is  understood  as  transactional,  then  this  again  reinforces  the  
limiting  and  restriction  of  voice.  The  limiting  of  ‘voice’  here  is  not  only  
structural  –  in  terms  of  the  questions  asked  and  responses  available  on  
surveys  –  but  also  relational,  meaning  that  how  students  understand  the  
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function  of  voice  initiatives  relative  to  their  experience  affects  the  expression  
of  their  own  voice.  It  surely  does  not  go  unnoticed  by  students  that  the  
feedback  collected  at  the  end  of  an  academic  year  will  generally  be  used  to  
improve  provision  for  the  following  year,  meaning  that  those  students  who  
lend  their  voice  to  a  particular  measure  may  not  directly  benefit  from  doing  
so.    
  
Another  key  issue  with  student  voice  measures  is  that  they  may  not  be  as  
democratic  as  they  appear  to  be,  given  that  responses  to  surveys  cannot  be  
made  on  students’  own  terms.  While  both  national  and  institutional  initiatives  
target  individuals  and  purport  to  acknowledge  their  voices,  it  remains  up  to  
HE  managers  and  policy-­makers  to  decide  which  students’  feedback  is  
presented  in  marketing  campaigns,  while  other  voices  may  be  suppressed  or  
ignored  altogether.  Even  in  campaigns  such  as  ‘You  Said,  We  Did’,  the  
individual  ‘you’  will  often  be  lost  among  the  statistics  as  institutions  tend  to  
select  the  student  feedback  that  best  supports  their  strategic  imperatives.    
  
While  on  the  NSS  there  are  both  open  and  closed  questions,  allowing  for  the  
collection  of  quantitative  and  qualitative  data,  quantitative  data  is  
undoubtedly  much  easier  to  analyse  and  is  typically  considered  as  more  
objective.  But  even  with  quantitative  data,  universities  can  still  put  their  own  
strategic  slant  on  the  results  by  reporting  their  position  relative  to  others  in  a  
particular  region  or  county,  whereas  national  comparisons  might  not  look  as  
glowing.  So  while  a  particular  institution  might  be  ranked  in  the  ‘top  25’  for  
employability  nationally,  they  can  also  achieve  second  place  for  the  same  
measure  when  results  are  compared  regionally.    
  
In  an  era  of  increased  competitiveness  across  the  Higher  Education  
marketplace  and  the  globalisation  of  knowledge,  universities  now  focus  on  
‘big  data’  which  contributes  to  accountability  measures.  Every  attempt  to  
collect,  measure,  and/or  account  for  ‘the  student  voice’  is  thus  premised  
upon  market  ideals  rather  than  a  concern  for  students’  self-­cultivation.  The  
fact  that  universities  now  rely  on  such  formal  student  ‘voice’,  or  rather  
feedback,  to  prove  their  value  against  competing  institutions,  further  
instrumentalises  its  collection  and  use.    
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The  current  literature  on  ‘voice’  in  education  (whether  this  refers  to  pupil  
voice  initiatives  in  schools,  strategies  to  involve  students  more  in  curricular  
decisions  in  Further  Education,  or  the  use  of  surveys  to  ‘collect’  voice  in  HE)  
seems  to  use  the  terms  ‘voice’  and  ‘feedback’  almost  interchangeably,  as  if  
this  is  unproblematic.  If  students  are  ‘customers’,  as  they  are  increasingly  
seen  to  be  (Bay  and  Daniel,  2001;;  Mark,  2013),  then  it  seems  appropriate  
for  the  purchasing  of  a  product  or  service  –  their  Higher  Education  –  to  be  
followed  by  the  giving  of  feedback.  What  is  pertinent  here  is  that  the  term  
‘feedback’  implies  a  particular  endpoint  to  a  process.  But  as  I  will  explain  
further  in  what  follows,  the  recovery/discovery  of  ‘voice’  as  conceived  of  by  
Stanley  Cavell  is  an  iterative,  perfectionist  process,  rather  than  one  with  a  
discrete  beginning  and  end.    
  
Feedback  is  typically  viewed  in  a  positive  light,  as  providing  the  link  between  
problems  and  solutions;;  in  the  case  of  Higher  Education,  this  is  manifested  
in  the  use  of  student  survey  responses  for  staff  development  and  curricular  
innovations  (Brooman  et  al.,  2015).  The  collection  of  feedback  in  HE  through  
a  variety  of  surveys  and  questionnaires  is  thus  seen  as  a  way  of  checking  
that  everything  is  working  properly,  in  essence,  that  everyone  is  functioning  
effectively  (meeting  student  needs),  and  as  a  way  of  addressing  problems.  
This  is  clearly  the  motivation  of  the  Curriculum  Manager  in  scenario  1,  
seeking  to  implement  a  new  policy  to  explain  survey  questions  before  asking  
students  to  fill  them  in.  That  current  measures  of  student  voice  are  little  more  
than  instrumental,  means-­ends  exchanges  is  evident  in  both  scenarios  as  it  
becomes  clear  that  student  feedback  is  only  collected  to  meet  accountability  
pressures.        
  
These  central  criticisms  of  student  voice  measures  –  that  they  are  limiting,  
transactional,  instrumental,  and  potentially  undemocratic  –  stem  not  only  
from  how  and  why  ‘voice’  is  collected  in  the  first  place,  but  also  from  how  
student  feedback  is  then  subsequently  used.  Internally,  student  ‘voice’  or  
feedback  will  often  be  used  to  inform  curricular  developments  as  part  of  a  
university’s  quality  assurance  process.  While  using  what  students  have  said  
to  change  and  improve  teaching  practices  looks  to  be  a  valuable  activity,  this  
does  not  guarantee  that  each  individual  student’s  voice  has  been  listened  to.  
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Whatever  feedback  students  give,  the  onus  is  still  on  institutions  to  decide  
what  voices  to  acknowledge  and  what  may  be  side-­lined.  As  one  student  
discusses  student  voice  measures:    
[Democratic]  I  wouldn’t  say  so.  Because  I’d  say  you  are  still  reporting  
things  to  the  department  and  then  the  department  decide  what  to  do  
with  the  things  that  are  reported.  So  you  have  the  power  to  say  this  is  
an  issue  but  you  don’t  have  the  power  to  do  anything  about  it  yourself  
(Freeman,  2014,  p.181).    
  
In  an  increasingly  competitive  HE  marketplace,  students’  expectations  are  
assiduously  attended  to  as  those  left  dissatisfied  may  simply  take  their  
business  elsewhere,  following  a  similar  logic  to  that  of  switching  energy  
providers.  As  students  are  considered  more  as  customers  and  consumers  
who  can  ‘vote  with  their  feet’,  this  implies  an  economic  individualism  which  is  
captured  in  such  marketing  taglines  as  ‘Have  Your  Say’  and  ‘Build  Your  
Future’.  Yet  the  voices  of  individual  students  are  simply  not  taken  into  
account  by  those  in  power;;  instead  each  student’s  voice  becomes  merely  
part  of  ‘the  student  voice’  which  is  considered  as  synonymous  with  
feedback.    
  
In  what  follows,  I  seek  to  re-­think  the  issue  of  student  voice,  and  present  a  
richer  conception  of  ‘voice’  by  drawing  on  the  philosophical  works  of  Stanley  
Cavell.  The  discussion  will  be  informed  by  several  central  distinctions  such  
as  that  between  conformity/compliance  and  self-­reliance,  a  distinction  
between  voice  and  feedback,  and  a  consideration  of  how  voice  is  expressed  
both  individually  and  communally.  If  the  collection  of  student  voice  is  to  
genuinely  empower  students,  rather  than  being  a  mere  tick-­box  exercise,  
then  universities  need  to  consider  whether  current  initiatives  are  fit  for  
purpose;;  a  central  tenet  of  this  will  be  how  they  can  account  for  those  
dissenting  in  criteria.      
  
3.2  Student  Voice:  Conformity  and  Compliance  
I  now  turn  to  the  etymologies  of  both  ‘conform’  and  ‘comply’  to  argue  that  
current  student  voice  initiatives  depend  on  conformity  and  compliance.  While  
measures  of  student  voice  do  allow  students  to  express  their  voices,  such  
‘voice’  is  invariably  shaped  by  accountability  pressures,  institutional  
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objectives,  and  response  formats  available.  Ultimately,  this  reduces  the  
possession  and  expression  of  voice  to  mere  ventriloquism,  a  point  made  
previously  by  Fulford  (2009)  in  relation  to  the  development  of  students’  
academic  writing.    
  
As  shown  in  both  opening  scenarios,  what  is  most  contentious  about  such  
contrived  measures  of  ‘voice’  is  that  it  is  not  only  students  who  must  comply  
and  conform,  but  also  academic  staff  and  institutions  themselves;;  as  the  
curriculum  manager  in  scenario  1  states,  ‘I’m  sure  we  all  know  what  bad  
NSS  ratings  can  do  to  an  institution  these  days’.  The  potential  to  account  for  
student  voice  in  a  different  way  is  difficult  to  envisage  as  the  NSS  and  similar  
surveys  now  exert  great  power  over  the  HE  marketplace,  essentially  
determining  which  institutions  are  the  ‘winners’  and  ‘losers’  in  the  game  of  
student  satisfaction.    
  
It  is  my  contention  that  student  voice  campaigns  are  reliant  on  students’  
compliance  and  conformity,  which  contradicts  their  implicit  –  and  sometimes  
even  explicit  –  claim  to  promote  autonomy  and  freedom.  From  the  etymology  
of  ‘comply’  (meaning  to  ‘carry  out,  to  fulfill,  to  accomplish’),  it  is  clear  that  
compliance  is  what  is  demanded  from  students  as  they  are  reminded  
numerous  times  over  a  given  period  to  lend  their  voice  to  particular  surveys,  
almost  to  the  point  where  non-­compliance  is  no  longer  seen  as  a  viable  
option.    
  
Another  interesting  feature  of  the  etymology  of  ‘comply’  is  its  intransitive  
usage  from  1600  onwards,  meaning  ‘to  consent’  or  ‘to  act  in  accordance  with  
another’s  will  or  desire’.  The  fact  that  compliance  may  mean  acting  in  
accordance  with  someone  else’s  wishes  implies  a  kind  of  subversion  here,  
and  this  is  particularly  problematic  if  universities  are  claiming  that  the  
motivation  behind  student  surveys  is  to  encourage  students  to  express  their  
own  voice.  Such  compliance  is  illustrated  on  the  part  of  academic  and  
student  alike  in  scenario  2,  as  the  lecturer  has  to  comply  with  the  new  policy  
introduced  by  her  Curriculum  Manager,  and  the  students  do  fill  in  the  mid-­
module  review  forms  despite  initially  expressing  their  disdain.    
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Where  there  is  compliance,  there  is  also  likely  to  be  conformity.  The  
etymology  of  ‘conform’  (from  confourmen  meaning  to  be  obedient  (to  God)  
and  to  comply)  is  helpful  here  as  it  implies  that  conformity  involves  changing  
one’s  own  behaviour  to  match  up  to  the  expectations  of  some  higher  
authority;;  in  an  originary  sense,  this  is  typically  God.  The  intransitive  sense  
of  ‘conform’  also  means  to  ‘act  in  accordance  with  an  example’.  In  the  case  
of  student  voice,  the  ‘example’  or  point  of  reference  for  what  to  say  will  often  
come  from  prominent  marketing  slogans  and  institutional  campaigns.  A  
prime  example  of  this  is  where  universities  ask  their  students  to  say  why  
they  love  studying  at  that  institution,  with  taglines  such  as  
‘#LoveUniversityX’.  While  these  marketing  and  branding  activities  would  not  
be  considered  as  ‘inappropriate  influence’  over  NSS  results  (Ipsos  MORI,  
2017),  it  is  important  to  acknowledge  that  these  discourses  can  become  
totalising,  unconsciously  influencing  whether  students  choose  to  lend  their  
voice  to  such  campaigns,  and  if  so,  how  they  may  express  their  voice.    
  
The  inherent  conformity  and  compliance  of  student  voice  measures  can  
similarly  be  seen  in  the  way  that  they  privilege  the  individual  voice  over  and  
above  any  sort  of  collective,  or  communal,  voice.  On  the  face  of  it,  focusing  
on  the  individual  voices  of  students  seems  to  be  a  valuable  endeavour,  and  
in  theory  it  should  promote  diversity  rather  than  conformity.  However,  the  
issue  is  that  typically,  only  those  student  voices  which  are  saying  what  an  
institution  wants  to  hear  will  be  listened  to.  Emphasising  the  value  of  the  
individual  voice  also  prevents  the  student  body  from  thinking  and  responding  
as  a  community.  This  relates  to  the  criticisms  evinced  above  but  equally  
adds  that  what  universities  are  doing  by  encouraging  conformity,  
compliance,  and  an  economic  individualism  is  little  more  than  producing  
‘excellent  sheep’  (Deresiewicz,  2015).    
  
That  Higher  Education  Institutions,  and  the  education  system  more  broadly,  
are  producing  a  large  number  of  ‘excellent  sheep’  is  evidenced  by  an  
increased  emphasis  being  placed  on  the  student  trajectory  or  ‘lifecycle’  
(Raven,  2016;;  Roberts,  2018),  with  universities  seeking  to  capture  a  
significant  ‘market  share’  in  terms  of  student  numbers,  and  then  getting  
these  students  through  their  degrees  as  quickly  and  efficiently  as  possible  
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(Bates  and  Hayes,  2017).  As  Deresiewicz  reflects  on  his  own  university  
experience,  he  writes  that:    
What   it  meant   to  actually  get  an  education,  and  why  you  might  want  
one—how  it  could  help  you  acquire  a  self,  or  develop  an  independent  
mind,  or   find  your  way   in   the  world—all   this  was  off   the   table  (2015,  
p.1).    
  
In  terms  of  creating  a  ‘sheepish’  student  voice  then,  this  tendency  to  
obliterate  difference  and  to  assume  that  all  students  want  the  same  
educational  journey  is  exemplified  in  a  particular  approach  to  assignment  
writing.  Here,  I  am  thinking  of  the  increasingly  common  practices  of  
providing  students  with  writing  frames  and/or  model  answers  to  assignment  
questions.  What  I  have  found  from  my  own  teaching  experience  is  that  
undergraduates  not  only  want  –  one  could  even  say  expect  –  to  be  given  a  
writing  frame  for  their  assignments  detailing  how  to  structure  their  academic  
work  (with  explicit  guidance  on  what  to  include  in  each  section),  but  
moreover  they  also  want  to  be  given  approximate  word  counts  for  each  part  
of  their  assignment.    
  
In  one  sense,  it  is  a  good  thing  for  students  to  be  given  clear  guidance  on  
what  is  expected  of  them  in  a  particular  assignment,  such  as  what  the  
learning  outcomes  are  and  how  they  could  meet  them.  But  offering  up  
writing  frames  and  model  answers  may  in  fact  be  hindering  students’  
progress  more  than  they  are  helping  them,  as  what  such  detailed  outlines  
and  structured  plans  actually  do  is  prevent  students  from  thinking  about  it  for  
themselves,  from  using  their  own  initiative  and  responding  creatively  to  the  
problem  or  question  posed.  All  that  is  therefore  required  of  students  is  a  kind  
of  passive  conformity  and  compliance  to  university  requirements;;  this  could  
be  considered  as  a  denial  or  repression  of  voice  (Fulford,  2009).  Such  a  
limiting  of  voice  in  assessment  guidance  should  also  be  seen  in  stark  
contrast  to  campaigns  such  as  ‘You  Said,  We  Did’,  exemplifying  that  the  
student  voice  is  only  encouraged  and  acknowledged  in  particular  domains.  
Moving  away  from  voices  of  compliance  and  conformity  will  involve  a  shift  
towards  ‘self-­reliance’,  a  concept  taken  from  the  work  of  the  19th  century  
American  essayist  and  philosopher,  Ralph  Waldo  Emerson,  and  I  will  turn  
my  attention  to  this  next.  
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3.3  From  Conformity  to  Self-­Reliance  
‘Self-­Reliance’  is  one  of  Emerson’s  earlier  essays  and  also  one  of  the  most  
well-­known.  Writing  in  mid-­nineteenth  century  America  –  specifically  
Concord,  Massachusetts  –  Emerson  is  considered  by  Cavell  to  be  among  
America’s  greatest  philosophers.  His  work  has  been  most  widely  expounded  
by  Stanley  Cavell,  who,  in  writing  Conditions  Handsome  and  Unhandsome  
(1990),  generated  a  renewed  philosophical  interest  in  Emerson’s  work  and  
particularly  in  the  concept  of  ‘Emersonian  moral  perfectionism’.  It  is  
important  to  note  that  Emerson  was  not  writing  about  education  in  the  formal  
sense  of  schooling,  but  what  Cavell  has  shown  by  discussing  key  
Emersonian  ideas  is  how  his  works  are  pertinent  to  a  broader  consideration  
of  what  it  means  to  be  ‘educated’.  I  will  say  more  about  this  in  the  next  
chapter  where  I  also  discuss  the  work  of  Emerson’s  contemporary,  Henry  
David  Thoreau.  Of  import  here  is  the  link  between  self-­reliance  and  voice.    
  
Put  simply,  self-­reliance  is  the  ability  to  trust  one’s  own  judgment.  It  pertains  
to  following  one’s  own  ideas  in  the  midst  of  conflicting  arguments  from  
society.  But  becoming  self-­reliant  is  also  inextricably  linked  in  Emerson’s  
work  to  the  awakening  of  genius.  The  self-­reliant  person  is  the  most  
cultivated  one;;  thus,  becoming  self-­reliant  is  educative  in  itself  as  this  
exemplifies  Bildung  or  self-­formation.  As  Cavell  writes,  ‘Emerson’s  
“upbuilding”  in  “the  upbuilding  of  man”  virtually  pronounces  Bildung’  (1989,  
p.8).    
  
While  the  self-­reliant  individual  will  exhibit  a  greater  independence  of  
thought,  rather  than  imitating  and  regurgitating  what  others  have  thought,  
this  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  self-­reliance  consists  in  solitude.  Self-­
reliance  does  not  mean  being  so  independent  that  one  turns  away  from  
one’s  community.  Instead,  it  is  about  trusting  one’s  own  genius  rather  than  
blindly  following  that  of  others.  As  Emerson  writes:  ‘to  believe  your  own  
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thought,  to  believe  that  what  is  true  for  you  in  your  own  private  heart  is  true  
for  all  men—that  is  genius’  (1841/2000,  p.132).16        
  
Self-­reliance  can  also  be  understood  as  the  aversion  of  conformity;;  Emerson  
regards  only  nonconformists  as  true  men  and  women.  Here,  self-­reliance  
and/or  nonconformity  is  not  simply  about  disrupting  the  status  quo,  rather  
becoming  self-­reliant  is  a  matter  of  each  person  reconciling  themselves  to  
themselves,  independent  of  the  influence  of  what  is  customary.  As  Emerson  
explains:  
No  law  can  be  sacred  to  me  but  that  of  my  nature.  Good  and  bad  are  
but  names  very  readily  transferable  to  that  or  this;;  the  only  right  is  what  
is  after  my  constitution;;  the  only  wrong  what  is  against  it  (1841/2000,  
p.135).    
  
Becoming  self-­reliant  is  a  process  of  learning  to  trust  oneself,  one’s  own  
thoughts  and  judgments,  which  in  turn  means  acting  in  accordance  with  
one’s  nature  rather  than  social  convention  alone.  What  this  means  for  ‘voice’  
then  is  that  nonconformity  should  be  cherished  rather  than  shunned.  
Equally,  the  shift  from  what  Emerson  terms  ‘Intuition’  to  tuition  should  not  
mean  that  one’s  natural  Intuition,  which  is  related  to  genius,  is  entirely  
superseded.  Self-­reliance  is  often  expressed  in  a  number  of  ways,  with  the  
possession  and  expression  of  one’s  voice  being  one  of  these.  Emerson’s  
own  self-­reliance  is  writ  large  throughout  his  essays.    
  
                                                                                        
16  Emerson’s  concept  of  ‘self-­reliance’  can  be  understood  as  stemming  from  
his  turning  away  from  the  Unitarian  Church  in  the  mid-­nineteenth  
century.  Although  his  father  was  a  Unitarian  minister,  Emerson  
believed  that  Christianity  contributed  further  to  man’s  condition  of  
‘secret  melancholy’  rather  than  the  awakening  of  genius;;  hence  his  
avocation  of  self-­reliance  as  the  aversion  of  conformity  can  be  seen  
as  an  aversion  to  Unitarianism.  In  turning  away  from  such  organised  
religion,  Emerson  and  his  contemporary,  Thoreau,  became  key  
figures  in  the  establishment  of  Transcendentalism  which  argued  that  
a  religious/relational  connection  to  the  world  should  be  sought  
through  an  immersion  in  nature.  For  further  details  on  this  see  the  
entry  on  Ralph  Waldo  Emerson  in  the  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  
Philosophy.  [Online].  [Accessed  11  February  2019].  Available  from:  
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/emerson/.  
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Emerson’s  distinctive  way  of  writing  embodies  the  themes  he  deals  with  and  
he  turns  away  from  many  culturally  accepted  ways  of  thinking  about  these  
ideas  including  nature,  experience,  and  scholarship.  In  addition,  his  writing  
style  and  structural  choices  might  be  thought  to  constitute  the  expression  of  
his  voice,  as  well  as  enacting  the  nonconformity  he  advocates.  As  Cavell  
argues  in  relation  to  another  of  Emerson’s  essays:    
Emerson’s  ‘Experience’  announces  and  provides  the  conditions  under  
which  an  Emersonian  essay  can  be  experienced  –  the  conditions  of  its  
own  possibility.  Thus   to  announce  and  provide  conditions   for   itself   is  
what  makes  an  essay  Emersonian  (1989,  p.103).    
  
One  could  add  to  this  that  the  conditions  of  possibility  for  being  and  
becoming  self-­reliant  are  similarly  announced  in  the  writing  of  ‘self-­reliance’.  
In  what  follows,  I  will  further  explore  the  distinction  between  
conformity/compliance  and  self-­reliance  by  drawing  on  the  works  of  Stanley  
Cavell.  While  Emerson’s  writings  not  only  discuss,  but  also  embody  self-­
reliance,  I  will  argue  further  that  Cavell’s  works  similarly  evince  such  
(educative)  nonconformity.    
  
3.4  Philosophical  Conceptions  of  Voice:  The  Turn  to  Cavell    
The  American  philosopher  Stanley  Cavell  does  not  write  directly  about  
Higher  Education,  or  even  education  in  the  sense  of  formal  schooling.  
Indeed,  his  work  draws  on  film,  opera,  the  works  of  the  American  
transcendentalists,  Henry  David  Thoreau  and  Ralph  Waldo  Emerson,  and  
even  on  Shakespearian  tragedy,  to  inform  his  philosophy.  His  writings  
address  (amongst  other  things)  issues  of  morality,  skepticism,  and  ordinary  
language  philosophy.  However,  this  does  not  mean  that  his  work  does  not  
have  a  bearing  on  education;;  indeed,  the  educational  force  of  Cavell’s  work  
is  widely  recognised  (Saito  and  Standish,  2012).  Saito  and  Standish  explain  
the  pertinence  of  Cavell’s  work  as  follows:  
He  engages  in  a  sustained  exploration  of  the  nature  of  philosophy  that  
takes  teaching  and  learning  (and  the  anxiety  inherent  in  these)  to  be  at  
its  heart;;   it   is  also  that  he  is  preoccupied  with  what  it   is  to  teach  and  
learn,  with  the  kinds  of  transformation  these  might  imply  and  with  the  
inseparability  of  these  from  what  a  human  life  is.  In  his  considerations  
of  the  ordinary  and  the  social  world,  questions  of  teaching  and  learning  
recur  (2012,  pp.2-­3).    
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In  his  work,  Cavell  repeatedly  turns  to  issues  of  voice.  But  for  Cavell  (1979a;;  
1996),  voice  does  not  equate  to  the  expression  of  mere  opinion;;  he  
conceptualises  ‘voice’  in  a  more  philosophically  nuanced  way  as  being  tied  
to  one’s  sense  of  self  and  one’s  search  for  a  particular  form  of  education.  In  
Contesting  Tears,  Cavell  (1996)  discusses  several  films  from  the  genre  he  
titles  ‘The  Melodramas  of  the  Unknown  Woman’.17  I  will  discuss  one  of  the  
melodramas  –  Gaslight  –  in  detail  here,    to  illustrate  how  the  principal  
woman’s  search  for  a  voice  is  complex,  involving  moments  of  both  
repression  and  recovery.    
  
3.5  ‘Voice’  in  Cavell  
The  writings  of  Cavell  are  both  autobiographical  and  exploratory,  often  
refusing  to  conform  to  more  traditional  ways  of  writing  in  philosophy.  One  
prime  example  of  how  Cavell’s  writing  is  different  to  other  writing  in  
philosophy  is  seen  in  his  approach  to  film  criticism.  Sinnerbrink  draws  
attention  to  Cavell’s  writing  on  film,  stating  that:    
Cavell  is  clearly  not  dealing  with  the  more  conventional  philosophy  of  
film,  in  which  it  is  precisely  a  matter  of  ‘formal  argumentation’  or  even  
‘scientific   evidence’…In   Cavell’s   hands   philosophy   is   thus   neither  
science   nor   poetry   but   exists   ambiguously   between   the   two   (2014,  
pp.57-­58).  
  
So,  Cavell’s  work  is  not  structured  in  terms  of  verifiable  propositions  and/or  
the  search  for  objectivity.  Instead,  his  writings  are  deeply  reflective,  
encouraging  his  readers  to  see  themselves  and  the  world  differently.  Due  to  
this,  it  has  been  difficult  for  Cavell  to  be  recognised  as  a  philosopher,  and  
specifically,  an  ordinary  language  philosopher  (Gould,  1998;;  Saito  and  
Standish,  2012).  Cavell  has  redefined  what  we  generally  think  of  as  
constituting  ‘philosophy’  and  also  what  it  means  to  write  philosophically.    
  
                                                                                        
17  This  genre  includes  Letter  from  an  Unknown  Woman  (1948),  Gaslight  
(1944),  Stella  Dallas  (1937),  and  Now,  Voyager  (1942).  
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3.5.1  Cavell’s  Own  Search  for  a  Voice  
Timothy  Gould  has  highlighted  three  distinct  understandings  of  voice  in  
Cavell’s  work:  (i)  first,  there  is  Cavell’s  own  voice  as  discovered  through  his  
philosophical  project;;  (ii)  there  is  ‘the  human  voice  that  philosophy  is  
characterised  as  banishing’;;  and  (iii)  there  is  the  metaphysical  voice  or  ‘voice  
before  language’  (Gould,  1998,  p.53).    
  
In  A  Pitch  of  Philosophy  (1994),  Cavell  describes  his  struggle  to  find  his  own  
‘voice’  in  philosophy  and  how  his  autobiography  is  inextricably  linked  with  
this  search  for  a  voice.  As  he  puts  it,  ‘the  autobiographical  dimension  of  
philosophy  is  internal  to  the  claim  that  philosophy  speaks  for  the  human,  for  
all;;  that  is  its  necessary  arrogance’  (Cavell,  1994,  p.10).  There  is  a  play  on  
words  evident  here  in  the  use  of  both  ‘arrogance’  and  ‘arrogation’  to  describe  
the  ‘voice’  constitutive  of  Anglo-­analytic  philosophy.    
  
The  first  section  of  A  Pitch  of  Philosophy  is  titled  ‘Philosophy  and  the  
Arrogation  of  Voice’  and  as  Cavell  (1994)  explains,  the  fact  that  philosophy  
often  assumes  the  right  to  speak  for  all  (its  arrogance),  is  exactly  what  has  
led  to  the  ‘arrogation’  of  his  own  voice  in  the  discipline.  What  Cavell  (1979a,  
p.154)  characterises  as  the  ‘denial  of  the  human  self’  is  symptomatic  of  the  
risk  that  the  human  voice  may  be  ‘sidelined  elsewhere  in  philosophy’  
(Jenner,  2013,  p.119),  that  is,  in  the  Anglophone  philosophical  tradition.  But  
as  Jenner  explains,  ‘a  decisive  virtue  of  ordinary  language  philosophy  for  
Cavell  is  that  its  methodological  appeal  to  “what  we  say  when”  foregrounds  
and  insists  on  the  human  voice’  (2013,  p.119).    
  
For  Cavell,  finding  his  own  voice  in  the  discipline  meant  writing  outside  the  
traditional  confines  of  ‘philosophy’  by  acknowledging  that  his  own  ‘voice’  was  
both  autobiographical  and  personal,  and  that  this  voice  still  had  something  
legitimate  to  offer  to  the  field.  The  concept  of  ‘voice’  pervades  Cavell’s  work  
but  time  and  again  he  resists  confining  his  conception  of  ‘voice’  to  a  specific  
list  of  features.  As  Gould  (1998)  highlights,  ‘voice’  and  ‘method’  are  
intimately  connected  for  Cavell;;  in  a  seemingly  paradoxical  manner,  the  
discovery  of  his  own  voice  is  both  the  means,  and  the  goal,  of  his  
philosophical  project.  It  is  through  crafting  and  writing  his  own  philosophical  
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works  that  Cavell  hopes  to  discover  and/or  recover  his  own  voice,18  but  his  
‘voice’  likewise  is  the  means  through  which  he  conducts  his  philosophy  –  it  
constitutes  his  ‘method’,  so  to  speak.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  Cavell’s  own  
writings  enact  a  kind  of  Emersonian  self-­reliance,  which  involved  accounting  
for  his  own  genius  and  voicing  his  personal  experiences.  Cavell  states  the  
aim  of  his  project  from  the  very  beginning  of  A  Pitch  of  Philosophy  as  
follows:    
I  propose  here  to  talk  about  philosophy  in  connection  with  something  I  
call   the   voice,   by   which   I   mean   to   talk   at   once   about   the   tone   of  
philosophy  and  about  my  right  to  take  that  tone  (1994,  p.3).      
  
That  Cavell  does  not  simply  imitate  the  writing  styles  of  earlier  philosophers  
also  signals  his  growing  self-­reliance.  While  this  is  evident  throughout  his  
works,  Cavell’s  nonconformity  is  clearest  here  when  discussing  the  tendency  
of  philosophy  to  privilege  some  voices  over  others,  thus  constituting  an  
arrogation  of  voice.  It  is  important  to  highlight  here  that  Cavell’s  conception  
of  ‘voice’,  chiefly  concerned  with  what  it  means  to  possess  and  express  
one’s  voice,  is  inextricably  tied  to  the  search  for  his  own  voice  within  
philosophy.  Cavell’s  search  for  a  voice  was  not  simply  an  exercise  in  
stubbornness  or  contrariness,  or  indeed  a  matter  of  style  alone.  His  
expression  of  self-­reliance  involved  a  recounting  of  what  ‘counts’  as  
philosophy;;  this  is  nowhere  more  evident  than  in  Cavell’s  commitment  to  
exploring  Hollywood  film,  and  film  itself,  as  a  philosophical  medium.    
  
Cavell  defends  his  use  of  the  autobiographical  when  he  states:  ‘I  am  unsure  
for  whose  views  beyond  mine  I  would  be  speaking’  (1994,  p.4).  Another  
justification  for  Cavell’s  use  of  autobiography  is  that  he  admits:  ‘I  feel  the  
need  to  recount  what  I  have  so  far  written,  to  add  it  up  again’  (1994,  p.6).  
Philosophy  for  Cavell  is  not  the  sort  of  discipline  in  which  concrete,  definitive  
                                                                                        
18  Throughout  this  chapter,  the  terms  ‘discovery’  and/or  ‘recovery’  will  be  
used  interchangeably,  unless  specified.  The  term  ‘discovery’  will  be  
used  where  one’s  search  for  a  voice  –  after  first  recognising  that  
one’s  voice  has  been  repressed  –  has  only  just  begun.  In  contrast,  
the  term  ‘recovery’  will  be  used  to  denote  the  subsequent  finding  of  
one’s  voice  after  the  initial  repression,  although  this  recovery  does  not  
have  a  definitive  endpoint.      
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answers  can  be  found  and  then  turned  away  from.  Instead,  the  kinds  of  
questions  we  ask  in  doing  philosophy  are  questions  which  demand  our  
utmost  attention,  they  are  questions  which  we  must  ‘devote  our  most  alert  
and  wakeful  hours  to’  (Thoreau,  1854/1997,  p.95).  Thus,  Cavell  keeps  
revisiting  his  ideas  in  different  works  over  the  course  of  his  career,  but  marks  
the  initiation  of  what  he  terms  his  own  ‘intellectual  voice’  in  his  first  encounter  
with  J.L.  Austin  (1994,  p.6).    
  
3.6  Voice,  Criteria,  and  Community  
Cavell’s  conception  of  ‘voice’  cannot  be  understood  as  separable  from  its  
relation  to  Wittgensteinian  criteria  and  how  these  operate  in  a  language  
community.  The  possession  and  expression  of  voice  ties  one  to  a  particular  
language  community,  by  virtue  of  using  language,  and  this  expression  is  
strongly  influenced  by  that  community’s  criteria.  Criteria  tell  us  what  ‘counts’  
as  an  instance  of  something  and  what  does  not,  allowing  us  to  then  make  
judgments  as  to  the  quality  of  a  particular  case.  Wittgensteinian  criteria  
structure  our  utterances  in  a  particular  way  as  they  determine  the  
meaningfulness  of  our  expressions.    
  
Cavell  explains  the  role  of  criteria  in  language  use  with  the  example  of  a  
diving  competition;;  there  are  criteria  involved  which  determine  whether  a  
‘dive’  has  taken  place,  either  we  agree  that  a  particular  set  of  movements  
counts  as  a  dive  or  not.  But  we  must  first  agree  that  something  is  a  ‘dive’  in  
order  to  then  rate  it  out  of  ten,  for  example  (Cavell,  1979a,  p.91).  As  Cavell  
explains,  ‘the  judge  has  a  more  or  less  clear  area  of  discretion  in  the  
application  of  standards,  but  none  whatever  over  the  set  of  criteria  he  is  
obliged  to  apply’  (1979a,  p.12).  The  criteria  that  make  possible  certain  
language-­games  are  communally  agreed  upon;;  to  be  part  of  a  community  is  
to  agree  in  criteria,  otherwise  a  shared  language  would  be  almost  
impossible.    
  
Criteria  are  not  explicitly  formulated  and  taught,  instead  they  are  acquired  as  
a  child  is  initiated  into  a  particular  language  community.  One  cannot  learn  
the  criteria  from  looking  up  a  word  in  the  dictionary;;  grasping  the  criteria  
means  knowing  what  to  count  as  an  instance  of  ‘x’  and  learning  a  language  
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is  learning  ‘how  to  go  on’,  that  is,  how  to  use  words  in  other  contexts  than  
have  been  taught  (Cavell,  1979a,  p.122).19  But  just  as  a  community’s  set  of  
criteria  are  not  explicitly  taught,  it  can  be  difficult  to  explicate  what  they  are  in  
a  particular  scenario.  In  fact,  our  criteria  may  only  be  put  to  the  test  once  a  
disagreement  occurs.  As  Cavell  puts  it,  ‘to  say  we  “have  established”  full  
criteria  for  our  word  does  not  mean  that  we  can  establish  what  they  are  on  
demand:  our  investments  in  a  word  are  rarely  liquid’  (1979a,  p.72).  It  is  for  
this  reason  that  Cavell  expresses  dismay  that  we  agree  in  our  criteria,  and  
judgments  based  on  these  criteria,  to  such  a  great  extent.    
  
Criteria  are  often  appealed  to  and  are  thus  made  more  explicit  when  we  
‘“don’t  know  our  way  about”,  when  we  are  lost  with  respect  to  our  words’  
(Cavell,  1979a,  p.34),  or  in  Wittgensteinian  terms  when  ‘language  has  gone  
on  holiday’  (1963,  §38).  Appealing  to  criteria  is  a  way  of  settling  judgments;;  if  
I  elicit  my  community’s  criteria  for  ‘something’s  being  so’  and  you  have  
different  criteria  from  mine,  then  in  order  for  us  to  continue  communicating,  
either  you  must  accept  my  criteria  as  correct,  or  I  must  accept  yours  (Cavell,  
1979a,  p.45).  If  we  can  agree  in  this  particular  judgment  but  then  again  
realise  that  we  have  different  criteria  for  the  same  concept,  we  may  
eventually  exhaust  our  justifications,  reach  bedrock,  and  be  left  with  nothing  
else  to  say  than  ‘this  is  simply  what  I  do’  (Wittgenstein,  1963,  §217).    
But  the  fact  that  we  mostly  do  agree  in  our  judgments  as  a  language  
community  is  represented  in  the  fact  that  we  are  able  to  use  the  term  ‘we’.  In  
the  title  of  his  work  Must  We  Mean  What  We  Say?,  Cavell  (1969/2015)  is  
using  we  in  both  a  first-­person,  and  in  a  plural  sense.  Cavell  describes  how  
eliciting  ‘we’  is  a  call  to  one’s  community:    
When   Wittgenstein   or   at   this   stage   any   philosopher   appealing   to  
ordinary   language,   ‘says   what   we   say’,   what   he   produces   is   not   a  
generalisation,   but   a   (supposed)   instance   of   what   we   say.  We  may  
think  of  it  as  a  sample.  The  introduction  of  the  sample  by  the  words  ‘We  
                                                                                        
19  In  The  Claim  of  Reason,  Cavell  describes  this  learning  ‘how  to  go  on’  with  
language  as  an  ‘appeal  to  [one’s]  projective  imagination’,  that  is,  an  
‘invitation  to  imagine  a  context’  and  what  one  would  say  in  this  
figurative  context  (1979a,  p.154).  On  this  view,  to  learn  a  language  is  
to  be  able  to  find  words  suited  to  one’s  needs;;  this  ability  to  ‘voice’  
oneself  is  acquired  through  testing  out  one’s  vocabulary  in  new  and  
different  contexts.    
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say…’  is  an  invitation  for  you  to  see  whether  you  have  such  a  sample,  
or  can  accept  mine  as  a  sound  one  (1979a,  p.19).  
  
The  appeal  to  ‘what  we  say’  is  an  invocation  of  the  ordinary  and  it  is  
concerned  with  our  everyday  utterances.  Such  appeals  to  ‘what  we  say’  
often  reveal  the  extent  to  which  we  agree  in  both  criteria  and  judgments.  The  
extent  of  our  agreement  reaches  beyond  the  specific  examples  evoked  in  
appealing  to  ‘what  we  say’  and  as  Cavell  puts  it,  ‘the  idea  of  agreement  here  
is  not  that  of  coming  to  or  arriving  at  an  agreement  on  a  given  occasion,  but  
of  being  in  agreement  throughout,  being  in  harmony,  like  pitches  or  tones,  or  
clocks,  or  weighing  scales’  (1979a,  p.32);;  this  he  terms  our  ‘mutual  
attunement’  with  one  another.  That  we  are  ‘mutually  attuned’  means  that  we  
typically  agree  in  our  judgments,  for  example,  we  can  judge  whether  a  word  
has  been  used  appropriately  or  not  in  a  particular  context.  But  as  Cavell  
states:    
There  is  no  logical  explanation  of  the  fact  that  we  (in  general,  on  the  
whole)  will  agree  that  a  conclusion  has  been  drawn,  a  rule  applied,  an  
instance   to   be   a   member   of   a   class,   one   line   to   be   a   repetition   of  
another   (even   though   it   is  written   lower  down,  or   in  another  hand  or  
color);;  but  the  fact  is,  those  who  understand  (i.e.  can  talk  logic  together)  
do  agree.  And  the  fact  is  that  they  agree  the  way  they  agree;;  I  mean,  
the  ways  they  have  of  agreeing  at  each  point,  each  step  (1979a,  p.118).      
  
Our  agreement  in  judgments  is  largely  influenced  by  a  community’s  social  
conventions;;  these  are  practices  which  influence  our  way  of  life  (Cavell,  
1979a).  So,  to  be  part  of  a  community  and  to  communicate  with  others  in  
one’s  community,  we  must  be  involved  in  the  same  set  of  language-­games  
and  know  the  rules  for  such  games,  whether  this  understanding  is  implicit  or  
explicit  (Wittgenstein,  1963).  Our  criteria  then  allow  us  to  make  judgments  of  
meaning  as  to  whether  the  rules  of  a  particular  language-­game  have  been  
obeyed,  such  as  whether  this  particular  instance  ‘counts’  as  what  we  mean  
by  ‘x’.    
  
It  is  important  to  highlight  the  link  between  criteria  and  community,  but  also  
that  these  criteria  are  ineluctably  tied  to  one’s  voice.  The  expression  of  one’s  
voice  is  always  framed  by  a  community,  by  whether  one  chooses  to  either  
consent  to,  or  dissent  from,  that  community’s  criteria.  To  consent  to  the  
community’s  criteria  is  to  allow  that  community  to  speak  for  you,  and  in  
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return  you  are  also  able  to  speak  on  behalf  of  the  community.  If  you  consent  
in  criteria  then  this  is  ‘not  mere  obedience,  but  membership  in  a  polis’  
(Cavell,  1979a,  p.23).    
  
In  order  to  speak  for  yourself  in  a  true  sense,  you  must  either  acknowledge  
your  membership  of  a  particular  community  and  your  adherence  to  their  
criteria,  or  you  must  choose  to  dissent,  and  thereby  assert  that  the  
community  does  not  speak  for  you.  As  Cavell  puts  it,  ‘once  you  recognise  a  
community  as  yours,  then  it  does  speak  for  you  until  you  say  it  doesn’t,  i.e.  
until  you  show  that  you  do’  (1979a,  p.27).  The  shift  from  mere  conformity  
and  compliance  towards  self-­reliance  is  enacted  here.  The  distinction  rests  
not  so  much  on  whether  one  consents  or  dissents  in  relation  to  their  
community’s  criteria,  but  whether  this  is  an  informed  choice  rather  than  tacit  
consent  being  assumed  on  the  individual’s  behalf.    
  
As  discussed  above,  self-­reliance  does  not  mean  removing  oneself  from  a  
community  in  order  to  be  completely  independent;;  it  involves  following  the  
bent  of  one’s  own  genius  despite  conflicting  societal  influences.  As  Emerson  
writes:    
A   man   should   learn   to   detect   and   watch   that   gleam   of   light   which  
flashes   across   his   mind   from   within…[and   once   found,   we   should]  
abide  by  our  spontaneous   impression  with  good-­humored   inflexibility  
then  most  when  the  whole  cry  of  voices  is  on  the  other  side  (1841/2000,  
pp.132-­133).    
  
To  express  one’s  voice  without  acknowledging  the  communal  influences  
framing  such  ‘voice’  would  be  at  best  naïve,  and  at  worst  disingenuous.  In  
being  initiated  into  a  language  community  from  childhood,  one’s  language  is  
always  inherited,  and  so  there  may  always  be  some  sense  in  which  my  
words  are  not  entirely  my  own.  It  may  only  be  when  a  disagreement  arises  
that  the  criteria  influencing  my  judgments  and  use  of  language  –  constituting  
my  ‘voice’  –  are  made  explicit.  Being  part  of  a  community  can  mean  that  
one’s  tacit  consent  is  assumed;;  choosing  whether  to  actually  be  part  of  the  
language  community  may  occur  through  learning  to  express  one’s  voice  
politically.  As  Cavell  explains:    
To  speak  for  oneself  politically  is  to  speak  for  the  others  with  whom  you  
consent  to  association,  and  it  is  to  consent  to  be  spoken  for  by  them  –  
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not  as  a  parent  speaks  for  you,  i.e.,  instead  of  you,  but  as  someone  in  
mutuality  speaks  for  you,  i.e.,  speaks  your  mind  (1979a,  p.27).    
  
The  alternative  to  this  would  be  to  dissent  in  criteria,  to  speak  for  oneself  
privately  rather  than  politically.  But  choosing  to  dissent  in  criteria  does  not  
mean  cutting  all  ties  with  one’s  community,  instead  it  will  involve  a  
renegotiation  of  the  content  of  such  criteria.  As  Cavell  describes  here,  
‘dissent  is  not  the  undoing  of  consent  but  a  dispute  about  its  content,  a  
dispute  within  it  over  whether  a  present  arrangement  is  faithful  to  it’  (1979a,  
p.27).  While  I  may  consent  to  the  criteria  of  my  language  community  –  my  
‘voice’  is  not  only  expressed  in  dissent  –  nevertheless,  this  consent  is  always  
tentative  and  based  upon  specific  instances  of  ‘what  we  say’.    
  
The  pertinence  of  these  ideas  for  thinking  about  measures  of  student  voice  
in  Higher  Education  is  that  they  open  up  questions  of  community,  consent,  
and  dissent;;  these  are  concepts  which  are  typically  left  out  of  university  
initiatives  focused  merely  on  the  collection  and  measurement  of  student  
voice.  Cavell’s  own  search  for  a  voice  in  philosophy  can  be  seen  as  
metonymic  of  many  students’  discovery  or  recovery  of  voice,  although  the  
‘arrogance  of  philosophy’  that  contributed  to  the  arrogation  of  Cavell’s  voice  
(1994,  p.10)  is  here  replaced  with  a  kind  of  ‘arrogance  of  policy’  or  of  
accountability.  The  distinction  made  earlier  between  conformity/compliance  
and  self-­reliance  will  now  be  discussed  in  relation  to  Cavell’s  conception  of  
‘voice’,  with  illustrative  examples  taken  from  film.      
  
3.7  Voice,  Cavell,  and  1940s  Hollywood  Film  
Stanley  Cavell  has  written  extensively  on  film  to  elucidate  his  
conceptualisation  of  ‘voice’,  and  particularly  the  woman’s  search  for  a  voice,  
with  works  including  The  World  Viewed  (1979b),  Pursuits  of  Happiness  
(1981b),  Contesting  Tears  (1996),  and  Cities  of  Words  (2005a).  In  his  work  
on  1940s  Hollywood  film,  Cavell  (1981b;;  1996)  distinguished  and  
characterised  two  particular  genres  of  film  which  he  titled  ‘The  Melodramas  
of  the  Unknown  Woman’,  and  ‘The  Comedies  of  Remarriage’.    
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There  are  several  characteristic  features  that  the  melodramas  have  in  
common:  the  principal  women  in  the  films  are  often  depicted  at  two  stages  of  
life:  ‘a  state  of  innocence,  and  a  state  of  experience,  years  apart’  (Cavell,  
2005a,  p.233).  The  heroine’s  voice  is  usually  depicted  as  suppressed  by  a  
man  (typically  her  spouse),  and  her  ‘metamorphosis’  –  which  in  part  consists  
of  the  finding,  or  recovery  of  her  voice,  her  expressiveness  –  is  often  a  very  
risky  process,  ‘sometimes  to  her  mortal  danger  (as  in  Gaslight)’  (Cavell,  
2005a,  p.234).  In  the  melodramas,  ‘marriage  is  explicitly  rejected  as  part  of  
the  woman’s  perfectionist  ambitions’.  The  role  of  the  mother  is  central  in  
these  films,  and  ‘the  principal  woman’s  mother  is  always  present  and  the  
principal  woman  is  herself  presented  as  a  mother’  (Cavell,  2005a,  p.395).  
The  fate  of  conversation  –  the  physical  expression  of  voice  –  between  the  
principal  women  and  their  spouses  is  also  of  central  importance  in  the  
melodramas,  since  ‘conversation,  the  opening  of  mutual  understanding,  is  
defeated,  negated,  by  irony’  (Cavell,  2005a,  p.234).    
  
In  the  melodramas,  the  principal  women  are  often  seeking  a  ‘voice’  and  a  
particular  sort  of  education  through  marriage  and/or  romantic  encounters.  
The  men  in  these  films  initially  present  themselves  as  a  guide  or  ‘coach’  for  
the  women  towards  transformation  and  independence,  but  instead  they  are  
seen  to  suppress  the  women’s  voices  –  either  indirectly  through  avoidance  
tactics  and  unavailability,  or  through  deliberate  manipulation  and  control.  
While  the  heroines  in  these  films  start  out  thinking  that  they  can  discover  
their  own  voices  –  or  expressiveness  –  through  marriage,  the  recovery  of  
voice  is  often  enacted  through  a  negation  of  marriage  itself  (Cavell,  1996).    
  
The  woman’s  search  for  a  voice  depicted  in  the  melodramas  is  related  to  
ideas  of  criteria  and  community.  The  woman’s  recovery  of  voice  towards  the  
end  of  each  film  is  inextricably  tied  to  her  community,  either  through  her  
consent  to,  or  dissent  from,  criteria.  The  pattern  that  Cavell  charts  across  the  
melodramas  generally  involves  a  shift  from  the  repression  or  suppression  of  
voice  towards  its  discovery/recovery.  As  I  will  argue  here,  this  pattern  can  
also  be  considered  in  terms  of  a  move  from  conformity  and/or  compliance,  
towards  self-­reliance.  While  the  recovery  of  voice  and  the  development  of  
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self-­reliance  are  not  synonymous  ideas,  they  are  interrelated  through  the  
use  of  language,  criteria,  and  ties  to  community.          
  
The  role  of  the  ‘Other’  in  the  process  of  recovering  one’s  voice  is  also  
significant.  While  striving  for  independence  and  self-­intelligibility,  the  
principal  women  often  need  a  ‘friend’  (‘voice  coach’,  or  ‘therapist’)  to  guide,  
even  prompt,  their  journeying  towards  transformation  (Cavell,  2005a,  p.27).  
Towards  the  end  of  each  film,  the  audience  is  left  feeling  that  the  heroines  
have  ‘recovered’  their  voices  to  some  extent,  but  that  full  expressiveness  is  
still  to  be  achieved.  The  end  of  the  films  also  portray  the  moment  of  
‘conversion’  (Cavell,  1990,  p.36)  or  ‘realisation’,  which  marks  out  the  
beginning  of  the  recovery  of  voice;;  this  can  occur  either  in  a  moment  of  
confrontation,  or  of  silence.  
  
The  journey  towards  a  recovery  of  ‘voice’  is  complex  and  on-­going,  indeed  
Cavell  describes  it  as  perfectionist.  The  discovery  and/or  recovery  of  voice,  
as  depicted  in  the  melodramas,  can  be  seen  as  a  perfectionist  quest  for  
‘self-­reliance’  or  as  ‘an  aversion  to  conformity’  (Emerson,  1841/2000,  p.134).  
This  theme  of  Emersonian  moral  perfectionism  is  evident  throughout  the  
genre  of  the  melodramas  and  is  a  feature  of  each  heroine’s  search  for  a  
voice.  The  starting  point  for  such  a  perfectionist  journey  is  often  the  
experience  of  a  moral  crisis,  and  as  Cavell  puts  it:  
To  be  chagrined  by  every  word  that  most  men  say  is  going  to  put  you  
at   odds   with   those   men   and   make   your   common   sense   sound  
paradoxical.   This   is   the   crisis   out   of   which   moral   perfectionism’s  
aspiration  takes  its  rise,  the  sense  that  either  you  or  the  world  is  wrong  
(2005a,  p.29).    
  
The  crisis  experienced  here  forces  one  to  consider  whether  one’s  own  
conduct  is  ‘confrontable  in  moral  conversation’,  that  is,  whether  one  could  
justify  one’s  own  actions,  sense  of  self,  and  expression  of  ‘voice’  to  others  in  
one’s  community  (Cavell,  2005a,  p.12).  But  that  self-­reliance  involves  an  
aversion  of  conformity  may  mean  that  one  realises  that  one  cannot  commit  
oneself  to  the  world  in  the  way  that  the  community  sees  it  –  this  is  to  dissent  
in  criteria.  This  is  not  about  being  obstinate  in  response  to  questioning  from  
others  in  one’s  community,  but  rather  that  each  person  must  reconcile  
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themselves  to  themselves  first  and  foremost,  as  self-­intelligibility  must  
precede  the  acknowledgement  of  others.    
  
Thus  far,  I  have  introduced  the  genre  that  Cavell  (1996)  has  titled  ‘The  
Melodramas  of  the  Unknown  Woman’  and  delineated  the  main  
characteristics  shared  among  the  films.  I  have  also  outlined  some  of  the  
significant  features  of  the  woman’s  search  for  a  voice  in  the  melodramas,  
particularly  the  fact  that  it  is  perfectionist  in  nature.  With  these  points  in  mind,  
I  will  now  discuss  the  film  Gaslight  at  length,  with  some  further  some  
examples  taken  from  Now,  Voyager.    
  
3.7.1  Gaslight  
In  Gaslight,  the  principal  woman  Paula  is  shown  as  not  only  searching  for  a  
voice  and  sense  of  self,  but  for  a  voice  that  is  entirely  her  own.  From  the  
opening  scenes  of  the  film,  the  audience  witnesses  Paula  struggling  to  make  
herself  heard  authentically  in  her  singing  lessons.  She  is  being  taught  by  
Signor  Guardi,  who  also  coached  her  aunt  Alice  Alquist  to  become  a  famous  
opera  singer.  But  Paula  clearly  feels  unable  to  live  up  to  her  aunt’s  
reputation,  and  in  fact  she  does  not  wish  to,  as  she  complains  ‘I  haven’t  the  
voice,  have  I?’.  This  dissatisfaction  with  her  voice  may  stem  from  the  
pressure  to  conform  to  the  standards  of  operatic  singing,  with  its  distinctive  
style  and  sounds.  Signor  Guardi  also  seems  to  expect  Paula  to  imitate  her  
aunt  Alice’s  voice  which,  while  adored  by  many  fans,  renders  her  voiceless  
even  as  she  sings  louder.  So,  as  is  characteristic  of  the  melodramas,  Paula  
hopes  to  discover  her  own  voice,  expressiveness,  and  sense  of  self  through  
marriage.  Paula  is  charmed  by  the  piano  accompanist  to  her  singing  
lessons,  Gregory  Anton,  and  they  marry  only  a  few  weeks  after  meeting.  
    
Paula  and  Gregory  settle  in  her  aunt  Alice’s  house  in  London,  although  
Paula  feels  uncomfortable  there  as  her  aunt  was  found  murdered  in  the  
house.  Unbeknownst  to  Paula,  Gregory  is  the  murderer  of  Paula’s  aunt,  and  
is  desperately  seeking  her  jewels  that  he  believes  to  be  stored  in  the  house.  
On  their  first  outing  as  a  married  couple,  Paula  and  Gregory  visit  the  Tower  
of  London.  Before  leaving  the  house,  Gregory  gives  Paula  a  brooch  he  has  
inherited  from  his  family,  making  a  scene  of  his  carefully  placing  it  into  her  
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bag.  As  they  walk  around  the  tower,  Gregory  takes  the  brooch  from  Paula’s  
bag  while  she  is  not  looking  and  then  alerts  her  to  its  loss;;  Paula  feels  
terrible  for  losing  it,  though  she  cannot  remember  moving  the  brooch  herself.  
This  scene  highlights  Gregory’s  deviousness  and  marks  out  the  beginning  of  
Paula’s  ‘decreation’,  another  central  feature  of  the  melodramas  (Cavell,  
1996,  p.49).    
  
On  several  occasions,  Gregory  moves  pictures  and  other  items  around  the  
house,  claiming  that  Paula  has  done  it  and  then  forgotten.  But  his  sustained  
attempts  to  drive  Paula  mad  (in  the  hopes  of  inheriting  Alice  Alquist’s  jewels  
himself),  are  most  clearly  exemplified  in  the  fluctuating  gas  lighting  in  her  
bedroom  as  Gregory  searches  for  Alice  Alquist’s  jewels  among  her  
belongings  stored  in  the  attic.  Paula,  having  been  made  to  doubt  everything  
she  knows,  looks  to  the  house  servants  to  support  what  she  sees,  and  to  
explain  how  the  lighting  could  fluctuate  when  no  one  in  the  house  seems  to  
have  turned  on  other  lights.  Gregory’s  manipulation  of  Paula  not  only  
constitutes  an  arrogation  of  voice,  but  this  is  also  described  by  Cavell  as  a  
kind  of  ‘vampirism’  (p.70),  whereby  ‘a  way  of  describing  the  mode  of  torture  
that  is  systematically  driving  Paula  out  of  her  mind  is  to  note  that  she  is  
being  deprived  of  words,  of  her  right  to  words,  of  her  own  voice’  (1996,  p.57,  
my  emphasis).  Thus,  the  suppression  of  Paula’s  voice  exemplifies  an  
extreme  form  of  what  Cavell  terms  ‘the  threat  of  inexpressiveness’,  and  this  
is  associated  with  madness.      
  
The  Antons’  marriage  could  quite  easily  be  compared  to  a  dictatorship,  with  
Gregory  holding  all  the  power  over  his  wife  due  to  his  manipulations  of  her  
mental  state.  Paula  must  comply  with  Gregory’s  wishes  and  whims,  most  
notably  in  ‘playing  the  game’  of  searching  for  objects  that  she  has  not  
misplaced.  But  there  is  also  a  degree  of  conformity  evident  in  their  
relationship.  As  Gregory’s  deviousness  continues  throughout  the  film,  Paula  
expresses  her  voice  less  and  less.  Even  where  Paula  does  make  her  voice  
heard,  she  is  typically  restricted  to  a  sort  of  authorised  script,  with  her  own  
role  in  the  marriage  dictated  as  that  of  the  ‘mad  woman’.    
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A  prime  example  of  how  Paula’s  voice  is  suppressed  through  compliance  
and  conformity  is  this:    
Gregory:   You   tell   Miss   Thwaites   [a   friendly   neighbour]…that   your  
mistress  is  sorry,  but  she’s  not  well  enough  to  see  her  [directed  
at  Nancy,  the  maid].  
  
Paula:  Gregory,  why  did  you  do  that?  I  would’ve  liked  to  have  seen  her.  
  
Gregory:  I  thought  you  were  only  trying  to  be  polite.  Why  didn’t  you  tell  
me  you  really  wanted  to  see  her?...If  you  really  wanted  to  see  
her,  all  you  had  to  say  was:  ‘Show  her  up,  Nancy’,  wasn’t  it?  
  
After  speaking  to  the  maid  on  Paula’s  behalf  and  sending  away  their  visitor  
Miss  Thwaites,  hence  denying  her  voice  altogether,  Gregory  then  makes  it  
seem  as  if  Paula  could  have  changed  the  outcome  if  only  she  had  spoken  
up.  But  when  she  tries  to  speak  and  intervene,  Gregory  represses  Paula’s  
voice,  claiming  that  his  actions  are  for  her  own  benefit.  Paula  is  not  more  
assertive  here  as  Gregory  has  already  manipulated  her  into  submission,  with  
compliance  and  conformity  taking  the  place  of  love  and  mutual  respect  in  
their  marriage.  While  Gaslight  shows  the  suppression  and  arrogation  of  the  
principal  woman’s  voice  to  be  coercive  and  controlling,  even  abusive,  in  the  
other  melodramas  this  is  often  subtler.    
  
3.7.2  Now,  Voyager  
Now,  Voyager  depicts  the  heroine  Charlotte  Vale’s  search  for  a  voice  and  
sense  of  self.  The  crisis  that  marks  out  Charlotte’s  perfectionist  journey  is  
seemingly  a  mental  health  crisis,  with  Charlotte  on  the  verge  of  a  nervous  
breakdown  due  to  her  mother’s  controlling  ways.  Psychiatrist  Dr.  Jaquith  
comes  to  visit  Charlotte  and  realises  that  her  problems  could  be  addressed  
by  taking  her  away  from  the  overbearing  Mrs.  Windle  Vale.  After  spending  
some  time  at  Cascade,  the  clinic  owned  by  Jaquith,  Charlotte  sets  out  on  a  
voyage  to  South  America.  On  her  travels,  Charlotte  meets  the  affable  
Jeremiah  Duvaux  Durrance,  known  colloquially  as  Jerry.  They  have  a  
romantic  dalliance,  but  this  is  short-­lived  as  Jerry  is  already  married  and  
hence  unavailable  to  Charlotte.  
  
Charlotte  and  Jerry  part  amicably  and  decide  to  remain  friends  but  on  her  
return,  Charlotte  is  nevertheless  transformed.  She  is  able  to  renegotiate  the  
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terms  of  her  relationship  with  her  mother  and  reclaims  her  own  voice  through  
fighting  back  against  Mrs.  Vale’s  tyranny.  After  a  heated  argument,  Mrs.  
Vale  dies  of  a  heart  attack  and  Charlotte  returns  to  Cascade  for  Dr.  Jaquith’s  
guidance.  There,  she  meets  Jerry’s  troubled  daughter,  Tina,  and  strikes  up  a  
friendship  with  her.  Over  time,  Charlotte  takes  on  the  role  of  a  mother  to  Tina  
and  they  leave  Cascade  together.  It  is  through  her  mothering  of  Tina,  rather  
than  through  marriage,  that  Charlotte  finally  attains  a  kind  of  self-­reliance  
and  recovers  her  voice.      
  
In  Now,  Voyager,  the  repression  of  Charlotte’s  voice  is  enacted  in  her  
relationship  with  her  mother,  Mrs.  Windle  Vale.  The  meddlesome  Mrs.  Vale  
controls  all  aspects  of  Charlotte’s  life  –  what  she  reads,  how  she  behaves,  
and  her  appearance  –  in  hopes  of  keeping  her  unmarried,  and  so  available  
to  act  as  her  nurse  should  the  need  arise  as  Mrs.  Vale  gets  older.  Bound  to  
her  mother’s  rule,  Charlotte  is  forced  to  conform  to  what  is  expected  of  her,  
even  though  this  leaves  no  room  for  free  expression,  and  it  conflicts  with  her  
own  genius.  However  the  suppression  and  arrogation  of  the  principal  
women’s  voices  occurs,  it  is  a  significant  feature  of  the  melodramas  that  it  
does  occur;;  this  suppression  is  often  the  result  of  compliance  and  conformity  
to  another’s  wishes.  In  all  of  the  melodramas  though,  the  discovery  and/or  
recovery  of  voice  is  at  least  underway  by  the  end  of  each  film  with  the  help  
of  a  ‘Friend’  or  ‘voice  coach’  (Cavell,  2005a,  p.27).      
  
3.7.3  The  Recovery  of  Voice:  The  Role  of  the  ‘Voice  Coach’  
The  recovery  of  Paula’s  voice  begins  with  the  intervention  of  local  detective,  
Mr.  Cameron.  Cameron’s  interest  in  the  married  couple  is  sparked  when  he  
observes  one  of  Gregory’s  staged  ‘lost  watch’  scenes  at  a  social  gathering,  
and  he  wishes  to  help  Paula  if  he  can.  Following  this,  Cameron  observes  
Gregory’s  activities  and  witnesses  him  leaving  the  house  on  an  evening  and  
re-­entering  his  own  attic  from  a  neighbouring  house  –  obviously  wishing  to  
keep  his  search  of  Alice’s  possessions  a  secret.  Mr.  Cameron  gains  Paula’s  
trust  by  showing  her  a  glove  he  was  given  by  her  famous  aunt,  and  then  with  
his  encouragement  she  is  able  to  admit  what  she  hardly  dared  to  believe;;  
that  it  is  Gregory  who  is  responsible  for  the  noises  in  the  attic  and  the  
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dimming  of  her  light,  and  that  he  killed  her  aunt  Alice  in  his  greedy  quest  for  
her  precious  jewels.    
  
Cameron’s  role  is  that  of  a  ‘voice  teacher’,  assuring  Paula  that  she  
possesses  a  voice  and  should  not  be  terrified  of  expressing  it,  despite  
Gregory’s  attempts  to  convince  her  she  is  going  mad  (Cavell,  1996,  p.58).  
Cameron  does  not  use  Paula’s  voice  or  lack  thereof  for  his  own  gain,  as  
Gregory  does  throughout  the  film,  but  instead  he  urges  Paula  to  reclaim  her  
own  words  and  sense  of  self.  In  a  pivotal  scene  Cameron  says  to  Paula,  
‘Mrs.  Anton,  you  know,  don’t  you?  You  know  who’s  up  there’,  to  which  she  
replies,  ‘No…  How  could  he  be?’.  Paula  does  not  seem  surprised  that  
Gregory  is  her  tormentor  in  the  attic,  but  rather  that  Cameron  acknowledges  
the  same  noises  and  changes  in  lighting  that  she  herself  witnesses,  leading  
Paula  to  draw  her  own  conclusions.  Cavell  describes  Cameron’s  role  in  the  
recovery  of  Paula’s  voice  as  follows:      
The  young  detective,  in  giving  her  [Paula]  an  explanation  [for  the  noises  
in  the  attic  and  fluctuating  gas  lighting],   in  a  sense,  of  what  she  saw,  
bringing   her   back   from   strangulation,   reintroducing   her   to   language  
(demonstrating   that   her   words   are   not   shameful,   but   ordinary   and  
perfectly  credible,  that  the  speech  act  is  hers  to  define),  returns  her  to  
her  voice  (1996,  p.58).    
  
It  is  important  to  note  that  Paula’s  being  able  to  confirm  that  Gregory  is  in  the  
attic,  as  prompted  by  Cameron,  is  the  beginning  of  her  perfectionist  journey  
towards  self-­conversion  and  the  recovery  of  voice,  rather  than  its  ending.    
  
Paula’s  reintroduction  to  language  and  reclaiming  of  her  words  is  not  
something  to  be  conducted  once  and  for  all;;  instead  it  will  require  a  continual  
striving  towards  her  ‘unattained  but  attainable’  self  that  marks  it  out  as  
perfectionist.  While  the  path  of  perfectionism  can  be  traced  in  these  films,  it  
would  be  misleading  to  think  of  these  journeys  toward  the  
recovery/discovery  of  voice  as  having  discrete  beginnings  and  endings.  The  
person  seeking  transformation  may  never  reach  a  definitive  end-­point  of  
their  journey  –  a  final  telos  –  but  they  will  nevertheless  achieve  ends  within  
the  process  itself;;  as  Cavell  puts  it,  ‘“having”  “a”  self  is  a  process  of  moving  
to,  and  from,  nexts’  (1990,  p.12).  
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The  role  of  the  ‘voice  teacher’  is  also  central  to  Charlotte  Vale’s  recovery  of  
voice  (Cavell,  1996,  p.58).  For  Charlotte,  although  she  looks  for  an  
education  from  Jerry,  it  is  in  fact  Dr.  Jaquith  who  supports  her  perfectionist  
quest.  This  is  not  only  because  he  acts  as  her  ‘therapist’,  another  side  to  ‘the  
Friend’,  but  moreover  due  to  the  fact  that  only  he  recognises  Charlotte  as  
the  person  she  truly  is.  While  Mrs.  Vale  refers  to  Charlotte  as  her  ‘ugly  
duckling’  and  Jerry  goes  along  with  her  alias  ‘Camille  Beauchamp’,  Dr.  
Jaquith  acknowledges  Charlotte’s  own  voice  from  the  beginning.  Charlotte’s  
transformation  over  the  course  of  the  film  is  symbolised  as  that  from  an  ‘ugly  
duckling’  to  a  ‘funny  butterfly’,  the  title  Cavell  gives  to  his  chapter  on  the  
melodrama  in  Contesting  Tears  (1996,  p.115).    
  
What  enables  Mr.  Cameron  and  Dr.  Jaquith  to  act  as  ‘voice  teachers’  in  
these  melodramas  is  nothing  less  than  their  acknowledgement  of  the  
principal  women  on  their  own  terms  (Cavell,  1996,  p.58),  a  capacity  which  is  
typically  misplaced  or  unused  by  the  heroine’s  spouses/love  interests.  As  
Cavell  explains  the  threat  of  inexpressiveness  or  ‘unknownness’,  he  writes  
that  ‘the  woman’s  problem  is  not  one  of  not  belonging  but  one  of  belonging,  
only  on  the  wrong  terms’  (1996,  p.213).  This  tension  between  belonging  and  
(in)expressiveness  is  also  characteristic  of  Cavell’s  own  search  for  a  voice  
within  philosophy.  For  Cavell,  the  problem  was  not  that  he  could  not  have  a  
legitimate  voice  in  the  discipline  of  philosophy,  but  rather  that  his  voice  was  
expected  to  conform  to  customary  ways  of  doing  and  writing  philosophy.  
Cavell’s  assertion  of  his  right  to  write  autobiographically  thus  constitutes  an  
aversive  act  of  self-­reliance,  allowing  for  a  genuine  expression  of  voice.    
  
The  role  of  these  voice  coaches  or  ‘the  Friend’  is  central  to  perfectionism,  
but  it  also  implies  something  about  how  the  possession  and  expression  of  
one’s  voice  is  inextricably  linked  to  a  language  community  and  is  framed  by  
criteria  (Cavell,  2005a,  p.27).  The  quest  for  one’s  own  voice  and  sense  of  
self  is  intimately  bound  up  with  others  in  the  community,  whether  the  voice  
that  is  discovered  and/or  recovered  necessitates  either  consenting  to,  or  
dissenting  in,  the  criteria  of  such  a  community.    
  
While  each  heroine  in  the  melodramas  is  on  their  own  individual  journey  
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towards  recovering  their  ‘voice’,  sense  of  self,  and  experiencing  
transformation,  it  is  important  to  note  that  this  is  not  a  path  they  tread  alone.  
Just  as  the  recovery  of  voice  involves  another  and  is  tied  to  one’s  
community,  so  too  may  the  expression  of  one’s  voice  be  dependent  on  an  
encounter  with  the  other,  such  as  Cameron.  This  raises  the  issue  of  the  
political  in  Cavell’s  conception  of  voice,  as  speaking  for  oneself  at  all  implies  
that  one  is  speaking  politically.  Each  utterance  one  makes  is  an  expression  
of  communal  ties  and  of  one’s  membership  in  a  polis,  therefore  any  instance  
of  speaking  for  oneself  also  implies  speaking  on  behalf  of  others.  This  
makes  speaking  itself,  and  the  possession  and  expression  of  voice,  an  
inherently  political  act.      
  
3.7.4  Voice:  Self-­Reliance  and  Perfectionism  
In  the  melodramas,  the  way  in  which  the  principal  women’s  voices  are  
reclaimed  happens  not  only  in  dramatic  scenes,  such  as  Paula’s  ‘aria  of  
revenge’  against  Gregory,  but  also  in  quieter  moments  like  when  Charlotte  
Vale  walks  off  the  boat  a  transformed  woman  after  her  voyage.  Paula’s  ‘aria  
of  revenge’  takes  place  when  Gregory’s  ulterior  motives  have  been  
uncovered  and  Mr.  Cameron  has  tied  him  to  a  chair  while  they  await  the  
police  (Cavell,  1996,  p.59).  Paula  states  that  she  wishes  to  speak  with  her  
husband  alone,  and  Gregory  then  tries  to  convince  Paula  to  free  him,  
arguing  that  his  actions  have  been  misunderstood.  Among  her  aunt’s  
possessions  in  the  attic,  Paula  finds  a  knife  which  Gregory  asks  her  to  use  to  
cut  him  free.  But  here,  Paula  conforms  to  her  role  as  a  mad  woman  and  
uses  it  to  her  advantage.  By  assuming  the  ‘madness’  that  Gregory  has  tried  
to  induce  in  her,  Paula  is  finally  able  to  make  her  voice  heard,  and  the  
following  constitutes  her  ‘cogito’  (Cavell,  1996,  p.60):  
Are  you  suggesting  that  this  is  a  knife?  I  don’t  see  any  knife.  You  must  
have  dreamed  you  put  it  there…Are  you  mad,  my  husband?  Or  is  it  I  
who  am  mad?  Yes.  I  am  mad…If  I  were  not  mad  I  could  have  helped  
you…But  because  I  am  mad  I  am  rejoicing  in  my  heart  without  a  shred  
of  pity,  with  glory  in  my  heart.      
        
Here,  Paula  is  not  only  asserting  her  own  voice  but  also  affirming  her  
existence,  chiefly  that  her  vision  of  reality  coincides  with  that  of  others  (such  
as  Mr.  Cameron),  meaning  she  is  completely  sane  despite  Gregory’s  
manipulations.  What  Paula  says  here  evidences  her  growing  self-­reliance  as  
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she  trusts  her  own  judgment  over  Gregory’s.  Paula  acts  like  a  mad  woman,  
but  she  subverts  conformity  –  she  does  not  conform  to  what  Gregory  would  
have  wanted  her  to  say,  and  neither  does  she  comply  with  his  wishes  (to  
release  him).  In  this  scene  Paula’s  voice  is  recovered,  yet  her  remark  in  the  
final  scene  that  ‘this  night  will  be  a  long  night’  signals  that  there  is  still  more  
work  on  the  self  to  be  done.  This  is  a  central  characteristic  of  the  
melodramas  but  also  of  Cavell’s  conception  of  ‘voice’,  that  the  search  for  a  
voice  is  perfectionist.    
  
The  discovery  and/or  recovery  of  voice  is  no  less  complex  in  Now,  Voyager,  
wherein  Charlotte  Vale  reclaims  her  own  voice  from  her  mother’s  influence  
by  asserting  that  she  is  no  longer  afraid  of  Mrs.  Vale’s  threats  to  her  finances  
and  her  reputation.  While  this  is  one  instance  in  which  Charlotte’s  
transformation  is  visibly  marked,  the  recovery  of  her  voice  and  developing  
sense  of  self-­reliance  is  also  exemplified  in  the  final  scenes  of  the  film  when  
she  is  confronted  by  Jerry.  Towards  the  end  of  the  film,  Jerry  questions  
Charlotte  as  to  her  motivation  for  looking  after  his  daughter  Tina,  wrongly  
assuming  she  is  doing  it  as  a  way  to  remain  close  to  him.    
  
After  correcting  Jerry  on  this,  Charlotte  seems  to  have  finally  detected  that  
‘gleam  of  light’  which  is  characteristic  of  self-­reliance  (Emerson,  1841/2000,  
p.132),  noting  that  she  no  longer  wants  to  pursue  what  social  convention  
tells  her  she  ought  to  –  a  house  of  her  own,  husband  of  her  own,  and  
children  of  her  own.  Here,  Charlotte  effects  a  romantic  separation  from  Jerry,  
although  they  will  still  be  tied  together  in  their  relationships  with  Tina.  In  this  
final  scene,  Charlotte  is  expressing  her  voice  in  her  own  terms,  and  not  
merely  as  the  ‘ugly  duckling’  or  as  Jerry’s  love  interest.  This  marks  the  
closing  of  that  particular  circle  in  which  she  was  ‘unknown’  to  herself  and  to  
others,  while  the  ending  of  the  film  can  be  seen  as  the  drawing,  in  
Emersonian  terms,  of  a  new  circle.    
  
While  Gaslight  provides  several  prominent  examples  of  how  conformity  and  
compliance  may  come  to  replace  self-­reliance,  it  also  offers  an  insight  into  
what  the  recovery  or  discovery  of  one’s  own  voice  (and  sense  of  self)  might  
look  like.  While  it  could  be  said  that  Paula’s  voice  is  recovered  in  her  
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powerful  ‘aria  of  revenge’  (Cavell,  1996,  p.59),  the  process  of  becoming  self-­
reliant  in  terms  of  possessing  and  expressing  one’s  voice  is  ongoing,  as  
alluded  to  in  the  closing  scene  of  the  film.    
  
Despite  the  fact  that  Paula  is  not  simply  silenced  in  the  film,  the  pressure  
placed  on  her  to  conform  and  comply  to  Gregory’s  demands  contributes  to  
an  erosion  of  her  self-­intelligibility,  and  of  the  right  to  possess  her  own  
words.  While  the  examples  taken  from  Gaslight  and  Now,  Voyager  are  stark,  
in  reality  the  dividing  line  between  conformity/compliance  and  self-­reliance  is  
not  fixed.  Some  relationships  may  be  premised  upon  conformity/compliance,  
such  as  Paula  and  Gregory’s  marriage,  but  others  support  and  encourage  
self-­reliance  (such  as  that  between  Paula  and  Mr.  Cameron).  Yet  the  picture  
is  typically  more  complex  than  this,  with  the  move  towards  self-­reliance  or  
mere  conformity  resting  on  every  speech  act  or  expression  of  voice.    
The  discovery  or  recovery  of  one’s  voice  will  depend  on  a  commitment  to  
‘testing  out’  the  depth  of  one’s  adherence  to  the  criteria  of  a  language  
community,  or  in  essence,  the  extent  to  which  one  is  in  ‘mutual  attunement’  
with  others  (Cavell,  1979a,  p.32).  The  importance  of  maintaining  one’s  own  
voice  and  asserting  this  despite  the  influence  of  others,  is  described  by  
Emerson  as  follows:    
It   is   easy   in   the  world   to   live   after   the  world’s   opinion;;   it   is   easy   in  
solitude  to  live  after  our  own;;  but  the  great  man  is  he  who  in  the  midst  
of   the   crowd   keeps   with   perfect   sweetness   the   independence   of  
solitude  (1841/2000,  p.136).    
  
What  it  means  to  possess  and  express  one’s  voice  is  inextricably  tied  to  a  
language  community;;  our  agreement  in  criteria  should  be  up  for  negotiation  
with  every  invocation  of  what  ‘we’  say  if  conformity  and  compliance  are  to  be  
avoided.  It  is  important  to  highlight  though,  that  a  genuine,  self-­reliant  
expression  of  one’s  voice  can  equally  be  made  through  consenting  to,  or  
dissenting  in,  criteria.    
  
Cavell’s  conception  of  ‘voice’  –  as  tied  to  one’s  sense  of  self  and  
perfectionist  –  is  arguably  much  richer  than  that  currently  pervading  the  
Higher  Education  sector.  Current  measures  of  student  ‘voice’  regard  it  
merely  in  terms  of  quality  assurance  and  enhancement  (Brooman  et  al.,  
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2015;;  Hall,  2016;;  Higdon,  2016),  whereby  voice  is  collected  as  a  means  to  
an  end;;  to  improve  the  ‘quality’  of  service  provision  in  order  to  attract  more  
student-­consumers.  Some  researchers  have  already  critiqued  the  vacuity  of  
these  initiatives,  stating  that  the  collection  of  student  voice  is  little  more  than  
an  ‘element’  in  the  ‘disciplinary  machine’  that  is  the  contemporary,  corporate  
university  (Canning,  2017,  p.522).  But  the  criticisms  I  have  discussed  here,  
that  voice  measures  are  limiting,  transactional,  instrumental,  and  potentially  
undemocratic,  stem  from  the  fact  that  current  measures  of  ‘voice’  amount  to  
little  more  than  collecting  feedback.  Bearing  the  central  distinction  between  
conformity/compliance  and  self-­reliance  in  mind,  I  will  now  explore  some  
potential  implications  of  these  ideas  for  the  HE  sector.    
  
3.8  Nonconformity  and  Self-­Reliance:  Implications  for  the  HE  
Sector  
At  the  end  of  Emerson’s  essay  ‘self-­reliance’,  he  asserts  that  ‘a  greater  self-­
reliance  must  work  a  revolution  in  all  the  offices  and  relations  of  men;;  in  their  
religion;;  in  their  education;;  in  their  pursuits;;  their  modes  of  living’  
(1841/2000,  p.147).  I  argue  that  this  idea  has  import  for  the  current  state  of  
the  HE  sector.  I  will  now  consider  not  only  what  self-­reliance  may  look  like  in  
relation  to  ‘voice’,  but  also  how  it  could  be  practically  encouraged  and/or  
incorporated  into  university  initiatives.    
  
A  significant  sign  of  progress  in  moving  from  conformity/compliance  towards  
self-­reliance  would  be  for  university  managers  and  policy-­makers  to  
recognise  that  current  attempts  to  capture,  collect,  and  measure  ‘the  student  
voice’  generate  little  more  than  feedback.  This  distinction  is  exemplified  by  
the  fact  that  student  ‘voice’,  in  essence  feedback,  is  typically  only  collected  
and  acknowledged  at  the  end  of  the  student  lifecycle,  meaning  that  it  is  used  
to  make  improvements  to  service  provision  for  future  student-­consumers  
without  directly  impacting  on  those  lending  their  ‘voice’  to  such  measures.  
Even  where  student  voice  is  collected  at  an  earlier  stage  by  a  university,  the  
impetus  is  often  to  pre-­emptively  feed  their  responses  back  into  quality  
assurance  and  enhancement  processes.  Before  this  gap  between  voice  and  
mere  feedback  can  be  addressed,  there  is  a  need  to  acknowledge  that  
‘voice’  and  ‘feedback’  are  not  synonymous  terms.  
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While  this  distinction  between  feedback  and  voice  intuitively  makes  sense,  
what  really  differentiates  the  two  is  the  extent  to  which  one’s  self  is  
implicated  in  each  expression,  with  feedback  being  a  relatively  low-­stakes  
report  on  the  consumption  of  goods  or  services.  Feedback  is  often  
structured  in  terms  of  the  good,  the  bad,  and  the  ugly  –  underpinning  what  
one  says  will  be  a  reflection  on  how  the  goods  or  services  delivered  matched  
up  with  one’s  expectations  pre-­delivery,  known  as  the  expectancy  
disconfirmation  paradigm  (Appleton-­Knapp  and  Krentler,  2006;;  Alves  and  
Raposo,  2009).    
  
The  provision  of  feedback  following  a  consumption  experience  inevitably  
positions  the  person  expressing  their  opinions  as  a  ‘customer’  or  ‘consumer’  
and  nothing  more.  As  such,  while  the  giving  of  feedback  does  count  as  an  
expression  of  voice,  it  is  an  experience  that  is  entirely  structured  by  
conformity  and  compliance,  meaning  that  this  does  not  exemplify  ‘voice’  in  a  
richer,  Cavellian  sense.  While  feedback  will  be  taken  at  face  value,  as  
providing  a  sum  evaluation  of  a  consumption  experience,  Cavell  argues  that  
when  it  comes  to  the  expression  of  voice  ‘saying  something  is  never  merely  
saying  something,  but  is  saying  something  with  a  certain  tune  and  at  a  
proper  cue  and  while  executing  the  appropriate  business’  (1994,  p.30,  
original  emphasis).  
  
The  possession  and  expression  of  one’s  voice  is  thus  ‘never  merely  saying  
something’  but  it  ties  one  to  a  particular  language  community,  through  which  
one  is  able  to  say  what  ‘counts’  for  them,  and  what  they  consent  to  being  
said  on  their  behalf  through  an  invocation  of  the  ‘we’.  Just  as  Cavell  relates  
the  recovery  and/or  discovery  of  voice  to  one’s  sense  of  self,  so  too  could  
the  expression  of  voice  equally  relate  to  what  Emerson  terms  ‘the  self-­
sufficing  and  therefore  self-­relying  soul’  (1841/2000,  p.144).  Thus,  the  
expression  of  voice  is  a  laying  bare  of  the  soul  even  in  the  most  ordinary,  
everyday  utterances.    
  
Making  one’s  own  voice  heard,  an  act  of  self-­reliance  and  nonconformity,  is  
not  simply  a  linguistic  matter.  It  is  through  the  possession  and  expression  of  
voice  that  ‘we’  each  show  how  the  world  looks  to  us,  offering  up  an  example  
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to  the  language  community  which  may  be  accepted  or  rebuked.  With  this  in  
mind,  Cavell  writes  that  particular  utterances  can  ‘risk,  if  not  cost,  blood’  
(2005b,  p.187).20  So  the  expression  of  voice,  unlike  the  giving  of  feedback,  is  
high  stakes  as  it  implies  the  difficult  resolution  of  an  internal  tension  between  
self-­knowledge  and  self-­loss;;  this  is  clearly  exemplified  in  Paula’s  ‘aria  of  
revenge’  (Cavell,  1996,  p.59).    
  
If  the  expression  of  voice  is  shaped  by  institutional  pressures  of  conformity  
and  compliance,  then  it  is  easy  to  see  how  self-­reliance  could  be  side-­lined.  
While  student  voice  initiatives  typically  emphasise  how  they  take  account  of  
each  individual’s  voice,  with  taglines  such  as  ‘Have  your  say’  and  ‘Make  your  
voice  heard’,  this  is  at  risk  of  being  negated  by  the  way  that  student  
responses  are  then  analysed  and  evaluated,  which  tends  to  group  students  
together  in  terms  of  their  course,  department,  and  institution.  The  collection  
of  student  ‘voice’  via  the  NSS  is  even  analysed  and  compared  nationally.  
What  is  left  out  here  is  any  consideration  of  the  student  body  as  a  
community,  although  the  expression  of  each  individual  student’s  voice  does  
imply  claims  to  community  through  the  application  of  criteria  to  structure  
what  is  said.  That  our  language  is  shared  also  means  that  any  expression  of  
voice  is  in  some  sense  communal,  whether  this  refers  to  the  student  
community  or  something  broader,  yet  current  voice  initiatives  cannot  account  
for  this.      
  
Where  the  language  community  is  acknowledged,  there  is  an  assumed  
homogeneity  present  as  universities  and  policy-­makers  refer  to  the  student  
voice,  as  if  all  students  expressed  the  same  opinions.  As  considerations  of  
‘the  student  voice’  ignore  the  feedback  of  individual  students,  institutional  
managers  will  also  tend  to  group  different  communities  of  students  together,  
although  this  is  not  unproblematic.  Across  various  measures  of  student  
satisfaction,  it  has  been  found  that  male  and  female  students  value  social  
and  academic  aspects  of  their  Higher  Education  differently,  mature  students  
are  more  likely  than  their  younger  peers  to  be  satisfied  overall,  and  that  
                                                                                        
20  Passionate  utterances,  or  the  perlocutionary  effects  of  speech,  will  be  
discussed  in  greater  detail  in  Chapter  Five.    
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cultural  differences  can  similarly  influence  students’  perceptions  of  service  
quality  (Miliszewska  and  Sztendur,  2012;;  O’Driscoll,  2012;;  Parahoo  et  al.,  
2013;;  Elsharnouby,  2015).    
  
Given  that  the  impulse  to  collect  student  ‘voice’  or  feedback  is  ineluctably  
linked  to  student  satisfaction  then,  it  is  misleading  to  consider  students  as  a  
homogeneous  group.  In  order  to  account  for  each  individual’s  voice  –  as  
university  marketing  campaigns  often  promise  –  it  will  be  necessary  to  
capture  students’  voices  plural,  rather  than  simply  ‘the  student  voice’.21  An  
example  of  doing  so  would  be  to  keep  a  record  of  all  those  students  who  do  
not  fill  in  surveys  such  as  mid-­module  reviews,  particularly  when  they  
express  their  reason  for  not  doing  so.  To  withdraw  one’s  consent  from  the  
language  community  in  this  way  constitutes  an  act  of  self-­reliance,  and  its  
legitimacy  as  an  active  expression  of  voice  needs  to  be  better  acknowledged  
by  universities  and  policy-­makers  alike.    
  
For  those  who  decide  not  to  lend  their  voice  to  dominant  measures  such  as  
the  NSS,  this,  in  effect,  renders  them  voiceless.  It  may  be  considered  by  
policy-­makers  as  a  sign  of  students’  apathy  or  disengagement  with  their  
Higher  Education,  but  as  Fulford  writes  of  disengagement:    
[It  is]  not  a  failure  to  act  and  an  absence  of  will,  but  rather…[it  can  be  
considered  as]  an  awakening  of  voice  that  is  an  active  expression  of  a  
commitment   to   one’s   language,   community,   and   education   (2017,  
p.108).    
  
To  disengage  from  powerful  discourses  that  rely  on  conformity  and  
compliance  itself  counts  as  a  move  towards  self-­reliance,  as  one  asserts  that  
a  particular  language  community  does  not  speak  for  them.  If  universities  are  
to  produce  more  than  just  ‘excellent  sheep’  (Deresiewicz,  2015),  then  
encouraging  students  to  possess  and  express  their  own  voices  should  
involve  a  commitment  to  students’  moral/intellectual  cultivation  and  self-­
reliance,  rather  than  the  administration  of  a  mere  tick-­box  exercise.  While  
student  feedback  is  of  instrumental  value  to  university  managers,  supporting  
students’  discovery  and/or  recovery  of  voice  is  intrinsically  valuable  to  us  all.    
                                                                                        
21  I  am  indebted  to  my  colleague,  Dr.  Anne  Pirrie,  for  this  insight.    
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Chapter  4  
Modes  of  Settlement  in  Higher  Education  
Scenario22  
An  assessment  drop-­in  session  for  undergraduate  students  is  taking  place.  
Student  attendance  is  entirely  voluntary  and  a  register  is  not  kept.  The  
session  is  held  ten  days  before  the  assignment  due  date.  
 
 
Lecturer:  [To  one  of  the  students]  Hi,  how  are  you  getting  on  with  the  
assignment  then?  
  
Student  1:  Well,  I’ve  been  a  bit  stressed  about  it  really.  I’m  just  not  sure  I  am  
doing  enough  to  get  a  good  2:1  mark…  
  
Lecturer:  It’s  ok,  I  can  look  at  your  essay  plan  today  and  let  you  know  if  
you’re  on  the  right  lines.  Have  you  brought  your  plan  with  you?  
  
Student  1:  Well,  erm,  no…I  haven’t  really  done  my  plan  yet.  I  was  hoping  
you  could  tell  me  what  to  put  in  it…  
  
Lecturer:  Right,  well  if  you  tell  me  your  ideas,  then  I  can  guide  you  with  your  
plan.  So,  are  you  going  to  write  your  essay  on,  the  first  three  lectures  
or  our  second  set  of  lectures?  
  
Student  1:  The  first  three  lectures.  
  
Lecturer:  Ok,  and  have  you  read  the  articles  I  put  in  those  folders  online?  
The  module  handbook  also  has  guidelines  for  the  assignment…  
  
Student  1:  Aww,  right…well,  I  haven’t  read  the  handbook  but  I  just  need  to  
get  a  good  mark  on  this  assignment  so  this  module  boosts  my  
percentage  overall.  How  can  I  make  sure  that  I  do  well  on  this  essay?    
  
Lecturer:  All  you  need  to  do  is  talk  about  the  lecture  materials,  make  
reference  to  the  articles  I’ve  given  you…and  show  what  you’ve  
learned  in  this  module.  Think  about  the  learning  outcomes  of  each  
lecture,  and  match  this  up  with  the  assessment  criteria.  I’ve  given  you  
a  choice  of  two  questions  to  split  the  material  and  make  it  less  
difficult.  All  you  need  to  get  a  good  mark  is  to  make  your  essay  speak  
to  the  criteria…  
  
Student  1:  Erm,  well…I’ve  never  really  understood  the  criteria  to  be  honest.  I  
mean,  what  is  it  that  makes  an  essay  worth  a  2:1  rather  than  a  2:2?    
  
                                                                                        
22  This  scenario  is  based  on  a  real  situation,  but  is  partly  fictionalised.  
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Lecturer:  The  main  thing  I  look  for  in  an  assignment  is  a  coherent  argument,  
which  is  backed  up  by  research  evidence.  What  grade  an  essay  gets  
will  depend  on  how  well  it  does  this…you  have  to  be  critical  in  your  
writing  rather  than  just  descriptive.  Does  that  make  sense?            
    
Student  1:  Yeah,  I  think  so.  Could  you  look  over  a  draft  of  my  essay  before  I  
hand  it  in  to  check  that  it  would  be  alright?  
  
Lecturer:  I’m  afraid  I  can  only  look  at  your  essay  plan,  but  send  that  over  to  
me  when  you  have  it  and  I’ll  give  you  some  feedback  on  it.  Are  you  
feeling  happier  about  the  assignment  now?  
  
Student  1:  Yes,  thanks  for  your  help.  I’ll  see  you  next  week.  
  
[Student  1  exits  and  Student  2  enters]  
  
Lecturer:  Hi,  how  are  you  doing?  
  
Student  2:  Alright  I  think,  I  just  wanted  to  check  if  I’m  including  the  right  
things  in  my  assignment.  
  
Lecturer:  Yes,  that’s  not  a  problem.  Do  you  have  your  essay  plan  with  you?  
  
Student  2:  Ah,  I  have  it  here.  (student  2  places  a  flow  chart  on  the  table).  
  
Lecturer:  Well,  this  looks  very  detailed  so  well  done  for  being  so  organised.  
You’ve  got  a  lot  of  literature  to  be  included  here…what  point  are  you  
arguing  for?  
  
Student  2:  Sorry,  what  do  you  mean?  
  
Lecturer:  Are  you  arguing  that  x  is  the  best  policy  to  use  in  early  years  
settings,  or  is  y  better?    
  
Student  2:  Erm,  well  I’m  going  to  talk  about  them  both…  
  
Lecturer:  But  what  do  you  think  about  the  issue?  Reflecting  on  this  should  
make  your  writing  more  critical,  which  is  what  gets  the  top  marks.      
  
Student  2:  So  I’m  allowed  to  put  my  opinion  in  there?  
  
Lecturer:  Well…yes,  if  it’s  backed  up  by  research.      
  
Student  2:  And  then  I  should  get  a  2:1  right?  
  
Lecturer:  It  depends  on  how  well  you  present  your  argument…but  you’re  
engaging  with  international  literature  which  is  great,  so  just  make  sure  
to  follow  the  structure  which  you  have  shown  me  today.    
    
Student  2:  So  if  I  stick  to  this  essay  plan  I  should  be  fine?  
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Lecturer:  Based  on  what  you’ve  shown  me,  I  think  your  essay  will  definitely  
pass  but  focus  on  being  critical  if  you  want  the  higher  grades.    
  
Student  2:  Ok,  I’ll  try  my  best…thanks  for  going  through  it  with  me.  I  think  I  
know  what  to  do  with  the  essay  now.    
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The  students  depicted  in  the  scenario  are  invariably  seeking  a  form  of  
settlement;;  they  want  to  know  exactly  what  to  include  in  an  essay,  and  how  
to  meet  the  assessment  criteria  to  get  that  ‘gold  standard’  2:1  degree  
classification.  While  the  scenario  is  fictionalised,  it  is  based  on  a  real  
experience  observed  in  a  university  context.  Staff  interactions  with  students  
are  changed  by  students’  focus  on  the  degree  classification  and  the  high  
tuition  fees  given  in  exchange  for  this,  whilst  universities’  scrutiny  of  
satisfaction  scores  from  the  NSS  are  used  as  a  form  of  accountability.  These  
policies  and  pressures,  when  taken  together,  can  mean  staff  feel  the  need  to  
settle  students  down,  rather  than  to  provide  opportunities  for  the  kind  of  
educative  conversations  (about  the  content)  that  might  well  be  unsettling.  
This  is  exemplified  by  the  lecturer  asking  the  student  ‘are  you  feeling  happier  
about  the  assignment  now?’  The  scenario  that  opens  this  chapter  shows  
how  student  satisfaction  measures  have  substantially  impacted  upon  
teaching  and  learning  practices  in  the  university.    
  
In  this  chapter  I  focus  in  more  detail  on  the  idea  of  settlement,  and  I  will  
describe  how  the  etymology  of  ‘satisfaction’  implies  forms  of  settlement,  in  
terms  of  both  settling  up  and  settling  down.  The  issues  with  such  settlement  
in  Higher  Education  were  detailed  in  Chapter  One,  namely  that  it  leads  to  an  
‘end-­stopped’  (Sturm,  2011,  p.6),  outcome-­focused  education  that  is  
ontologically  inauthentic,  and  this  can  be  stifling  to  independent  thought.  In  
arguing  against  settlement,  there  is  an  important  distinction  to  be  made  here  
between  the  kinds  of  (economic)  settlement  that  are  being  critiqued,  versus  
a  more  personal  form  of  settlement,  such  as  settling  in  to  university.  
Students  clearly  need  to  be  ‘settled’  in  certain  ways,  such  as  the  provision  of  
induction  activities,  comfortable  halls  of  residence,  and  sufficient  
administrative  information.  But  I  argue  that  settlement  is  problematic  when  
its  focus  is  directed  towards  a  kind  of  closing  down  in  relation  to  learning,  
teaching  and  assessment  practices.    
  
I  make  a  distinction  here  between  forms  of  un-­educative  settlement,  such  as  
that  depicted  in  the  scenario  which  is  shaped  by  concerns  over  ‘value  for  
money’,  and  educative  unsettling  characterised  by  other  ways  of  teaching  
and  being  with  one’s  students.  If  an  institution’s  chief  aim  becomes  student  
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satisfaction  then  this  implies  that  student  expectations  must  be  met  at  all  
costs.  But  this  raises  the  question  of  ‘are  we  giving  students  what  they  need,  
or  merely  what  they  want?’  I  argue  that  settling  students  down  in  this  way  is  
fundamentally  un-­educative  as  it  limits  the  possibilities  for  self-­transformation  
and  human  flourishing  in  favour  of  particular  ends  –  that  is,  preparation  for  
one’s  place  in  the  labour  market.  In  this  sense,  Higher  Education  is  reduced  
to  mere  instruction  or  training,  as  it  is  increasingly  aligned  with  student-­
consumer  desires.          
        
In  order  to  reconceive  the  value  of  Higher  Education  in  more  than  monetary  
and  instrumental  terms,  I  argue  against  forms  of  un-­educative  settlement  
that  are  inextricably  tied  to  the  use  of  student  satisfaction  measures.  To  
settle  teaching,  learning  and  thinking  from  the  outset,  confining  students  to  
learning  outcomes  and  module  specifications,  is  anathema  to  Higher  
Education  in  its  richest  sense.  Instead,  I  will  explore  the  possibilities  of  
educative  unsettling  as  a  reframing  of  the  way  we  account  for  ourselves,  and  
will  move  to  discuss  a  perfectionist  education  of  the  self.  In  order  to  
introduce  these  ideas  and  elucidate  what  may  be  valuable  about  educative  
unsettling,  I  will  briefly  discuss  the  etymology  of  ‘satisfaction’  before  turning  
to  the  works  of  the  American  transcendentalist  writers,  Henry  David  Thoreau  
and  Ralph  Waldo  Emerson.  Themes  of  unsettling  and  perfectionism  will  be  
investigated  by  drawing  on  Thoreau  and  Emerson’s  writings,  and  Cavell’s  
interpretation  of  these  works,  before  moving  on  to  a  consideration  of  an  
ontological  form  of  unsettlement  –  the  das  Unheimliche  –  taken  from  the  
work  of  German  philosopher,  Martin  Heidegger.    
  
4.1  Etymological  Tracings  
4.1.1  Satisfaction:  Settling  Up23  
As  I  have  argued  previously,  the  etymology  of  ‘satisfaction’  (from  the  Latin  
satisfactionem  dare,  meaning  to  satisfy  a  creditor,  or  discharge  a  debt)  
suggests  that  it  can  be  understood  in  terms  of  a  kind  of  settlement  of  an  
                                                                                        
23  Sections  of  this  chapter  were  published  elsewhere  in  Skea,  C.  2017.  
Student  Satisfaction  in  Higher  Education:  Settling  Up  and  Settling  
Down.  Ethics  and  Education.  12(3),  pp.364-­377.  
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account  (Skea,  2017).  ‘Settlement’  has  also  been  used  in  a  legal  sense,  
when  cases  are  drawn  to  a  close  and  this  involves  the  payment  of  an  
account,  such  as  the  “settling  of  arrangements”  in  a  divorce’.  The  etymology  
of  ‘satisfaction’  shows  that  this  is  linked  to  the  ‘settling  up’  of  a  financial  
transaction  (Skea,  2017).  ‘Satisfaction’  could  thus  be  considered  as  a  form  
of  ‘settling  up’,  as  when  we  ‘settle  up’  the  bill  in  a  restaurant.  Upon  leaving  
Higher  Education,  the  students’  debts  will  be  settled  up  once  they  obtain  a  
graduate  job.  ‘This  is  the  exchange  value  of  a  degree:  obtaining  a  degree  
typically  involves  the  development  of  transferable  employability  skills  (for  
which  they  have  paid  substantial  tuition  fees),  and  then  entering  graduate  
employment  is  seen  as  a  return  on  their  investment  through  increased  
earnings…[Thus]  employability  could  be  considered  as  the  ultimate  ‘settling  
up’,  and  endpoint,  of  the  financial  transaction  that  is  one’s  Higher  Education’  
(Skea,  2017,  pp.366-­367).  
  
4.1.2  Satisfaction:  Settling  Down  
I  have  also  argued  that  student  ‘satisfaction’  can  be  considered  as  a  form  of  
settling  down.  Initially  in  the  1620s,  the  term  ‘settlement’  was  used  in  
reference  to  the  colonisation  of  land  and  setting  up  a  new  territory;;  this  is  
akin  to  an  idea  of  settling  down  –  of  making  home.  Talk  of  ‘early  settlers’  
relates  back  to  the  surge  in  emigration  to  North  America  in  the  early  1600s,  
where  people  ventured  to  new  lands  and  made  it  their  own  (Skea,  2017).    
  
The  etymology  of  ‘satisfaction’  is  also  linked  to  a  sense  of  ‘appeasement’  or  
‘contentment’.  Contentment  in  relation  to  student  satisfaction  could  be  
considered  as  the  meeting  of  student  needs  and/or  expectations,  with  a  
focus  on  ensuring  ‘value  for  money’  and  settling  students  down.  This  is  not  
to  give  an  entirely  negative  account  of  settling  down.  Of  course,  in  some  
contexts,  settling  down  is  just  what  is  needed  (think  of  a  child  who  has  
grazed  her  knee  and  needs  to  be  comforted,  and  settled);;  it  is  rather  to  
question  forms  of  settling  down  and  contentment  in  Higher  Education  (Skea,  
2017).    
  
‘From  looking  at  the  etymology  of  both  satisfaction  and  settlement,  it  seems  
clear  that  these  terms  could  relate  both  to  a  form  of  settling  up  (an  idea  
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which  directly  relates  to  forms  of  economic  exchange),  as  well  as  settling  
down  (making  everything  comfortable  and  homely).  Both  settling  up  and  
settling  down  are  concepts  steeped  in  market  economics.  If  student  
“satisfaction”  can  be  seen  in  these  terms,  that  is,  inextricably  tied  to  the  
language  of  economic  rationality,  then  it  too  denotes  forms  of  settling  up,  
and  down’  (Skea,  2017,  p.367).    
  
4.2  ‘Educative’  Unsettling?    
In  what  follows  I  will  draw  on  one  of  the  central  ideas  that  informs  this  thesis,  
Emersonian  moral  perfectionism,  to  argue  for  the  educative  potential  of  
being  unsettled,  before  going  on  to  explore  several  illustrations  of  
perfectionist  ideas  in  the  works  of  Thoreau  and  Emerson.  While  the  writings  
of  Thoreau  are  not  directly  about  education  in  the  formal  sense  of  schooling,  
the  educational  and  philosophical  force  of  his  work  has  been  emphasised  by  
Stanley  Cavell  among  others  (Cavell,  1981a;;  Saito  and  Standish,  2012).    
  
The  ultimate  aim  of  such  a  perfectionist  education  could  be  stated  as  a  
movement  toward  ‘conversion’,  ‘transformation’,  and/or  ‘self-­transcendence’  
(Cavell,  1990,  p.36;;  2005a,  p.29;;  Saito,  2012,  p.181).  This  movement  
towards  one’s  next,  higher  self  necessitates  leaving  and  unsettlement.  Of  
crucial  importance  here  is  that  both  Thoreau  and  Emerson  are  described  as  
‘orienters’  and  as  ‘philosophers  of  direction…tirelessly  prompting  us  to  be  on  
our  way,  endlessly  asking  us  where  we  stand,  what  it  is  we  face’  (Cavell,  
1981a,  pp.141-­142).  Thus,  to  read  their  works  is  to  be  unsettled  and  
educated,  in  the  sense  of  being  awoken  from  our  lives  of  ‘quiet  desperation’  
(Thoreau,  1854/1997,  p.9).    
  
Unsettlement  is  something  that  Thoreau,  Emerson  and  Cavell  not  only  
discuss,  but  also  embody  in  their  works;;  they  demand  of  their  readers  a  
willingness  to  traverse  previously  untaken  paths.  The  kind  of  educative  
unsettling  I  wish  to  pursue,  and  that  counteracts  the  impulse  to  un-­educative  
forms  of  settlement,  is  thus  underpinned  by  the  perfectionist  vision  of  
education  that  is  exemplified  in  these  philosophical  works.  With  this  in  mind,  
I  will  now  explain  in  greater  detail  what  is  meant  by  the  term  ‘Emersonian  
moral  perfectionism’  (Cavell,  1990,  p.12),  and  how  it  is  illuminating  for  the  
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considerations  of  settlement  that  are  discussed  here.      
4.3  Perfectionism  and  Unsettling  
‘Emersonian  moral  perfectionism’  is  the  term  used  by  Stanley  Cavell  to  
characterise  a  central  aspect  of  Emerson’s  work,  that  the  self  cannot  be  a  
fixed  entity,  but  is  continually  aspiring  toward  a  higher  version  of  itself.  This  
Cavell  describes  as  our  having  an  ‘unattained  but  attainable  self’  (1990,  
p.12).  Perfectionism  is  perhaps  most  clearly  described  in  Emerson’s  essay  
‘Circles’,  where  he  describes  the  journey  of  the  soul  as  being  an  
‘apprenticeship  to  the  truth’  in  which  ‘around  every  circle  another  can  be  
drawn’  (1841/2000,  p.252).  The  closing  of  each  circle  marks  out  significant  
moments  of  self-­transformation,  yet  each  is  not  the  end-­point  of  the  soul’s  
journey  towards  what  Naoko  Saito  terms  ‘self-­transcendence’,  but  is  merely  
a  stopping  point  along  the  way  (2012,  p.181).  It  is  important  to  emphasise  
here  that  perfectionism  ‘does  not  imply  perfectibility’  (Cavell,  1990,  p.3),  so  it  
is  not  that  there  is  a  ‘final’  state  of  perfection  that  we  cannot  reach,  but  rather  
that  there  is  no  finality  to  be  found  here.  As  Cavell  explains:    
I   do   not   read   Emerson   as   saying…that   there   is   one  
unattained/attainable  self  we  repetitively  never  arrive  at,  but  rather  that  
“having”  “a”  self  is  a  process  of  moving  to,  and  from,  nexts  (1990,  p.12).    
  
While  Cavell  refuses  to  give  a  list  of  necessary  and  sufficient  conditions  for  
perfectionism,  he  does  specify  a  number  of  texts  which,  ‘in  their  interplay’,  
could  be  considered  as  perfectionist  including:  Plato’s  Republic,  Aristotle’s  
Nicomachean  Ethics,  Augustine’s  Confessions,  Shakespeare’s  Hamlet,  and  
several  of  Emerson’s  essays  (1990,  p.4).24  In  the  introduction  to  Conditions  
Handsome  and  Unhandsome,  Cavell  writes  that  ‘a  definition  of  what  I  mean  
by  perfectionism,  Emersonian  or  otherwise,  is  not  in  view  in  what  follows’  
(1990,  p.4).  Instead,  the  texts  and  films  listed  are  to  serve  as  exemplars  of  
his  theme.    
  
What  is  central  to  perfectionism  is  that  the  concern  with  one’s  moral  life  is  
invoked  by  experiencing  crises;;  this  is  typically  expressed  as  ‘the  sense  that  
either  you  or  the  world  is  wrong’  (Cavell,  2005a,  p.29).  Seeking  to  make  
                                                                                        
24  For  a  full  list  of  these  texts,  see  Cavell  (1990,  p.5).    
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oneself  more  intelligible  to  the  community  naturally  involves  a  reappraisal  of  
one’s  self,  invoking  a  consideration  of  the  path  of  the  soul.  The  movement  
from  one’s  current  self  to  a  next,  higher  self,  thus  necessitates  leaving  and  
unsettlement.  Crises  not  only  mark  out  the  beginning  of  a  perfectionist  
journey,  but  they  also  exemplify  the  kind  of  anti-­settlement  that  I  am  
advocating  here.    
  
An  illustration  of  being  unsettled  –  in  the  perfectionist  sense  –  is  Thoreau’s  
method  of  accounting  for  the  self.  In  Walden,  Thoreau  disrupts  the  use  of  
economic  language  in  everyday  life  as  he  draws  attention  to  the  fact  that  
certain  terms  did  not  initially  have  economic  connotations.  For  Thoreau,  an  
‘economisation’  of  language  was  an  unfortunate  consequence  of  the  
industrialisation  of  the  age.  Neufeldt  describes  the  importance  of  ‘economy’  
to  Thoreau’s  work  when  he  writes  that:  
I   am   convinced   that   our   understanding   of   Thoreau’s   writings   is  
impoverished  or  enriched  by  the  extent  to  which  we  probe  his  culture,  
recognize   the   new   economic   vernacular   with   its   range   of   semantic  
shifts   and   differentiations,   and   acknowledge   the   implications   of   the  
linguistic   changes   for   the   culture   in   which   he   had   to   locate   himself  
(1989,  p.23).      
  
In  the  opening  chapter  of  Walden,  titled  ‘Economy’,  Thoreau  lists  his  
outgoings  and  income,  detailing  exactly  what  it  cost  him  to  build  his  hut  and  
how  much  it  cost  to  maintain  himself  while  he  was  at  Walden  Pond  for  two  
years.  Thoreau  lists  his  expenses  but  argues  that  the  accounts  which  are  
most  important  to  him  are  not  those  of  the  economic  kind,  as  he  writes,  ‘I,  on  
my  side,  require  of  every  writer  [every  neighbour],  first  or  last,  a  simple  and  
sincere  account  of  his  own  life,  and  not  what  he  has  heard  of  other  men’s  
lives’  (1854/1997,  pp.5-­6).  The  ‘accounting’  of  which  Thoreau  speaks  
unsettles  terminology  that  is  commonly  taken  to  be  economic;;  instead  he  
encourages  his  readers  to  see  that  the  most  fundamental  account  we  can  
give  is  of  ourselves.      
  
A  specific  example  of  Thoreau’s  ‘translation’  of  economic  terminology  is  his  
use  of  the  term  ‘interest’.  Thoreau  writes  of  ‘interest’  in  terms  of  what  strikes  
him  and  what  he  is  interested  in,  rather  than  mere  monetary  interest  as  the  
accumulation  of  capital.  Cavell  states  that  this  transformation  of  the  term  
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‘interest’  is  an  integral  part  of  Walden  itself,  and  as  he  writes,  ‘it  would  be  a  
fair  summary  of  the  book’s  motive  to  say  that  it  invites  us  to  take  an  interest  
in  our  lives,  and  teaches  us  how’  (1981a,  p.67).  Terms  such  as  ‘interest’  and  
‘investment’  clearly  have  economic  overtones;;  Thoreau  is  not  attempting  to  
do  away  with  this  instrumental  language  entirely,  but  by  unsettling  such  
terms  and  putting  certain  words  in  translation,  his  work  offers  readers  an  
alternative  way  of  accounting  for  themselves.    
  
Thoreau’s  ‘accounting’  involves  a  reappraisal  of  our  language  in  the  form  of  
an  inter-­discursive  translation,  as  discussed  in  Chapter  Two.  Throughout  his  
work,  Thoreau  reframes  such  economically  focused  terms  as  ‘account’,  
‘interest’,  and  ‘audit’.  But  he  also  sheds  new  light  on  the  following  terms:  
leaving,  unsettlement,  crises,  and  homelessness  (Thoreau,  1854/1997).  
Despite  their  common  pejorative  connotations,  these  terms  are  not  
discussed  negatively  by  Thoreau;;  instead,  he  sees  settlement  and  leaving  
as  being  different  stages  of  undergoing  crises,  which  are  not  only  necessary  
but  transformative.    
  
4.3.1  Crises  
As  with  the  forms  of  unsettlement  discussed  above,  to  undergo  a  crisis  is  not  
necessarily  a  negative  experience  but  could  instead  be  considered  
transformative.  In  the  essay  Walking  (1862/1993),  Thoreau  expresses  his  
dismay  that  we  tend  not  to  experience  many  crises  at  all,  and  he  links  crises  
to  the  exercise  of  thought,  or  in  essence,  genius.  As  he  writes,  ‘it  is  
remarkable  how  few  events  or  crises  there  are  in  our  histories,  how  little  
exercised  we  have  been  in  our  minds,  how  few  experiences  we  have  had’  
(Thoreau,  1862/1993,  p.70).    
  
To  experience  a  crisis  is  likened  to  undergoing  a  conversion  or  
transformation  through  which  one  gains  greater  knowledge  of  oneself;;  such  
crises  thus  represent  a  significant  step  towards  ‘self-­transcendence’  (Saito,  
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2012,  p.181).25  As  Thoreau  writes,  ‘our  moulting  season,  like  that  of  the  
fowls,  must  be  a  crisis  in  our  lives’  (1854/1997,  p.23).  Experiencing  a  crisis  
may  be  deeply  unsettling  and  uncomfortable,  but  it  also  marks  the  closing  of  
one  particular  circle  and  the  drawing  of  another.  The  moulting  of  the  fowls  
discussed  in  Thoreau’s  Walden  –  as  symbolic  of  crises  –  could  be  seen  as  
comparable  with  the  perfectionist  journey  of  the  self.  The  shedding  of  old  
feathers  and  gaining  of  a  new  plumage  is  transformative  for  the  duck,  yet  
this  process  must  be  repeated  systematically  and  cyclically;;  it  is  not  the  case  
that  once  the  duck  has  moulted,  its  journey  is  finished.  What  Thoreau  says  
of  crises  also  matches  up  with  his  preference  for  wildness  over  cultivation;;  
finding  one’s  way  through  a  swamp  (which  may  include  getting  lost)  is  
ultimately  more  valuable  than  navigating  neatly  laid-­out  paths.  A  crisis,  whilst  
being  a  valuable  experience  in  and  of  itself,  can  also  mark  out  a  concern  
with  the  moral  life  that  is  perfectionism.    
  
Crises  necessitate  unsettlement  and  leaving,  yet  in  experiencing  a  crisis  
there  is  also  a  renewal  of  oneself  which  can  be  identified  as  a  form  of  
awakening.  The  awakening  of  genius  is  meant  to  counteract  what  Thoreau  
describes  as  our  condition  of  ‘quiet  desperation’,  whereby  ‘we  are  sound  
asleep  nearly  half  our  time’  (1854/1997,  p.295).  It  may  be  only  through  
undergoing  a  crisis  that  one’s  genius  is  awoken  and  thus  a  concern  with  
one’s  self-­intelligibility,  a  marker  of  perfectionism,  is  ignited.  There  is  
immense  value  to  be  found  in  experiencing  unsettlement  and  crises  if  these  
provoke  both  transformation  and  conversion.    
  
The  kind  of  ‘rebirth’  that  is  exemplified  by  the  regular  moulting  of  the  fowl  is  
emblematic  of  perfectionism  and  hence,  of  being  unsettled.  This  is  not  
something  characteristic  of  the  unique  event  of  Christian  baptism.  Instead,  
the  notion  of  rebirth  in  Walden  refers  to  a  daily  baptism  in  our  life  and  words,  
such  as  Thoreau  underwent  in  the  waters  of  Walden  Pond.  What  is  meant  
                                                                                        
25  ‘Self-­transcendence’,  that  is,  conversion  and  transformation  of  the  self,  is  
the  aim  of  Emersonian  moral  perfectionism;;  this  theme  will  be  
detailed  later  in  the  chapter.  But  the  term  ‘self-­transcendence’  is  used  
by  Naoko  Saito  to  describe  the  perfectionist  journey  as  a  movement  
from  ‘self-­obscurity’  to  ‘self-­realisation’.  See:  Saito  (2012).  
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by  this  sense  of  baptism  in  Thoreau’s  work  is  aptly  summarised  by  Martin  
Luther,  quoted  in  the  preface  to  Cavell’s  Senses  of  Walden:  ‘for  all  our  life  
should  be  baptism,  and  the  fulfilling  of  the  sign,  or  sacrament,  of  baptism’  
(1981a,  p.xvi,  my  emphasis).  Crises  form  a  significant  aspect  of  this  baptism  
and  rebirth,  as  they  foreground  the  transformation  or  conversion  invoked  
here.  They  disrupt  one’s  current  sense  of  self  in  order  to  move  on  to  a  higher  
self,  while  rebirth  itself  can  be  seen  as  one  of  many  tangible  ‘ends’  within  
perfectionism;;  each  instance  of  rebirth  can  be  considered  as  part  of  the  
perfectionist  journey  towards  self-­transcendence.      
  
4.3.2  Bottomlessness  
In  Self-­Reliance,  Emerson’s  writing  is  the  enactment  of  his  theme;;  the  essay  
itself  can  be  seen  as  an  act  of  aversion.  To  read  his  essays  is  to  be  
awakened,  but  it  is  also  to  allow  oneself  to  be  put  into  question.  The  sense  
of  bottomlessness  in  Emerson’s  work,  that  there  is  no  ‘final’  reading  or  
interpretation  to  be  arrived  at,  is  an  example  of  the  kind  of  educative  
unsettling  that  I  am  arguing  for  here.  To  explain  the  theme  of  an  Emersonian  
essay,  or  what  features  mark  out  a  work  as  Emersonian,  is  no  easy  task.  As  
Cavell  (1989)  describes  his  reading  of  Emerson’s  Experience,  it  is  only  when  
he  reaches  the  end  of  the  essay  that  he  realises  the  ‘answer’  he  sought  is  
writ  throughout  and  set  up  from  the  first  few  lines.  He  comments  on  the  
opening  question  of  Experience  ‘where  do  we  find  ourselves?’  (Emerson,  
1844/2000,  p.307),  asking  of  his  readers  and  Emerson  himself,  ‘who,  in  what  
straits,  asks  such  a  question?  Of  whom?’  and  then  notes  that  ‘the  question  
has  itself  to  be  asked  in  the  perplexed,  say  disoriented,  state  the  essay  goes  
on  to  describe’  (Cavell,  1989,  p.88).    
  
The  ambiguities  inherent  in  Emerson’s  writing  provoke  a  feeling  of  
uneasiness.  There  is  a  sense  of  bottomlessness  in  our  possible  
interpretations  of  such  a  text,  and  this  is  inextricably  linked  with  the  reading  
required  of  Walden.  As  Cavell  explains,  part  of  the  difficulty  of  reading  
Emerson’s  essays  –  yet  also  a  marker  of  their  philosophical  value  –  is  that  
we  may  never  arrive  at  a  final  interpretation  of  his  words.  To  settle  things  
decidedly  for  us  would  be  much  easier  on  Emerson’s  readers,  but  would  not  
provoke  the  very  self-­reliance  he  is  advocating.  Instead,  we  must  be  
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prepared  to  undergo  crises,  to  be  unsettled,  and  to  experience  a  sense  of  
bottomlessness  as  transformative  rather  than  ignominious.  While  a  firm  
‘bottom’  or  conclusion  may  not  be  reached,  or  at  least  not  definitively,  it  is  
not  the  case  that  there  is  no  bottom  at  all;;  there  is  still  a  ‘point  d’appui’  to  be  
found  in  every  line  of  Emerson’s  essays,  just  as  there  are  distinct  ‘ends’  in  
perfectionism  (Cavell,  1981a,  p.71;;  1989).                
  
Cavell  elucidates  these  ideas  in  the  essay  ‘Finding  as  Founding:  Taking  
Steps  in  Emerson’s  “Experience”’  (1989,  pp.77-­119).  Here,  every  instance  of  
our  finding  a  ‘bottom’,  or  for  example,  agreeing  on  the  definition  of  a  word  
together,  is  provisional.  Every  act  of  ‘finding’  is  something  we  must  move  on  
from  in  order  to  ‘found’  something  else,  and  in  this  sense,  the  reading  
required  of  Emerson’s  work  could  itself  be  described  as  perfectionist  (Cavell,  
1989).  To  be  faced  with  Emerson’s  question  ‘where  do  we  find  ourselves?’  
could  be  extremely  unsettling  and  provoke  a  crisis  in  his  readers  
(1844/2000,  p.307).  In  answer  to  this,  Emerson  writes  that  we  find  ourselves:  
In  a  series  of  which  we  do  not  know  the  extremes,  and  believe  that  it  
has  none.  We  wake  and  find  ourselves  on  a  stair;;  there  are  stairs  below  
us,  which  we  seem  to  have  ascended;;  there  are  stairs  above  us,  many  
a   one,   which   go   upward   and   out   of   sight   (1844/2000,   p.307,   my  
emphasis).      
  
So  we  do  find  ourselves  somewhere,  that  is,  on  a  stair,  and  reach  a  bottom.  
Yet  this  is  a  place  from  which  we  must  turn  back  upon  ourselves  in  order  to  
be  transformed,  and  to  progress  towards  our  next,  higher  selves  –  this  is  the  
task  of  Emersonian  moral  perfectionism.  What  this  sense  of  bottomlessness  
shows  us  is  that  in  doing  philosophy,  and  in  aspiring  to  lead  lives  of  more  
than  ‘secret  melancholy’  (Emerson,  1844/2000,  p.411),  there  is  an  ongoing  
movement  of  the  self;;  to  be  unsettled  in  this  sense  is  educative.    
  
That  this  kind  of  unsettlement  and  bottomlessness  can  be  educative  
incorporates  a  rich  notion  of  what  it  means  to  be  educated,  in  terms  of  self-­
cultivation  or  Bildung,  rather  than  a  process  of  simply  acquiring  facts  and  
information  which  is  later  to  be  tested.  The  way  in  which  being  unsettled,  
lost,  and/or  experiencing  crises  is  ‘educative’  is  cognisant  of  its  etymological  
roots,  whereby  ‘educate’  involves  a  ‘bringing  forth’  or  ‘leading  out’  (from  the  
Latin  educare).  Being  unsettled  means  that  one  must  be  led  out  from  what  
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they  have  always  accepted  as  given,  from  their  life  of  ‘quiet  desperation’  and  
conformity  (Thoreau,  1854/1997,  p.9),  and  in  turn  what  is  brought  forth  is  a  
different  way  of  accounting  for  oneself.      
  
This  theme  of  bottomlessness  is  also  present  in  Thoreau’s  work  as  he  
discusses  the  bottom  of  Walden  Pond;;  Thoreau  mocks  his  neighbours  who  
believe  that  certain  ponds  are  bottomless  without  checking  this  for  
themselves.  As  he  writes,  ‘it  is  remarkable  how  long  men  will  believe  in  the  
bottomlessness  of  a  pond  without  taking  the  trouble  to  sound  it’  (Thoreau,  
1854/1997,  pp.254-­256).  It  is  a  significant  part  of  his  project  in  Walden  to  
measure  the  depth  of  the  pond,  and  to  monitor  its  seasonal  changes.  At  
issue  here  is  not  so  much  whether  Walden  Pond  is  actually  ‘bottomless’  nor  
whether  we  can  arrive  at  a  final  interpretation  of  Emerson’s  work,  but  rather  
that  each  person  should  follow  the  bent  of  their  own  genius  and  discover  
their  own  way.  
  
Unsettlement  and  bottomlessness  are  distinctly  left  out  of  the  opening  
scenario;;  as  one  student  asks  ‘how  can  I  make  sure  that  I  do  well  on  this  
essay?’.  Both  students  are  seeking  a  definitive  way  forward  with  their  
assignments,  whether  they  have  a  plan  or  not,  and  they  are  relying  on  the  
academic  to  provide  this  kind  of  settling  down.  While  this  is  not  referred  to  in  
the  scenario,  it  is  now  also  a  common  practice  for  students  to  be  given  
model  answers,  writing  frames,  and  word  counts  for  each  individual  section  
of  an  assignment  –  leaving  little  room  for  the  bent  of  genius.    
  
Perfectionism  is  imbued  with  a  sense  of  bottomlessness  and  unsettlement,  
as  well  as  being  provoked  by  crises.  The  value  of  such  disruption  is  
epitomised  in  a  transformation  of  the  self.  Cavell’s  discussion  of  ‘finding  as  
founding’  –  summarised  as  the  fact  that  ‘foundation  reaches  no  farther  than  
each  issue  of  finding’  (1989,  p.114)  –  is  not  only  characteristic  of  Emerson’s  
Experience,  but  it  also  describes  the  kind  of  educative  unsettling  that  is  writ  
large  in  the  theme  of  perfectionism.  
  
4.3.3  The  Bent  of  Genius  
While  offering  his  community  an  exemplar  of  life  as  aspiration  (to  the  human)  
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rather  than  desperation,  Thoreau  was  not  advocating  for  everyone  to  mimic  
his  project,  and  move  into  the  woods  with  him.  Instead,  what  Thoreau  
wanted  of  his  neighbours  was  for  them  to  awaken  to  what  their  lives  
consisted  in,  and  what  their  society  was  becoming,  that  is,  little  more  than  an  
economic  machine.  Following  one’s  own  genius  necessitates  being  
unsettled,  as  it  involves  a  turning  away  from  one’s  community  in  order  to  
pursue  what  one  wants  to  be  and  carving  out  one’s  own  path  through  the  
wilderness.  But  such  solitude  and  turning  away  from  society  must  be  
balanced  against  the  needs  of  one’s  community,  indeed  a  significant  feature  
of  Thoreau’s  project  at  Walden  was  that  he  lived  only  a  mile  from  his  
neighbours,  thus  his  ‘experiment  of  living’  could  be  seen,  and  his  words  
heeded,  by  others  in  the  community  (1854/1997,  p.47).      
  
Thoreau  is  acting  as  the  chanticleer,26  bringing  the  morning  and  waking  up  
his  neighbours,  both  in  conducting  his  ‘experiment  of  living’  and  in  the  writing  
of  Walden  (1854/1997,  p.47).  Thoreau  wishes  to  awaken  his  community  to  
their  own  genius,  as  he  puts  it:    
I  desire  that  there  may  be  as  many  different  persons  in  the  world  as  
possible;;  but   I  would  have  each  one  be  very  careful   to   find  out  and  
pursue   his   own   way,   and   not   his   father’s   or   his   mother’s   or   his  
neighbor’s  instead  (1854/1997,  p.65).  
  
But  Thoreau’s  Walden  is  not  a  prescriptive  ‘how-­to’  guide  for  the  awakening  
of  genius.  He  is  offering  us  an  exemplar  of  what  it  means  to  live  beyond  the  
confines  of  societal  machinations,  and  his  readers  are  urged  to  find  out  for  
themselves  what  this  means.  To  live  after  one’s  own  ideals,  whether  living  in  
solitude  or  amongst  one’s  neighbours,  and  to  follow  ‘the  bent  of  [one’s  own]  
genius’  however  crooked  or  narrow,  is  what  Walden  itself  and  the  trope  of  
                                                                                        
26  The  chanticleer  is  mentioned  in  the  epigraph  to  Walden  which  is  as  
follows:  ‘I  do  not  propose  to  write  an  ode  to  dejection,  but  to  brag  as  
lustily  as  chanticleer  standing  on  his  roost,  if  only  to  wake  my  
neighbors  up’  (Thoreau,  1854/1997,  p.5).  The  chanticleer  is  not  only  
meant  to  awaken  Thoreau’s  readers,  but  the  book  itself  was  written  in  
order  to  wake  his  neighbours  up,  particularly  to  the  dangers  of  leading  
lives  of  mere  ‘quiet  desperation’  (p.9).  
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the  chanticleer  are  meant  to  evoke  (Thoreau,  1854/1997,  p.51).    
  
Thoreau  discusses  the  independence  of  genius  in  terms  of  his  approach  to  
farming  and  growing  his  beans.  A  central  feature  of  Walden  is  Thoreau’s  
physical  involvement  in  building  his  hut  and  growing  his  own  beans,  in  
addition  to  the  labour  of  writing  the  book  itself.  When  it  came  to  tending  his  
bean-­field,  Thoreau  committed  himself  to  working  his  land  with  only  primitive  
tools,  such  as  hoes  and  spades.  He  did  not  hire  other  men,  or  horses  and  
machinery,  to  assist  his  work.  His  project  in  growing  his  beans  was  about  
more  than  crop  yield  and  profit,  it  was  part  of  his  daily  work.  Just  as  the  
community  questioned  Thoreau’s  project  in  living  by  Walden  Pond,  they  
disregarded  his  farming  methods  too.  But  Thoreau  sowed  and  tended  to  his  
beans  as  he  felt  appropriate,  developing  a  relationship  of  intimacy  with  them.    
  
For  Thoreau,  following  the  bent  of  his  own  genius  meant  that  his  ‘was  one  
field  not  in  Mr.  Coleman’s  report’  (Thoreau,  1854/1997,  p.142),27  but  the  
economic  rationality  underpinning  such  a  report  was  precisely  what  Thoreau  
wanted  to  resist.  Following  his  own  genius  involved  an  unsettling  of,  and  
movement  away  from,  convention.  The  awakening  of  genius  may  not  always  
involve  new  and  innovative  methods  of  farming  (or  living),  or  developing  
alternatives  for  the  sake  of  it,  but  it  does  necessitate  a  kind  of  aversive  
thinking  along  the  lines  of  Emerson’s  ‘self-­reliance’.  The  unsettlement  
involved  here  may  also  put  one  on  the  path  of  perfectionism.    
  
Following  the  bent  of  one’s  genius,  as  Thoreau  discusses,  involves  a  sense  
of  bottomlessness  or  groundlessness  as  well  as  departure,  envisaged  as  
pulling  up  anchor  and  sailing  away;;  as  he  states:  ‘you  want  room  for  your  
thoughts  to  get  into  sailing  trim  and  run  a  course  or  two  before  they  make  
their  port’  (1854/1997,  p.127).  For  Emerson,  following  one’s  own  genius  
rather  than  relying  on  public  opinion  is  captured  in  his  concept  of  ‘self-­
reliance’,  which  is  an  aversion  of  conformity.  Self-­reliance  is  not  simply  an  
exercise  in  stubbornness  –  that  one  must  stick  to  one’s  own  ideas  
                                                                                        
27  This  report  by  Henry  Coleman  involved  a  large-­scale  survey  of  agriculture  
throughout  Massachusetts.  
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relentlessly  –  but  rather  offers  an  account  of  the  awakening  of  genius.  The  
development  of  one’s  capacity  for  self-­reliance  may  be  not  only  contentious,  
but  also  unsettling.  Self-­reliance  involves  being  able  to  follow  one’s  own  
convictions  amidst  societal  pressures  and  this  is  where  it  may  be  unsettling,  
both  for  oneself  and  others  in  the  community.  Such  productive  unsettlement  
is  clearly  what  is  lacking  in  the  opening  scenario,  as  the  academic  explicitly  
tells  the  students  ‘all  you  need  to  do  is…’  and  ‘all  you  need  to  get  a  good  
mark  is…’,  meaning  that  there  is  no  need  for  students  to  awaken  their  own  
genius,  let  alone  follow  it.    
  
What  we  see  in  the  scenario  is  more  synonymous  with  blind  conformity  than  
the  aversion  of  it.  Even  where  there  is  the  potential  for  the  awakening  of  
genius,  such  as  the  academic  asking  student  2  ‘what  point  are  you  arguing  
for?’,  this  tends  to  be  dismissed  as  both  students  are  only  seeking  a  
particular  grade  on  an  assignment.  While  there  is  nothing  wrong  with  having  
a  firm  ground  or  ‘point  d’appui’  to  guide  one’s  genius  (Cavell,  1981a,  p.71),  
the  students  in  the  scenario  seem  to  anchor  their  thoughts  purely  in  terms  of  
criteria  and  learning  outcomes,  with  no  potential  for  them  getting  into  ‘sailing  
trim’  (Thoreau,  1854/1997,  p.127).    
  
What  Thoreau’s  project  at  Walden  Pond  adds  to  this  discussion  of  
settlement  and  being  unsettled  is  an  exemplar  of  how  to  balance  these  two  
foci;;  this  is  clearly  laid  out  in  his  discussion  of  why  he  settled  by  the  pond  in  
the  first  place,  and  why  it  was  equally  important  that  he  leave  it.  As  Thoreau  
writes:    
I  left  the  woods  for  as  good  a  reason  as  I  went  there.  Perhaps  it  seemed  
to  me  that  I  had  several  more  lives  to  live,  and  could  not  spare  any  more  
time  for  that  one  (1854/1997,  p.287).      
  
4.3.4  Walking,  Sauntering,  and  Homelessness  
Strongly  related  to  the  theme  of  unsettlement  are  the  interlinked  themes  in  
Thoreau’s  work  of  walking,  sauntering,  and  homelessness.  Here  
‘homelessness’  means  being  sans  terre  (being  a  saunterer),  that  is,  without  
a  home  and  yet  being  equally  at  home  everywhere  (Thoreau,  1862/1993,  
p.49).  Thoreau  refers  to  sauntering,  rather  than  walking,  as  an  act  of  daily  
baptism  and  of  going  to  the  Holy-­Land  (metaphorically)  in  one’s  walks  which  
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necessitates  leaving  and  unsettlement.  What  it  would  mean  to  remain  settled  
in  one’s  thoughts  while  walking  is  captured  here:  ‘I  am  alarmed  when  it  
happens  that  I  have  walked  a  mile  into  the  woods  bodily,  without  getting  
there  in  spirit’  (Thoreau,  1862/1993,  p.52).  There  is  something  unthinking  
about  walking  which,  while  it  allows  for  bodily  exercise,  has  no  claim  to  the  
exercise  of  one’s  genius.    
  
For  Thoreau,  walking  is  a  matter  of  sticking  to  neatly  laid  paths  and  
established  roads,  allowing  one  to  arrive  at  their  destination  as  efficiently  as  
possible.  But  sauntering  necessitates  that  one  be  ‘free  from  all  worldly  
engagements’,  in  a  sense  unsettled,  before  setting  out  on  a  walk  (Thoreau,  
1862/1993,  p.51).  The  act  of  sauntering  involves  blazing  one’s  own  trail  
through  the  wilderness  rather  than  relying  on  commonly  used  roads  and  
highways  of  travel.  While  forging  one’s  own  path  in  the  wilderness  may  
result  in  getting  lost,  Thoreau  highlights  that  this  itself  can  be  ‘a  surprising  
and  memorable,  as  well  as  valuable,  experience’  (1854/1997,  p.154).  He  
explains  the  value  of  such  an  unsettling  experience  as  getting  lost  in  the  
woods  as  follows:    
Not  till  we  are  lost,  in  other  words,  not  till  we  have  lost  the  world,  do  we  
begin  to  find  ourselves,  and  realize  where  we  are  and  the  infinite  extent  
of  our  relations  (Thoreau,  1854/1997,  p.154).    
  
Adding  to  this  distinction  between  mere  walking  and  sauntering,  Thoreau  
writes  that  ‘the  walking  of  which  I  speak  has  nothing  in  it  akin  to  taking  
exercise…but  is  itself  the  enterprise  and  adventure  of  the  day’  (1862/1993,  
pp.51-­52).  So  sauntering  involves  an  intellectual  exercise  as  one  is  walking.  
It  is  important  to  say  that  I  do  not  mean  this  in  the  sense  of  a  psychologised  
‘embodied  cognition’,  but  rather  that  freeing  oneself  from  thought  in  an  
engagement  with  nature  is  a  useful  exercise  in  itself.  Sauntering  and  being  
unsettled  were  integral  to  Thoreau’s  ‘experiment  in  living’  (Cavell,  1981a,  
p.45).      
  
The  sense  of  homelessness  Thoreau  refers  to  in  Walking  –  that  of  being  a  
saunterer  –  is  exemplified  in  his  project  at  Walden  Pond.  Cavell  describes  
the  purpose  of  Thoreau’s  ‘experiment’  as  being  ‘not  to  learn  that  life  at  
Walden  was  marvelous,  but  to  learn  to  leave  it.  It  will  make  for  more  crises.  
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One  earns  one’s  life  in  spending  it;;  only  so  does  one  save  it’  (1981a,  p.45).  
The  necessity  of  Thoreau  making  his  home  by  Walden  Pond  and  then  
learning  how  to  leave  it  (engaging  with  a  sense  of  bottomlessness  and/or  
homelessness)  could  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  perfectionism  is  
inherently  anti-­settlement,  and  demands  of  us  a  continuous  movement  
between  settlement  and  leaving,  whereby  such  unsettling  is  educative  in  
itself.    
  
That  homelessness  is  an  illustration  of  perfectionism  and  educative  
unsettling  is  also  shown  in  Cavell’s  autobiography  Little  Did  I  Know  (2010),  
where  he  documents  his  almost  annual  movements  between  Sacramento,  
California  and  Atlanta,  Georgia  throughout  his  childhood.  While  Cavell’s  
uneasiness  with  this  cyclical  uprootedness  is  clearly  evident  and  it  increases  
as  he  grows  up  –  for  example,  he  writes  that  ‘Berkeley  and  Harvard  were  the  
two  places  that  I  [he]  had  ever  felt  at  home’  (2010,  p.401),  rather  than  any  of  
his  childhood  homes  –  nevertheless  this  could  be  described  as  educative,  as  
Cavell  had  to  learn  how  to  live  with  a  sense  of  being  both  at  home  and  yet  
experiencing  the  unhomely  at  the  same  time.28    
  
In  his  autobiography,  Cavell  details  the  movement  away  from  his  musical  
roots  (Cavell’s  mother  and  three  of  his  uncles  were  renowned  concert  
pianists)  toward  a  life  of  philosophy.  Cavell’s  own  sense  of  ‘homelessness’  is  
both  physical,  in  that  he  never  truly  felt  at  home  either  in  Sacramento  or  
Atlanta,  and  ontological,  as  it  was  only  after  studying  music  to  a  high  level  
that  he  decided  that  it  was  not  what  he  was  truly  interested  in  (taking  on  
Thoreau’s  translation  of  ‘interest’).  As  Cavell  explains:  
By  the  end  of  college  I  had  come  to  realise  that  music  was  not  my  life.  
How  that  crisis  eventually  produced  the  conviction  that  a  life  of  study  
and  writing  growing  out  of  philosophy  was  for  me  to  discover  (2010,  
p.4,  my  emphasis).    
  
That  Cavell  describes  such  a  stark  realisation  as  a  ‘crisis’  again  links  back  to  
Thoreau’s  reverence  for  crises  as  transformative  –  and  hence  educative  in  
                                                                                        
28  This  sense  of  being  equally  at  home  and  unhomely  is  known  as  ‘the  
uncanny’  or  das  Unheimliche  in  Martin  Heidegger’s  work,  I  will  explain  
this  term  further  in  the  next  section.  
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the  perfectionist  sense  –  experiences.  As  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter,  
Cavell  argued  for  autobiography  to  be  accepted  as  a  legitimate  mode  of  
writing  in  philosophy,  and  so  in  a  sense  this  ‘homelessness’  and  unsettling  
persists  throughout  his  academic  work.  The  homelessness  discussed  here  is  
not  merely  the  case  of  one’s  being  without  a  home,  but  of  being  sans  terre,  a  
particular  sense  of  ‘homelessness’  that  characterises  both  sauntering  and  
perfectionism  (Thoreau,  1862/1993,  p.49).  Having  discussed  several  
iterations  of  Emersonian  moral  perfectionism,  I  now  take  a  rather  different  
turn  to  consider  what  an  ontological  perspective  on  settlement  and  unsettling  
may  offer.      
  
4.4  Heidegger,  Settlement,  and  the  Ontological  
The  themes  of  crises,  bottomlessness,  and  homelessness  present  in  
Thoreau  and  Emerson’s  writings  are  also  evident  in  the  work  of  German  
philosopher  Martin  Heidegger,  although  with  a  different  focus.  I  will  now  
elucidate  the  links  between  the  works  of  these  philosophers  from  different  
traditions  and  backgrounds  in  order  to  show  why  some  of  Heidegger’s  
concepts  are  relevant  to  the  argument  here,  before  moving  on  to  discuss  his  
notion  of  the  uncanny  (or  das  Unheimliche),  and  the  educative  potential  of  
experiencing  angst.    
  
The  links  between  Thoreau  and  Emerson  are  more  easily  explicable  than  
those  between  the  two  Transcendentalists  and  Martin  Heidegger,  yet  there  
are  lines  of  connection  between  their  ideas  that  merit  attention  here.  The  
American  philosopher  Stanley  Cavell  has  drawn  connections  between  the  
ideas  of  Thoreau  and  Heidegger,  and  he  has  also  stated  that  he  sees  
Emerson’s  work,  via  Nietzsche,  as  an  anticipation  of  Heidegger’s  (Cavell,  
1989;;  2005b).  As  Cavell  (2005b)  describes,  to  read  the  works  of  Thoreau  
and  Heidegger  is  to  be  awakened,  but  they  are  also  linked  through  their  joint  
affinities  with  poetry.    
  
Thoreau’s  own  writing  could  be  considered  as  poetic  and/or  prophetic  
(Cavell,  1981a;;  2005b),  while  in  his  later  works  Heidegger  draws  
substantially  on  the  works  of  the  German  poet,  Friedrich  Hölderlin.  As  Cavell  
writes,  ‘Hölderlin  and  Thoreau  [may  be  taken]  as  inspiring  or  requiring  or  
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providing  philosophy’  (2005b,  p.216).  This  requirement  and  provision  of  
philosophy  by  Thoreau  and  Heidegger  can  be  seen  as  provoked  by  a  sense  
of  alienation,  or  a  skepticism  of  language  being  (in)appropriate  to  their  
needs,  although  expressed  in  very  different  ways  (Cavell,  2005b).  The  
conditions  of  ‘quiet  desperation’  (Thoreau,  1854/1997,  p.9)  and/or  ‘secret  
melancholy’  (Emerson,  1844/2000,  p.411)  are  mirrored  by  Heidegger  in  his  
concern  that  our  being  is  typically  constrained  to  inauthenticity  in  everyday  
life.29    
  
As  I  will  discuss  below,  Heidegger’s  (1962)  major  concern  with  the  subject  of  
‘Being’  is  that  its  questionability  has  been  forgotten;;  people  tend  to  become  
absorbed  in  worldly  concerns  which  leaves  little  room  for  ontological  
considerations.  The  crisis  marking  out  perfectionism,  a  discord  between  
oneself  and  one’s  community,  is  not  only  considered  transformative  by  
Thoreau  and  Emerson  but  could  also  be  seen  as  such  by  Heidegger.  To  
move  away  from  one’s  community  in  order  to  examine  one’s  own  soul  and  
capacity  for  genius  could  be  considered  as  heeding  Heidegger’s  warning  
that  in  ‘Being-­with’  others,  we  are  trapped  by  the  common  opinion  of  ‘the  
they’  or  das  Man30  and  confined  to  inauthenticity  (1962,  p.137).  The  a-­
teleological  nature  of  perfectionism,  as  a  continual  striving  towards  one’s  
next,  higher  self,  also  shares  some  commonalities  with  what  Heidegger  says  
about  Being.  In  Heidegger’s  work  the  ‘awakening’,  or  rather  uncovering,  of  
                                                                                        
29  The  terms  ‘authenticity’  and  ‘inauthenticity’  when  used  in  reference  to  
Heidegger  do  not  have  the  same  connotations  as  in  common  
parlance.  It  is  not  that  one  way  of  Being  is  superior  to  another,  in  
essence,  that  being  ‘authentic’  is  better,  but  each  term  is  
representative  of  the  different  relationships  one  may  have  with  their  
own  Being.  To  be  ‘authentic’  can  be  likened  to  having  an  awareness  
of  one’s  own  Being,  whereas  inauthenticity  is  an  obliviousness  to  this  
fact.        
30  das  Man,  or  the  ‘they’,  is  the  others  or  society  with  whom  one’s  own  Being  
is  connected.  As  Heidegger  writes,  ‘The  Self  of  everyday  Dasein  [our  
human  Being,  translated  as  Being-­there]  is  the  they-­self’;;  this  means  
that  one’s  own  Being  and  experience  of  ‘Being-­in-­the-­world’  is  
dictated  by  others.  The  ‘they-­self’  is  inauthentic  as  the  limits  of  one’s  
experience  ‘have  been  established  with  the  “they’s”  averageness’  
(Heidegger,  1962,  p.167).      
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the  question  of  Being  (rather  than  genius)  is  also  an  ongoing,  iterative  
process.  One’s  authentic  self  as  a  case  of  Dasein  may  be  revealed  through  
angst,31  yet  this  does  not  mean  that  one  can  then  choose  to  be  authentic  
and  subsequently  conduct  oneself  in  this  way.  In  fact,  Dasein  often  conceals  
itself  as  much  as  das  Man  may  direct  one’s  experience  of  the  world  
(Heidegger,  1962).  Connections  between  Thoreau,  Emerson,  and  Heidegger  
have  already  been  drawn  by  Cavell.  The  links  between  these  writers  that  
merit  attention  here  are  the  common  themes  in  their  works  of  
sleeping/inauthenticity,  bottomlessness,  homelessness,  and  the  ongoing  
search  for  a  sense  of  self  or  Being.    
  
For  Thoreau  (1854/1997),  the  awakening  of  genius  is  to  be  provoked  by  his  
trope  of  the  chanticleer;;  whereas  for  Heidegger  (1962),  a  concern  with  our  
Being  is  to  be  awakened  or  uncovered  through  angst.  The  ‘Being’  of  human  
beings  is  structured  by  our  ‘Being-­in-­the-­world’  and  ‘Being-­with’  others,  both  
of  which  are  typically  inauthentic  (Heidegger,  1962).  This  is  an  ontological  
form  of  unsettlement,  characterised  by  the  fact  that  we  may  never  truly  grasp  
what  our  Being  consists  in;;  what  Heidegger  alludes  to  is  that  we  are  always  
unsettled  and  ‘un-­homely’  in  our  Being.  
  
4.5  Unsettling  in  Heidegger’s  Work:  The  das  Unheimliche  
4.5.1  Heidegger’s  Philosophical  Project  
Martin  Heidegger  first  introduces  his  notion  of  the  uncanny,  or  the  das  
Unheimliche  (literally  un-­homely),  in  Being  and  Time  (1962,  hereafter  BT).  
The  uncanny  is  inextricably  tied  to  Heidegger’s  project  in  BT  to  explicate  and  
                                                                                        
31  Angst,  like  boredom,  is  a  grounded  mood  which  characterises  our  ‘Being-­
in-­the-­world’.  In  Being  and  Time,  Heidegger  proposed  a  threefold  
structure  of  our  ‘Being-­in-­the-­world’  consisting  of:  Befindlichkeit  
(moods  or  attunements),  Verstehen  (understanding),  and  Rede  
(discourse).  Angst  shapes  what  it  means  for  one  to  be  in  the  world  
and  to  be  with  others,  influencing  how  we  interpret  the  things  we  
encounter  and  determining  our  experience  of  the  world  in  a  particular  
way,  in  this  case,  being  predisposed  toward  angst  and  anxiety.  As  
Heidegger  explains,  ‘a  mood  makes  manifest  “how  one  is,  and  how  
one  is  faring”…in  this  “how  one  is”,  having  a  mood  brings  Being  to  its  
“there”  [uncovers  our  Being]’  (Heidegger,  1962,  p.173).    
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pose  the  question  of  Being.  This  investigation  of  Being  is  conducted  
phenomenologically  and  Heidegger  discusses  ‘Being’  itself  through  the  
mode  of  Dasein.  Dasein  literally  translates  as  ‘Being-­there’;;  it  describes  a  
Being  or  entity  for  which  the  question  of  Being  is  relevant  (Heidegger,  1962,  
p.27).  As  Heidegger  puts  it,  ‘Dasein  is  in  each  case  mine’  (1962,  p.67),  and  I  
am  that  entity  for  whom  there  is  a  question  of  Being;;  as  such,  my  own  Being  
is  implicated  in  this  question  (Skea,  2017).  
  
As  I  have  argued  previously,  ‘although  comprehending  the  question  of  Being  
may  itself  be  unsettling,  considering  one’s  own  ontological  condition  could  
also  be  transformative  –  and  thus  educative  –  in  its  own  right’  (Skea,  2017,  
p.370).  In  what  follows,  I  will  discuss  Heidegger’s  notion  of  the  uncanny  as  
provoked  by  the  mood  of  angst.  The  uncanny  could  be  considered  as  the  
most  primordial  form  of  unsettlement  –  an  unsettlement  and  unhomeliness  
within  one’s  Being  –  but  there  are  benefits  to  be  gained  from  this  experience.  
As  Katherine  Withy  (2015,  p.4)  puts  it,  ‘the  uncanny  experience  is  not  a  
negative  revelation  of  what  everyday  life  has  been  like  but  a  positive  
revelation  of  what  the  human  essence  is  like’,  and  it  is  this  positive  value  of  
being  unsettled  and  experiencing  the  uncanny  to  which  I  now  draw  attention  
(Skea,  2017).      
  
4.5.2  The  Uncanny    
As  I  have  written  elsewhere,  ‘Heidegger’s  ‘uncanny’  or  das  Unheimliche  is  
integral  to  our  human  condition,  and  it  is  contingent  upon  the  fact  that  we  
ourselves  are  cases  of  Dasein’  (Skea,  2017).  The  ‘un-­canny’  is  conceived  of  
as  a  negation  of  that  which  is  ‘canny’  or  homely.  ‘Canny’  is  a  word  of  
Scottish  origin,  meaning  among  other  things,  a  sense  of  ‘knowing  and  
comfort,  coziness’  (Withy,  2015,  p.1).  The  term  ‘uncanny’  was  originally  
coined  by  Sigmund  Freud,  and  in  seeking  English  equivalents  to  
‘Unheimlich’,  he  describes  the  uncanny  as:  ‘uncomfortable,  uneasy,  gloomy,  
dismal,  uncanny,  ghastly;;  (of  a  house)  haunted;;  (of  a  man)  a  repulsive  
fellow’  (1919,  p.2).      
  
Freud  (1919)  translated  Unheimlich  as  ‘un-­homely’,  understood  as  a  sense  
of  the  unfamiliar  within  what  is  familiar,  this  was  explicated  through  the  
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example  of  Hoffman’s  ‘The  Sandman’.32  While  clearly  influenced  by  Freud’s  
work,  Heidegger’s  (1962)  conception  of  the  uncanny  differs  from  that  of  
Freud  in  that  his  conception  is  much  stronger.  ‘Rather  than  the  uncanny  
being  a  feeling  we  experience  at  a  particular  time,  and  provoked  by  a  
particular  situation,  Heidegger  considers  the  das  Unheimliche  to  be  
something  more  primordial  –  as  something  ontological  within  our  human  
condition’  (Skea,  2017,  pp.370-­371).    
  
The  das  Unheimliche  to  which  Heidegger  refers  implies  a  sense  of  
homelessness  inherent  to  the  human  condition,  that  we  are  both  at  home  
and  not  at  home  at  the  same  time.  Withy  (2015)  describes  this  as  the  double  
condition  of  being  at  home  without  having  access  to  the  hearth  which  is  the  
true  homely.  The  uncanny  nature  of  human  beings  as  cases  of  Dasein  may  
be  revealed  through  experiencing  angst,  and  what  is  uncovered  in  angst  is  
the  fact  of  our  ‘thrownness’  (Heidegger,  1962).  Thrownness  describes  the  
condition  of  our  never  being  able  to  quite  get  to  the  bottom  of  our  Being;;  
there  is  an  existential  dread  –  or  uncanniness  –  provoked  here  by  the  fact  
that  we  cannot  know  why  we  are  here,  and  why  we  are  the  kinds  of  beings  
we  are.    
  
It  is  in  realising  the  thrownness  of  our  condition  that  we  may  recognise  our  
uncanny  nature,  that  there  is  a  sense  of  obscurity  within  ourselves  and  
within  our  Being  that  we  can  never  fully  overcome.  This  concern  with  one’s  
Being  is  not  something  we  are  always  aware  of  but  rather,  the  uncanny  
nature  of  Dasein  may  be  revealed  through  angst.  Angst  is  a  grounded  mood,  
which  means  that  unlike  other  moods  such  as  fear,  it  is  not  object-­oriented  
or  directed  towards  particular  situations  (Withy,  2015).    
  
To  experience  angst  and  uncover  one’s  Being  as  a  case  of  Dasein  is  
unsettling  and  discomforting,  but  it  can  also  be  transformative  for  our  own  
                                                                                        
32  For  further  details,  see:  Freud,  S.  1919.  The  Uncanny.  The  
Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology.  [Online].  [Accessed  09  March  
2017].  Available  from:  http://web.mit.edu/allanmc/www/freud1.pdf.  
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self-­understanding.  Angst  could  be  considered  as  opening  the  door  to  our  
uncanny  nature,  revealing  what  is  inside,  which  is  the  fact  that  human  beings  
are  ‘the  most  uncanny  of  all  that  is  uncanny’  (Heidegger,  1984/1996,  p.92).  It  
is  in  the  self-­revelatory  nature  of  angst  that  experiencing  the  das  
Unheimliche  can  be  considered  educative.  To  become  aware  of  one’s  own  
inherent  uncanniness,  that  we  are  ontologically  un-­homely,  could  constitute  
a  crisis  marking  out  the  perfectionist  journey.  
  
It  is  not  that  angst  is  felt  at  a  particular  time  and  then  we  move  on  from  this;;  
as  with  the  das  Unheimliche  itself,  angst  is  inseparable  from  the  human  
experience.  As  Withy  puts  it,  ‘Being-­in-­the-­world  is  angst’  (2015,  pp.80-­81,  
original  emphasis),  and  as  I  have  explained  it  elsewhere,  it  is  ‘through  the  
mood  of  angst,  [that]  the  question  of  one’s  Being  (and  the  very  
unintelligibility  of  this  question)  [is]  revealed’  (Skea,  2017,  p.371).  With  this  in  
mind  I  will  now  elucidate  how  this  ontological  form  of  unsettlement,  in  
essence,  the  uncanny,  may  manifest  itself  as  Being’s  continual  struggle  
between  self-­obscurity  and  self-­knowledge.  To  explain  this  further,  I  will  draw  
on  an  example  from  Sophocles’  Antigone.    
  
4.5.3  Sophocles’  Antigone  
As  I  have  described  Heidegger’s  philosophical  project,  he  draws  on  several  
Greek  plays  to  discuss  the  question  of  Being,  and  as  he  explains  here  ‘this  
poetry  [of  the  Greeks]  is  tragedy  –  the  poetry  in  which  Greek  Being  and  
Dasein  [a  Dasein  belonging  to  Being]  were  authentically  founded’  (2000,  
p.154).  In  both  the  Introduction  to  Metaphysics  (2000)  and  Holderlin’s  Hymn  
“The  Ister”  (1984/1996),  Heidegger  discusses  Sophocles’  play  Antigone  and  
the  choral  ‘Ode  to  Man’  in  particular,  as  an  explication  of  the  uncanny  (Skea,  
2017).    
  
The  first  stationary  song  from  Sophocles’  Antigone,  the  choral  ‘Ode  to  Man’,  
has  been  discussed  at  length  by  Heidegger  as  an  example  of  the  uncanny  
(das  Unheimliche),  with  Antigone  herself  being  characterised  as  ‘the  
supreme  uncanny’  (1984/1996,  p.104).  The  choral  ode  is  made  of  two  
strophes,  with  each  having  a  corresponding  antistrophe.    
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For  our  discussion  here,  I  will  present  the  initial  six  lines  of  the  first  strophe:  
Manifold  is  the  uncanny,  yet  nothing  
More  uncanny  looms  or  stirs  beyond  the  human  being.  
He  ventures  forth  on  the  foaming  tide  
amid  the  southern  storm  of  winter  
and  crosses  the  surge  
of  the  cavernous  waves    
(Heidegger,  1984/1996,  p.58).  
  
What  this  extract  highlights  is  that  the  human  being  is  the  uncanniest  entity  
of  all,  and  that  this  uncanniness  is  manifold  or  doubly  δεινóν  –  deinon  
(Heidegger,  1984/1996).33  ‘This  manifoldness  represents  the  fact  that  one’s  
Being,  as  uncanny,  is  always  counterturning  back  upon  itself’  (Skea,  2017,  
p.372).  
  
The  counterturning  of  Being  is  a  continual  movement  between  presencing  
and  absencing,  or  between  ‘self-­obscurity’  and  ‘self-­knowledge’  (Skea,  
2017).  That  this  movement  is  on-­going  and  involves  unsettlement  means  
that  our  uncanny  nature,  and  our  existential  condition  of  homelessness,  
adds  ontological  weight  to  the  perfectionist  argument.  Our  condition  of  
uncanniness,  or  das  Unheimliche,  is  inextricably  tied  to  the  fact  that  in  
perfectionism  one  is  always  moving  towards  that  ‘unattained  but  attainable  
self’  (Cavell,  1990,  p.12).  Just  as  our  Being  is  uncovered,  it  is  again  plunged  
into  self-­loss;;  there  is  a  position  of  ‘doubleness’  wherein  we  can  feel  at  home  
while  still  being  denied  access  to  the  hearth  (Withy,  2015).  ‘This  quest  for  
intelligibility  (with  Dasein  as  the  sense-­maker)  is  analogous  to  being  cast  
forth  on  the  foaming  tide,  as  the  ode  puts  it’  (Skea,  2017,  p.372).  Withy  
explains  this  as  follows:  
The  human  being’s  “faring  forth”  into  the  sea  does  not  refer  to  sea  travel  
or  fishing  but  poetically  projects  the  human  being’s  entry  into  being’s  
struggle…The  human  being  breaks  away  into  the  overwhelming  sea,  
stretching  out  beyond  itself  towards  being  (2015,  p.125).    
  
Venturing  forth  on  the  foaming  tide,  as  provoked  by  encountering  the  
uncanny,  involves  a  breaking  away  from  firm  ground,  ‘it  breaks  out  
                                                                                        
33  Heidegger  interprets  the  term  ‘deinon’  as  meaning  ‘on  the  one  hand,  the  
fearful,  but  also  the  powerful,  and  finally,  the  inhabitual’  (1984/1996,  
p.67).      
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(auszubrechen)  from  that-­which-­is-­homely’  (Withy,  2015,  p.125).  ‘In  
recognising  the  uncanniness  within  one’s  own  Being,  one  then  has  to  leave  
what  is  ‘canny’  or  homely  in  pursuit  of  self-­knowledge’  (Skea,  2017,  p.373).  
This  could  be  seen  as  analogous  to  what  Thoreau  writes  about  one’s  
thoughts  getting  ‘into  sailing  trim’  (1854/1997,  p.127),  and  the  importance  of  
lifting  anchor  and  sailing  into  the  unknown,  although  for  Heidegger  what  
constitutes  the  ‘unknown’  is  our  own  Being.    
  
There  is  also  a  significant  link  here  between  the  ‘homelessness’  that  is  
fundamental  to  the  das  Unheimliche,  and  what  Thoreau  writes  of  being  
homeless  or  sans  terre,  that  it  allows  one  to  follow  the  bent  of  their  own  
genius.  The  balance  discussed  earlier  between  being  settled  on  the  one  
hand,  and  leaving  and  departure  on  the  other,  is  accurately  depicted  in  the  
ode’s  image  of  the  human  being’s  search  for  an  authentic  self  or  Being.  ‘This  
being  cast  forth  on  the  foaming  tide  is  a  treacherous  and  difficult  journey,  
both  literally  and  metaphorically,  as  representative  of  a  concern  with  one’s  
soul.  One  must  ride  the  crest  of  the  waves,  without  being  able  to  plunge  into  
its  depths’  (Skea,  2017,  p.373).      
  
If  we  as  human  beings  are  inherently  uncanny,  then  unsettlement  is  part  of  
our  ontological  character.  Even  when  we  think  we  are  getting  closer  to  
uncovering  the  nature  of  Being,  we  realise  the  shallowness  of  our  view  and  
that  there  are  more  bodies  of  water  to  explore.  That  Thoreau  urges  his  
readers  to  ‘explore  the  private  sea’  (1854/1997,  p.286)  before  embarking  on  
expeditions  further  afield  is  emblematic  of  the  characterisation  of  the  das  
Unheimliche  in  Sophocles’  play.  For  Heidegger,  that  which  anchors  cases  of  
Dasein  and  prevents  such  self-­exploration  is  the  inauthenticity  of  everyday  
existence,  whereas  for  Emerson  this  would  be  envisaged  as  conformity.    
  
Heidegger  considers  the  doubleness  of  human  beings  to  consist  in  their  
being  homely,  whilst  at  the  same  time  feeling  ‘un-­at-­home’  (Withy,  2015,  
p.100).  There  is  a  sense  of  homelessness  fundamental  to  Dasein  which  is  
echoed  in  Thoreau’s  endorsement  of  sauntering.  With  a  sense  of  
homelessness  comes  the  freedom  to  follow  the  bent  of  one’s  own  genius,  or  
rather,  to  uncover  an  authentic  sense  of  Being.  Recognising  the  obscurity  of  
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oneself  and  one’s  Being,  in  essence,  our  condition  of  thrownness,  may  be  
unsettling  but  even  remembering  that  there  is  a  question  of  Being  marks  a  
significant  step  forward.  As  I  have  explained  previously,  ‘in  dealing  with  the  
question  of  Being,  the  most  fundamental  question  that  we  have,  we  may  
indeed  feel  ‘lost  at  sea’  with  no  safe  ground  in  which  to  (re-­)anchor  
ourselves…but  it  may  also  be  utterly  transformative’  (Skea,  2017,  p.373).    
  
Clearly,  this  chapter  has  also  involved  a  ‘faring  forth’  as  I  have  moved  from  
the  particularities  of  the  scenario  to  a  broader  conception  of  what  it  means  to  
be  ‘educated’  and  to  be  unsettled  in  helpful  and  transformative  ways  (Withy,  
2015,  p.125).  While  the  works  of  Thoreau,  Emerson,  Cavell,  and  Heidegger  
are  not  commonly  referred  to  in  educational  philosophy,  nor  in  relation  to  the  
Higher  Education  sector,  I  have  drawn  on  their  works  here  to  argue  that  
experiencing  crises,  bottomlessness,  homelessness,  and  the  unknown  (both  
within  and  without  oneself)  may  constitute  a  perfectionist  education  of  the  
self.  I  will  now  outline  how  angst  is  related  to  the  das  Unheimliche,  before  
offering  some  specific  examples  of  what  such  a  crisis  or  sense  of  
bottomlessness  might  look  like  in  Higher  Education.  
  
4.6  Angst    
While  it  may  be  uncomfortable  and  unsettling  to  experience  angst,  and  
primarily  so  because  we  do  not  know  why  we  feel  anxious,  it  is  revelatory  for  
Being.  What  is  revealed  in  angst  is  our  own  uncanny  nature,  the  fact  that  we  
are  in  a  position  of  ‘doubleness’  ontologically,  being  both  at  home  and  ‘un-­at-­
home’  at  the  same  time  (Withy,  2015,  p.100).  It  is  in  recognition  of  one’s  
‘thrownness’  and  the  das  Unheimliche  that  we  are  cast  forth  ‘on  foaming  
tide’  (Heidegger,  1962;;  1984/1996).  The  trajectory  of  Being  as  envisaged  in  
Sophocles’  ‘Ode  to  Man’  could  be  likened  to  Thoreau’s  discussion  of  
sauntering,  that  to  saunter  requires  us  to  ‘go  forth  in  the  spirit  of  undying  
adventure…prepared  to  send  back  our  embalmed  hearts’  (1862/1993,  p.50).    
  
Angst  may  be  self-­revelatory,  prompting  us  to  think  about  ontological  
considerations  rather  than  just  our  everyday,  worldly  concerns.  In  
experiencing  angst,  numerous  questions  of  self-­knowledge  could  be  
uncovered,  in  essence,  that  there  are  depths  beneath  the  waves  as  yet  
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unchartered  (Heidegger,  1962).  Recognising  one’s  self-­obscurity  –  whether  
this  has  occurred  through  conformity  (as  Thoreau  and  Emerson  discuss)  or  
absorption  into  the  ‘average  everydayness’  of  das  Man  –  could  be  extremely  
unsettling,  but  it  also  marks  out  the  beginning  of  Being’s  journeying  towards  
self-­knowledge  (Heidegger,  1962,  p.43).    
  
The  perpetual  oscillation  of  exploration  and  covering-­over  of  Being  is  
described  by  Withy  as  a  ‘counterturning’,  with  the  riding  of  the  waves  
characterised  as  a  movement  between  ‘self-­possession  and  self-­loss,  
openness  and  finitude’  (2015,  p.122).  Such  counterturning  seems  almost  
synonymous  with  the  perfectionist  journey  of  the  soul  towards  self-­
transcendence,  whereby  one  acknowledges  the  present  state  of  their  self  
and  yet  strives  towards  their  next,  higher  self.    
  
Both  Emerson  and  Heidegger  discuss  the  cultivation  of  oneself;;  for  
Emerson,  this  is  manifested  as  a  concern  with  one’s  soul,  whereas  
Heidegger  is  concerned  with  the  unconcealment  of  Being.  While  Emersonian  
moral  perfectionism  is  antifoundationalist  and  resists  finality  (Cavell,  1989),  
there  are  still  ends  to  be  reached  within  the  journey,  but  from  a  Heideggerian  
perspective  the  uncanniness  of  human  beings  is  not  something  that  can  be  
overcome.  There  is  a  sense  of  homelessness  and  unsettlement  that  is  
ontologically  distinctive  of  human  beings.  So  I  argue  that  to  emphasise  
student  satisfaction  and  seek  to  settle  students  down  in  Higher  Education  is  
disingenuous  to  Being  itself.  Emphasising  student  satisfaction  not  only  
reinforces  the  commodification  of  teaching  and  learning,  but  the  forms  of  
settlement  it  bolsters  also  unhelpfully  shelter  students  from  experiencing  
angst,  thus  covering  over  the  fact  that  we  as  human  beings  are  
fundamentally  ontologically  unsettled.    
  
4.7  Educative  Unsettling:  Uncanniness  in  the  Classroom  
If  universities  were  to  recognise  the  importance  of  students’  experiencing  
angst  and  uncanniness,  then  what  would  this  mean  for  teaching  and  learning  
in  HE?  In  practical  terms,  students’  recognition  of  their  own  uncanniness  
could  be  prompted  by  adopting  less  prescriptive  teaching  approaches  in  
Higher  Education.  By  this  I  do  not  mean  encouraging  the  tick-­box  exercise  of  
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‘student-­led  enquiry’  (Cook-­Sather,  2009;;  Madriaga  and  Morley,  2016)  or  a  
‘flipped  classroom’  approach  (Nanclares  and  Rodriguez,  2015),  but  rather  
something  more  in  line  with  what  Paul  Gibbs  calls  ‘pottering-­about’  in  the  
curriculum  (2016,  p.8).    
  
Distinguishing  contentment  and  ‘profound  happiness’  from  short-­term  desire  
satisfaction,  Gibbs  argues  that  ‘a  university  should  challenge  students  to  
develop  the  capabilities  to  optimise  their  potential  to  make  responsible,  or  at  
least  informed,  choices’  (2016,  p.8,  my  emphasis);;  this  sounds  much  like  the  
capacity  for  Emersonian  self-­reliance.  So  with  greater  freedom  in  the  
‘curriculum’  of  Higher  Education,  students  may  experience  angst  and  feel  
uncomfortable.  Indeed  they  may  have  been  used  to  more  didactic  teaching  
methods  in  school,  but  it  could  also  prompt  greater  self-­reflection,  
encouraging  them  to  think  beyond  immediate  concerns  to  consider  what  it  is  
they  want  from  their  education.        
  
It  is  not  necessarily  that  educators  could  provoke  angst  in  students,  but  what  
is  within  their  remit  is  the  creation  of  intellectual  impasses.  As  Schwieler  and  
Magrini  highlight:    
Authentic   learning   is   not   only   related   to   the   impasse   we   find  
in…conversion,   beyond   this,   its   potential   lives   only   in   terms   of   an  
‘inquiry’   that  unfolds  as   the  strife  between   ‘truth’  and   ‘untruth’   (2015,  
p.27,  original  emphasis).    
  
The  impasse  or  strife  that  is  educationally  conducive  to  the  unconcealment  
of  Being  is  not  only  that  regarding  the  nature  of  truth,  but  that  which  is  
encountered  in  the  ‘thinking  of  Being’  itself  (Schwieler  and  Magrini,  2015,  
-­  131  -­  
p.27).34  Such  strife  is  captured  in  the  counterturning  of  Being,  whereby  
Dasein  is  torn  between  self-­knowledge  and  self-­loss,  and  continually  moving  
between  the  two  (Withy,  2015).  Thus,  as  with  uncanniness,  strife  is  central  to  
the  human  experience.    
  
Strife  and  unsettlement  are  not  only  experiences  we  may  encounter  in  our  
everyday  lives,  but  they  are  part  of  what  it  is  to  be  human.  Rather  than  
contributing  further  to  the  covering-­over  of  Being,  Higher  Education  could  be  
a  space  for  freeing  students  from  their  everyday  ontic  concerns,  so  that  
ontological  considerations  –  such  as  who  they  are,  what  their  Being  consists  
in,  and  what  they  want  to  be  going  forward  –  could  come  to  the  fore.    
  
While  the  unconcealment  of  Being  may  be  provoked  by  experiencing  angst  
and  being  unsettled,  this  is  educative  in  itself  as  it  could  reveal  our  
capabilities  rather  than  narrowly  focusing  on  acquired  competencies.  This  is  
exemplified  in  Gibbs’  notion  of  ‘profound  happiness’  which  he  describes  as  a  
‘contentment  in  becoming  what  one  wills  one’s  being  to  be,  in  the  knowledge  
of  one’s  capabilities’  (2015,  p.56).  While  the  creation  of  intellectual  impasses  
is  one  example  of  what  educative  unsettling  might  look  like  in  Higher  
Education,  I  will  now  turn  to  two  further  examples  to  illustrate  what  a  
perfectionist  education  might  consist  in:  Williams’  Stoner  (1965/2003),  and  
Thoreau’s  notion  of  ‘uncommon  schooling’  (1854/1997,  p.99).      
  
                                                                                        
34  An  example  of  such  educative  ‘strife’  or  intellectual  impasse  is  given  by  
Heidegger  in  ‘The  Art  of  Teaching’  (1945/2002).  There,  he  advocates  
for  the  creation  of  impasses  through  adopting  a  model  of  Socratic  
encounter  in  teaching  in  HE.  Heidegger  discusses  the  value  of  aporia,  
which  is  ‘a  specific  kind  of  lack  or  want,  a  perplexity  achieved  by  
encounter  with  the  previously  unthought,  an  uncertainty  about  where  
to  go  next  driven  by  a  desire  to  progress’  (1945/2002,  p.41).  A  
teacher  withholding  their  knowledge  in  certain  situations,  that  is,  
‘temporarily  staging  the  scene  of  resourcelessness’  could  provoke  
angst  in  students,  but  it  might  also  create  an  intellectual  impasse  that  
is  both  transformative  and  edifying  (1945/2002,  p.41).      
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4.8  Educative  Unsettling:  Stoner  
Educative  unsettling,  in  contrast  to  pervasive  forms  of  un-­educative  
settlement,  is  central  to  the  perfectionist  Higher  Education  I  am  advocating  
for  here.  Stoner  (1965/2003),  a  novel  by  American  writer  John  Williams,  
serves  as  an  exemplar  of  what  it  might  look  like  to  be  unsettled  and  to  
experience  crises  as  part  of  one’s  Higher  Education.  The  book  traces  the  life  
of  its  main  character,  William  Stoner,  and  tells  the  story  of  his  life  from  the  
point  where  he  begins  his  Higher  Education.  Stoner  is  from  a  rural  farming  
community,  and  almost  naturally,  it  seems,  goes  to  the  University  of  Missouri  
to  study  agriculture,  with  the  plan  of  then  returning  to  the  farm  and  taking  it  
over  from  his  parents.  Stoner  settles  readily  into  Higher  Education,  finding  
his  studies  manageable,  if  not  a  little  too  easy.  He  feels  at  home  studying  
soil  chemistry,  but  it  is  the  required  course  in  English  literature  that  ‘troubled  
and  disquieted  him  in  a  way  nothing  had  ever  done  before’  (Williams,  
1965/2003,  p.10).    
  
As  I  have  explained  elsewhere,  ‘Stoner  is  clearly  unsettled  and  discomfited  
by  his  classes  in  English  literature.  When  asked  by  his  tutor,  Archer  Sloane,  
to  explain  one  of  Shakespeare’s  sonnets  in  front  of  the  class,  Stoner  cannot  
answer.  Despite  not  knowing  the  “correct”  answers,  and  being  unable  to  
explicate  his  thoughts,  Stoner  is  clearly  seduced  by  English  literature  and  
the  unsettling  experience  this  has  offered  him’  (Skea,  2017,  p.374).  Although  
he  entered  Higher  Education  with  a  particular  end-­goal  in  mind,  Stoner  
experiences  an  unsettlement  in  the  English  literature  classes  that  he  is  
captivated  by,  and  this  changes  the  trajectory  of  his  whole  life.  Stoner  
subsequently  commits  himself  to  studying  English  literature  and  becomes  a  
professor  in  the  discipline.    
  
While  Stoner’s  education  is  perfectionist  in  nature,  and  so  in  a  sense  ‘a-­
teleological’  (Schumann,  2017,  p.6),  there  are  still  ends  to  be  found  within  
this  journey  such  as  the  completion  of  his  PhD  and  the  publication  of  his  first  
monograph.  But  Stoner’s  education  continues  over  the  course  of  his  lifetime  
and  is  characterised  by  a  perpetual,  on-­going  renewal  of  the  self.  Thoreau’s  
vision  of  crises  being  akin  to  the  moulting  of  the  fowls  is  exemplified  in  
Stoner.  As  Williams  describes,  just  when  Stoner  believes  he  may  have  
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grasped  the  knowledge  he  so  desperately  seeks,  ‘there  would  come  to  him  
the  awareness  of  all  that  he  did  not  know,  of  all  that  he  had  not  read;;  and  the  
serenity  for  which  he  labored  was  shattered’  (1965/2003,  p.26).    
  
Stoner’s  education  epitomises  Cavell’s  notion  of  perfectionism  as  involving  
‘moving  to,  and  from,  nexts’  (1990,  p.12);;  what  the  character  of  William  
Stoner  offers  readers  is  a  concrete  vision  of  the  human  being’s  perpetual  
striving  towards  its  next,  higher  self.  The  perfectionist  move  from  self-­
obscurity  towards  self-­transcendence  is  never  ‘complete’  or  finalised,  but  
rather  it  is  something  that  each  person  must  dedicate  their  lives  to.  This  is  
illustrated  in  Stoner’s  final  movements  as  he  reaches  for  his  first  monograph:  
It  hardly  mattered  to  him  [Stoner]  that  the  book  was  forgotten  and  that  
it   served  no  use;;  and   the   question   of   its  worth   at   any   time   seemed  
almost   trivial.  He  did  not  have   the   illusion   that  he  would   find  himself  
there,  in  that  fading  print;;  and  yet,  he  knew,  a  small  part  of  him  that  he  
could  not  deny  was  there,  and  would  be   there  (Williams,  1965/2003,  
p.277).    
  
It  is  only  at  the  end  of  his  life  that  Stoner  is  able  to  reflect  on  the  value  of  his  
Higher  Education  and  recognise  the  contribution  he  has  made.  What  this  
example  brings  to  the  fore  is  that  experiencing  unsettlement  in  one’s  Higher  
Education  may  be  utterly  transformative;;  such  unsettlement  is  educative  as  it  
forces  one  to  take  up  a  critical  position  of  ‘doubleness’,  evaluating  the  
current  state  of  one’s  self  against  a  higher  self  they  aspire  to.  Focusing  on  
settling  students  down  rather  than  offering  opportunities  for  them  to  be  
unsettled,  to  experience  crises  and/or  angst,  is  precisely  to  ‘limit  the  
possibilities  of  thought  that  a  university  education  should  open  up’  (Fulford,  
2009,  p.226).    
  
4.9  Educative  Unsettling:  Uncommon  Schooling  
A  final  example  of  what  a  perfectionist,  unsettling  education  might  consist  in  
is  depicted  in  Thoreau’s  concept  of  ‘uncommon  schooling’  (1854/1997,  
p.99).  What  Thoreau  means  by  this  term  is  much  broader  in  scope  than  
merely  formal  schooling.  The  ‘uncommon  schooling’  which  Thoreau  calls  for  
is  precisely  that  whereby  our  ‘education’  extends  beyond  the  confines  of  the  
classroom,  where  our  education  does  not  end  upon  reaching  adulthood,  and  
such  ‘education’  can  be  described  as  an  initiation  into  ‘a  form  of  life’  
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(Wittgenstein,  1963,  §19).  In  advocating  for  an  ‘uncommon  schooling’,  
Thoreau  argues  that  a  liberal  education  should  be  available  to  all.  But  the  
thrust  of  this  concept  is  that  it  goes  beyond  formal  education;;  we  should  be  
educated  into  our  culture  in  such  a  way  that  we  can  make  our  own  decisions  
over  which  texts  are  important,  and  over  where  we  place  our  personal,  moral  
and  intellectual  ‘investments’.    
  
What  Thoreau  wants  his  neighbours  to  gain  from  such  an  ‘uncommon  
schooling’  is  precisely  the  kind  of  self-­cultivation  that  is  normally  the  
preserve  of  noblemen,  and  as  he  writes  ‘instead  of  noblemen,  let  us  have  
noble  villages  of  men’  (1854/1997,  p.101).  Thoreau’s  argument  rests  on  his  
belief  that  the  pursuit  of  liberal  studies  should  not  be  restricted  to  those  with  
greater  financial  resources  and/or  unavailable  to  those  in  smaller  villages  
like  Concord.  The  fact  that  ‘the  mass  of  men  lead  lives  of  quiet  desperation’  
(p.9)  is  not  simply  due  to  the  fact  that  the  neighbours  Thoreau  was  referring  
to  were  farmers  and  traders,  but  rather  that  ‘what  with  foddering  cattle  and  
tending  the  store,  we  are  kept  from  school  too  long,  and  our  education  is  
sadly  neglected’  (1854/1997,  pp.99-­100).      
  
It  is  also  important  to  highlight  here  that  Thoreau,  in  advocating  for  
uncommon  schooling,  was  not  suggesting  that  the  life  of  a  farmer  is  in  any  
sense  of  less  worth  than  that  of  a  nobleman.  Thoreau  did  not  want  to  
educate  his  fellow  villagers  such  that  they  became  noblemen  or  took  up  a  
different  vocation,  as  this  would  be  disingenuous  at  best.  What  he  sought  to  
achieve  through  the  idea  of  ‘uncommon  schooling’  was  more  about  
awakening  people  to  their  condition  (again  the  trope  of  the  chanticleer  is  
prominent)  and  ‘crossing  the  gulf  of  ignorance  which  surrounds  us’  
(Thoreau,  1854/1997,  pp.99-­101).    
  
The  aim  of  this  kind  of  uncommon  schooling  is  to  transform  people’s  outlook  
on  the  world  so  that  they  are  able  to  re-­evaluate  their  position  in  it.  Such  an  
awakening  of  genius  can  be  likened  to  ‘the  morning  or  the  spring  of  our  lives’  
(Thoreau,  1854/1997,  p.98).  Thoreau’s  ‘uncommon  schooling’  is  
perfectionist  in  nature  as  it  implies  that  our  education  is  in  some  sense  never  
complete  or  final,  so  committing  oneself  to  this  kind  of  liberal  self-­cultivation  
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necessitates  unsettlement  (this  is  demonstrated  in  Thoreau’s  own  project  at  
Walden  Pond).  If  Thoreau’s  vision  of  education  were  perfectible  instead  then  
our  ‘common  schools’,  which  end  just  before  adulthood,  would  be  sufficient.  
However,  as  he  argues,  ‘[while]  we  have  a  comparatively  decent  system  of  
common  schools,  schools  for  infants  only…[we  have]  no  school  for  
ourselves’  (Thoreau,  1854/1997,  p.99).      
  
The  perfectionism  inherent  in  Thoreau’s  concept  of  ‘uncommon  schooling’  is  
further  elucidated  and  developed  in  Cavell’s  notion  of  philosophy  as  the  
‘education  of  grownups’  (1979a,  p.125).  In  Cavell’s  work,  as  in  that  of  
Thoreau  and  Emerson,  any  discussion  of  ‘education’  is  not  limited  to  formal  
schooling.  The  ‘education  of  grownups’  refers  to  an  education  that  continues  
once  we  reach  adulthood  (Cavell,  1979a,  p.125),  but  it  is  also  a  perfectionist  
education  in  which  the  ‘other’  may  prompt  one’s  journey  toward  ‘self-­
transcendence’.  Here,  the  relationship  between  reading  and  writing,  and  
between  an  author  and  their  readers,  may  be  understood  as  ‘a  metonym  for  
the  teacher-­student  relationship’  (Saito,  2012,  p.181).    
  
In  delineating  what  a  perfectionist  ‘education  of  grownups’  might  consist  in,  
Naoko  Saito  has  stated  that  both  perfectionism  itself,  and  a  perfectionist  
education,  are  characterised  by  ‘goallessness’  (2012,  p.173).  Such  an  
education  is  envisaged  as  a  joint  enterprise  between  oneself  and  a  ‘friend’,  
or  in  this  case,  a  teacher.  In  the  perfectionist  journey,  initiation  is  always  
followed  by  departure,  and  settlement  is  always  coupled  with  leaving.  
Unsettlement  is  therefore  integral  to  ‘teaching’  in  this  sense.  The  
transformation  sought  in  perfectionism,  as  in  education,  may  involve  
discomfort  and  undergoing  crises  as  one  comes  to  realise  that  they  have  
until  now  been  living  in  ‘secret  melancholy’  (Emerson,  1844/2000,  p.411).    
  
I  am  not  advocating  here  that  academics  should  invoke  crises  in  their  
students,  for  example,  by  discussing  traumatic  experiences  in  the  lecture  
theatre.  But  allowing  students  to  encounter  uncertainty,  to  encourage  them  
to  take  up  a  position  of  ‘doubleness’  in  relation  to  themselves,  without  
jumping  in  to  ensure  their  happiness  and  contentment,  could  be  educative  in  
this  richer  sense  of  a  movement  towards  self-­transcendence.  The  
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‘doubleness’  involved  in  perfectionism  is  that  of  conformity  on  the  one  hand,  
and  ‘critical  self-­aversion’  on  the  other;;  as  Schumann  explains,  moving  
towards  our  next  self  necessitates  that  ‘we  are  drawn  to  becoming  ashamed  
of  our  present  self,  we  are  drawn  to  draw  another  circle  around  the  present  
circle’  (2017,  p.6).    
  
The  teacher’s  responsibility  could  thus  be  seen  as  that  of  prompting  forms  of  
educative  unsettling  in  their  students.  As  Saito  describes,  the  teacher  
aspiring  to  Emersonian  moral  perfectionism  is  charged  with  ‘offering  not  a  
place  for  security  or  settlement  but  rather  the  rough  ground,  the  “point  
d’appui”  (Cavell,  1981a,  p.71),  that  can  constitute  the  turning  point  for  the  
student’  (2012,  p.183).  What  we  see  in  the  opening  scenario  is  anathema  to  
this:  the  academic  almost  constructs  the  students’  assignments  for  them,  
removing  their  need  for  independent  enquiry,  thinking,  and  research.  I  am  
not  advocating  for  the  removal  of  support,  guidance,  and  supervision  but  
rather  I  highlight  that  the  scenario  takes  such  support  one  step  further  in  
seeking  to  ensure  the  students’  happiness  and/or  satisfaction.  Allowing  room  
for  students  to  struggle  in  a  particular  way  –  with  concepts,  with  ideas,  with  
finding  their  own  voice  –  could  be  ultimately  more  transformative.  Indeed,  as  
Fulford  argues,  students  should  be  afforded  time  and  space  in  the  
curriculum  in  which  they  can  (productively)  ‘be  lost’  (2016b,  p.530).    
  
The  rise  of  student  satisfaction  often  involves  a  closing  down  of  educative  
possibilities,  whereby  ‘knowledge’  is  reduced  to  mere  ‘information’  that  one  
collects  and  consumes,  and  teaching  is  reduced  to  either  knowledge  
transmission  or  even  ‘instruction’.  This  raises  the  question  of  whether  Higher  
Education  is  still  providing  ‘education’  or  whether  it  is  now  more  akin  to  a  
kind  of  ‘training’  for  the  globalised  knowledge  economy?  Bearing  these  
examples  of  educative  unsettling  –  strife  and  aporia,  Stoner  (Williams,  
1965/2003),  and  ‘uncommon  schooling’  (Thoreau,  1854/1997,  p.99)  –  in  
mind,  I  will  now  discuss  the  practical  implications  of  these  ideas  for  the  HE  
sector.    
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4.10  Implications  for  the  HE  Sector  
The  opening  scenario  is  illustrative  of  forms  of  un-­educative  settlement  
which  are  implied  by  the  current  focus  on  student  satisfaction  measures  in  
the  HE  sector.  If  Higher  Education  is  to  promote  self-­cultivation  and  
transformation  then  aligning  it  with  forms  of  educative  unsettling  seems  
imperative.  In  practical  terms,  provoking  student  experiences  of  
unsettlement  rather  than  satisfaction  may  involve  greater  freedom  in  the  
curriculum,  allowing  students  to  ‘potter  about,  to  follow  the  byways  of  their  
curiosity  and  not  to  worry  about  learning  outcomes  or  assessment  criteria’  
(Gibbs,  2016,  p.8).    
  
But  in  returning  to  the  scenario  that  opened  this  chapter,  the  practical  
implementation  of  forms  of  educative  unsettling,  for  example  the  creation  of  
intellectual  impasses,  is  not  unproblematic.  To  move  away  from  a  focus  on  
the  ‘outcomes’  of  Higher  Education  could  be  easier  said  than  done  when  
faced  with  students  asking  exactly  how  they  can  achieve  a  2:1  grade  
classification  on  a  particular  assignment.  Both  academics  and  students  are  
subjectivated  to  these  discourses  of  marketisation  and  there  is  little  room  to  
step  outside  of  them,  for  example,  in  refusing  to  discuss  assessment  criteria.  
Student  feedback  is  now  afforded  such  importance  in  HE  that  any  indication  
of  dissatisfaction  could  prove  catastrophic  for  an  academic’s  career.    
  
While  I  am  not  seeking  to  develop  a  curriculum  for  educative  unsettling  here,  
the  perfectionist  themes  and  engagement  with  angst  discussed  above  do  
have  very  real  implications  for  teaching  and  learning  in  Higher  Education.  I  
am  not  arguing  here  for  a  teaching  revolution  in  universities,  but  academics  
may  demonstrate  their  commitment  to  educative  unsettling  by  ‘withholding’  
their  knowledge  in  certain  situations,  letting  students  experience  angst  and  
aporia  without  stepping  in  to  save  them  straight  away  (Heidegger,  
1945/2002,  p.41).    
  
An  aim  of  Higher  Education  could  be  to  prompt  students  to  realise  the  extent  
of  what  they  do  not  know  and  that  their  quest  for  knowledge  can  never  really  
be  fulfilled  and  satisfied,  that  ‘deep  calls  unto  deep’  (Emerson,  1836/2000,  
p.38).  There  is  also  a  need  for  forms  of  educative  unsettling  that  could  help  
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to  uncover  our  Being;;  encouraging  students  to  embrace  angst  and  
uncanniness  could  be  ontologically  educative.  Taking  these  ideas  one  step  
further,  Roberts  has  even  argued  for  the  value  of  experiencing  despair  in  
one’s  education,  emphasising  that  education  is  ‘an  unsettling,  uncomfortable  
process’  (2013,  p.472).  While  despair  and  angst  cannot  be  conflated,  the  
notion  that  education  is,  and  should  be,  uncomfortable  to  a  certain  extent  
adds  weight  to  my  argument  for  the  benefits  of  educative  unsettling.    
  
If  universities  are  to  remain  sites  of  self-­cultivation  and  transformation,  then  
encouraging  students  to  become  self-­reliant  and  resist  blind  conformity  could  
constitute  part  of  their  mission.  Prompting  students  to  embrace  unsettling  
experiences  and  follow  the  bent  of  their  own  genius  is  important,  but  equally  
it  could  be  met  with  resistance  as  it  does  necessitate  leaving  the  beaten  
track  (Thoreau,  1854/1997;;  1862/1993).  While  the  impulse  to  satisfy  
students  and  settle  them  down  seems  anathema  to  this  educative  unsettling,  
it  also  reinforces  and  perpetuates  a  certain  (consumerist)  worldview.  As  
Gibbs  argues,  ‘the  satisfied  student  perpetuates  the  current  lifeworld  in  
which  they  find  themselves,  seeking  to  improve  the  quality  of  the  services  
provided’  (2016,  p.1)  rather  than  questioning  their  validity.  As  universities  are  
facing  greater  pressure  to  conform  and  to  aspire  to  student  satisfaction  over  
and  above  other  aims  of  Higher  Education,  Gibbs  writes  that  ‘we  are  
teaching  our  students  not  to  be  resiliently  critical,  but  to  cope  with  the  anxiety  
of  the  market  through  short-­term  palliatives’  (2017,  p.14),  in  essence,  by  
meeting  their  current  expectations.    
  
While  the  dominance  of  student  satisfaction  measures  and  ‘value  for  money’  
rhetoric  have  invariably  reduced  HE  to  a  consumable  good  or  service,  the  
‘product’  that  students  will  receive  cannot  be  clearly  delineated  from  the  
outset  as  it  depends  on  their  engagement  with  the  university  in  question.  In  
this  sense,  aiming  to  meet  students’  initial  expectations  cannot  be  
considered  educative  as  it  precludes  the  potential  outcome,  giving  students  
exactly  what  they  want  and  nothing  more.  Yet  promoting  crises,  a  sense  of  
bottomlessness  or  continual  openness,  embracing  angst  and  the  ontological  
homelessness  it  reveals,  could  pave  the  way  for  a  perfectionist  education  
that  transcends  accountability  measures  and  performativity  pressures.  
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Students  should  leave  their  Higher  Education  with  something  they  had  not  
anticipated  beforehand,  they  should  leave  with  not  simply  a  collection  of  
facts  about  a  particular  subject  and/or  their  degree  certificate,  but  with  a  
certain  capacity  for  self-­reliance.    
  
The  end  of  one’s  Higher  Education  marks  the  closing  of  one  circle  around  
which  another  can  be  drawn;;  students  should  be  encouraged  to  see  that  
their  education  is  not  about  achieving  some  final  perfectible  ‘end’  but  rather  
requires  a  daily  baptism  in  their  words  and  life.  The  educative  unsettling  I  
envisage  here  implies  an  education  which  accounts  for  the  fact  that  
perfectionism  necessitates  both  settlement  and  leaving.  It  is  only  in  
experiencing  crises  and  being  unsettled  that  we  may  be  able  to  resist  what  
Thoreau  describes  as  our  ‘remarkable’  tendency  to  ‘fall  into  a  particular  
route,  and  make  a  beaten  track  for  ourselves’  (1854/1997,  p.287).  If  the  
edifying  mission  of  universities  is  to  be  realised,  then  a  degree  of  educative  
unsettling  is  not  only  necessary  but  vital.      
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Chapter  5  
The  Rise  of  ‘Customer  Relations’  in  Higher  Education:  
Exploring  Possibilities  for  Dialogue    
Scenario  
Head  of  Department  (HoD):  Good  morning  everyone,  so  top  of  the  agenda  
for  today’s  team  meeting  is  the  new  tutorials  policy.35  We’ll  look  at  the  
document  together  and  you  can  ask  any  questions  about  it  before  we  
move  on.  It’s  worth  saying  that  this  is  not  a  policy  I  have  been  
involved  in  developing,  but  it’s  something  we’re  all  going  to  have  to  
put  into  practice,  okay…Have  you  all  read  the  booklet  setting  out  the  
new  guidelines  for  conducting  tutorials?    
  
[There  are  murmurs  and  nodding  heads  around  the  room]  
  
HoD:  Alright  that’s  great,  and  do  you  have  any  initial  questions?  
  
Academic  1:  Well  I  was  wondering…in  the  booklet  it  says  that  every  student  
should  be  given  a  tutorial  at  least  two  weeks  prior  to  assignment  
submission,  but  what  about  those  who  don’t  sign  up  for  any  of  the  
time  slots  and  don’t  come  for  a  tutorial?    
  
HoD:  Ah,  I  see  your  problem  there.  But  of  course,  we  all  have  a  
responsibility  to  engage  students  and  encourage  them  to  be  more  
active  learners,  getting  them  to  take  up  the  opportunities  we  offer  
them.    
  
Academic  1:  Ok,  so  can  I  just  clarify  that  I  wouldn’t  be  penalised  if  not  all  
students  received  tutorials,  or  if  some  of  them  decide  they  don’t  want  
to  come  along?  
  
HoD:  That’s  right,  as  long  as  you  can  prove  that  you  made  every  effort  to  fit  
said  tutorial  in  around  their  schedule…  Yes,  anything  else?  
  
Academic  2:  Erm,  the  policy  also  states  that  students  should  come  to  the  
tutorial  with  a  list  of  issues  that  they  want  to  be  resolved  or  questions  
they  need  to  ask.  Do  I  need  to  meet  all  of  their  expectations  in  just  
one  tutorial  session?  
                                                                                        
35  By  ‘tutorials’  here,  I  am  not  simply  referring  to  the  practices  of  Oxford  and  
Cambridge  universities  in  the  UK,  where  individual  meetings  between  
academics  and  their  students  is  central  to  teaching  and  learning.  I  am  
thinking  of  ‘tutorials’  here  in  a  broader  sense,  encompassing  any  one-­
to-­one  interactions  between  academics  and  students;;  such  tutorials  
may  include,  for  example,  the  discussion  of  student  progression,  
pastoral  concerns,  and/or  assessment  preparation.      
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HoD:  Yes,  you  should  definitely  work  hard  to  ensure  that  all  students  leave  
their  tutorials  knowing  what  to  do  for  their  assignment,  and  with  their  
questions  answered.  
  
Academic  3:  That  sounds  a  bit  unrealistic  to  me  though…some  students  
may  not  even  know  what  their  expectations  are.    
  
Academic  2:  Indeed,  I’m  not  entirely  sure  that  I  can  guarantee  that  all  of  a  
student’s  questions  will  be  answered  in  just  one  tutorial…What  if  the  
conversation  moves  away  from  assessment  criteria  to  a  broader  
discussion  of  course  content?  Surely,  this  would  still  meet  their  
needs,  albeit  in  a  different  way…    
  
HoD:  The  policy  states  that  the  30-­minute  academic  tutorials  should  be  
focused  on  student  assignments,  if  you  wish  to  go  beyond  this  then  it  
would  be  on  your  own  time…  Do  we  have  any  further  questions?  
  
Academic  1:  What  would  we  do  if  a  student  asked  for  a  tutorial  to  go  over  
their  feedback  on  an  assignment?  The  policy  only  seems  to  be  
focused  on  guiding  them  before  submission…  
  
HoD:  Well,  going  through  feedback  with  students  sounds  like  an  excellent  
idea,  but  you  would  have  to  offer  this  kind  of  tutorial  to  all  of  your  
students,  rather  than  just  those  who  asked  you  for  it.  The  reason  why  
this  new  policy  is  useful  though,  is  that  it  protects  academic  staff  from  
serious  complaints  being  made  against  them.  And  we  know  that  
student  complaints  are  rising  year  on  year.  Yes,  a  complaint  could  still  
be  made  about  the  effectiveness  of  a  tutorial,  but  if  staff  are  following  
the  guidelines  set  out  here  [they  hold  up  the  policy  booklet]  then  they  
will  be  afforded  a  level  of  protection  from  potential  disciplinary  action.      
  
Academic  2:  So  if  we  follow  this  policy,  then  we  couldn’t  be  sued  for  
inadequate  academic  support  or  something  like  that?  
  
HoD:  I  don’t  think  so,  no.  Or  at  least  if  you’re  following  this  policy  then  the  
university  would  be  strongly  supportive  of  your  practices.    
  
Academic  1:  Is  this  policy  being  implemented  because  of  the  new  student-­
consumer  charter  that  the  university  has  announced?  
  
HoD:  This  tutorials  policy  can  be  seen  as  an  off-­shoot  of  that,  yes.  We  can  
reduce  the  risk  of  complaints  being  filed  by  carefully  delivering  exactly  
what  is  promised  in  the  prospectus.  But  implementing  this  new  policy  
should  also  enhance  the  student  experience  we  provide.  Having  a  
clear  policy  on  tutorials,  in  addition  to  the  charter,  should  make  our  
jobs  a  lot  easier  as  everyone  knows  what’s  expected  of  them.  Is  
everyone  clear  on  the  format  of  tutorials  then?  
  
Academic  1:  Yes,  so  we  look  at  students’  lists  of  questions  and  address  
these  with  a  view  to  helping  them  meet  the  assessment  criteria…    
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HoD:  Excellent,  I’m  sure  that  if  we  all  subscribe  to  this  then  we’ll  have  happy  
students.  And  happy  students  mean  better  NSS  results,  which  is  
something  I’m  sure  we’re  all  concerned  about.  Alright,  well  if  there’s  
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5.1  The  ‘Customerisation’  of  Academic-­Student  
Relationships  
The  scenario  presented  above  serves  to  highlight  how  reframing  academic-­
student  relationships  as  ‘customer  relations’  often  reinforces  the  
commodification  of  Higher  Education,  exemplified  in  concerns  over  the  
completion  of  student  satisfaction  surveys.  The  emphasis  on  student  
satisfaction,  and  its  concomitant  repositioning  of  academic-­student  
relationships  as  ‘customer  relations’,  is  clearly  evident  in  the  scenario.  By  
implementing  an  explicit  tutorials  policy,  which  is  ultimately  aiming  to  
standardise  the  form  and  content  of  one-­to-­one  meetings  between  
academics  and  students,  the  Head  of  Department  (HoD)  seems  to  be  
implying  that  there  are  correct  and  incorrect,  if  not  more  and  less  efficient,  
ways  of  dealing  with  students.    
  
The  fact  that  the  policy  has  been  given,  ready-­made,  to  the  HoD  and  
academic  staff  is  problematic.  There  is  also  a  hint  of  irony  in  the  HoD’s  
claiming  that  the  new  policy,  if  adhered  to,  will  afford  staff  ‘a  certain  level  of  
protection  from  disciplinary  action’.  The  need  to  ensure  a  certain  level  of  
consistency  and  transparency  in  university  teaching  practices  –  such  as  the  
tutorial  –  is  embodied  in  the  tutorials  policy  discussed  in  the  scenario,  and  
this  is  symptomatic  of  a  broader  shift  from  academic  autonomy  to  customer  
accountability  in  the  HE  sector  (Harvey,  2005;;  Filippakou  and  Tapper,  2016).    
  
Over  the  past  decade,  students  have  been  increasingly  positioned  as  
‘customers’  and  ‘consumers’  of,  or  even  ‘stakeholders’  in,  Higher  Education  
(Bay  and  Daniel,  2001;;  Blackmore,  2009;;  Gruber  et  al.,  2010;;  Mainardes  et  
al.,  2013).  With  students  as  ‘customers’,  academics  and  universities  are  
reframed  as  mere  ‘service  providers’  (Clayson  and  Haley,  2005;;  Bates  and  
Kaye,  2014)  or  ‘information  brokers’  (Tomlinson,  2017,  p.454),  thus  
pedagogical  relationships  have  become  successively  marketised.  The  
relationship  between  student  feedback  and  a  university’s  league  table  
position,  and  hence  their  income,  is  mediated  by  ‘customer  relations’.  
Institutions  are  now  even  resorting  to  ‘customer  relationship  management’,  
for  example,  through  using  social  media  to  engage  with  student-­consumers  
in  order  to  enhance  quality  (Stukalina,  2012,  p.89;;  Clark  et  al.,  2017).    
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It  seems  as  if  the  new  tutorials  policy  alluded  to  in  the  scenario  removes  the  
need  for  conversation  beyond  curricular  concerns  and  issues  of  assessment,  
thus  reducing  academic-­student  relationships  to  mere  ‘service  encounters’  
or  exchanges  (Bianchi,  2013,  p.398).  The  policy  can  be  seen  as  providing  a  
kind  of  proforma  or  ‘script’  for  conducting  academic  tutorials,  which  could  not  
only  protect  staff  from  potential  complaints  made  against  them,  but  also  
assures  students  that  their  questions  will  be  answered  and  that  a  certain  
standard  will  be  met  in  terms  of  feedback  and  support.  In  one  sense,  having  
clear  policies  or  charters  setting  out  what  is  expected  of  students  and  what  
they  can  expect  from  academic  staff  can  be  a  useful  tool  for  the  
management  and  negotiation  of  expectations.  However,  what  I  critique  here  
is  that  this  way  of  relating  to  students,  in  essence,  ‘contracting’  with  them  
(Fulford,  2018),  increasingly  shapes  all  academic-­student  interactions.  
  
The  discourses  discussed  in  previous  chapters  –  the  collection  of  student  
‘voice’  (Chapter  Three),  and  modes  of  settlement  associated  with  student  
satisfaction  (Chapter  Four)  –  can  be  considered  as  iterations  of  a  wider  
focus,  to  which  I  turn  in  this  chapter,  on  ‘customer  relations’  in  the  HE  sector.  
Universities  are  concerned  with  student  ‘voice’  as  a  means  of  shaping  their  
service  provision  according  to  student  feedback  (Yeo,  2008;;  Blackmore,  
2009),  and  this  is  ultimately  aimed  at  meeting  student  expectations  and  
settling  them  down  (Mainardes  et  al.,  2013).    
  
As  I  argued  in  Chapter  Four,  the  impulse  to  settle  students  down  and  meet  
their  expectations  is  not  egregious  in  and  of  itself  –  indeed  certain  kinds  of  
settlement  are  not  only  permissible  but  necessary,  for  example,  students  
need  to  feel  settled  and  comfortable  in  their  accommodation.  But  problems  
can  occur  when  students  are,  as  it  were,  settled  down  in  their  learning,  and  
when  their  consumer  wants  are  attended  to  without  consideration  for  what  
they  might  actually  need.  The  tutorials  policy  discussed  above  can  be  seen  
as  an  iteration  of  such  settlement,  as  well  as  exemplifying  the  recent  
‘customerisation’  of  academic-­student  relationships  (Love,  2008,  p.18).        
  
I  argue  here  that  the  reduction  of  academic-­student  relationships  to  
‘customer  relations’  is  evident  in  students’  evaluations  of  their  Higher  
-­  145  -­  
Education  in  consumerist  terms;;  as  one  student  puts  it,  ‘[if  students  were  
customers]  the  school  would  then  dance  to  our  tune’  (Vuori,  2013,  p.183).  
The  increasing  ‘customerisation’  of  these  relationships  is  also  exemplified  in  
the  recent  surge  in  formal  student  complaints  (Love,  2008,  p.18;;  Fulford  and  
Skea,  forthcoming).  This  raises  such  questions  as  ‘who  is  pushing  these  
consumerist  discourses  in  Higher  Education?’,  and  ‘do  students  consider  
themselves  as  “customers”  of  universities?’  The  contractualisation  of  
pedagogical  relationships  is  clearly  driven  by  government  initiatives  seeking  
to  place  Students  at  the  Heart  of  the  System  (BIS,  2011)  and  to  provide  
‘MoneySuperMarket’  style  rankings  (Busby,  2018b).  
  
A  stark  example  of  ‘customerisation’  is  found  in  the  response  to  recent  strike  
action  by  some  academic  staff  in  the  UK,  resulting  in  thousands  of  students  
petitioning  for  financial  compensation  for  their  cancelled  lectures  (Bird,  2018;;  
Busby,  2018a;;  Weale,  2018).  Many  students  from  the  University  of  York,  and  
King’s  College  London,  campaigned  for  a  refund  of  their  tuition  fees  based  
on  the  following  premise:    
We  pay  a  large  amount  for  our  tuition  fees  and  we  expect  the  university  
in  return  to  provide  us  with  the  appropriate  education  and  to  pay  the  
staff  effectively  enough  to  give  us  an  education.  They  want  students  to  
pay  but  don’t  want   to  give  us  consumer  rights.   If   I  were   to  pay   for  a  
water   bill,   and   the   water   didn’t   come   through,   I   would   expect  
compensation  and  it’s  exactly  the  same  with  universities  (Weale,  2018,  
no  page).  
  
This  exemplifies  the  rise  of  ‘customer  relations’  in  UK  Higher  Education.36  
Treating  students  as  customers  is  not  always  problematic;;  in  fact  they  are  
quite  clearly  ‘customers’  when  paying  for  accommodation  and  university  
catering.  But  the  growing  ‘customerisation’  of  HE  is  an  entirely  different  
matter  when  academic-­student  relationships  are  seen  as  a  means  to  an  end;;  
here,  pedagogical  concerns  are  replaced  by  economic  ones.  As  Sabri  
                                                                                        
36  The  role  of  students  in  this  strike  is  more  complex  than  Weale  (2018)  
suggests.  Although  many  students  did  campaign  for  refunds  of  a  
portion  of  their  fees  and/or  compensation,  there  were  others  who  
were  also  supportive  of  university  staff  strike  action.  Students  
themselves  tried  to  explain  that  they  ‘stood  in  solidarity  with  lecturers’  
but  equally  felt  that  the  missed  lectures  affected  their  value  for  
money.  For  further  details  on  this,  see  Bird  (2018).  
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explains,  the  dominance  of  discourses  such  as  ‘the  student  experience’  and  
the  NSS  has  led  to  a  ‘sacralisation  of  the  customer…[whereby]  the  
consumer  is  a  sacred  form’  (2011,  p.665).  The  privileging  of  student-­
consumer  expectations  over  and  above  other  stakeholders’  views  –  
particularly  academics  –  seems  to  increase  student  choice  and  their  ability  to  
shape  the  HE  marketplace,  but  this  comes  at  the  cost  of  genuine  academic-­
student  relationships.37      
  
In  focusing  on  customer  relations  in  this  chapter,  I  argue  that  ‘student-­
consumers’  are  increasingly  seen  as  indistinguishable  from  customers  in  
other  sectors  such  as  retail.  Student  voice  campaigns  are  one  example  of  
this,  whereby  universities  are  collecting  student  feedback  in  order  to  make  
service  improvements,  just  as  any  other  business  must  respond  to  customer  
remarks  if  they  are  to  maintain  their  client  base  and  position  in  the  market.  
Once  the  preserve  of  homeware  stores  such  as  Ikea,  the  use  of  ‘smiley  
terminals’38  is  now  pervasive  in  many  service  industries,  and  they  are  
increasingly  being  used  across  university  campuses,  allowing  students  to  
simply  press  a  button  to  express  their  satisfaction  or  dissatisfaction  with  the  
facilities  there.    
  
A  consumer  identity  seems  to  have  been  almost  forced  upon  students,  as  
the  increasing  marketisation  of  the  sector  and  use  of  evaluative  tools  to  
encourage  competition  between  institutions  has  been  bolstered  by  UK  
government  policy,  whilst  alongside  these  changes  market  principles  have  
                                                                                        
37  While  the  term  ‘genuine’  is  contested,  I  am  using  this  with  specific  
reference  to  the  work  of  Martin  Buber,  who  articulates  the  notion  of  
‘genuine  dialogue’  whereby  the  relationship  does  not  wholly  involve  
objectification  of  the  other.  I  discuss  Buber’s  work  below  in  section  
5.2.  
38  These  terminals  usually  have  a  range  of  ‘smileys’  or  different  faces  on  
display  which  consumers  can  press  to  show  whether  they  were  happy  
or  disgruntled  by  their  experience.  One  manufacturer  of  these  
terminals  describes  their  usefulness  in  terms  of  being  able  to  ‘cut  
through  the  noise  and  get  feedback  right  at  the  point  of  experience’.  
For  further  details,  see:  https://www.honestly.com/feedback-­
terminals?kw=smiley%20terminal&gclid=EAIaIQobChMIoeCIo_Pp2gI
VBrTtCh2zzAoZEAAYAiAAEgL7UfD_BwE  [Accessed  03  May  2018].  
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infiltrated  pedagogical  relationships.  A  wealth  of  literature  focuses  on  
different  ways  in  which  universities  and  individual  academics  may  resist  the  
‘student-­as-­consumer’  model,  highlighting  its  negative  impact  on  learning  
(Clayson  and  Haley,  2005;;  Carey,  2013;;  Mark,  2013).  Ironically  though,  the  
‘voice’  that  is  missing  from  this  debate  is  precisely  that  of  students.  But  
where  students’  own  conception  of  themselves,  as  consumers  –  or  
otherwise  –  has  been  explored,  this  has  revealed  an  extraordinary  tendency  
towards  narcissism  (Nixon  et  al.,  2018).    
  
As  Nixon  et  al.  describe  ‘marketisation  enshrines  the  satisfaction  of  the  
sovereign  student  as  a  legitimate  and  central  imperative  of  the  HEI’  (2018,  
p.929).  Increasingly,  students  themselves  are  recognising  that  their  position  
as  ‘consumers’  of  Higher  Education  is  one  of  ‘sovereignty’,  wherein  
academics  must  bend  to  the  will  and  desire  of  ‘[his  or]  her  majesty  the  
student’  (Nixon  et  al.,  2018,  p.927).  The  link  between  students’  adoption  of  a  
‘consumer  orientation’  and  their  academic  performance  is  worth  noting  here,  
as  those  students  who  identify  more  strongly  as  consumers  of  HE  tend  to  
have  lower  academic  performance  (Bunce  et  al.,  2017).  Thus,  student  
identity  is  not  only  inextricably  tied  to  their  satisfaction  and  alumni  loyalty,  but  
also  to  retention  and  academic  outcomes.      
  
As  I  discussed  in  Chapter  Three,  the  collection  of  student  ‘voice’,  targeted  as  
it  is  towards  quality  assurance  and  curricular  development  processes,  often  
takes  it  as  a  given  that  students  are  ‘customers’  and  that  they  behave  in  line  
with  this  (Watjatrakul,  2014).  Students’  resistance  to  their  presupposed  
consumer  identity  typically  takes  the  form  of  political  expression,  as  
evidenced,  for  example,  in  student  protests  in  2010  prior  to  the  increase  in  
tuition  fees  in  England  (Murugesu,  2017),  and  in  their  support  of  academic  
staff  strikes  (Rosenvinge.  2018).    
  
The  extent  to  which  students  actually  identify  and  act  as  consumers,  or  
rather  have  this  status  imposed  on  them,  remains  to  be  seen  (and  
researched),  but  it  is  increasingly  difficult  for  students  to  see  Higher  
Education  as  anything  other  than  a  commodity  when  ‘signifiers  of  the  
student’s  sovereign  status  as  “chooser”  [and  therefore  consumer]  are  
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abundant’  (Nixon  et  al.,  2018,  p.929).  While  ‘the  notion  of  the  student  as  
consumer  has  been  widely  embraced  by  universities’  (Little  et  al.,  2009,  as  
cited  by  Carey,  2013),  the  concomitant  impact  of  this  on  academic-­student  
relationships  has  received  little  attention.  It  is  to  this  I  now  turn.    
  
5.1.1  Customer  Relations    
There  are  three  different  types  of  customer  relations  to  which  I  will  refer    
here,  before  elucidating  which  kind  of  relationship  I  find  holds  the  greatest  
educative  potential.  These  three  types  do  not  constitute  an  exhaustive  list  of  
potential  customer  relations,  but  they  will  be  outlined  here  in  order  to  discuss  
what  kind  of  relationships  currently  persist,  and  what  could  be  envisaged,  
between  academics  and  their  students.  
  
First,  there  is  the  kind  of  relation  that  occurs  when  a  customer  buys  a  
product;;  I  call  this  the  product-­based  relation.  Whether  the  purchase  is  
conducted  online  or  in  person,  buying  a  tangible  product  is  arguably  less  
reliant  on  the  creation  of  a  relationship  between  seller  and  buyer.  A  
customer  may  come  with  a  desirable  product  already  in  mind  or  they  might  
find  a  suitable  product  while  in  the  consumer  environment,  but  it  seems  as  if  
the  product  features  speak  for  themselves,  with  the  seller’s  role  confined  to  
merely  facilitating  the  purchasing  process.  For  example,  in  buying  a  new  
television  from  an  electrical  store,  customers  will  choose  between  different  
models  –  with  the  seller  guiding  their  decision  as  required  –  but  the  
establishment  of  a  relationship  between  these  parties  is  not  central,  as  the  
customer  is  committed  to  buying  a  product  rather  than  receiving  a  service.  
This  is  not  to  say  that  good  customer  service  is  unimportant  to  such  a  
transaction,  but  rather  that  the  exchange  is  not  primarily  determined  by  the  
seller-­consumer  relationship.    
  
The  second  kind  of  customer  relationship  I  highlight  is  that  of  paying  for  a  
service  that  involves  minimal  interaction  with  the  service  provider.  Here  I  am  
thinking  of  buying  one’s  car  insurance  online;;  this  could  be  referred  to  as  the  
service-­oriented  relation.  While  this  kind  of  transaction  may  involve  
telephone  contact  or  a  one-­off  meeting,  as  long  as  the  service  is  delivered  
on  time  and  to  the  expected  standard,  there  is  likely  to  be  little  or  no  further  
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contact.  This  type  of  customer  relation  does  involve  more  of  a  long-­term  
interaction  between  service  providers  and  consumers,  since  the  contract  
term  may  be  for  a  period  of  months,  but  the  relationship  implied  here  is  both  
distant  and  impersonal.  The  lack  of  personal  engagement  here  may  be  
preferred  by  some  customers  who  have  little  time  to  spare  and/or  for  
convenience  wish  to  be  primarily  online  consumers.      
  
Finally,  the  third  type  of  customer  relation  to  which  I  draw  attention  is  that  of  
buying  a  personalised  service  which  involves  sustained  contact  between  the  
service  provider  and  consumer,  whereby  a  trusting,  mutually  beneficial  
relationship  is  arrived  at.  I  refer  to  this  as  the  customer-­focused  relationship.  
As  an  example  of  this  kind  of  relationship,  I  am  thinking  of  that  rapport  which  
might  exist  between  a  hairdresser  or  beautician  and  their  clients.  To  allow  
someone  to  cut  and  colour  one’s  hair  necessitates  a  certain  level  of  trust  
between  an  individual  and  the  hairdresser,  this  can  only  develop  as  a  
relationship  is  created  and  nurtured  over  time.  Whether  a  customer  returns  
to  any  particular  salon  will  not  wholly  depend  on  the  service,  price  and  
location,  but  it  will  typically  also  be  mediated  by  the  quality  of  the  relationship  
itself.    
  
The  ‘service’  provided  in  the  case  of  one’s  hairdressing  is  not  something  pre-­
packaged  that  can  be  consumed  or  utilised  indiscriminately;;  instead  each  
client  will  receive  a  personalised,  almost  tailor-­made  service  that  meets  their  
needs  and  expectations.  While  in  this  kind  of  customer  relation  a  service  is  
provided,  the  service  itself  is  not  the  focus,  but  rather  customers  themselves.  
In  such  a  relationship,  service  provision  must  be  informed  by,  and  
responsive  to,  each  customer’s  wishes.  That  the  customer  is  at  the  ‘heart’  of  
such  a  relationship  aligns  with  the  UK  government’s  drive  to  place  students  
‘at  the  heart  of  the  [Higher  Education]  system’  (BIS,  2011,  p.1).  This  and  
other  recent  policy  initiatives  have  sought  to  make  Higher  Education  
increasingly  ‘customer-­focused’  under  the  auspices  of  quality  assurance  and  
enhancement,  although  arguably  this  has  been  ruinous  for  academic-­student  
relationships.            
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Returning  to  the  scenario  that  opened  this  chapter,  I  argue  that  the  type  of  
‘customer  relations’  implied  by  the  new  tutorials  policy,  while  presented  by  
the  university  as  customer-­focused  is,  in  fact,  a  service-­oriented  relation.      
Such  a  policy  removes  the  personalisation  of  academic-­student  
relationships,  mandating  that  all  students  be  given  ‘the  same  treatment’,  
while  at  the  same  time  proclaiming  their  commitment  to  meeting  the  
expectations  of  individual  students.  While  focusing  on  the  service  itself  could  
lead  to  improvements  in  the  quality  of  provision,  the  issue  with  this  kind  of  
relation  is  that  student-­consumers  tend  to  be  regarded  as  a  homogenous  
body  with  a  coherent  set  of  expectations.  The  guiding  assumption  is  that  all  
students  want  to  be  ‘satisfied’  merely  in  terms  of  successful  assessments,  
and  obtaining  a  good  degree  classification  which  can  be  ‘traded  in’  for  higher  
graduate  earnings.    
  
In  describing  these  three  types  of  customer  relations,  the  use  of  either  
‘relation’  or  ‘relationship’  is  deliberate.  As  I  will  explore  later  in  the  chapter  
with  reference  to  the  philosophy  of  Martin  Buber,  there  is  a  distinct  difference  
between  ‘relations’  and  ‘relationships’;;  the  former  comprise  a  kind  of  means-­
ends,  goal-­directed  interaction,  while  the  latter  imply  ‘a  past,  a  present,  and  
potential  for  a  future’  in  an  encounter  with  the  other  (Kramer,  2003,  p.38).  So  
the  customer-­focused  relationship  is  generally  richer  and  more  dialogic,  
continuing  over  an  extended  period  of  time.  Product-­based  and  service-­
oriented  relations,  on  the  other  hand,  may  be  limited  to  particular  
transactions,  and  the  focus  is  more  on  what  is  being  exchanged  than  on  the  
other  party  involved,  the  consumer.  I  have  briefly  discussed  these  three  
different  kinds  of  customer  relations  in  order  to  draw  out  what  is  potentially  
problematic  about  the  tutorials  policy  featured  in  the  opening  scenario,  in  
particular  the  promotion  of  a  customer-­focused  relation,  which  is  in  fact  a  
service-­oriented  one.    
  
My  critique  of  the  ‘customerisation’  (Love,  2008,  p.18)  of  academic-­student  
relationships  is  threefold:  (i)  that  such  discourses  are  reductionist,  limiting  
conceptions  of  Higher  Education  to  what  is  valued  in  the  globalised  
knowledge  economy;;  (ii)  that  pedagogical  relationships  are  reduced  to  the  
transactional,  whereby  they  are  considered  merely  as  ‘service  encounters’  in  
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a  university’s  provision  (Bianchi,  2013,  p.398),  and  (iii)  that  such  
relationships  are  seen  in  more  instrumental  terms  not  only  limits  the  
possibility  for  genuine  dialogue,  but  is  inimical  to  a  perfectionist,  dialogic,  
and  transformative  education.  As  academic-­student  relationships  are  
increasingly  contractualised  and  proceduralised,  exchanges  between  
academics  and  students  may  take  on  an  instrumental,  quid  pro  quo  
rationale.  And  as  Fulford  highlights,  the  reduction  of  academic  tutorials  to  a  
‘quasi-­contractual’  relationship  can  have  ‘a  stifling  effect’  (2016a,  p.416;;  
2012,  p.77).    
  
Admittedly,  not  all  academic-­student  relationships  are  explicitly  constrained  
by  ‘customer  relations’  policies  and  procedures  as  depicted  in  the  scenario  
above.  While  I  am  not  arguing  against  universities  seeking  to  provide  an  
excellent  student  experience,  I  do  wish  to  draw  attention  to  the  ways  in  
which  consumerist  terminology  may  confine  such  relationships  to  the  realm  
of  economic  exchange.  The  language  used  in  academic-­student  interactions  
inevitably  frames  the  relationship  in  a  particular  way,  that  is,  in  terms  of  the  
production  and  consumption  of  knowledge.  As  I  will  argue  here,  
repositioning  pedagogical  relationships  solely  in  terms  of  ‘customer  relations’  
is  antithetical  to  an  edifying  and  dialogic  Higher  Education.    
  
5.2  Educative  Relationships  with  the  Other:  The  Turn  to  
Philosophy  
Having  outlined  my  concerns  with  the  reframing  of  academic-­student  
relationships  in  terms  of  ‘customer  relations’,  I  will  now  draw  on  the  works  of  
Martin  Heidegger,  Stanley  Cavell,  and  Martin  Buber  to  explore  how  the  use  
of  economic  language  effects  certain  relationships,  before  moving  on  to  a  
consideration  of  the  modes  of  dialogue  that  broadly  align  with  these  different  
kinds  of  relation.  I  will  build  on  earlier  discussions  of  the  works  of  Cavell  and  
Heidegger,  but  also  bring  the  philosophy  of  Buber  to  bear  on  this  issue  of  
relationships  with  the  other.    
  
Heidegger’s  work  is  pertinent  here  for  thinking  about  how  we  use  and  often  
misuse  language,  and  that  language  itself  is  intimately  tied  up  with  our  
Being.  In  discussing  Heidegger’s  unique  conception  of  language  I  will  
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highlight  that  the  infiltration  of  a  kind  of  economic,  accountability-­based  
language  into  the  HE  sector  is  problematic  as  it  frames  what  it  means  to  live  
and  work  in  the  university  in  a  particular  way.  I  will  show  that  the  language  
‘we’  as  a  community  use  implies  certain  kinds  of  relationships,  and  such  talk  
of  academics  as  ‘service  providers’  (Bates  and  Kaye,  2014)  or  ‘information  
brokers’  (Tomlinson,  2017,  p.454)  serving  ‘student-­consumers’  (Yeo,  2008)  
limits  the  potential  for  dialogue  between  parties.  I  will  propose  what  a  more  
edifying,  dialogic  Higher  Education  might  consist  of  in  three  ways:  (i)  by  
drawing  on  the  works  of  Martin  Buber;;  (ii)  by  engaging  with  Cavell’s  
discussion  of  speech  acts  and  educative  relationships,  and  (iii)  by  exploring  
how  these  themes  are  illustrated  in  film.                    
  
5.2.1  The  Contributions  of  Buber  and  Cavell  
The  writings  of  Austrian-­born,  Israeli  philosopher,  Martin  Buber,  are  varied,  
dealing  with  ethical  relationships  to  the  other,  Hasidism,  Zionism,  and  also  
fictional  works.  His  philosophy  is  often  described  as  being  a  ‘philosophy  of  
dialogue’  as  this  concern  permeates  his  works  (Kramer,  2003).  Buber  not  
only  wrote  about  dialogue,  but  was  also  actively  engaged  in  many  dialogues  
over  his  lifetime  with  colleagues  such  as  Gershom  Scholem,  Franz  
Rosenzweig,  and  Herman  Hesse  among  others.39  That  these  continued  
exchanges  informed  Buber’s  work  highlights  the  potential  for  understanding  
the  other  through  dialogue,  and  this  is  another  central  tenet  of  his  
philosophy.    
  
While  Buber’s  philosophy  is  not  strictly  a  philosophy  of  religion,  it  must  be  
considered  in  light  of  his  strong  commitment  to  Judaism,  as  he  ultimately  
considered  one’s  relationship  to  the  other  as  a  model  of  man’s  relationship  
with  God.  Buber  writes  very  little  on  education  in  the  formal  sense  of  
schooling,  but  he  was  involved  in  Jewish  adult  education  in  Germany  until  
1938,  before  lecturing  at  the  Hebrew  University  in  Jerusalem.  The  
educational  force  of  Buber’s  work  has  increasingly  been  recognised,  as  
                                                                                        
39  Gershom  Scholem  was  a  renowned  philosopher  and  historian,  
Rosenzweig  was  a  translator,  theologian  and  philosopher,  while  
Hesse  was  a  famous  poet  and  novelist.    
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several  researchers  have  explored  the  implications  of  his  philosophy  of  
dialogue  for  schooling  (Morgan  and  Guilherme,  2012;;  Stern,  2013;;  Jacobi,  
2017)  and  Higher  Education  (Fulford,  2016a).  I  will  add  to  this  body  of  work  
not  only  by  focusing  on  tutorials  and  conversations  in  HE,  but  also  on  the  
broader  discourse  of  ‘customer  relations’.    
  
I  draw  again  on  the  work  of  Cavell,  particularly  his  extension  of  J.L.  Austin’s  
speech  act  theory,  to  argue  that  genuine  dialogue  may  in  fact  be  restricted  
by  the  proceduralisation  of  language  –  the  tutorials  policy  discussed  in  the  
scenario  being  an  example  of  this.  I  will  show  how  Cavell’s  move  away  from  
Austin’s  focus  on  procedure  and  ‘felicity  conditions’  invites  his  readers  to  
‘improvisation  in  the  disorders  of  desire’  (2005b,  p.185).  Where  Austin  is  
criticised  for  being  ‘skittish  about  emotion’,  Cavell  emphasises  the  
importance  not  only  of  what  is  said,  but  also  how  one  says  it  and  the  effect  
this  may  have  on  the  other.  What  Cavell  adds  to  Austin’s  work  is  the  
conception  of  passionate  utterance,  which  takes  language  beyond  the  
procedural  and  accounts  for  relational  concerns.  Thus,  Cavell’s  work  is  
valuable  for  this  chapter  given  its  concern  not  only  with  dialogue  per  se,  but  
also  with  the  relationships  that  exist  between  academics  and  their  students.    
  
As  I  will  argue  in  what  follows,  to  engage  in  genuine  dialogue  and  encounter  
with  the  other  may  be  educative  in  itself,  and  I  will  explore  this  in  relation  to  
film.  Film  is  central  to  Cavell’s  philosophical  project,  as  I  discussed  in  
Chapter  Three  with  the  examples  of  Gaslight  and  Now,  Voyager.  Film’s  
value  is  evidenced  in  the  capacity  of  the  medium  to  screen,  and  offer  up,  a  
particular  vision  of  the  world.  As  Cavell  writes:  
The   world   of   a   moving   picture   is   screened…What   does   the   silver  
screen  screen?  It  screens  me  from  the  world  it  holds—that  is,  makes  
me   invisible.  And   it   screens   that  world   from  me—that   is,   screens   its  
existence  from  me.  That  the  projected  world  does  not  exist  (now)  is  its  
only  difference  from  reality  (1979b,  p.24).      
  
As  one  is  drawn  into  the  world  of  the  screen,  there  is  a  certain  alienation  
from  the  real  world.  And  yet,  the  world  that  is  screened  is  a  reflection  of  the  
world  itself.  As  I  am  absorbed  in  the  world  of  film,  I  am  both  ‘in’  and  out  of  
the  world,  hence  I  am  placed  in  a  position  of  ‘strangeness’  relative  to  my  
world.  The  use  of  film  in  this  chapter  also  counteracts  a  common  criticism  of  
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Buber  and  Heidegger’s  works,  that  their  philosophy  is  too  abstract  and  
lacking  in  real  world  examples.  Film  not  only  has  the  capacity  to  make  
abstract  concepts  more  real,  but  it  can  also  bring  educational  and  
philosophical  questions  to  the  fore.  For  example,  Cavell  finds  that  
‘Emersonian  moral  perfectionism’  is  beautifully  exemplified  and  brought  to  
life  in  film  (Cavell,  1990;;  1996).    
  
By  engaging  with  the  works  of  both  Buber  and  Cavell,  I  make  an  original  link  
between  them  which  will  offer  a  way  forward  in  rethinking  what  it  means  to  
be  in  relation  with/to  another,  and  how  such  a  relationship  is  structured  by  
dialogue.  While  dialogue  is  the  focus,  I  will  also  explore  how  this  impacts  
upon  relationships,  highlighting  that  certain  relationships  and  conversations  
may  be  educative  in  and  of  themselves.  In  what  follows,  I  will  draw  lines  of  
connection  between  what  Buber  terms  ‘genuine  dialogue’  (1988,  p.69),  and  
Cavell’s  extension  and  elaboration  of  Austin’s  speech  act  theory;;  at  the  heart  
of  both  philosophers’  works  is  a  recognition  of  the  importance  of  engaging  
with  the  other  on  their  own  terms.    
  
To  be  open  and  attentive  to  the  other  is  central  to  Buber’s  ‘genuine  dialogue’  
(1988,  p.69),  and  as  I  will  show,  such  an  openness  relies  on  there  already  
being  an  established  relationship  between  interlocutors  whereby  one  can  
make  demands  on  the  other.  This  is  something  Cavell  describes  as  being  
able  to  ‘demand  from  you  a  response  in  kind,  one  you  are  in  turn  moved  to  
offer’  (2005b,  p.182).  For  Buber,  genuine  community  can  only  be  created  
through  relationships  that  are  dialogic,  mutual,  and  reciprocal  (Kramer,  2003,  
p.77).  To  be  in  community  with  others  is  also  educative  in  a  broader  sense  
of  what  Cavell  terms  ‘the  education  of  grownups’  (1979a,  p.125).  In  what  
follows,  the  connection  between  dialogue  and  relationships  will  be  explored  
by  drawing  on  both  Buber  and  Cavell,  and  in  doing  so,  I  will  argue  for  the  
educative  potential  of  ‘genuine  dialogue’  (1988,  p.69)  and  being  in  
community  with  others.  
  
5.2.2  The  Proceduralisation  of  Language    
The  language  used  in  the  scenario  –  typically  the  language  of  consumerism  
–  is  suggestive  of  a  certain  kind  of  relationship,  one  which  is  premised  on  an  
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exchange  and  can  be  judged  as  to  its  efficiency.  The  language  used  is  
ineluctably  tied  to  the  enactment  of  the  ‘relationship’,  or  more  precisely,  the  
interaction.  Here,  language  is  seen  as  merely  a  means  to  an  end,  useful  for  
fulfilling  one’s  side  of  the  bargain  but  then  pushed  aside  once  the  exchange  
has  occurred.  A  proceduralisation  of  language  implies  a  proceduralisation  of  
relationship,  and  this  limits  the  potential  for  genuine,  authentic  dialogue  
between  interlocutors.  Admittedly,  this  is  a  bold  claim  to  make  but  the  
proceduralisation  of  language  is  so  pervasive  and  routinised  that  it  comes  to  
shape  relationships,  framing  them  instrumentally.  An  example  of  this  is  when  
we  contact  service  providers  over  the  phone,  it  is  as  if  their  whole  interaction  
with  us  is  driven  by  a  script  from  which  there  is  no  divergence.  The  language  
used  in  such  a  case  is  not  communicating  anything  between  parties,  but  
merely  effecting  a  procedure.  
  
In  his  later  works,  Heidegger  was  critical  of  such  ‘technicalisation’  of  
language,  arguing  that  rather  than  language  being  a  device  we  utilise  and  
then  dispose  of,  we  need  to  learn  how  to  ‘undergo  an  experience  with  
language’  (1971,  p.57,  my  emphasis),  through  which  the  nature  of  language  
itself  could  be  revealed.  In  the  first  chapter  of  Heidegger’s  On  the  Way  to  
Language,  an  extensive  dialogue  is  presented  between  a  Japanese  
Participant  and  an  Inquirer  (presumed  to  be  Heidegger  himself).  The  main  
premise  of  the  dialogue  is  to  discuss  issues  of  translation,  particularly  the  
fact  that  certain  Japanese  terms  used  in  reference  to  art  cannot  be  equated  
to  any  Western  terminology.  The  interlocutors  are  already  constrained  by  
speaking  in  their  common  language  of  German  (not  the  native  language  of  
the  Japanese  Participant).  As  the  Inquirer  acknowledges  these  difficulties,  
he  states  that  ‘the  language  of  our  dialogue  might  constantly  destroy  the  
possibility  of  saying  that  of  which  we  are  speaking’  (Heidegger,  1971,  p.15).  
So  while  the  partners  in  dialogue  can  clearly  converse  with  each  other,  it  
seems  as  if  the  language  used  to  do  so,  in  this  case  German,  almost  
inevitably  closes  down  certain  possibilities  of  thought  and  dialogue.    
  
It  is  my  contention  that  in  a  similar  manner,  the  language  of  ‘customer  
relations’  represents  a  limiting  of  dialogue  to  the  realm  of  exchange  and  to  
what  is  the  ‘business’  of  the  day.  The  issue  at  stake  here  is  not  that  a  
-­  156  -­  
language  of  ‘customer  relations’  exists  in  and  of  itself,  but  that  it  increasingly  
dominates  conversations  in  contemporary  universities.  To  highlight  the  
potential  dangers  of  this,  I  will  draw  a  distinction  between  relationships  
premised  upon  exchange,  and  those  influenced  by  the  possibilities  of  
encounter.    
  
5.2.3  Exchange  versus  Encounter  
As  the  opening  scenario  illustrates,  accountability  pressures,  and  the  
impulse  to  meet  student  expectations,  can  reduce  academic-­student  
relationships  to  mere  transactions.  The  scenario  (which  is  increasingly  
typical  of  some  HE  practices)  suggests  that  what  is  exchanged  between  
academics  and  their  students  is  information  or  knowledge,  and  only  that  
which  is  needed  to  help  students  to  meet  assessment  criteria.  Even  without  
an  explicit  tutorials  policy,  with  rising  tuition  fees  and  higher  student  
expectations  (Bay  and  Daniel,  2001;;  Rolfe,  2002;;  Mark,  2013),  academic-­
student  conversations  may  be  all  too  easily  reduced  to  mere  exchanges.    
Fulford  describes  this  emphasis  on  exchange  in  Higher  Education  when  she  
writes:    
Student  satisfaction,  in  the  tutorial  context,  derives  from  a  conversation  
(rather  than  a  discussion)  which  is  based  on  the  contentment  derived  
from   knowing   exactly   what   is   required   to   gain   a   pass   mark   in   an  
assignment,  or  to  achieve  a  certain  degree  classification  (2013,  pp.116-­
117).    
  
Academic  tutorials,  once  a  space  of  conversation  and  exploration,  are  now  
increasingly  dominated  by  economic  imperatives  and  a  zealous  concern  with  
satisfaction.  As  suggested  in  the  opening  scenario  from  Chapter  Four,  
students  may  arrive  at  tutorials,  whether  they  have  done  the  necessary  work  
or  not,  expecting  academics  to  provide  them  with  the  necessary  advice  of  
how  to  achieve  a  certain  grade  on  an  assignment.  Focusing  on  improving  
students’  work  is  rightly  a  central  part  of  being  a  good  tutor,  but  my  concern  
here  is  that  this  should  not  be  the  sole  matter  under  discussion.  Focusing  
entirely  on  assessment  outcomes  and  grading  criteria  could  not  only  limit  the  
potential  for  dialogue  between  the  parties,  but  it  may  also  reduce  education  
itself  to  the  mere  acquisition  of  marketable  knowledge  and  skills,  which  in  
turn  are  exchanged  for  higher  earnings  in  the  labour  market.    
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While  I  am  not  entirely  vilifying  ‘exchange’  here,  it  is  my  contention  that  
problems  can  arise  where  exchange  comes  to  dominate  thought  and  action  
in  Higher  Education,  and  particularly  in  teaching  and  learning  contexts.  
Exchange  writ  large  cannot  be  eradicated:  students  pay  tuition  fees  in  
exchange  for  their  teaching  and  learning  opportunities,  while  teaching  itself  
necessarily  involves  an  exchange  of  information.  But  where  exchange  
becomes  the  ruling  logic  of  academic-­student  relationships,  genuine  
dialogue  and  the  potential  of  the  university  to  embody  ‘the  great  community’  
is  negated  (Buber,  1957/1990,  p.102).      
  
My  discussion  here  will  not  be  restricted  to  academic  tutorials,  but  the  
limiting  of  academic-­student  relationships  to  the  realm  of  exchange  remains  
a  wider  issue  throughout  the  HE  sector,  exemplifying  what  Paul  Standish  
refers  to  as  a  ‘closed  economy  of  exchange’  (2005,  p.54).  In  such  a  closed  
economy,  the  emphasis  is  on  what  goods  or  knowledge  can  be  exchanged  
for  others;;  conversations  with  one’s  peers  and  lecturers  may  be  seen  as  
means  to  other  ends,  and  the  tendency  is  always  towards  considerations  of  
market  value.  What  is  problematic  about  such  an  economy  is  not  that  certain  
goods  and  services  are  exchanged,  but  that  the  persons  involved  may  
consequently  be  objectified  and  reduced  to  a  function  of  their  utility.  Under  
such  an  economy,  academics  are  considered  as  mere  ‘service  providers’  
(Bates  and  Kaye,  2014),  facilitators  or  technicians  of  learning,  and  even  
‘human  capital’  like  any  other  (Jones-­Devitt  and  Samiei,  2011,  p.88).  But  
what  is  distinctive  about  the  role  of  academics,  and  what  marks  out  an  
edifying  Higher  Education  experience,  is  that  the  ‘ends’  cannot  easily  be  
known  or  stated  from  the  outset.    
  
At  the  heart  of  a  transformative  Higher  Education  is  a  commitment  to  
knowledge  and  truth,  the  quest  for  which  must  be  embarked  on  by  
academics  and  students  together.  This  necessitates  that  one’s  worldview  be  
challenged  and  questioned,  and  that  meaning-­making  is  mutually  
negotiated.  I  am  arguing  here  that  academic-­student  relationships  should  
transcend  the  realm  of  mere  exchange  and  that  pedagogical  relationships  
should  rather  be  characterised  by  encounter,  it  is  to  this  that  I  now  turn.    
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‘Encounter’,  understood  as  a  meeting  of  adversaries  or  confrontation,  comes  
from  the  Old  French  encontre  meaning  ‘a  meeting,  a  fight,  and/or  an  
opportunity’.  While  an  ‘encounter’  does  have  negative  connotations,  it  is  in  
the  positive  idea  of  encounter  as  ‘opportunity’  that  I  find  its  educative  
potential.  To  be  confronted  by  another  may  not  always  mean  to  have  a  fight  
or  disagreement  with  them,  but  instead  encountering  an  ‘other’  could  be  an  
opportunity  for  self-­transformation  and  progression  in  the  perfectionist  
sense.    
  
In  encountering  another  who  may  hold  a  different  point  of  view,  one’s  own  
beliefs  and  values  may  be  questioned  and  contested.  Being  confronted  by  
another  may  also  help  to  separate  out  what  one  really  thinks  and  believes  
from  those  culturally  normative  values  into  which  one  has  been  inculcated.  
The  educative  value  of  being  confronted  by  another  through  discussion  has  
already  been  highlighted  by  Fulford  who  draws  a  distinction  between  a  
‘conversation’  or  con-­versation  (deriving  from  the  Latin  convertere  meaning  
to  turn  together,  with  others),  and  a  ‘discussion’  (from  the  Latin  discutere  
meaning  ‘to  strike  asunder’,  2013,  p.116).    
  
As  I  argue  here,  whether  a  conversation  or  discussion  takes  place  between  
academics  and  students  will  depend  on  whether  the  relationship  is  premised  
upon  exchange,  or  rather  encounter.  I  suggest  that  it  is  only  through  
encountering  the  other  authentically,  that  is,  in  allowing  oneself  to  be  
challenged  and  confronted,  that  academic-­student  relationships  can  
transcend  economic  concerns;;  this  would  constitute  a  significant  move  away  
from  the  impulse  to  settle  students  down.  To  encounter  another  is  an  
opportunity  to  learn  more  not  only  about  the  other,  but  also  about  oneself.  
Relationships  based  on  encounter  will  necessitate  a  turning  toward,  and  
engagement  with,  the  other;;  they  will  involve  an  acknowledgement  of  the  
other  that  is  not  primarily  concerned  with  what  one  might  gain  from  them.  To  
encounter  another  in  this  way  means  to  approach  them,  and  engage  in  
dialogue  with  them,  as  a  valuable  end  in  itself.    
  
The  fundamental  difference  between  relationships  of  exchange  and  those  of  
encounter  is  that  those  centred  on  exchange  tend  to  be  outcome-­driven,  for  
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example,  where  students  simply  seek  to  ensure  a  particular  grade  on  an  
assignment.  Relationships  that  are  premised  upon  encounter,  however,  
cannot  be  determined  by  a  means-­ends  rationality  as  the  ‘outcome’  of  any  
particular  encounter  and/or  confrontation  may  not  be  known  in  advance.  
While  not  all  forms  of  exchange  between  academics  and  students  are  
problematic,  reframing  these  relationships  in  terms  of  an  openness  to  
encounter  could  be  more  educative  in  revealing  new  paths  of  thought,  and  
new  ways  of  seeing  the  world  and  one’s  place  in  it.  It  is  my  contention  here  
that  Higher  Education  should  support  such  an  edifying  process  of  self-­
revelation  and  transformation.    
  
The  repositioning  of  academic-­student  relationships  as  ‘customer  relations’  
in  current  educational  policy  reinforces  the  notion  of  ‘exchange’  as  central  to  
HE,  with  broader  concerns  over  student  satisfaction  and  ‘value  for  money’  
having  a  trickle-­down  effect  on  the  day-­to-­day  conversations  between  
academics  and  their  students.  In  order  for  academic-­student  relationships  to  
be  relationships  rather  than  mere  transactions,  creating  an  open  space  for  
encounter  and  (educative)  confrontation  between  these  parties  is  imperative.  
For  such  encounters  to  take  place,  academic-­student  relationships  need  a  
foundation  of  mutual  trust  and  reciprocity,  rather  than  accountability  and  
skepticism.  In  what  follows,  I  will  draw  on  the  works  of  Martin  Buber  and  
Stanley  Cavell  to  elucidate  how  educative  relationships  founded  upon  
encounter  could  encourage  greater  dialogue  between  academics  and  their  
students.  
  
5.3  Buber’s  Philosophy  of  Dialogue  
Martin  Buber’s  most  celebrated  work  is  his  exposition  of  dialogue  and  ethical  
relationships  in  the  short  volume  Ich  und  Du,  translated  as  I  and  Thou.  In  it,  
he  distinguishes  between  two  principal  word-­pairs  that  make  up  our  
experience  of  the  world  and  influence  how  we  interact  with  others.  These  
word-­pairs  are  the  I-­It  and  I-­Thou.  As  Buber  states,  the  ‘I’  is  inseparable  from  
these  word-­pairs,  so  any  invocation  of  the  ‘I’  will  be  in  relation  to  either  an  ‘It’  
or  a  ‘Thou’.  The  I-­It  is  a  relation  based  on  exchange  whereby  the  ‘other’  is  
objectified  and  seen  as  a  means  to  an  end.  The  emphasis  here  is  placed  on  
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what  one  can  gain  from  interacting  with  this  ‘It’,  whether  they  are  another  
human  being,  an  animal,  or  an  inanimate  object.    
  
Crucially,  what  marks  out  an  I-­It  relation  is  its  being  ‘goal-­directed’  (Buber,  
1970,  p.13).  The  I-­It  belongs  to  the  realm  of  experience,  so  an  encounter  
with  another  person  will  be  evaluated  and  analysed  for  what  one  can  take  
away  from  it,  rather  than  being  valued  in  and  of  itself.  There  is  something  
subversive  about  I-­It  relations,  that  the  ‘I’  involved  always  seeks  to  consume  
or  control  the  ‘It’  in  some  way,  and  as  Buber  notes,  one  can  never  enter  this  
world  of  experience  with  their  ‘whole  being’  (1970,  p.9).    
  
In  contrast,  the  I-­Thou  is  a  relationship  which  transcends  particular  
interactions  and  is  not  oriented  towards  goals  and  outcomes.  The  I-­Thou  is  
founded  upon  reciprocity,  that  ‘I’  recognise  the  ‘other’  as  a  ‘Thou’  similar  to  
myself.  Rather  than  just  one  side  of  the  relationship  benefitting  from  an  
encounter,  the  I-­Thou  places  demands  on  both  parties  to  be  open  and  
responsive  to  one  another.  The  primary  word  I-­Thou  establishes  the  world  of  
relation,  as  opposed  to  mere  experience,  and  uttering  the  word  Du  or  ‘Thou’  
to  another  implies  a  relationship  which  has  ‘a  past,  a  present,  and  potential  
for  a  future’  (Kramer,  2003,  p.38).    
  
While  something  may  be  exchanged  between  an  ‘I’  and  a  ‘Thou’,  the  
relationship  is  not  founded  upon  this  alone.  In  an  I-­It  interaction,  the  role  of  
the  ‘I’  is  almost  negligible  and  the  emphasis  is  placed  on  obtaining  
something  from  the  ‘It’.  But  in  an  I-­Thou  relationship,  the  ‘I’  must  be  fully  
present  to  the  other  and  as  Buber  explains,  ‘the  primary  word  I-­Thou  can  be  
spoken  only  with  the  whole  being’  (1970,  p.9).  It  is  this  placing  of  oneself  
fully  into  relation  with  the  other  that  makes  the  I-­Thou  ethically  richer  than  
the  I-­It;;  the  former  involves  reaching  out  towards  another  and  creates  a  
communion  with  them,  while  the  latter  is  confined  to  individuation  and  merely  
objectifies  the  other.    
  
In  I  and  Thou,  Buber  gives  a  clear  example  that  explains  how  the  two  
principal  word-­pairs  shape  our  interactions  differently;;  this  is  his  illustration  of  
how  one  may  encounter  a  tree.    
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He  writes:    
I  contemplate  a  tree.  I  can  accept  it  as  a  picture:  a  rigid  pillar  in  a  flood  
of  light,  or  splashes  of  green  traversed  by  the  gentleness  of  the  blue  
silver   ground…I   can   assign   it   to   a   species   and   observe   it   as   an  
instance,   with   an   eye   to   its   construction   and   its   way   of   life…I   can  
dissolve  it   into  a  number,   into  a  pure  relation  between  numbers,  and  
eternalise  it.  Throughout  all  of  this  the  tree  remains  my  object  and  has  
its  place  and  its  time  span,  its  kind  and  condition  (Buber,  1970,  p.57).  
  
This  exemplifies  the  I-­It  relation  wherein  one  tries  to  analyse  and  gain  an  
understanding  of  the  other,  in  this  case  a  tree,  by  reducing  it  to  the  sum  of  its  
parts.  What  occurs  in  this  relation  is  that  a  clear  line  is  drawn  between  
subject  and  object;;  the  tree  is  reduced  to  an  objective  ‘It’  that  I  can  use  as  a  
means  to  an  end  and  so  it  is  not  experienced  holistically.  Assigning  the  tree  
to  a  particular  species,  and/or  dissolving  it  into  a  number,  also  denies  the  
individuality  of  this  tree  that  ‘I’  am  faced  with;;  considering  the  other  as  an  ‘It’  
removes  the  potential  uneasiness  of  confrontation  that  may  be  evoked  in  
truly  encountering  the  tree.    
  
While  Buber  does  not  distinguish  the  I-­It  from  the  I-­Thou  in  terms  of  
exchange  versus  encounter,  I  suggest  that  the  I-­Thou  relationship  would  be  
more  accommodating  of  genuine  encounter  between  interlocutors.  Rather  
than  objectifying  the  ‘other’,  whether  this  is  a  tree  or  another  person,  the  I-­
Thou  is  a  relationship  founded  upon  an  openness  to,  and  recognition  of,  the  
other  as  the  kind  of  entity  they  are.  I-­Thou  relationships  necessitate  that  the  
‘Thou’  is  considered  in  their  own  ‘personal  uniqueness’,  as  the  ‘Thou’  that  
they  are  rather  than  what  ‘I’  presume  them  to  be  (Kramer,  2003,  p.19).  This  
different  sense  of  individuation,  that  the  ‘other’  is  singled  out  and  
encountered  as  a  ‘Thou’  rather  than  an  ‘It’,  is  also  presented  in  Buber’s  
discussion  of  the  tree.  As  he  states:                
It  can  also  happen,  if  will  and  grace  are  joined,  that  as  I  contemplate  
the  tree  I  am  drawn  into  a  relation,  and  the  tree  ceases  to  be  an  It.  The  
power  of  exclusiveness  has  seized  me…The  tree  is  no  impression,  no  
play  of  my  imagination,  no  aspect  of  a  mood;;  it  confronts  me  bodily  and  
has   to   deal  with  me  as   I  must  deal  with   it—only   differently…What   I  
encounter   is  neither  the  soul  of  a  tree  nor  a  dryad,  but  the  tree  itself  
(1970,  pp.57-­58,  my  emphasis).        
  
A  fundamental  difference  between  these  two  ways  of  understanding  and  
relating  to  the  tree  is  that  in  viewing  the  tree  as  a  ‘Thou’,  it  is  experienced  as  
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a  whole  without  concern  for  the  usefulness  of  its  component  parts  or  seeing  
it  as  a  means  to  an  end.  What  can  be  taken  away  from  Buber’s  tree  example  
is  that  whether  an  I-­It  relation  or  I-­Thou  relationship  is  established  between  
oneself  and  another  will  depend  on  how  one  approaches  and  views  this  
‘other’.  Both  principal  word-­pairs  are  necessary  to  the  human  experience,  so  
the  I-­It  is  still  important.  But  as  I  will  argue  here,  the  I-­It  should  not  be  
allowed  to  dominate  our  interactions  with  others,  especially  academic-­
student  relationships.    
  
In  the  I-­It/I-­Thou  distinction,  the  two  are  inextricably  linked  and  cannot  be  
considered  mutually  exclusive.  So  while  the  I-­It  may  seem  less  desirable  
when  compared  to  the  reciprocal,  mutual  relation  that  is  the  I-­Thou,  neither  
word-­pair  has  precedence  over  the  other,  but  rather  each  person  continually  
moves  between  the  two.  One  could  not  live  entirely  in  the  world  of  the  I-­It  or  
I-­Thou;;  both  are  necessary  to  our  experience  of  the  world  and  others  in  it.  As  
Buber  writes,  ‘without  It  man  cannot  live.  But  he  who  lives  with  It  alone  is  not  
a  man’  (1970,  p.24).  It  seems  almost  inevitable  that  an  I-­Thou  relationship  
will  be  reduced  to  a  mere  I-­It  over  time,  or  as  conditions  change,  yet  the  I-­It  
cannot  become  an  I-­Thou  once  the  ‘other’  has  already  been  objectified.  
Buber  describes  this  condition  as  the  ‘fated  lapse  into  It  of  every  single  You  
[Thou]’  (1970,  p.145).    
  
The  ‘It’  is  not  a  final  telos  of  the  I-­Thou  relationship,  but  rather  marks  out  a  
different  realm  of  human  relations.  It  would  surely  be  exhausting  if  all  our  
engagements  with  others  took  the  form  of  an  I-­Thou  relationship.  While  the  
‘Thou’  may  be  reduced  to  an  ‘It’  in  particular  contexts,  the  I-­Thou  relationship  
can  still  be  reasserted,  although  an  ‘It’  can  never  become  a  ‘Thou’.  The  I-­
Thou  can  be  seen  as  a  richer,  more  dialogic  version  of  the  I-­It,  and  thus  as  
the  metamorphosis  of  ethical  relationships.  While  the  I-­Thou  may  involve  an  
exchange,  the  relationship  is  not  limited  to  this  alone  as  it  is  founded  upon  
reciprocity  and  a  mutual  openness  to  the  other.  Bearing  this  central  
distinction  in  mind,  I  will  now  discuss  the  different  modes  of  dialogue  that  
Buber  describes  as  characteristic  of  these  relationships,  before  exploring  
how  these  ideas  are  exemplified  in  film  and  their  pertinence  for  education.    
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5.4  Educative  Relationships:  Modes  of  Dialogue    
In  Between  Man  and  Man  (1947/2002),  Buber  adds  a  further  dimension  to  
his  philosophical  thought  by  elucidating  how  one’s  relationship  to  an  
individual  ‘other’  –  whether  this  is  an  I-­It  or  an  I-­Thou  –  is  related  to  a  
broader  community  of  others.  While  dialogue  features  heavily  in  I  and  Thou,  
it  is  in  his  later  work  that  Buber  distinguishes  between  three  different  modes  
of  dialogue.  First,  there  is  genuine  dialogue.  In  such  an  encounter,  ‘each  of  
the  participants  really  has  in  mind  the  other  or  others…and  turns  to  them  
with  the  intention  of  establishing  a  living  mutual  relation  between  himself  and  
them’  (Buber,  1947/2002,  p.22,  my  emphasis).  As  Buber  explains,  genuine  
dialogue  –  whether  verbalised  or  silent  –  is  characterised  by  a  kind  of  
openness  to  the  other  and  relies  upon  recognition  of  the  other  as  the  person  
they  are,  rather  than  what  ‘I’  perceive  them  to  be.    
  
In  genuine  dialogue,  the  person  with  whom  one  is  speaking  is  the  focus  
rather  than  the  subject  being  discussed,  if  indeed  anything  is  discussed.  A  
prime  example  of  genuine  (and  silent)  dialogue  that  Buber  refers  to  is  the  
passing  smile  of  a  stranger  in  the  street.  What  marks  out  such  an  encounter  
as  genuine  dialogue  is  that  the  person  smiling,  and  the  stranger  noticing  this,  
are  drawn  briefly  into  relation  with  one  another.  Genuine  dialogue  is  
premised  upon  being  able  to  experience  ‘the  other  side’  of  the  relationship,  
and  this  can  only  occur  when  the  singularity  of  the  other  is  recognised  
(Buber,  1947/2002,  loc.158).  While  genuine  dialogue  is  not  necessarily  
confined  to  the  realm  of  the  I-­Thou,  it  seems  as  if  the  I-­It  negates  the  
possibility  for  such  dialogue,  as  the  other  is  already  objectified.        
  
Second,  there  is  technical  dialogue.  In  this  mode,  what  is  communicated  
between  interlocutors  is  mere  information,  hence  its  denotation  as  
‘technical’.  The  exchange  of  information  is  what  is  central  to  this  form  of  
dialogue,  rather  than  the  people  involved.  As  Buber  writes,  technical  
dialogue  is  ‘prompted  solely  by  the  need  of  objective  understanding’  and  as  
such,  the  interlocutors  are  unlikely  to  be  drawn  into  relation  with  one  another  
(1947/2002,  p.22).  Thus,  technical  dialogue  is  more  aligned  with  the  realm  of  
exchange  than  encounter.  In  this  form  of  dialogue,  there  is  communication  –  
in  terms  of  an  exchange  of  information  –  but  it  remains  unclear  the  extent  to  
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which  the  interlocutors  are  in  ‘conversation’  and/or  having  a  ‘discussion’  
(Fulford,  2013).    
  
Technical  dialogue  is  more  likely  to  characterise  I-­It  relations  than  I-­Thou  
relationships;;  the  ‘It’  could  be  the  information  that  is  transmitted  or  the  ‘other’  
with  whom  one  is  in  dialogue.  I  suggest  that  the  scenario  that  opened  this  
chapter  exemplifies  technical  dialogue,  and  this  mode  of  dialogue  also  
characterises  the  tutorials  policy  described.  The  Head  of  Department  (HoD)  
is  clearly  concerned  with  transmitting  information,  rather  than  engaging  in  
genuine  dialogue  with  those  with  whom  he/she  is  conversing.  In  the  
scenario,  it  seems  as  if  both  the  HoD  and  academics  involved  have  been  
objectified  and  reduced  to  ‘It’s.      
  
The  third  form  of  ‘dialogue’  –  which  is  not  really  dialogue  at  all  –  is  
monologue  disguised  as  dialogue.  This  form  of  ‘dialogue’  appears  to  be  a  
dialogue,  as  two  or  more  people  meet  and  talk  to  each  other.  But  as  Buber  
highlights,  those  involved  only  ‘speak  each  with  himself  in  strangely  tortuous  
and  circuitous  ways  and  yet  imagine  they  have  escaped  the  torment  of  being  
thrown  back  on  their  own  resources’  (1947/2002,  p.22).  Such  ‘dialogue’  is  
vacuous,  with  each  interlocutor  pretending  to  be  interested  in  the  other  and  
what  they  have  to  say,  while  really  only  listening  to  themselves.    
  
While  ‘technical  dialogue’  is  less  desirable  when  compared  to  ‘genuine  
dialogue’,  Buber  still  sees  it  as  useful  in  certain  situations.  In  HE,  technical  
dialogue  may  be  necessary  when  giving  student  induction  talks,  for  example,  
or  when  explaining  to  new  students  how  to  use  the  library  facilities.  On  the  
other  hand,  Buber  remains  extremely  critical  of  ‘monologue  disguised  as  
dialogue’,  as  it  takes  no  account  of  the  persons  or  information  involved  in  the  
dialogue.  This  third  type  of  dialogue  is  exemplified  in  what  Buber  describes  
as:  
A   conversation   characterised   by   the   need   neither   to   communicate  
something,  nor   to   learn  something,  nor  to   influence  someone,  nor   to  
come   into  connexion  with  someone,  but  solely  by   the  desire   to  have  
one’s   own   self-­reliance   confirmed  by  marking   the   impression   that   is  
made,  or  if  it  has  become  unsteady  to  have  it  strengthened  (1947/2002,  
p.23).  
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This  refusal  to  acknowledge  the  other  in  monologue  is  why  Buber  states  that  
it  is  one  of  many  ‘faceless  spectres  of  dialogue’  (1947/2002,  p.23).  Relating  
these  modes  of  dialogue  to  the  three  types  of  customer  relations  discussed  
previously,  the  product-­based  relation  could  be  considered  monologic  in  
nature  as  the  product  is  bought  and  utilised/consumed,  rather  than  being  
something  the  customer  is  brought  into  relation  with.  Technical  dialogue  is  
exemplified  in  the  service-­oriented  relation,  whereby  the  dialogue  is  centred  
on  information  regarding  a  product  or  service  being  transmitted  from  one  
party  to  another.  The  ‘smiley  terminal’  is  an  example  of  such  dialogue,  as  
information  is  shared  but  the  ‘relation’  is  confined  to  a  particular  ‘service  
encounter’  (Bianchi,  2013,  p.398).    
  
The  mode  of  dialogue  that  most  aligns  with  the  customer-­focused  
relationship  is  seemingly  genuine  dialogue.  But  this  type  of  customer  relation  
cannot  break  out  of  mere  technical  dialogue  as  the  ‘other’  is  already  
experienced  as  a  ‘customer’,  thus  making  it  difficult  to  encounter  this  
customer  as  the  person  they  are.  Even  in  the  customer-­focused  relationship  
which  is  more  personalised  and  dialogic,  what  is  exchanged  in  this  
relationship  is  information,  and  that  which  ultimately  creates  a  better  service  
for  the  customer.  With  the  role  of  each  interlocutor  in  this  type  of  customer  
relation  already  pre-­determined  (that  one  is  the  service  provider  and  the  
other  a  customer),  the  complete  singularity  of  the  other  to  whom  one  is  
speaking  cannot  be  acknowledged,  thus  confining  the  customer-­focused  
relationship  to  technical  dialogue.    
  
These  different  modes  of  dialogue  are  exemplified  in  different  practices  in  
contemporary  Higher  Education.  Technical  dialogue  may  characterise  a  
large  proportion  of  student  induction  activities  for  example.  Monologue  
disguised  as  dialogue  can  typically  occur  in  the  development  of  new  
university  initiatives  and  policies,  wherein  academics  and  students  may  be  
asked  for  their  ‘feedback’  on  a  policy  which  is  to  be  implemented  regardless  
of  what  ’consultation’  has  taken  place.    
  
Monologue  is  most  evident  where  the  student  ‘voice’  is  collected  and  
analysed  from  student  surveys;;  here  I  am  thinking  of  the  NSS,  but  also  of  
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institutional  initiatives  purporting  to  take  account  of  students’  feedback.  The  
space  for  genuine  dialogue  in  universities  is  to  be  found  in  academic-­student  
relationships,  in  those  one-­to-­one  conversations  that  are  characterised  by  
mutual  openness  to  the  other  and  receptivity.  Genuine  dialogue  can  also  
occur  in  lecture  theatres,  in  libraries  and  in  seminar  groups,  but  whether  this  
happens  will  depend  on  how  the  ‘other’  is  positioned,  either  as  a  ‘Thou’  or  an  
‘It’.      
  
Buber  distinguishes  three  types  of  dialogue  –  genuine,  technical,  and  
monologue  –  from  each  other  but  they  are  not  mutually  exclusive,  just  as  his  
I-­It/I-­Thou  distinction  is  not.  The  pertinence  of  Buber’s  philosophy  of  dialogue  
to  a  discussion  of  customer  relations  in  Higher  Education  is  clear  given  that  
the  different  modes  of  dialogue  he  elucidates  imply  different  types  of  
relationships  with  others.  While  Buber’s  modes  of  dialogue  were  not  used  to  
describe  relationships  in  the  economic  realm,  such  as  that  between  service  
provider  and  consumer,  there  is  an  affinity  between  this  and  his  critique  of  
‘modern  existence’  as  ‘inalienable’  and  devoid  of  genuine  dialogue  
(1947/2002,  p.22).  
  
While  I  have  discussed  here  different  types  of  dialogue  and  the  effect  of  
these  on  relationships,  I  will  now  move  on  to  a  further  exploration  of  how  
dialogic  relationships  can  be  educative  by  drawing  on  Cavell’s  work.  I  
suggest  that  Cavell’s  ‘passionate  utterance’  is  a  concrete  example  of  
Buber’s  ‘genuine  dialogue’,  though  the  two  concepts  should  not  be  
conflated.  Where  Buber  focuses  on  the  surprise  involved  in  genuine  
dialogue  with  another,  Cavell  emphasises  the  moral  aspect  of  conversation,  
that  we  are  ultimately  responsible  for  our  words  and  their  effect  on  the  other.  
What  Cavell  highlights  here,  in  line  with  Buber’s  argument,  is  that  the  topic  
being  discussed  is  not  what  is  most  important,  but  rather  the  relationships  
that  are  implied  by  such  dialogue.    
  
5.5  Stanley  Cavell  and  Passionate  Utterance    
Cavell’s  notion  of  ‘passionate  utterance’  builds  upon  and  extends  J.L.  
Austin’s  speech  act  theory,  highlighting  the  importance  of  ‘the  passions,  or  
say,  the  expressive,  in  speech’,  an  aspect  which  he  found  lacking  in  Austin’s  
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work  (2005b,  p.159).  In  How  To  Do  Things  with  Words,  J.L.  Austin  (1962)  
explained  his  binary  model  of  speech  acts  where  he  distinguished  
constatives  (statements)  from  performatives  (doing  something  in  saying  
something).  Austin  devised  a  list  of  felicity  conditions  or  ‘criteria’  to  
determine  whether  an  utterance  was  ‘happy’  or  not,  and  thus  whether  it  
counted  as  a  performative.    
  
Austin  gives  several  examples  of  performatives  including,  ‘I  name  this  ship  
The  Queen  Elizabeth’,  ‘I  now  pronounce  you  man  and  wife’,  and  ‘I  give  and  
bequeath  my  watch  to  my  brother’  (Cavell,  2005b,  p.158).  Felicity  conditions  
include,  for  example,  the  necessity  that  the  context  is  appropriate  (naming  
the  ship  as  part  of  an  official  naming  ceremony),  that  the  correct  persons  are  
involved  (only  an  ordained  minister  can  marry  a  couple),  and  that  the  
persons  involved  commit  themselves  to  subsequently  acting  in  accordance  
with  the  performative  (they  act  as  a  married  couple,  and  the  watch  is  given  
to  the  bequeathed  brother).    
  
What  Austin’s  felicity  conditions  cannot  account  for,  however,  is  the  effect  of  
the  emotions  and  desires  on  speech.  In  fact,  Austin  only  briefly  mentions  
perlocutionary  speech  effects  as  utterances  which  may  have  ‘consequential  
effects  on  the  thoughts,  feelings,  and  actions  of  others’  (Cavell,  2005b,  
p.169).40  It  is  here  that  Cavell  extends  Austin’s  theory  of  speech  acts.  The  
passionate  utterance  is,  for  Cavell,  a  speech  act  which  has  an  effect  on  the  
other,  termed  its  perlocutionary  effect.  The  perlocutionary  speech  act  
describes  utterances  in  which  a  person  is  ‘doing  something  by  saying  
something’  (Austin,  1962,  p.91).  Often  what  a  person  is  doing  is  affecting  an  
                                                                                        
40  Austin  distinguished  between  three  different  aspects  of  language:  the  
locutionary  force  of  words  (where  we  simply  say  something  
meaningful,  what  he  termed  ‘constatives’),  the  illocutionary  force  
(where  we  do  something  in  saying  something,  what  he  termed  
‘performatives’),  and  the  perlocutionary  effect  of  words  (where  we  do  
something  by  saying  something).  The  perlocutionary  effect  pertains  to  
the  effect  our  words  have  on  another.    
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‘other’  in  some  way,  for  example,  getting  someone  to  stop  what  they  are  
doing  by  saying  ‘I  beg  you  to  stop’.41    
  
Cavell  adds  to  Austin’s  discussion  of  the  perlocutionary  by  stating  that  the  
effects  of  such  utterances  are  not  only  felt  by  the  other,  one’s  respondent,  
but  also  the  utterer  him  or  herself.  This  effect  on  the  other  may  be  designed  
and  orchestrated,  or  it  may  be  unforeseen,  but  each  individual  is  responsible  
for  their  utterances  and  the  consequences  of  their  speech  acts  (Cavell,  
2005b).  As  Cavell  puts  it,  ‘to  know  what  perlocutionary  acts  I  am  liable  for  
“bringing  off”  is  part  of  knowing  what  I  am  doing  and  saying,  or  am  capable  
of  knowing  and  saying’  (2005b,  p.174).  Using  the  title  of  another  of  Cavell’s  
works  here,  in  answer  to  the  question  Must  We  Mean  What  We  Say?  
(1969/2015),  the  appropriate  response  seems  to  be  a  resounding  yes.  Our  
speech  acts,  especially  perlocutionary  effects,  often  involve  a  confrontation,  
and  Cavell  wants  us  to  recognise  that  ‘each  instance  of  which  [of  a  
passionate  utterance]  directs,  and  risks,  if  not  costs,  blood’  (2005b,  p.187).      
  
It  is  clear  that,  for  Cavell,  passion  itself  has  a  role  to  play  in  successfully  
executing  these  perlocutionary  effects.  This  is  one  of  Cavell’s  analogous  
felicity  conditions  (akin  to  Austin’s  felicity  conditions  for  performatives),  that  
‘in  speaking  from  my  passion  I  must  actually  be  suffering  the  passion’  
(2005b,  p.181).  I  emphasise  here  that  passionate  utterances  do  not  
necessarily  involve  speaking  ‘passionately’  to  the  other,  for  example,  in  a  
heated  disagreement.  Instead,  the  role  of  passion  is  more  indicative  of  one’s  
motivation  to  speak,  and  the  other  being  moved  to  respond,  than  the  way  in  
which  the  utterance  is  actually  conducted.    
  
                                                                                        
41  Cavell  lists  several  examples  of  perlocutionary  speech  acts,  including  A.J.  
Ayer’s  well-­known  example  ‘I’m  bored’  and  adds  his  own  examples,  
such  as:  ‘They  say  I  (or:  Perhaps  I;;  or:  I  would  not  wish  to)  anger,  
mortify,  charm,  affront,  encourage,  disappoint,  embarrass,  confuse  
etc.  you’,  and  ‘you  (or:  Are  you  attempting  to…?)  anger,  mortify,  
charm,  affront,  encourage,  disappoint,  embarrass,  confuse  etc.  me’  
(2005b,  pp.177-­178).  
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In  contrast  to  Austin’s  felicity  conditions  for  performative  speech  acts,  
passionate  utterances  are  harder  to  judge  in  terms  of  their  correctness  and  
completion;;  this  is  clearly  linked  to  the  lack  of  a  governing  procedure  but  
also  to  the  ways  in  which  the  relationship  may  be  altered.  What  it  is  ‘we’  are  
doing  in  undergoing  a  passionate  utterance  is  nothing  less  than  ‘staking  our  
future’  (Cavell,  2005b,  p.185),  putting  the  future  of  our  relationship  at  risk;;  if  
you  decline  my  invitation  to  exchange,  then  there  is  inevitably  nothing  left  to  
say.    
  
In  experiencing  a  passionate  utterance  there  is  an  ‘invitation  to  exchange’  
which  may  be  accepted  by  the  other,  but  equally  ‘you  may  contest  my  
invitation  to  exchange,  at  any  or  all  of  the  points  marked  by  the  list  of  
conditions  for  the  successful  perlocutionary  act’  (Cavell,  2005b,  p.182).  This  
invitation  to  exchange  and  demand  for  a  response  from  the  other  –  a  
demand  which  may  or  may  not  be  fulfilled  –  represents  another  of  Cavell’s  
‘felicity  conditions’  for  perlocutions.  While  the  term  ‘exchange’  is  used  by  
Cavell  to  describe  what  may  –  if  the  invitation  is  accepted  –  invoke  a  
passionate  utterance,  this  does  not  place  it  firmly  within  the  realm  of  
exchange  relations.  Earlier,  I  made  a  distinction  between  relationships  
premised  upon  exchange,  and  those  of  encounter;;  a  passionate  utterance  is,  
I  suggest,  an  example  of  genuine  dialogue  and  encounter,  while  the  
‘invitation  to  exchange’  involved  here  pertains  to  an  ethical  and  educative,  
rather  than  economic,  exchange  (Cavell,  2005b,  p.182).    
  
What  marks  out  Cavell’s  passionate  utterance,  and  its  ‘invitation  to  
exchange’,  as  an  encounter  are  the  motives  underlying  the  dialogue  and  
informing  the  relationship  itself  (2005b,  p.182).  A  passionate  utterance  must  
be  motivated  by  experiencing    a  ‘passion’,  whether  this  is  love,  hatred,  or  
even  boredom;;  the  interlocutors  are  not  incentivised  by  the  need  for  
information  or  affirming  their  own  ‘self-­reliance’  (Buber,  1947/2002,  p.23).  
The  lack  of  conventional  procedures  governing  passionate  utterances  
means  that  each  individual  case  must  be  judged  as  to  its  appropriateness.  
This  appropriateness  rests  on  the  fact  that  I  am  claiming  ‘to  have  standing  
with  you  in  the  given  case’  (2005b,  p.181).    
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By  engaging  in  a  passionate  utterance  with  you,  I  am  acknowledging  you  in  
your  own  ‘personal  uniqueness’,  which  is  for  Buber  a  marker  of  genuine,  
rather  than  technical,  dialogue  (Buber,  1947/2002;;  Kramer,  2003,  p.19).  
While  Cavell  does  list  analogous  ‘felicity  conditions’  for  the  conducting  of  a  
passionate  utterance,  this  is  a  rather  impish  mimicking  of  Austin’s  work.  In  
fact,  one  of  the  central  features  of  passionate  utterance  is  its  definitive  lack  
of  proceduralisation;;  there  cannot  be  a  procedure  for  engaging  with  the  other  
in  this  way,  as  each  instance  will  be  unique  and  shaped  by  the  persons  
involved.  But  equally,  the  lack  of  strict  felicity  conditions  and  procedures  
does  not  mean  that  in  Cavell’s  ‘passionate  utterance’  anything  goes.  Cavell’s  
argument  is  more  nuanced  than  this.  In  fact,  he  describes  a  passionate  
utterance  as  ‘an  invitation  to  improvisation  in  the  disorders  of  desire’  (2005b,  
p.185,  my  emphasis).  Rather  than  setting  up  a  strict  dichotomy  between  
proceduralisation  and  disarray,  what  is  important  here  is  the  improvisation,  
namely  that  each  interlocutor  is  able  to  negotiate  with  the  other  what  they  
are  willing  to  speak  about;;  this  offers  both  parties  an  insight  into  the  criteria  
that  shapes  their  relationship.    
  
That  passionate  utterance  cannot  be  pre-­determined  or  carried  out  
according  to  a  procedure  or  formula  is  both  more  authentic  to,  and  
representative  of,  dialogic  relationships  between  people  in  a  language  
community.  Genuine  dialogue  may  be  difficult,  conflictual  and/or  
confrontational,  and  there  will  often  be  miscommunications  that  arise  
between  interlocutors.  Genuine  dialogue  does  not  always  flow  smoothly,  but  
this  adds  richness  to  what  is  said  and  strengthens  the  relationship  itself.    
  
The  ‘testing  out’  of  one’s  relationship  with  another  in  passionate  utterance,  
by  offering  an  ‘invitation  to  exchange’  which  may  or  may  not  be  accepted,  
highlights  the  improvisation  involved  in  genuine  dialogue  (Cavell,  2005b,  
p.182),  and  there  is  inevitably  an  element  of  ‘unknownness’  in  such  
dialogue.  This  ‘unknownness’  is  not  necessarily  a  kind  of  radical  skepticism  
where  one  questions  the  extent  to  which  one  may  truly  ‘know’  the  other,  but  
more  a  questioning  of  oneself,  and  one’s  relationships.  In  reflecting  on  their  
relationship,  the  interlocutors  involved  in  a  passionate  utterance  are  being  
educated,  that  is,  they  are  learning  not  only  about  the  ‘other’  in  this  dialogue  
-­  171  -­  
but  also  about  themselves.  This  is  beautifully  described  by  Cavell  when  he  
states  that  ‘we  are  educations  for  one  another’  (1990,  p.31).    
  
The  presentation  of  the  tutorial  policy  in  the  opening  scenario  seems  to  
negate  the  potential  for  genuine  dialogue,  as  the  exchange  it  encourages  is  
merely  instrumental  and  economic,  rather  than  there  being  space  for  a  
reciprocal  ‘invitation  to  exchange’  (Cavell,  2005b,  p.182).  It  seems  as  if  
accountability  and  performativity  pressures  necessitate  the  elimination  of  
risk,  although  for  Cavell  this  marks  out  a  passionate  utterance.  While  
exchange  cannot  be  separated  out  from  academic-­student  relationships,  
alongside  the  exchange  of  information  geared  toward  economic  exchange,  
there  is  a  need  to  reassert  here  that  tutorials  are  also  a  space  for  encounter  
and  genuine  dialogue.  But  the  kind  of  tutorials  advocated  for  in  the  scenario  
are  just  one  example  of  the  gradual  erosion  of  opportunities  for  passionate  
utterance  in  Higher  Education;;  in  turn  this  is  replaced  by  easily  accountable  
performative  speech  acts.    
  
The  occurrence  of  performatives  in  HE  extends  beyond  individual  tutorials  to  
the  making  of  complaints  (Fulford  and  Skea,  forthcoming).  While  the  recent  
surge  in  student  complaints  is  illustrative  of  students’  increasing  
‘customerisation’  (Love,  2008,  p.18),  it  seems  as  if  the  ‘felicity  conditions’  or  
policy  for  making  a  formal  complaint  affords  a  measure  of  ‘safety…that  
avoids  the  risk  of  embarrassing  confrontation  with  faculty  staff’  (Fulford  and  
Skea,  forthcoming,  p.6).  Thus,  the  risk  and  confrontation  –  in  the  sense  of  
encountering  another  –  characteristic  of  genuine  dialogue  and  passionate  
utterance  are  being  replaced  by  transparent  policies  with  the  intention  of  
ensuring  quality  and  commensurability  across  the  sector.  Having  now  
presented  Buber’s  I-­It/I-­Thou  distinction  and  modes  of  dialogue,  and  having  
explored  this  further  through  Cavellian  passionate  utterance,  I  will  now  
pursue  these  ideas  in  relation  to  film,  paying  particular  attention  to  what  is  
educative  about  relationships  characterised  by  genuine  dialogue  and/or  
passionate  utterance.    
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5.6  Dialogue  and  Film:  A  Special  Day  
A  Special  Day  (Una  Giornata  Particolare)  is  an  Italian  film  directed  by  the  
notable  screenwriter  and  director,  Ettore  Scola  in  1977.  Set  on  May  6th,  
1938,  the  film  shows  the  activities  of  one  family  and  their  neighbours  over  
the  course  of  a  ‘special  day’  when  Hitler  visited  Mussolini  in  Rome.  In  the  
opening  scenes,  the  audience  sees  the  main  character  Antonietta  preparing  
her  family  for  the  parade  celebrating  Hitler’s  visit,  with  her  seeking  to  ensure  
that  the  children  look  presentable.  Antonietta  is  married  to  fascist  party  
member  Emanuele,  and  although  her  family  are  attending  the  festivities  on  
this  ‘special  day’,  Antonietta  is  involuntarily  confined  to  their  apartment  as  
she  must  still  attend  to  the  housework.    
  
As  other  women  from  the  apartment  block  leave  to  join  the  parade,  it  
becomes  clear  that  attendance  is  reserved  for  women  of  a  certain  social  
class,  with  Antonietta  unable  to  go  along  as  the  family  cannot  pay  for  a  maid.  
The  film  opens  with  historical  footage  from  the  actual  parade  showing  the  
meeting  of  Hitler  and  Mussolini.  But  this  serves  merely  as  a  backdrop  to  the  
other  ‘special  day’,  a  day  that  proves  transformative  for  Antonietta  and  her  
neighbour,  Gabriele.    
  
After  carrying  out  several  household  chores,  the  audience  sees  Antonietta  
attending  to  her  pet  mynah  bird,  who  then  escapes  through  an  open  window.  
Antonietta,  in  search  of  her  bird,  is  drawn  into  an  encounter  with  her  
neighbour  Gabriele,  whom  she  has  not  met  before.  Unbeknown  to  
Antonietta,  Gabriele  is  contemplating  ending  his  own  life  as  he  has  been  
fired  from  his  job  as  a  radio  announcer,  and  unveiled  as  a  homosexual,  
meaning  that  he  will  most  likely  be  forced  into  exile  and/or  imprisoned  under  
Mussolini’s  fascist  regime.  Gabriele  welcomes  the  distraction  of  meeting  
Antonietta,  yet  the  more  they  talk  to  one  another,  the  clearer  it  becomes  that  
Antonietta  has  been  subjectivated  by  the  fascist  regime.  She  struggles  to  
understand  why  anyone  who  could  attend  the  parade  would  not  do  so.  In  
coming  face  to  face  with  the  anti-­fascist  Gabriele,  Antonietta  is  forced  to  
confront  the  stark  reality  of  what  she  believes,  and  to  question  whether  
Mussolini  is  indeed  the  great  leader  that  she  has  been  told  he  is.  The  
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audience  is  invited  to  see  how,  just  like  the  bird  who  has  been  locked  away  
in  its  cage,  Antonietta  has  been  locked  into  particular  ways  of  thinking.    
  
What  develops  between  the  pair  is  a  ‘bond  of  shared  intimacy’,  through  
which,  as  Foster  writes,  ‘both  are  subtly  transformed’;;  both  are  educated  
(2017,  p.4).  Over  the  course  of  the  day,  Antonietta  and  Gabriele  reveal  
something  of  themselves  to  each  other:  for  Antonietta,  this  is  her  heartfelt  
confession  that  she  is  relatively  uneducated,  and  that  both  infidelity  and  
politics  have  strained  her  marriage  to  Emanuele.  Gabriele,  on  the  other  
hand,  feels  comfortable  enough  with  Antonietta  to  tell  her  about  his  struggle  
with  maintaining  a  façade  of  heteronormative  values.    
  
The  dialogue  between  Antonietta  and  Gabriele  becomes  increasingly  
conflicted;;  it  is  as  if  their  dialogue  is  confrontational42  precisely  because  they  
know  that  this  is  allowable  within  their  evolving  relationship.  There  are  
several  ‘invitations  to  exchange’  proffered  (Cavell,  2005b,  p.182),  initially  by  
Gabriele,  and  these  are  accepted  and  pursued  by  Antonietta.  A  prime  
example  of  how  such  dialogue  can  be  educative,  yet  also  confrontational  (in  
the  sense  of  an  encounter),  is  when  Gabriele  challenges  Antonietta’s  beliefs  
with  a  quotation  she  has  venerated  in  a  photo  album.  The  exchange  is  as  
follows:    
Gabriele:  [Reading  a  quotation  by  Mussolini  from  Antonietta’s  album]  
‘Genius   is   incompatible  with   the  physiology  and  psyche  of   the  
female  and  is  always  strictly  masculine’.  You  agree?  
  
Antonietta:  [after  some  hesitation]  Of  course  I  agree.  Why?...Aren’t  the  
history  books  always  full  of  men?  
  
Gabriele:  Sure.  Maybe  too  full.  There’s  no  room  for  anyone  else.  Least  
of  all  women.  
  
                                                                                        
42  What  I  mean  by  ‘confrontation’  in  this  section  is  not  any  kind  of  aggressive  
act  whereby  two  or  more  people  clash  together  violently.  Rather,  what  
I  am  referring  to  here  is  a  kind  of  moral  confrontation  in  which  one’s  
conduct  may  be  ‘confrontable  in  moral  conversation’  (Cavell,  2005a,  
p.12).  It  is  conversation  of  this  form  which  marks  out  perfectionism  
and  can  be  educative.  In  HE,  the  ‘confrontation’  I  am  thinking  of  is  
that  which  may  occur  between  a  student  and  the  subject  material  they  
are  introduced  to.    
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Antonietta:  You  know,  you’re  a  tough  one  to  figure  out.      
                  
Asking  Antonietta  if  she  agrees  with  the  quotation  that  she  has  
commemorated  in  her  photo  album  is  a  direct  challenge  to  her  political  
sympathies.  This  ‘invitation  to  exchange’  is  taken  up  by  Antonietta  (Cavell,  
2005b,  p.182),  but  she  then  seems  unable  to  account  for  herself  as  both  a  
woman  and  a  fascist.  When  she  subsequently  expresses  her  difficulty  in  
‘figuring  out’  Gabriele,  we  could  understand  this  as  a  crisis  marking  out  
Antonietta’s  perfectionist  journey,  and  her  quest  for  self-­intelligibility  and  
conversion.    
  
The  multiple  encounters  between  Antonietta  and  Gabriele  that  take  place  
during  this  ‘special  day’  are  educative  for  both  parties  as  they  are  confronted  
with  ‘the  other  side’  of  the  relationship  (Buber,  1947/2002,  loc.158),  and  in  
turn,  the  other  side  of  their  own  political  sentiments.  What  Gabriele  learns  
from  Antonietta  complicates,  and  yet  deepens,  his  understanding  of  what  it  
is  to  be  a  ‘fascist’.  He  comes  to  know  Antonietta  in  her  ‘complete  singularity’  
(Kramer,  2003),  rather  than  simply  as  one  fascist  among  others.    
  
The  relationship  between  Antonietta  and  Gabriele  is  characterised  by  
genuine  dialogue  as  both  interlocutors  acknowledge  the  other  in  their  own  
‘personal  uniqueness’  (Kramer,  2003,  p.19),  although  it  does  not  start  out  
this  way.  When  Antonietta  goes  looking  for  her  bird  which  has  flown  onto  
Gabriele’s  window  ledge,  their  initial  discussion  is  a  form  of  technical  
dialogue  marked  by  goal-­directedness;;  Antonietta  wants  to  catch  her  bird  
and  return  it  safely  home,  while  Gabriele  plays  the  role  of  a  dutiful  neighbour  
and  nothing  more.  Their  first  meeting  is  thus  akin  to  a  transaction.  But  the  
development  of  a  relationship  premised  upon  encounter  and  genuine  
dialogue  transcends  this  first  exchange,  with  Gabriele  visiting  Antonietta’s  
apartment  under  the  guise  of  offering  her  a  book.  What  is  opened  up  from  
their  first  interaction  is,  for  both  parties,  a  wish  to  know  the  other.    
  
Dissatisfied  with  her  lot,  Antonietta  seeks  an  education  from  Gabriele  and  
we  are  persuaded  that  she  learns  more  from  him  in  one  day  than  in  a  
lifetime  with  her  husband.  Antonietta’s  education  up  to  this  point  is  
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incomplete,  shaped  primarily  by  the  fascist  beliefs  into  which  she  was  
inducted  by  her  husband  and  community.  What  Gabriele  wants  to  learn  from  
Antonietta  is  what  makes  fascists  believe  what  they  do,  and  how  they  justify  
their  beliefs  in  light  of  resistance.  While  Gabriele  is  resigned  to  his  fate  –  that  
he  is  likely  to  be  exiled  or  killed  because  of  his  sexuality  –  he  is  still  seeking  
an  insight  into  the  family  life  that  is  heralded  by  Mussolini.  Gabriele  wants  to  
see  life  from  another’s  viewpoint,  to  experience  alterity,  and  his  relationship  
with  Antonietta  is  integral  to  his  perfectionist  education  throughout  the  film.    
While  their  differing  political  views  cannot  be  ignored,  this  does  not  limit  their  
relationship  to  mere  technical  dialogue.  In  fact,  politics  is  the  subject  of  a  
rather  heated  debate  following  the  visit  of  a  neighbourhood  warden.  Their  
subsequent  conversation,  which  exemplifies  genuine  dialogue  and  
passionate  utterance,  runs  as  follows:  
Gabriele:  I’m  generally  her  [the  neighbourhood  warden]  favourite  topic  
–  after  her  late  husband,  that  is.  In  his  death  throes  he  refused  
last  rites  and  asked  to  be  buried  in  his  fascist  black  shirt.  
  
Antonietta:  He  was  a  great  man,  a  true  fascist.  He  wasn’t  a  naysayer  
or  one  of  those…subversives.    
  
Gabriele:  Like  me,  right?...I  don’t   think   I’m  an  antifascist.   If  anything,  
fascism  is  anti-­me.    
  
Antonietta:  Sure,  they’re  all  against  you.  Spare  me…Then  tell  me  why  
you  were  fired  from  the  radio.  Just  for  fun?  
  
Gabriele:   Because   –   Perhaps   my   voice   didn’t   meet   official  
requirements.    
  
It  is  with  the  utterance  of  ‘like  me,  right?’  that  Gabriele  is  inviting  Antonietta  
to  enter  into  a  relation  with  him,  to  talk  about  difficult  topics.  Engaging  in  a  
passionate  utterance  with  another  in  this  way  often  means  that,  as  Cavell  
puts  it:    
[We  do  not]  stop  at  what  we  should  or  ought  to  say,  nor  at  what  we  may  
and  do  say,  but  take  in  what  we  must  and  dare  not  say,  or  have  it  at  
heart  to  say,  or  are  too  confused  or  too  tame  or  wild  or  terrorized  to  say  
or  to  think  to  say  (2005b,  p.185).    
  
In  a  passionate  utterance,  one  may  be  able  to  say  what  is  often  unsayable,  
and  it  is  perhaps  due  to  this  that  ‘each  instance  of  which  [the  passionate  
utterance]  directs,  and  risks,  if  not  costs,  blood’  (Cavell,  2005b,  p.187).  Yet  
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the  risk,  or  as  Buber  would  describe  it  ‘surprise’,  is  precisely  what  marks  out  
this  kind  of  dialogue  as  genuine  (1988,  p.103).    
  
Antonietta  is  clearly  surprised  by  Gabriele’s  challenging  of  the  terms  
‘subversive’  and  ‘antifascist’  here,  and  she  learns  that  people  cannot  be  so  
easily  categorised  in  this  way.  While  the  pair  are  learning  specific  facts  about  
each  other,  for  example  why  Gabriele  was  fired  from  his  radio  announcer  
job,  they  are  also  strengthening  the  foundation  of  their  relationship  –  a  
relationship  that  underwrites  the  distinction  between  fascism  and  
antifascism.  This  conversation  not  only  exemplifies  genuine  dialogue,  but  it  
is  educative  as  both  Antonietta  and  Gabriele  are  ‘experiencing  the  other  
side’  of  their  relationship  (Buber,  1947/2002,  loc.158).    
  
As  the  film  draws  to  a  close,  Antonietta  leaves  Gabriele’s  apartment  to  return  
home  –  after  securing  their  intimacy  by  having  sex  –  and  her  family  and  all  
those  who  attended  the  parade  come  back.  Antonietta  and  her  family  have  
dinner  as  normal,  and  here  the  audience  sees  that  her  marriage  is  
characterised  by  technical  dialogue  or  even  monologue,  rather  than  genuine  
encounter.  Emanuele  is  dismissive  of  his  wife,  questioning  whether  she  has  
been  busy  cleaning  all  day  or  rather  lazing  in  bed,  and  she  is  clearly  viewed  
as  a  mere  object.  The  lack  of  reciprocity  and  genuine  dialogue  in  the  
marriage  is  exemplified  in  the  final  scene  when  Emanuele  demands  that  
Antonietta  comes  to  bed  so  that  they  can  conceive  another  child,  ‘a  little  
Adolf’  as  he  puts  it.    
  
When  Antonietta  refuses  to  obey  her  husband’s  orders,  it  becomes  clear  that  
what  she  has  gained  that  day  is  a  sense  of  self-­reliance,  as  she  walks  away  
from  him  to  read  the  book  Gabriele  gave  her.  At  the  end  of  the  ‘special  day’,  
guards  come  to  take  Gabriele  away  and  Antonietta  observes  this  from  her  
window.  Whatever  happens  to  Gabriele  and  Antonietta  following  this  day  is  
unknown,  but  what  is  clear  is  that  their  relationship  has  been  mutually  
educative.  Antonietta  comes  to  realise  that  she  is  more  than  just  a  wife  and  
a  mother,  that  she  is  able  to  negotiate  her  identity  and  express  her  voice  in  
her  own  terms;;  Gabriele  learns  that  not  all  fascists  are  the  same,  a  comment  
he  makes  to  Antonietta  herself.      
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That  several  conversations  between  the  principal  pair  are  confrontational  –  
conversations  marked  by  genuine  encounter  –  is,  as  I  have  discussed  here,  
not  a  marker  of  their  distance  from  one  another,  but  rather  of  their  
developing  relationship  of  mutuality  and  reciprocity.  Not  only  do  Antonietta  
and  Gabriele  exemplify  genuine  dialogue,  with  some  engagement  in  
passionate  utterance,  but  they  also  encounter  one  another  in  a  meaningful  
and  educative  way.  To  encounter  another  (or  even  an  inanimate  object,  such  
as  a  tree  for  Buber)  in  its  etymological  sense  is  to  be  confronted  by  them,  as  
in  a  meeting  of  adversaries,  but  it  is  likewise  an  opportunity.  This  return  to  
the  etymology  of  ‘encounter’  reinforces  the  argument  pursued  here,  that  
what  happens  between  Antonietta  and  Gabriele  on  this  special  day  can  be  
aptly  described  as  an  encounter  in  its  richest  sense.    
  
The  ‘opportunity’  taken  up  by  Antonietta  and  Gabriele  is  that  of  coming  to  
know  the  ‘other’,  and  thereby  coming  to  know  and  understand  oneself  
further.  It  is  in  seizing  this  opportunity  that  both  parties  are  educated,  in  the  
perfectionist  sense,  with  their  encounter  prompting  the  shift  from  ‘self-­
obscurity’  to  ‘self-­transcendence’  that  is  characteristic  of  the  movement  of  
the  self  towards  conversion  and  transformation  (Saito,  2012,  p.181).  Thus,  
the  relationship  that  develops  between  Antonietta  and  Gabriele  is  mutually  
educative,  encompassing  a  concern  for  what  it  is  to  live  a  moral  life  and  what  
it  means  to  be  morally  answerable  to,  and  accountable  for,  oneself.  The  
question  of  morality  in  Emersonian  moral  perfectionism  is  not  that  which  
could  be  settled  by  appeals  to  a  deontological  ethics,  but  rather  it  ‘involves  
one’s  participation  in  “a  city  of  words”,  the  language  community’  (Saito,  
2007b,  p.145).  As  Saito  explains,  ‘the  moral  force  of  perfectionism  hinges  
not  on  judgment  (as  in  conventional  moral  theories),  but  on  “every  word”’  
(2007b,  p.145).  
  
Gabriele’s  role  in  Antonietta’s  education  can  be  understood  as  that  of  ‘the  
Friend’,  a  person  who  intervenes  in  another’s  perfectionist  journey  and  
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guides  them  towards  their  next,  higher  self  (Cavell,  2005a).43  The  ‘Friend’  is  
not  necessarily  a  moral  authority;;  their  role  is  to  guide  and  steer,  rather  than  
control,  the  ‘other’  along  their  perfectionist  journey.  Cavell  describes  the  role  
of  ‘the  Friend’  in  perfectionism  when  he  writes  that  they  are  ‘a  figure  that  
may  occur  as  the  goal  of  the  journey  but  also  as  its  instigation  and  
accompaniment’  (2005a,  p.27).  What  we  note  about  the  role  of  the  ‘Friend’  in  
perfectionism  is  that  while  they  are  guiding  another  in  their  perfectionist  
quest,  the  ‘Friend’  may  be  educated  themselves.  That  such  an  encounter  
can  be  mutually  educative  is  exemplified  in  A  Special  Day  (1977).    
  
One’s  perfectionist  journey  is,  by  its  very  nature,  bound  up  with  others  
through  being  part  of  a  shared  language  community.  It  is  ‘the  Friend’  who  
encourages  and  challenges  them  to  move  on  from  their  current  self  towards  
conversion  (Cavell,  2005a,  p.27).  In  order  for  the  ‘Friend’  to  guide  the  ‘other’  
in  their  perfectionist  journey,  a  trusting  relationship  characterised  by  genuine  
dialogue  must  be  established,  and  this  will  be  tested  by  the  interlocutors  
engaging  in  a  passionate  utterance.  Even  if  an  ‘invitation  to  exchange’  is  
proffered  by  one  and  denied  by  the  other,  hence  even  when  a  passionate  
utterance  is  negated,  this  can  still  be  morally  educative  and  revelatory  for  the  
self  (Cavell,  2005b,  p.182).    
  
In  his  examination  of  different  modes  of  dialogue,  Buber  highlights  that  
genuine  dialogue  may  indeed  be  conflictual,  while  the  ‘great  community’  is  
not  one  in  which  everyone  agrees  on  every  issue  but  rather  consists  of  a  
space  in  which  differences  can  be  explored  and  ‘otherness  overcome…in  
living  mutuality’  (1957/1990,  p.102).  Thus,  a  perfectionist  education  of  the  
self,  as  exemplified  by  both  Antonietta  and  Gabriele,  must  be  founded  upon  
dialogue  and  mediated  by  mutually  trusting,  reciprocal  relationships.    
  
                                                                                        
43  As  I  discussed  in  Chapter  Three  (see  p.98),  the  ‘Friend’  who  guides  
another’s  perfectionist  journey  may  also  occupy  the  role  of  ‘voice  
coach’:  for  Paula  in  Gaslight,  this  figure  is  Mr.  Cameron,  and;;  for  
Charlotte  Vale  in  Now,  Voyager,  this  is  Dr.  Jaquith.    
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The  difference  between  relationships  premised  upon  exchange  and  those  of  
encounter  can  be  seen  by  the  extent  to  which  trust  is  evoked  between  
interlocutors;;  in  an  exchange,  there  is  no  need  for  reciprocity,  mutuality,  or  
an  affirmation  of  trust  as  the  relation  it  implies  is  purely  goal-­directed.  Yet  a  
relationship  of  encounter,  with  the  moral  confrontation  this  may  involve,  
relies  on  the  establishment  of  mutual  trust.  As  genuine  dialogue  ties  one  to  
others  in  the  language  community  through  ‘experiencing  the  other  side’  of  
one’s  relationships  (Buber,  1947/2002,  loc.158),  this  is  foundational  to  the  
perfectionist  movement  of  the  self  towards  its  next,  higher  self.    
  
I  now  return  to  the  opening  scenario,  and  to  a  consideration  of  relationships  
in  the  Higher  Education  sector,  in  order  to  explore  what  these  ideas  about  
reciprocity  and  encounter  mean  for  academic-­student  relationships.  I  will  
discuss  whether  relationships  premised  upon  exchange  can  be  educative,  
and  if  not,  how  genuine  dialogue  and  encounter  can  be  encouraged  between  
these  parties.    
  
5.7  Educative  Relationships  and  Dialogue:  Implications  for  
the  HE  Sector  
The  tutorials  policy  described  in  the  scenario  seems  to  be  a  particular  sort  of  
‘script’,  restricting  and  reducing  the  potential  dialogue  between  academics  
and  students  to  matters  of  academic  concern  alone,  particularly  assessment  
guidance.  While  focusing  on  assessments  and  degree  classifications  is  not  
necessarily  wrong,  my  concern  in  this  chapter  is  that  such  exchange  can  
begin  to  crowd  out  genuine  dialogue  and  encounter.  These  discourses  of  
accountability  and  student  satisfaction  can  subjectivate  both  academics  and  
students,  in  turn  distorting  academic-­student  relationships  and  reducing  
them  to  mere  service  transactions.    
  
Universities  are  arguably  subjected  to  such  pressures  on  a  larger  scale;;  they  
increasingly  focus  on  assessment  and  feedback,  developing  policies  to  
ensure  that  feedback  is  timely  and  consistent,  as  this  is  one  of  eight  main  
sections  on  the  NSS.  So  if  students  feel  that  they  are  not  given  enough  
guidance  in  preparing  for  assessments  and/or  receive  helpful  feedback  
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within  a  given  timescale  (typically  20  working  days),  then  this  could  influence  
their  satisfaction  ratings,  and  in  turn  the  university’s  league  table  position.    
  
The  proceduralisation  of  language  in  Higher  Education,  as  evidenced  by  talk  
of  ‘student-­consumer  charters’,  is  concomitant  with  a  kind  of  
proceduralisation  of  relationships.  If  students  are  positioned  as  ‘customers’  
or  ‘consumers’,  and  academics  are  seen  as  mere  ‘human  capital’  or  
‘facilitators’  of  learning,  this  will  almost  inevitably  reduce  their  relationship  to  
an  I-­It  exchange.  But  the  proceduralisation  of  language  and  relationships  in  
the  university  can  be  seen  as  just  one  symptom  of  a  wider  shift  in  the  sector  
towards  transparency,  public  accountability,  and  the  elimination  of  risk  in  
seeking  to  ensure  student  satisfaction.    
  
Conducting  one’s  seminars,  tutorials,  and  lectures  according  to  a  ‘script’  
risks  limiting  both  thought  and  conversation  to  mere  curriculum  content  
reduced  to  only  what  is  needed  to  pass  the  exam,  resulting  in  a  kind  of  
‘technical  dialogue’  or  even  ‘monologue  disguised  as  dialogue’  (Buber,  
1947/2002,  p.22).  Thus  the  reframing  of  academic-­student  relationships  as  
mere  ‘transactions’  or  ‘service  encounters’  has  far-­reaching  implications  for  
the  potential  dialogue  occurring  in  contemporary  universities  (Bianchi,  2013,  
p.398).    
  
To  avoid  the  proceduralisation  of  relationships  and  a  technicisation  of  
teaching  and  learning  –  where  learning  outcomes  are  not  only  the  ‘ends’  of  
one’s  education  but  its  driving  force  –  what  is  needed  is  an  openness  to  the  
other,  a  commitment  to  relationships  rather  than  mere  exchanges,  and  a  
space  for  genuine  dialogue  and  encounter  in  amongst  competing  curricular  
demands.  The  student  satisfaction  agenda  and  marketisation  of  Higher  
Education  have  led  to  a  sort  of  ‘buyer’s  market’  (Pells,  2017,  no  page),  which  
while  admirable  in  terms  of  widening  participation,  does  present  a  particular  
set  of  problems  in  the  classroom.  As  Richard  Smith  questions,  ‘how  is  the  
university  to  know  its  students  as  individuals  when  they  are  spilling  onto  the  
stairs  of  the  lecture-­theatre  and  sitting  on  the  windowsills  of  the  seminar  
room?’  (2005,  p.148).  With  increasing  staff-­student  ratios  across  the  sector,  
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it  seems  as  if  encounter  and  genuine  dialogue  may  be  more  difficult  to  come  
by  in  a  system  now  dominated  by  a  market/exchange  rationality.    
  
That  genuine  dialogue  has  been  stripped  away  in  the  HE  sector  is  a  direct  
result  of  opening  it  up  to  neoliberal  forces.  Such  dialogue  is  now  typically  
replaced  by  ‘technical  dialogue’,  if  not  even  ‘monologue  disguised  as  
dialogue’  (Buber,  1947/2002,  p.22),  and  this  reduces  the  potential  for  Higher  
Education  to  be  perfectionist  in  nature.  But  the  erosion  of  trust  in  favour  of  
accountability  also  negatively  impacts  on  the  education  offered  by  
universities,  as  teaching  and  learning  processes  are  progressively  being  
informed  by  economic  imperatives,  and  a  concern  for  students’  self-­
cultivation  is  increasingly  understood  only  in  terms  of  their  employability.  
While  treating  students  as  ‘customers’  is  now  almost  common  practice  in  
Higher  Education,  the  criticisms  I  outlined  above  are  pertinent  when  
‘customer  relations’  crosses  over  from  facilities  and  services  to  pedagogical  
relationships.    
  
That  the  reframing  of  academic-­student  relationships  in  terms  of  ‘customer  
relations’  is  reductive,  transactional,  and  instrumental  cannot  be  rectified  by  
appeals  to  the  ‘student-­as-­producer’  or  ‘co-­producer’  (Lambert,  2009;;  Carey,  
2013).  Admittedly,  shifting  the  student’s  role  from  that  of  ‘consumer’  to  
‘producer’  does  imply  more  active  involvement  in  their  own  learning,  thus  
correcting  for  ‘entitlement’  attitudes  (Finney  and  Finney,  2010).  But  the  
‘student-­as-­producer’  metaphor  is  still  constrained  by  the  language  and  
principles  of  the  market,  reinforcing  an  ‘us’  and  ‘them’  divide  between  
students  and  their  lecturers.    
  
5.7.1  ‘The  Great  Community’  
At  the  heart  of  what  is  problematic  about  the  transition  from  academic-­
student  relationships  to  mere  ‘customer  relations’  is  not  only  the  negation  of  
genuine  dialogue  and  the  emphasis  placed  on  exchange,  but  also  a  
movement  away  from  the  idea  of  the  university  as  a  ‘community’.  Higher  
Education  is  increasingly  seen  as  an  individualistic  endeavour;;  university  
marketing  slogans,  such  as  ‘Experience.  Yours  for  the  taking.’  and  ‘Discover  
Your  Future’,  certainly  align  with  this.  But  there  is  a  contradiction  to  be  
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resolved  here  between  on  the  one  hand,  devoting  attention  to  students  as  
individuals,  and  on  the  other,  the  massification  of  the  sector.    
  
While  technical  dialogue  may  have  a  legitimate  place  in  universities,  it  is  only  
through  genuine  dialogue  that  ‘the  great  community’  can  be  established  
(Buber,  1957/1990,  p.100).  To  envision  the  university  as  a  community  of  
scholars44  committed  to  the  pursuit  of  truth  and  knowledge  might  seem  
outmoded,  but  however  this  ‘community’  is  expressed,  surely  it  should  be  a  
central  aim  of  HE  that  students  are  prepared  to  live  in  communion  with  
others?  Returning  to  Buber’s  I-­It/I-­Thou  distinction  here,  the  ‘I’  is  never  
singular,  it  is  always  bound  in  relation  to  another  whether  this  is  an  ‘It’  or  a  
‘Thou’.  Thus,  building  relationships  of  mutuality,  reciprocity,  and  openness  
should  be  at  the  forefront  of  teaching  and  learning  in  the  contemporary  
university.    
  
As  Buber  describes  his  vision  of  ‘the  great  community’,  he  remarks  that  
‘what  is  called  for  is  not  “neutrality”  but  solidarity,  a  living  answering  for  one  
another…[in]  living  reciprocity…[and  a]  communal  recognition  of  the  
common  reality  and  communal  testing  of  common  responsibility’  (1957/1990,  
p.102).  Such  a  ‘living  answering  for  one  another’  and  being  called  upon  to  
respond  to  the  other  is  more  akin  to  an  encounter  than  an  exchange.  But  
rather  than  closing  down  potential  confrontation  and  encounter,  as  the  
current  proceduralisation  of  language  and  relationships  does,  university  
leaders  and  policy-­makers  instead  need  to  recognise  the  educative  potential  
of  genuine  dialogue  and  encounter.  Only  then  can  academics  reclaim  
                                                                                        
44  This  is  true  to  the  etymological  roots  of  ‘university’  meaning  a  ‘body  of  
persons  constituting  a  university’,  from  the  Anglo-­French  université  
(universality,  academic  community).  In  the  academic  sense,  
‘university’  is  a  shortening  of  universitas  magistrorum  et  scholarium  
meaning  a  ‘community  of  masters  and  scholars’.  For  more  details  
see:  https://www.etymonline.com/word/university#etymonline_v_4520  
[Accessed  18  January  2019].    
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seminars,  tutorials,  and  lectures  as  sites  of  encounter  where  difficult  topics  
may  be  broached,  and  even  more  difficult  conversations  had.45    
  
Encouraging  genuine  dialogue  in  academic-­student  relationships  is  not  a  
matter  of  learning  and  applying  ‘particular  techniques’  in  the  classroom,  but  
of  developing  an  ‘attunedness’  to  one’s  students  (Smith,  2003,  p.322).  What  
is  central  to  dialogue  and  encounter,  and  to  Higher  Education  itself,  is  the  
forging  of  rich  and  reciprocal  I-­Thou  relationships,  not  only  between  
academics  and  students,  but  also  between  students  and  their  subject  
content.    
  
Developing  I-­Thou  relationships  premised  on  encounter  (rather  than  I-­It  
exchange  relations)  in  Higher  Education  is  emblematic  of  a  perfectionist  
education  of  the  self.  As  Buber  writes  of  the  significance  of  the  I-­Thou  
relationship,  he  states  that  'I  become  through  my  relation  to  the  Thou;;  as  I  
become  I,  I  say  Thou.  All  real  living  is  meeting’  (1970,  p.9).  So  the  I-­Thou  
relationship  is  a  means,  as  well  as  a  marker,  of  education  in  its  richest  
sense.  It  is  only  through  encountering  the  other  as  a  ‘Thou’  that  I  can  
become  ‘I’.  Such  an  education  of  the  self  is  clearly  evident  in  A  Special  Day  
when  Gabriele  acts  as  the  critical  friend  guiding  Antonietta’s  perfectionist  
transformation;;  they  encounter  each  other  as  instances  of  ‘Thou’  and  this  
proves  mutually  educative.    
  
The  kind  of  dialogue  that  should  pervade  academic-­student  relationships  is  
one  in  which  the  interlocutors  are  more  concerned  with  each  other  than  with  
solving  a  particular  problem.  If  a  dialogue  is  goal-­directed  then  this  can  
reduce  it  to  the  merely  technical,  and  the  same  could  be  said  of  education  
when  in  the  grip  of  performativity  measures.  If  engaging  in  dialogue  with  
another  is  to  be  truly  educative  in  terms  of  coming  to  know  oneself  and  
others,  then  all  the  outcomes  cannot  be  known  in  advance,  and  the  
conversation  must  remain  resolutely  open  rather  than  being  closed  off.  
                                                                                        
45  See  Fulford  and  Mahon  (2018)  for  a  philosophical  defence  of  the  
traditional  lecture  as  a  space  which  allows  room  for  encounter  and  
genuine  dialogue.    
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Genuine  dialogue  may  be  encouraged  by  tackling  such  questions  as  ‘what  is  
a  university  for?’,  ‘what  do  I  want  to  learn  from  university?’,  and  ‘what  does  it  
mean  to  be  a  student  of  this  subject?’.    
  
Anne  Pirrie  gives  an  illuminating  example  of  academic-­student  dialogue  in  
Higher  Education  whereby  a  student  asks  their  lecturer  ‘is  it  supposed  to  be  
this  hard?’  A  first  response  might  be  to  counter  the  student’s  question  with  
‘an  invitation  to  knowledge’,  such  as  asking  the  student  whether  they  have  
read  the  module  handbook  (2018,  p.9).  On  one  level,  this  would  answer  the  
student’s  question,  as  appeals  to  programme  documentation  and  learning  
outcomes  constitute  a  simplification  of  what  students  need  to  learn  and  
understand.  But  on  another  level,  there  is  a  question  behind  this  apparently  
straightforward  question,  or  as  Pirrie  puts  it:  ‘there  is  a  wick  that  burns  in  this  
question.  It  is  a  question  that  cannot  be  easily  extinguished’  (2018,  p.8).    
  
What  the  student  means  in  asking  this  question  will  depend  on  their  
relationship  with  the  lecturer;;  are  they  simply  asking  for  conceptual  
clarification,  or  questioning  the  aims  and  purpose  of  HE  more  broadly?  Just  
as  one’s  answer  to  this  student’s  question  is  inextricably  linked  to  the  nature  
of  the  relationship  between  interlocutors  –  whether  this  is  a  mere  exchange  
or  an  encounter  –  so  too  will  the  lecturer’s  response  be  informed  by  the  
relative  pressures  of  the  student  satisfaction  agenda  and  calls  for  public  
accountability.  What  is  interesting  about  this  example  is  that  whether  the  
ongoing  dialogue  will  be  genuine,  technical,  or  even  monologic  is  not  known  
from  the  outset,  and  it  has  the  potential  to  be  any  of  these  types  depending  
on  how  the  interlocutors  engage  with  each  other.        
  
So  what  does  this  mean  for  academic-­student  relationships  and  the  
practices  of  teaching  and  learning  in  universities?  My  contention  is  that  
rather  than  seeking  to  remove  risk,  encounter,  and  ambiguity  from  the  
Higher  Education  curriculum,  academics  and  university  managers  should  
directly  engage  with  it.  While  there  may  be  a  set  of  ‘conditions’  –  as  set  out  
in  the  opening  scenario  –  for  how  best  to  conduct  oneself  in  relation  to  one’s  
students,  these  risk  being  dominated  by  exchange  and  informed  by  market  
imperatives  rather  than  encounter  and  a  commitment  to  genuine  dialogue.  
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Moving  away  from  current  policies  and  practices  in  much  of  the  Higher  
Education  sector  is,  perhaps,  difficult  to  imagine,  but  it  could  start  from  a  
reframing  of  ‘customer  relations’  in  terms  of  a  ‘relatedness’  between  
academics  and  their  students.    
  
5.7.2  Relationships  and  Relatedness  
The  ‘relatedness’  I  advocate  here  would  occur  not  only  between  each  
student  and  their  work  or  subject  content,  but  also  between  academics  and  
their  students  (Heidegger,  1968,  p.14).  The  conception  of  Higher  Education  
implied  by  this  idea  of  ‘relatedness’  is  that  of  an  apprenticeship,  where  one  
learns  a  body  of  knowledge  as  well  as  how  to  apply  it  to  real  contexts.  But  
this  kind  of  apprenticeship  is  less  about  initiation  into  a  particular  vocation,  
and  more  akin  to  what  Emerson  calls  ‘an  apprenticeship  to  the  truth’  which  is  
itself  a  marker  of  perfectionism  (1841/2000,  p.252).  The  kind  of  
apprenticeship  Emerson  refers  to  here  is  that  which  reflects  the  fact  that  we,  
as  human  beings,  are  always  working  towards  that  ‘unattained  but  attainable  
self’  and  continually  striving  towards  our  higher  selves.  The  self-­
transcendence  which  is  to  be  attained  through  perfectionism  is  not  
something  that  is  ‘won’  and  conquered  once  and  for  all,  but  rather  it  involves  
an  ongoing  perfection  of  the  self  that  necessitates  the  kind  of  ‘relatedness’  
referred  to  above.      
  
Heidegger  describes  what  it  is  to  learn  by  elucidating  the  example  of  a  
cabinetmaker’s  apprentice.  As  he  explains,  one  cannot  become  an  expert  
cabinetmaker  through  ‘mere  practice’,  and  nor  is  it  a  matter  of  ‘merely  
gather[ing]  knowledge  about  the  customary  forms  of  the  things  he  is  to  
build’.  Instead,  what  is  central  to  the  apprentice’s  learning  of  his  craft  is  his  
‘relatedness’  to  the  wood  (Heidegger,  1968,  p.14).  While  the  apprentice  
must  learn  a  certain  amount  of  relevant  information  and  how  to  use  his  tools,  
there  is  an  aspect  of  his  education  that  cannot  be  directly  taught  and  must  
be  experienced;;  this  is  an  understanding  of,  and  respect  for,  one’s  raw  
materials,  in  this  case  wood.    
  
Respecting  one’s  raw  materials,  or  in  education  we  might  talk  about  one’s  
subject  material,  can  only  be  underpinned  by  a  relationship  of  encounter.  
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Students  could  be  encouraged  to  encounter  their  curriculum  content  not  
merely  as  something  to  be  consumed  and  then  regurgitated  when  
assessments  occur,  but  as  something  in  which  they  have  a  stake.  Students  
can  be  confronted  by  their  subject  content  in  such  a  way  that  they  come  to  
recognise  what  Saito  refers  to  as  ‘the  foreign  within  the  native’,  and  this  is  
educative  in  the  perfectionist  sense  (2007a,  p.271).  Whether  students  
develop  such  a  ‘relatedness’  to  their  subject,  as  the  cabinetmaker’s  
apprentice  becomes  acquainted  with  wood  will  ‘depend  obviously  on  the  
presence  of  some  teacher  who  can  make  the  apprentice  comprehend’  
(Heidegger,  1968,  p.15).  The  teacher-­student  relationship  thus  forms  the  
foundation  for  a  ‘relatedness’  to  one’s  subject.    
  
Crucially  what  marks  out  any  particular  relationship  as  one  of  ‘relatedness’  
rather  than  a  mere  (customer)  ‘relation’  is  the  lack  of  instrumentalism.  The  
cabinetmaker’s  apprentice  does  not  apprehend,  come  to  know,  and  relate  to  
the  wood  as  a  means  to  some  extraneous  end,  but  developing  a  
‘relatedness’  is  educative  in  itself.  Relatedness  also  implies  an  ongoing  
negotiation  of  one’s  relationship  to  the  other,  whereas  in  talking  of  ‘customer  
relations’  there  is  always  a  finite  endpoint  to  be  reached  and  the  relationship  
is  typically  confined  to  mere  ‘service  encounters’  (Bianchi,  2013,  p.398).  
What  this  means  for  the  role  of  the  academic  or  teacher  is  that  encounter,  
dialogue,  and  relatedness  should  be  at  the  heart  of  their  teaching.  More  
important  than  the  specific  content  an  academic  is  putting  across  to  their  
students  is  the  relatedness  they  espouse  to  such  content,  and  how  students’  
understanding  of  this  is  mediated  by  dialogue.      
  
What  this  conception  of  ‘relatedness’  highlights  is  that  genuine  learning  must  
be  dialogic  and  relational,  while  what  one  encounters  will  depend  on  the  
particular  person  teaching  the  course.  Relatedness  is  by  its  very  nature,  as  
non-­instrumental,  an  exemplification  of  how  one  should  be  open  and  
responsive  to  the  other,  whether  this  is  another  person  or  a  body  of  
knowledge.  Relatedness  is  iterative  rather  than  finite  and  may  need  to  be  
negotiated  between  the  parties  involved;;  it  must  also  be  responsive  to  the  
other  as  their  participation  in  a  relationship  is  already  implied.  ‘I’  cannot  
relate  to  ‘You’  unless  you  are  in  a  relationship  with  me,  whatever  this  
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consists  in.  Openness  and  reciprocity,  then,  are  at  the  heart  of  an  edifying  
and  transformative  education,  as  is  genuine  dialogue,  and  the  extent  of  this  
depends  upon  relatedness.    
  
Heidegger  describes  the  teacher-­student  relationship  as  a  difficult  one  to  
master,  with  teachers  themselves  often  in  a  position  of  having  to  learn,  and  
chiefly  what  they  must  learn  is  how  to  ‘let  learn’  (1968,  p.15).  Students  must  
surely  learn  how  to  learn  and  what  learning  consists  in,  rather  than  equating  
learning  with  the  acquisition  of  information.  But  teachers  and  academics  
must  also  ‘learn’  how  to  let  their  students  learn;;  this  can  only  be  achieved  
through  coming  to  know  their  students  as  individuals  and  through  a  
developing  relatedness  with/to  them.  A  pedagogical  relationship  of  ‘letting-­
learn’  implies  a  ‘relatedness’  and  reciprocity  whereby  ‘education’  is  a  mutual  
endeavour,  rather  than  being  a  ready-­made  ‘product’  that  students  can  buy  
and  then  exchange  in  the  labour  market  (Heidegger,  1968,  pp.14-­15).    
  
As  I  have  argued,  there  is  value  in  recognising  the  educative  force  of  
encountering  another,  as  well  as  the  usefulness  of  dealing  with  risk  and  
confrontation  in  dialogue.  Whether  genuine  dialogue  will  occur  depends  on  
the  ‘relatedness’  of  the  interlocutors  and  while  the  encounter  may  be  
fleeting,  what  marks  out  an  interaction  as  genuine  dialogue  is  openness  to  
the  other,  in  essence,  that  one  is  able  to  apprehend  the  other  in  their  
complete  singularity  (Buber,  1947/2002;;  Kramer,  2003).    
  
A  serious  challenge  to  reframing  academic-­student  relationships  in  terms  of  
‘letting-­learn’  and  ‘relatedness’  (Heidegger,  1968,  pp.14-­15)  is  that  it  would  
necessitate  breaking  down  the  traditional  positioning  of  the  academic  as  
‘expert’  or  ‘sage  on  the  stage’  (Mark,  2013,  p.6),  as  academics  themselves  
could  also  be  seen  as  apprentices  on  a  perfectionist  quest  toward  self-­
transformation.  But  such  learning  is  foundational  to  the  I-­Thou  relationship,  
whereby  I  can  only  become  ‘I’  through  being  able  to  say  ‘You’  or  ‘Thou’  to  
another  (Buber,  1970).    
  
While  the  provision  of  university  guidelines,  charters,  and  even  tutorial  
policies  such  as  those  outlined  in  the  opening  scenario  may  seem  
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unavoidable  as  academic-­student  relationships  are  increasingly  reframed  as  
‘customer  relations’,  they  are  not  to  be  accepted  uncritically.  As  Cavell  
highlights  in  his  discussion  of  passionate  utterance,  to  genuinely  encounter  
the  other  relies  on  a  distinct  lack  of  procedure.  For  Cavell,  the  establishment  
and  testing  out  of  a  relationship  between  interlocutors  is  more  important  than  
the  execution  of  a  procedure.    
  
Relatedness,  or  what  Smith  refers  to  as  an  ‘attunedness’  to  one’s  students  
(2003,  p.322),  is  not  something  that  can  be  planned  and  implemented  
according  to  some  institutional  strategy;;  it  can  only  be  realised  through  being  
open  and  responsive  to  the  other.  Rather  than  thinking  of  academics  as  
‘service  providers’  responsible  for  passing  on  certain  kinds  of  knowledge  to  
their  ‘student-­consumers’,  if  teaching  is  a  process  of  ‘letting-­learn’,  then  both  
parties  can  be  thought  of  as  apprentices  (to  a  craft,  to  the  truth).    
  
Relationships  are  often  difficult  to  initiate,  nurture,  and  navigate,  and  none  
more  so  than  that  between  academics  and  their  students.  But  a  university  
experience  must  allow  room  for  risk  and  encounter  in  order  to  attain  ‘the  
great  community’  (Buber,  1957/1990,  p.100).  Among  all  the  competing  
demands  influencing  teaching  and  learning  in  Higher  Education,  there  is  a  
need  for  encounter,  as  it  is  in  moments  of  genuine  dialogue  between  
academics  and  students  that  a  perfectionist  education  may  be  enacted.  In  a  
time  when  the  benefits  of  a  Higher  Education  are  typically  seen  in  
individualist,  marketised  terms,  we  return  again  to  Cavell’s  words  that  ‘we  
are  educations  for  one  another’  (1990,  p.31).    
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Part  III  
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Chapter  6  
Conclusions  and  Implications  for  the  HE  Sector  
6.1  What’s  Wrong  with  Student  Satisfaction?  
In  this  thesis,  I  have  provided  a  philosophical  consideration  of  ‘satisfaction’  
through  exploring  three  iterations  of  this  concept:  voice,  settlement,  and  
customer  relations.  As  I  have  argued  in  previous  chapters,  many  of  the  
initiatives  associated  with  student  satisfaction  are  neither  good  nor  bad  per  
se;;  what  is  significant  is  how  they  are  implemented,  and  which  aspects  of  
‘the  student  experience’  are  thereby  emphasised.    
  
Taking  academic-­student  relationships  as  an  example,  it  is  almost  inevitable  
that  students  are  now  considered,  and  related  to,  as  ‘customers’  or  
‘consumers’  of  Higher  Education.  While  in  some  areas  of  student  life,  such  
as  library  facilities  and  catering,  this  ‘customerisation’  is  unproblematic  
(Love,  2008,  p.18),  it  is  when  this  shift  in  language  and  relationships  moves  
into  the  realm  of  teaching  and  learning  that  it  can  constitute  a  negation  of  
genuine  dialogue,  and  reinforce  instrumentalised  ways  of  thinking  about  
Higher  Education.    
  
The  issue  at  stake  here  is  not  that  student  satisfaction  and  its  associated  
marketised  discourses  exist  in  the  HE  sector;;  that  is  something  well-­
established.  But  it  is  rather  that  their  infiltration  into  learning,  teaching,  and  
assessment  has  led  to  increased  accountability  pressures  and  performativity  
measures.  Academics  are  now,  more  than  ever  before,  required  to  publicly  
account  for  their  activities,  with  research  outputs  subject  to  REF  reviews,  
and  teaching  to  be  evaluated  via  the  TEF.  While  students  are  paying  
significant  sums  of  money  for  their  Higher  Education  and  are  thus  entitled  to  
an  excellent  ‘student  experience’,  my  concern  is  that  the  drive  to  create  what  
Roberts  terms  ‘pleasurable  and  measurable’  service  encounters  distorts  
what  is  most  valuable  about  Higher  Education  (2013,  as  cited  by  Gibbs,  
2017,  p.152):  its  edifying  potential.    
  
Problems  arise,  then,  when  student  satisfaction  is  taken  to  be  one  of  the  
primary  aims  of  Higher  Education.  As  the  concept  has  been  increasingly  
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reified  and  codified,  this  seems  to  imply  a  legitimacy  in  its  measurement.  But  
the  questions  I  have  raised  in  this  thesis  are  directed  towards  such  
‘legitimacy’.  I  have  questioned  the  value  of  measuring  satisfaction,  have  
sought  to  clarify  the  concept,  and  have  explored  the  justifications  given  for  
its  dominance  in  the  HE  sector.  In  a  rather  reverse  logic,  it  seems  as  if  
policy-­makers  and  universities  are  valuing  what  we  can  and  do  measure,  
rather  than  measuring  what  is  considered  valuable.    
  
There  is  also  a  question  of  fitness  for  purpose  surrounding  the  use  of  
student  satisfaction  measures,  as  these  surveys  are  used  as  a  broad-­brush  
indicator  of  ‘quality’,  despite  their  internal  inaccuracies  and  the  lack  of  a  
consistent  definition  of  ‘satisfaction’  in  the  scholarly  or  policy  literature.  
These  practical  difficulties  with  accurately  measuring  satisfaction  are  often  
cited  in  the  current  literature  base,  but  what  this  thesis  adds  is  a  critical  
reflection  on  the  ways  in  which  aiming  for  student  satisfaction  is  problematic  
in  and  of  itself.  Aiming  for,  and  directing  one’s  teaching  towards  ensuring,  
student  satisfaction  corrodes  the  transformative  nature  of  Higher  Education,  
and  instead  reinforces  the  rather  zealous  espousing  of  market  imperatives.            
            
As  discussed  earlier  in  the  thesis,  the  etymology  of  satisfaction  is  revealing,  
highlighting  its  link  with  an  economic  kind  of  settlement  and  the  meeting  of  
expectations.  While  a  certain  degree  of  settlement  is  required  –  in  relation  to,  
for  example,  induction  programmes  and  introductions  to  library  facilities  –  if  a  
university  is  overly-­focused  on  settling  students  down  in  order  that  they  
‘settle  up’,  then  teaching  and  learning  in  universities  may  be  reduced  to  little  
more  than  a  business  transaction.  The  premise  underlying  the  current  
emphases  on  accountability  and  performativity  (chiefly  that  they  increase  
efficiency  and  quality)  in  no  way  guarantees  a  ‘better’  education,  even  if  it  is  
one  with  assured  ‘value  for  money’  (Rolfe,  2002).  Economic  imperatives  
clash  with  educational  ideals,  risking  a  commodified  and  instrumentalised  
Higher  Education.    
  
The  collection  of  student  voice  across  the  Higher  Education  sector  is  just  
one  example  of  how  market  pressures  are  made  manifest,  with  universities  
working  to  ensure  their  economic  competitiveness  in  an  increasingly  
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crowded  market.  The  collection  of  ‘voice’,  or  more  often  than  not,  ‘feedback’  
is  linked  to  a  kind  of  pre-­emptive  quality  assurance.  While  the  NSS  is  the  
survey  that  is  most  reported  and  utilised  for  accountability,  the  timing  of  this  
and  other  surveys  is  just  one  criticism  among  many  that  could  be  levelled  at  
these  initiatives.  
  
As  discussed  in  Chapter  Three,  attempts  to  capture  the  student  voice  are  
typically  tokenistic  and  transactional,  while  the  subsequent  use  of  such  
feedback  may  be  undemocratic,  granting  a  ‘voice’  to  those  who  can  shout  
the  loudest,  and  side-­lining  other  students.  In  moving  away  from  mere  
feedback  toward  a  richer  conception  of  voice  in  the  Cavellian  sense,  both  
universities  and  policy-­makers  would  need  to  acknowledge  that  student  
voice  initiatives  are  often  limited  in  scope.  The  issues  associated  with  these  
measures  arise  due  to  the  very  fact  that  they  are  ‘measures’  at  all,  while  the  
impulse  to  ‘collect’  student  voice  can  in  fact  render  students  voiceless,  
passive  consumers.        
  
The  final  iteration  of  student  satisfaction  that  was  explored  in  Part  II  of  the  
thesis  was  customer  relations,  and  as  I  argued  in  Chapter  Five,  this  
language  of  ‘customerisation’  can  be  totalising  (Love,  2008,  p.18),  reducing  
academic-­student  relationships  to  mere  ‘service  encounters’  (Bianchi,  2013,  
p.398).  With  a  concerning  rise  in  formal  student  complaints  (Fulford  and  
Skea,  forthcoming)  and  student  co-­consumer  learner  charters  being  
implemented  across  UK  universities,  it  is  almost  as  if  the  contractual  crowds  
out  the  relational  aspects  of  a  Higher  Education.  Academic-­student  
relationships,  or  exchanges,  are  now  commonly  seen  as  means  to  other  
ends;;  engaging  with  one’s  lecturers  can  simply  be  considered  a  means  to  
obtaining  one’s  degree  certificate,  and  engaging  with  one’s  students  as  
‘customers’  or  ‘consumers’  is  de  rigeur.    
  
Institutions  are  concerned  with  maintaining  good  academic-­student  
relationships  as  a  way  of  securing  from  their  students  ‘repeat  business’,  
excellent  feedback  on  important  surveys,  and/or  alumni  contributions.  The  
scenario  proffered  in  Chapter  Five  seems  strangely  imaginable  in  the  current  
HE  climate,  and  the  one  way  to  encourage  genuine  dialogue  between  
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academics  and  their  students  might  be  to  resist  the  language  of  service  
providers  and  student-­consumers.  To  re-­state  the  primary  aim  of  this  thesis,  
I  have  sought  throughout  to  re-­envision  and  translate  current  conceptions  of  
‘student  satisfaction’,  in  turn  offering  a  perfectionist,  dialogic  vision  of  Higher  
Education  that  moves  some  way  towards  a  more  emancipatory,  
(educationally)  unsettling,  and  edifying  student  experience.    
        
6.2  How  to  go  on  
In  this  section,  I  will  suggest  how  we  might  ‘go  on’  (Cavell,  1979a,  p.122)  
from  here  given  the  concerns  raised.46  But  in  doing  this,  I  also  recognise  that  
student  satisfaction  and  its  associated  discourses  cannot  simply  be  
eradicated  from  the  HE  sector.  Supposing  that  student  satisfaction  
measures  could  be  removed  entirely  from  universities,  this  would  be  
problematic  on  many  levels.  Firstly,  it  would  involve  re-­addressing  market  
values  which  are  now  ingrained  throughout  the  Higher  Education  sector.  
This  would  also  involve  going  against  the  expectations  of  policy-­makers,  and  
in  turn,  students  themselves.  Claims  as  to  the  efficiency  and  quality  of  a  
marketised  HE  would  need  to  be  shown  as  inaccurate,  whilst  policy  
imperatives  would  need  to  re-­emphasise  the  educational,  rather  than  the  
economic,  value  of  Higher  Education.  Finally,  seeking  to  eliminate  student  
satisfaction  from  the  HE  sector  could  be  seen  as  overly  idealistic  or  even  
utopian,  with  one  potential  criticism  being  that  this  implies  harking  back  to  
some  ‘golden  age’  in  universities’  history.    
  
Bearing  all  of  these  concerns  in  mind  then,  it  would  be  both  unfeasible  and  
undesirable  to  completely  abolish  the  student  satisfaction  agenda.  In  a  
similar  vein,  it  would  be  nonsensical  to  argue  for  the  value  of  
                                                                                        
46  The  phrase  ‘how  to  go  on’  is  taken  from  Wittgenstein’s  Philosophical  
Investigations  (1963),  where  it  is  used  to  describe  how  children  are  
initiated  into  language.  First,  they  learn  how  to  use  words  and  what  
the  implicit  criteria  governing  our  language-­games  are  by  mimicking  
and  copying  others.  Next,  children  learning  a  language  must  learn  
precisely  ‘how  to  go  on’,  that  is,  how  to  apply  their  understanding  of  
language  in  new  and  different  contexts.  This,  Cavell  terms  ‘the  appeal  
to  projective  imagination’  (1979a,  p.145).  
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‘dissatisfaction’,  even  in  an  ontological  sense,  due  to  the  strong  pejorative  
connotations  associated  with  this  term.  Instead  it  seems  that  a  way  forward  
here  rests  on  the  following  question:  if  we  cannot  do  away  with  student  
satisfaction  entirely,  then  how  can  we  live  and  work  productively  with  it?    
  
Given  that  student  satisfaction  cannot  be  ‘done  away  with’,  my  aim  in  this  
chapter  is  rather  to  seek  to  ‘overcome’  the  concept,  meaning  that  it  ‘will  be  
surmounted  from  within  itself,  in  such  a  way  as  to  be  restored  to  and  fulfilled  
in  its  own  essence’  (Lovitt,  1977,  p.xxxv).  Heidegger  describes  this  
overcoming  as  his  response  to  the  dominance  of  technology,  and  as  I  will  
explore  further  below,  the  same  criticisms  regarding  the  covering-­over  of  
Being  could  be  levelled  at  neoliberalism  itself,  of  which  the  obsession  with  
student  satisfaction  is  but  an  unfortunate  symptom.    
  
So  how  could  student  satisfaction  be  ‘overcome’?  I  will  now  briefly  discuss  
whether  different  iterations  of  ‘satisfaction’  in  other  languages  could  provide  
useful  insights.  ‘Satisfaction’  and  its  analogues  in  French  –  la  satisfaction,  le  
règlement,  le  contentement,  la  réparation,  and  l’assouvissement  –  are  all  
linked  to  ideas  of  settling,  payment,  the  fulfilment  of  needs,  contentment,  and  
appeasement.  Similarly  the  Japanese  word  for  satisfaction,  ‘Manzoku’,  is  
related  to  notions  of  fulfilment,  happiness,  beatitude,  peace,  and  
gratification.  The  Spanish  la  satisfacción,  meaning  a  gratification  and  
indulgence  as  well  as  redress,  also  implies  an  economic  kind  of  settlement.    
  
Whichever  linguistic  variant  of  ‘satisfaction’  one  refers  to,  they  all  appear  to  
converge  and  invoke  the  same  ideas  of  satiation,  contentment,  settling,  
indulgence,  and  reparation.  It  seems  as  if  we  have  now  reached  bedrock,  
and  our  spade  is  turned  (Wittgenstein,  1963).  As  there  seems  to  be  no  
equivalent  term  in  another  language  suited  to  the  discussion  here,  I  will  now  
offer  a  re-­framing  of  ‘satisfaction’  and  will  explore  whether  this  concept  can  
be  understood  other  than  in  economic  terms.  In  what  follows,  I  will  offer  up  a  
richer  conception  of  student  satisfaction  which  differs  temporally,  relationally,  
and  dialogically  from  prevailing  understandings  of  the  term.        
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6.3  Towards  a  Different  Kind  of  ‘Satisfaction’  
The  central  issue  to  be  addressed  here  is  not  simply  that  student  satisfaction  
measures  are  administered  in  Higher  Education,  but  that  ‘satisfaction’  has  
been  reified  and  technicised  in  such  a  way  that  its  evaluation  is  almost  
something  that  is  done  ‘to’  students  rather  than  coming  ‘from’  them.  What  it  
means  to  be  ‘satisfied’  with  one’s  education  is  often  steeped  in  a  marketised  
language,  with  satisfaction  being  equated  to  ‘value  for  money’,  or  a  return  on  
one’s  investment  in  the  labour  market.  Admittedly,  the  economic  
connotations  associated  with  student  satisfaction  cannot  be  ignored  or  
eliminated,  but  I  wish  to  draw  attention  to  the  ontological,  ethical,  and  
relational  aspects  of  ‘satisfaction’  that  have  not  been  previously  considered.    
  
To  explore  further  the  educative  possibilities  of  student  satisfaction,  I  will  
make  a  distinction  between  two  different,  yet  inseparable,  modes  of  
satisfaction:  a  ‘now-­’  or  ‘attained’  satisfaction,  and  a  ‘not-­yet-­’  or  ‘to-­be-­
attained’  satisfaction.  As  I  will  explain  in  greater  detail  in  what  follows,  
current  conceptions  of  ‘satisfaction’  in  HE  are,  as  I  see  it,  limited  by  an  
emphasis  on  what  is  easily  calculable  and  measurable  in  one’s  experience;;  
this  in  turn  reduces  one’s  Higher  Education  to  a  series  of  mere  ‘service  
encounters’  and  business  transactions  (Bianchi,  2013,  p.398).  While  I  am  
making  a  distinction  between  these  two  forms  of  satisfaction,  they  are  not  
mutually  exclusive,  but  should  rather  be  considered  as  on  a  continuum  
where  each  person  may  experience  one  or  the  other  to  varying  degrees.    
  
This  conception  of  a  ‘not-­yet-­’  satisfaction  is  entirely  new,  thus  constituting  
part  of  the  originality  of  this  thesis,  and  its  contribution  to  the  current  
literature.  In  what  follows,  I  will  discuss  the  features  that  mark  out  a  now-­
satisfaction  with  illustrative  examples  taken  from  film,  before  moving  on  to  an  
explanation  of  a  not-­yet-­satisfaction.  Each  form  of  satisfaction  will  be  
explained  relative  to  their  characteristic  modes  of  thought,  their  
ontic/ontological  character,  epistemology,  the  modes  of  dialogue  and  
relationships  marking  them  out,  and  the  perfectibility  of  each  kind  of  
satisfaction.  An  illustrative  table  is  provided  below,  and  each  concept  will  be  
explained  further  in  the  next  section.    
  




Mode  of  thought  








Ontology   Ontic   Ontological  
Epistemology   Knowing  as  a  process  
of  consumption  
Knowing  as  a  way  of  
living  
Modes  of  dialogue   Technical  dialogue  
and/or  monologue  
Genuine  dialogue  
Relationships   I-­It   I-­Thou  
Perfectibility   Perfectible   Perfectionist  
  
Table  1:  Features  of  the  ‘now-­’  and  ‘not-­yet-­’  forms  of  satisfaction.  
  
6.4  A  now-­satisfaction  
A  central  feature  that  underpins  both  ‘now-­’  and  ‘not-­yet-­’  forms  of  
satisfaction  are  the  characteristic  modes  of  thought  aligning  with  each.  Here  
I  will  draw  on  Heidegger’s  distinction  between  calculative  and  meditative  
thought  to  assert  that  aiming  towards  certain  kinds  of  satisfaction  influences  
our  mode  of  thinking,  with  a  now  or  ‘attained’  satisfaction  typically  confined  
to  the  realm  of  calculative  thought.  In  his  Discourse  on  Thinking  (1966),  
Heidegger  distinguishes  what  he  terms  ‘calculative’  from  ‘meditative’  
thinking.  Calculative  thought  is  that  which  ‘computes’,  evaluating  the  costs  
and  benefits  of  particular  actions,  and  calculating  what  is  most  economical  
and  beneficial  for  oneself.  It  is  a  mode  of  thinking  which  ‘computes  ever  new,  
ever  more  promising  and  at  the  same  time  more  economical  possibilities’  
(Heidegger,  1966,  p.46).    
  
Calculative  thought  is  the  mode  of  thinking  most  associated  with  technology.  
As  Williams  writes,  it  is  ‘a  form  of  thinking  that  seeks  to  turn  what  is  thought  
about  into  an  object  for  representation  and  categorisation’  (2016,  p.47).  
Thus,  calculative  thought  by  its  very  nature  objectifies  all  aspects  of  
experience  and  reduces  subjects  to  objects,  and  objects  are  considered  only  
in  terms  of  their  use  value.  The  kind  of  now-­satisfaction  that  currently  
pervades  Higher  Education  is  characterised  by  such  calculative  thinking,  
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whereby  questions  of  economic  value  and  usefulness  tend  to  override  
ontological  concerns.    
  
Discourses  around  ‘student  satisfaction’,  ‘value  for  money’,  and  seeking  a  
‘return’  on  one’s  investment  in  HE  are  all  emblematic  of  this  kind  of  
calculative  thinking.  Calculative  thought  can  be  useful  in  certain  situations  
and  fields  of  enquiry,  as  well  as  in  educational  contexts,  for  example,  in  
‘calculating’  how  best  to  support  a  student  with  Special  Educational  Needs  
and/or  Disabilities  (SEND).  But  my  concern  here  is  that  such  a  technicisation  
and  formalisation  of  thinking  may  crowd  out  other  ways  of  thinking  about,  
and  approaching,  curriculum  content  and  those  delivering  it  to  students.  It  
seems  as  if  marketisation  and  calculation  go  hand  in  hand;;  in  Higher  
Education,  this  has  meant  that  concerns  over  employability  and  market  
position  are  now  at  the  forefront  of  debates  in  the  sector.  But  as  Heidegger  
writes,  calculative  thinking  is  just  one  mode  of  thought  and  while  useful  for  
computing,  it  ‘races  from  one  prospect  to  the  next.  Calculative  thinking  never  
stops,  never  collects  itself’  (1966,  p.46).    
  
A  now-­satisfaction  aligns  with  this  calculative  way  of  thinking  as  the  search  
for  this  kind  of  satisfaction  is  itself  calculative,  incorporating  calculations  of  
utility  as  one  works  towards  attaining  a  particular  outcome,  such  as  graduate  
employability.  The  rationale  behind  neoliberal  policy  tends  towards  the  
calculative,  assuming  that  customers  (or  students  in  Higher  Education)  are  
focused  on  how  they  can  secure  the  best  deal  for  themselves,  and  that  this  
underpins  any  and  all  decisions  in  such  a  competitive  economy.  This  
emphasis  on  what  is  calculative  not  only  influences  the  thinking  
characteristic  of  a  now-­satisfaction,  but  also  how  one  may  form  relationships  
with  others.  
  
As  discussed  in  Chapter  Five,  Buber’s  distinction  between  the  two  principal  
word-­pairs,  the  I-­It  and  I-­Thou,  rests  on  the  extent  to  which  the  other  is  
experienced  in  their  personal  uniqueness  (I-­Thou),  or  whether  they  are  seen  
only  as  a  means  to  an  end  (I-­It).  A  now-­satisfaction  exemplifies  the  
marketised  I-­It  relation.  By  virtue  of  its  economic  and  calculative  rationality,  a  
now-­satisfaction  is  more  individualised,  and  so  is  confined  to  the  realm  of  I-­It  
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subject-­object  experiences.  If  ‘I’  am  focused  on  attaining  a  now-­satisfaction,  
the  other  never  becomes  real  to  me,  that  is,  I  can  never  experience  them  in  
their  complete  singularity  (Buber,  1947/2002);;  instead,  my  understanding  of  
the  other  is  shaped  by  my  own  means-­ends  calculation  of  benefit.  The  
current  emphasis  placed  on  achieving  and  ensuring  student  satisfaction  in  
Higher  Education  is  confined  to  this  kind  of  now-­satisfaction,  where  
relationships  (with  one’s  university,  one’s  lecturers,  and  even  the  subject  
material)  are  seen  as  means  to  other  ends.  Genuine  dialogue  and  I-­Thou  
relationships  are  not  entirely  negated  by  aiming  for  a  now-­satisfaction,  but  
attaining  these  richer  relations  will  depend  on  one’s  capacity  to  move  
beyond  the  realm  of  exchange  that  commands  teaching  and  learning  in  the  
contemporary  university.        
  
The  I-­It/I-­Thou  distinction  is  inextricably  tied  to  dialogue,  with  different  forms  
of  dialogue  occurring  in  these  relationships.  A  now-­satisfaction  is  more  likely  
to  be  constituted  by  technical  dialogue  and/or  monologue,  whilst  being  
confined  to  mere  I-­It  relations  as  this  kind  of  satisfaction  is  goal-­directed,  and  
thus  the  relationships  involved  are  based  upon  exchange.  A  now-­
satisfaction,  in  its  emphasis  on  the  ‘now’  and  on  what  is  easily  calculable,  
implies  forms  of  settling  up  and  down  as  a  way  of  attaining  one’s  
satisfaction.  In  the  scenario  that  opened  Chapter  Four,  not  only  is  there  a  
kind  of  un-­educative  settlement  apparent  there,  but  the  conversations  
between  an  academic  and  their  students  are  limited  to  technical  dialogue;;  
the  exchange  is  limited  to  the  information  required  to  pass  an  assignment.    
  
A  now-­satisfaction  is  experienced  when  one’s  expectations  are  met.  
Perhaps  of  concern  is  the  fact  that  academics  are  almost  contractually  
obliged  to  provide  this  kind  of  short-­term  meeting  of  expectations.  That  
students’  learning  is  increasingly  personalised  does  not  equate  to  genuinely  
dialogic,  and  therefore  ‘personal’,  academic-­student  relationships.  What  
distinguishes  genuine  dialogue  from  other  modes  of  dialogue  is  what  Buber  
refers  to  as  ‘experiencing  the  other  side’  of  the  relationship  (1947/2002,  
loc.158),  and  this  ties  the  interlocutors  together  into  a  community.  But  such  
an  experiencing  of  the  other  as  a  ‘Thou’  is  typically  limited  in  the  drive  to  
ensure  a  now-­satisfaction,  as  individual  student-­consumers  are  encouraged  
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to  calculate  how  they  can  get  the  most  benefit  from  their  Higher  Education,  
and  with  increasing  competition  and  rising  graduate  unemployment  this  may  
even  be  to  the  detriment  of  the  academic  ‘community’.    
  
In  any  relationship  between  people,  whether  the  other  is  considered  an  ‘It’  or  
a  ‘Thou’,  there  is  always  an  invocation  of  an  ‘I’  as  it  cannot  be  separated  out  
from  these  word-­pairs  (Buber,  1970).  Considering  who  or  what  this  ‘I’  
consists  in  is  an  ontological  question,  although  the  ontological  difference  is  
also  a  distinguishing  feature  of  ‘now-­’  and  ‘not-­yet-­’  forms  of  satisfaction.  In  
his  seminal  work  Being  and  Time,  Heidegger  makes  an  important  distinction  
between  two  different  ways  of  understanding  and  experiencing  the  world  and  
others  in  it:  one  is  ontic,  and  the  other  ontological.  Ontic  knowledge  consists  
in  the  objective  characteristics  of  beings,  whereas  ontological  knowledge  
can  only  be  gleaned  through  investigating  what  is  foundational  to  Being  and  
what  makes  up  its  essence.    
  
While  the  ontic  and  ontological  are  separate  and  distinct,  the  barrier  between  
the  two  is  not  impermeable,  though  the  move  from  one  to  the  other  is  a  
complex  process  involving  both  the  concealment  and  unconcealment  of  
Being.  This  ontological  difference  could  also  be  described  in  terms  of  Erich  
Fromm’s  distinction  between  ‘being’  and  ‘having’  (1997/2013,  pp.59-­86).  In  
the  context  of  HE,  this  means  that  students  ‘seek  to  “have  a  degree”  [ontic]  
rather  than  “be  learners”  [ontological]’  (Molesworth  et  al.,  2009,  p.277,  
original  emphasis).  A  now-­satisfaction,  as  it  involves  the  pursuit  of  material  
goods  first  and  foremost,  is  confined  to  the  realm  of  the  ontic.  To  attain  a  
now-­satisfaction  is  to  have  one’s  expectations  met,  and  this  implies  a  
consumptive  relation  to  knowledge.    
  
As  a  now-­satisfaction  cannot  move  beyond  ontic  knowledge,  this  means  that  
what  it  is  to  be  and  particularly  to  be  a  case  of  Dasein,  is  not  meaningfully  
discussed  or  considered.  A  now-­satisfaction,  as  the  name  suggests,  is  
overly-­focused  on  everyday  concerns  and  expectations;;  this  exemplifies  
Dasein’s  condition  of  fallenness  (Verfallensein).  As  discussed  in  Chapter  
Three,  fallenness  refers  to  the  state  of  Dasein’s  everyday  inauthenticity;;  this  
is  the  fact  that  human  beings  often  do  not  face  up  to  the  question  of  Being.  
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Our  absorption  into  everyday  worldly  concerns,  for  example,  the  need  for  a  
graduate-­level  job  upon  completion  of  one’s  Higher  Education,  is  not  a  moral  
or  ethical  failing  by  any  means,  but  it  does  limit  both  thought  and  action  to  
what  is  merely  ontic.    
  
In  discussing  the  ontological  difference,  Heidegger  does  not  denigrate  ontic  
knowledge,  but  instead  seeks  to  draw  attention  to  the  perils  of  interpreting  
the  world  in  this  way  alone.  As  I  argue  here,  a  primary  danger  of  aiming  
towards  a  now-­satisfaction  is  that  confining  Higher  Education  to  the  realm  of  
the  ontic,  wherein  calculative  thought  and  a  neoliberal  rationality  pre-­
dominate,  can  contribute  to  a  machination  of  Being  not  dissimilar  to  that  
which  technology  effects.  What  Stephen  Ball  terms  ‘the  terrors  of  
performativity’  are  rife  throughout  the  HE  sector  (2003,  p.216),  constituting  a  
disturbing  state  of  affairs  in  which  teaching  and  learning  practices  are  
reduced  to  a  set  of  calculable  outputs  and  statistics  –  calculative  thought  
resurfaces  here  too.  In  this  context,  both  academics  and  students  may  be  
viewed  as  means  to  ends,  rather  than  ends  in  themselves,  and  hence  
become  dehumanised.  
  
That  teaching  and  learning  in  Higher  Education  is  increasingly  commodified,  
marketed,  and  measured  in  terms  of  concrete  ‘outputs’  is  not  only  
problematic  in  itself;;  it  can  also  negate  the  potential  for  all  stakeholders,  but  
particularly  students,  to  ‘take  a  stance’  on  their  Being  (Gibbs,  2015,  p.59).  
This  dissonance  is  discussed  by  Gibbs,  who  argues  that  rather  than  
supporting  students’  questioning  of  the  world  and  their  place  in  it,  
contemporary  Higher  Education  instead  tends  to  reinforce  and  reproduce  a  
kind  of  ‘consumer  anxiety’  (2017,  p.14).  As  the  now-­satisfaction  which  
currently  dominates  the  HE  sector  is  confined  to  ontic  knowledge,  this  
frames  students’  being  and  becoming  in  purely  consumerist  terms.    
  
In  the  essay  ‘The  Question  Concerning  Technology’,  Heidegger  states  that  
technology  contributes  to  a  ‘machination’  of  Being,  ‘enframing’  and  limiting  
our  Being  to  that  which  is  easily  measurable  and  calculable  (1977,  p.24).    
What  is  inherently  problematic  about  technology  and  its  enframing  effects  is  
explained  as  follows:  
-­  201  -­  
The   approaching   tide   of   technological   revolution   in   the   atomic   age  
could  so  captivate,  bewitch,  dazzle,  and  beguile  man  that  calculative  
thinking  may  someday  come  to  be  accepted  and  practiced  as  the  only  
way  of  thinking  (Heidegger,  1966,  p.56).    
  
It  seems  as  if  contemporary  Higher  Education  is  already  bewitched  and  
beguiled  by  calculative  and  technical  ways  of  thinking,  as  ontological  
concerns  are  suppressed  in  the  curriculum.  As  I  argue  here,  the  criticisms  
made  of  technology  could  also  be  levelled  at  neoliberalism  and  its  
concomitant  marketised  discourses.  Neoliberal  policies  have  quite  clearly  
reshaped  our  world  according  to  market  logic,  extolling  the  importance  of  
competition,  efficiency,  and  accountability.  But  what  has  received  insufficient  
attention  in  the  literature  is  the  way  in  which  ‘neoliberalisation’  can  be  seen  
as  ‘a  process  of  ontological  violence…through  which  things  and  human  
capabilities  are  revealed  as  an  array  of  “reserves”  set  available  for  the  
market  rational  utilisation’  (Joronen,  2013,  p.356,  my  emphasis).  
  
I  suggest  that  student  satisfaction  (which  in  its  current  form  is  a  now-­
satisfaction),  as  a  recent  iteration  of  the  neoliberalisation  of  Higher  
Education,  enacts  such  ‘ontological  violence’  (Joronen,  2013,  p.356).  Whilst  
teaching  and  learning  are  ever  more  technicised,  it  is  now  a  common  
practice  for  universities  to  demand  that  academics  structure  and  deliver  their  
‘content’  according  to  clearly  laid-­out,  pre-­determined  learning  outcomes.  
Similarly,  what  students  learn  in  Higher  Education  can  be  measured  and  
recorded  as  progress  tracked  against  their  individual  learning  plans  or  
trajectories.    
  
The  emphasis  placed  on  acquiring  a  body  of  marketable  skills,  with  students’  
identities  structured  according  to  their  employability,  is  now  evident.  Vitae’s  
‘Researcher  Development  Framework’  is  a  prime  example  of  such  a  
technicisation  of  the  self.47  Postgraduate  research  students  and  academic  
staff  are  encouraged  to  ‘identify  strengths,  plan  actions,  review  
                                                                                        
47  For  further  information  on  the  ‘Researcher  Development  Framework’  and  
its  organisation  tools,  see:  https://www.vitae.ac.uk/researchers-­
professional-­development/about-­the-­vitae-­researcher-­development-­
framework  [Accessed  26  July  2018].  
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achievements,  and  create  a  portfolio  of  evidence’  as  one’s  development  is  
considered  ultimately  in  calculative  terms;;  only  that  which  is  recorded  and  
reviewed  is  of  value.        
  
That  a  now-­satisfaction  is  reified  in  terms  of  calculative  thought  reduces  
students,  academics,  and  subject  content  to  mere  ‘standing-­reserve’  
(Bestand)  or  ‘flexible  raw  materials’  whereby  ‘what  something  is,  and  what  it  
is  worth,  is  determined  by  what  it  can  do  and  produce’  (Harvey,  2010,  
p.190).  Thus,  it  seems  as  if  there  is  a  tendency  towards  covering-­over  
students’  Being  rather  than  supporting  their  un-­concealment.  But  I  argue  that  
Higher  Education  should  have  an  ontological  dimension  to  it,  through  which  
students  come  to  recognise  that  there  is  a  question  of  Being,  and  that  this  
has  a  bearing  on  their  own  ontology.  While  recognising  that  one’s  Being  is  in  
question  does  not  ensure  a  more  authentic  understanding  of  oneself,  the  
opening  up  of  such  ontological  questions  is  richly  educative  in  itself.    
  
That  a  now-­satisfaction  is  confined  to  merely  ontic  knowledge  also  implies  a  
particular  relationship  to  knowledge  itself,  and  this  is  characteristically  one  of  
consumption.  The  language  of  computer  processing  such  as  ‘inputs’,  
‘outputs’,  and  ‘transformations’  often  coincides  with  this  epistemological  
relationship  and  such  terms  can  eclipse  what  it  is  to  know.  It  is  my  
contention  that  a  now-­satisfaction  is  structured  and  informed  by  market  
imperatives  in  such  a  way  that  knowledge  is  commodified  and  reduced  to  
mere  ‘information’.  
  
The  distinction  I  am  making  between  ‘knowledge’  and  ‘information’  rests  on  
the  extent  to  which  each  way  of  knowing  is  tied  to  one’s  sense  of  self.  I  
suggest  that  while  knowledge  is  often  internalised  and  embodied  –  in  
essence,  it  can  influence  how  a  person  acts  and  lives  their  life  –  information  
is  simply  collected  and  stored  away.  To  ‘know’  something  now  typically  
means  that  one  is  able  to  ingest  a  body  of  knowledge  and  then  regurgitate  
facts  on  demand;;  this  epistemological  approach  is  bolstered  by  the  
persistent  championing  of  high-­stakes  testing  throughout  education.  
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While  acquiring  a  set  of  verifiable  facts  is  valuable  in  itself,  my  concern  is  
that  in  the  contemporary  university,  ‘knowledge’  is  gradually  being  replaced  
by  ‘information’.  Information  can  be  disseminated,  delivered,  and  then  
tested:  it  fits  with  the  calculative  mode  of  thinking  that  is  now  writ  large  
throughout  the  HE  sector  and  the  now-­satisfaction  this  encourages.  
Knowledge,  on  the  other  hand,  can  be  more  difficult  to  measure  and  its  
effects  more  difficult  to  observe.  It  is  not  ‘calculable’  in  the  same  way.  The  
language  of  ‘inputs’  and  ‘outputs’  is  significant  here,  as  an  emphasis  on  
information  processing  and  its  relationship  to  ‘knowledge’  can  contribute  
further  to  the  machination  of  Being.    
  
This  shift  from  ‘knowledge’  to  ‘information’  is  exemplified  by  the  recent  drive  
to  measure  ‘student  engagement’  in  Higher  Education.  As  Macfarlane  (2017)  
rightly  critiques,  student  engagement  is  increasingly  considered  in  
performative  terms.  Whether  a  student  turns  up  for  their  lectures,  whether  
they  contribute  to  class  discussions,  and  whether  they  engage  with  the  
Virtual  Learning  Environment  (VLE)  are  all  indicators  of  engagement,  yet  
there  is  a  shallowness  here  that  needs  to  be  acknowledged.  As  Macfarlane  
argues,  ‘learning  at  university  is  fast  becoming…about  “the  performing  self”’  
(2017,  p.9);;  this  criticism  extends  beyond  student  engagement  to  my  own  
concerns  regarding  measures  of  student  voice.  This  emphasis  on  what  is  
performative,  easily  recognisable,  and  calculable  again  refocuses  one’s  
attention  on  the  ‘now’  of  a  now-­satisfaction.    
  
Students  increasingly  value  information  and  experiences  which  are  of  
immediate  use,  for  example,  undertaking  a  professional  placement  during  
one’s  degree  should  enhance  employability  and  hence  its  utilitarian  ‘ends’  
are  clear.  Such  a  shift  from  knowledge  to  information,  as  from  a  ‘not-­yet-­’  to  
a  now-­satisfaction,  is  also  evidenced  in  recent  calls  for  the  humanities  to  
‘justify’  or  prove  their  worth  in  a  way  that  is  commensurate  with  scientific  
disciplines  (Nussbaum,  2010;;  Damrosch  et  al.,  2014,  p.587).  The  economic  
value  of  humanities  subjects  is  here  being  placed  above  their  educational,  
edifying  value,  and  this  is  clearly  informed  by  calculative  thought.  The  
danger  associated  with  such  a  focus  on  short-­term  desire  satisfaction  
though,  is  that  it  implies  that  one’s  education  can  be  ‘complete’  and  as  an  
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off-­shoot  of  this,  that  meeting  student  expectations  is  all  universities  should  
focus  on.  The  very  fact  that  a  now-­satisfaction  has  discrete  ‘outputs’  means  
that  one’s  Higher  Education  can  be  considered  as  perfectible.    
  
A  now-­satisfaction  is  perfectible,  in  essence,  can  be  perfected,  depending  on  
the  extent  to  which  students  attain  their  desired  ‘ends’.  That  something  is  
perfectible  means  that  a  final,  perfected  state  can  be  reached,  and  in  turn  
that  one’s  relationship  to  the  thing  being  ‘perfected’  is  teleological  in  nature.  
A  now-­satisfaction  is  something  that  can  be  attained,  measured,  and  
improved  (and  all  within  the  standard  three-­year  period  of  undergraduate  
study).  What  this  implies  about  Higher  Education  is  that  one  can  be  
‘satisfied’,  one’s  quest  or  ‘appetite’  for  knowledge  and  truth  abated,  and  
hence  the  ‘perfection’  of  one’s  education  is  often  equated  to  the  much  
vaunted  2:1  degree  classification.  The  perfectibility  of  a  now-­satisfaction  
provides  a  kind  of  settlement  to  all  concerned  which,  while  reassuring,  may  
further  entrench  the  neoliberal  tendency  to  value  ontic  knowledge  over  and  
above  ontological  considerations.  While  learning  outcomes  and  other  
observable,  measurable  ‘ends’  of  Higher  Education  are  incessantly  called  for  
by  performativity  measures,  there  is  a  danger  here  that  such  a  neoliberalised  
culture  is  one  in  which  a  now-­satisfaction  could  become  totalising.      
  
Having  outlined  what  a  now-­satisfaction  consists  in,  and  discussed  the  
modes  of  thought,  dialogue,  relationships,  ontology,  and  epistemology  
characteristic  of  this  kind  of  satisfaction,  I  will  now  give  some  examples  of  
now-­satisfaction  from  the  films  presented  in  Chapter  Three.  I  add  to  Cavell’s  
discussion  of  Gaslight  and  Now,  Voyager  by  highlighting  what  film  can  
reveal  about  satisfaction,  as  the  melodramas  in  particular  explore  what  it  
means  to  be  satisfied  with  oneself,  and  with  one’s  education.  The  now-­
satisfaction  of  Paula’s  education  is  clearly  evident  in  her  ‘aria  of  revenge’,  a  
scene  in  which  Gregory  is  tied  and  bound  ready  for  police  collection.  As  
Gregory  cannot  hurt  her,  and  with  the  encouragement  of  Cameron,  Paula  is  
able  to  say  all  that  has  been  repressed  in  her  marriage  to  the  devious  
Gregory.    
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In  the  aria  scene,  Paula  takes  on  the  role  of  ‘mad  woman’  that  Gregory  has  
tried  to  enforce,  and  she  does  so  in  order  to  eschew  this  for  the  final  time,  to  
reassert  her  voice  in  her  own  terms.  Gregory  asks  Paula  to  use  the  knife  in  
her  hand  to  free  him,  and  her  aria  begins:    
Are  you  suggesting  that  this  is  a  knife?  I  don’t  see  any  knife.  You  must  
have  dreamed  you  put  it  there…Are  you  mad,  my  husband?  Or  is  it  I  
who  am  mad?  Yes.  I  am  mad…If  I  were  not  mad  I  could  have  helped  
you  [could  have  freed  you].    
  
Here,  Paula  is  referring  to  all  of  the  ‘confusions’  that  Gregory  has  
orchestrated  over  the  course  of  their  marriage  to  drive  her  mad.  This  ‘aria  of  
revenge’  clearly  involves  a  kind  of  now-­satisfaction  as  Paula  is  concerned  
with  recovering  her  voice  before  Gregory  is  arrested  and  taken  away.  What  
also  marks  out  this  scene  as  one  of  now-­satisfaction  is  its  goal-­directedness,  
and  that  the  dialogue  could  at  best  be  considered  a  ‘technical’  dialogue,  and  
at  worst,  a  mere  monologue  disguised  as  dialogue  (Buber,  1947/2002).  This  
is  significant  as  until  now,  their  whole  marriage  has  been  characterised  by  
monologue,  yet  now  it  is  Paula  who  controls  what  is  said.    
  
A  now-­satisfaction  is  also  attained  by  Charlotte  Vale  in  Now,  Voyager  when,  
upon  returning  home  from  her  transformative  journey  to  South  America,  she  
is  able  to  renegotiate  the  terms  of  her  relationship  with  her  mother,  Mrs.  
Windle  Vale.  Through  such  defiant  acts  as  choosing  her  own  clothes,  
sleeping  in  her  own  bedroom  (rather  than  that  next  to  her  mother’s),  and  
lighting  the  fire  in  the  living  room,  Charlotte  achieves  her  independence  and  
self-­reliance  for  ‘now’.  This  is  ultimately  effected  when,  in  an  argument  with  
Mrs.  Vale,  Charlotte  rejoices  in  stating  that  ‘I'm  not  afraid.  I'm  not  afraid.  I'm  
not  afraid,  Mother’.  While  this  marks  a  perfectible  ‘end’  of  Charlotte’s  
education  of  the  self,  it  is  one  she  must  move  on  from.    
  
In  all  of  the  melodramas,  there  are  instances,  typically  attained  through  
marriage,  of  now-­satisfaction.  While  the  heroines’  attainment  of  a  now-­
satisfaction  can  be  seen  as  educative,  this  is  always  a  step  along  the  way  
rather  than  the  ‘end’  of  their  journey.  The  now-­satisfaction  of  marriage  must  
in  fact  be  overcome  or  negated  by  the  principal  women  in  these  films  if  they  
are  to  discover  or  recover  their  voices,  and  hence  be  morally  educated  (in  a  
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perfectionist,  rather  than  perfectible  sense).  A  similar  shift  from  the  ‘now-­’  to  
the  ‘not-­yet-­’  is  also  much  needed  in  the  HE  sector.  I  am  arguing  for  a  move  
away  from  the  current  focus  on  now-­satisfaction  in  Higher  Education  as  
‘satisfaction’,  considered  in  these  terms,  does  not  equate  to  education.  If  a  
Higher  Education  is  to  be  transformative,  dialogic,  and  edifying,  then  policy-­
makers  and  institutional  managers  must  recognise  the  legitimacy  of,  and  
allow  room  for,  a  perfectionist  not-­yet-­satisfaction.        
  
6.5  A  not-­yet-­satisfaction  
While  calculative  thought  can  be  allegorised  as  a  straight-­running  railway  
track,  meditative  thought  instead  occupies  the  rough  ground  alongside  it.  In  
this  sense,  thinking  meditatively  is  akin  to  having  a  ‘conversation  on  a  
country  path’,  the  choice  title  Heidegger  gives  to  his  enquiry  (1966,  p.58).  
Rather  than  being  confined  to  the  average  everyday  concerns  of  the  world  
(Dasein’s  fallenness),  meditative  thought  constitutes  a  ‘releasement’  
(Gelassenheit)  towards  the  question  of  Being.  Meditative  thought  is  that  
which,  in  comprehending  subjects  as  they  are  in  themselves  rather  than  as  
means  to  other  ends,  remains  ‘open  to  the  mystery’  of  Being  (Heidegger,  
1966,  p.55).    
  
Meditative  thought  releases  us  to  that  which  gathers  man  and  Being  
together  in  relation  to  truth,  wherein  the  nature  of  thinking  itself  is  revealed.  
As  Heidegger  writes:  
Authentic   releasement   consists   in   this:   that   man   in   his   very   nature  
belongs  to  that-­which-­regions,  i.e.,  he  is  released  to  it…[and]  we  have  
just   characterised   that-­which-­regions   as   the   hidden   nature   of   truth  
(1966,  pp.82-­83).    
  
While  meditative  thought  brings  us  closer  to  ontological  questions  and  the  
hidden  nature  of  thinking,  it  also  moves  us  away  from  what  is  merely  
calculative.  As  Harvey  states,  ‘Gelassenheit  has  to  do  with  a  relation  toward  
things  that  is  no  longer  dominated  by  the  technical’  (2009,  p.21).  Contra  to  
thinking  that  is  technical  in  nature,  meditative  thought  implies  reflection,  
indeed  as  Schwieler  and  Magrini  describe:    
Reflection  awakens  us  and  keeps  us  awake  to  the  most  thought-­worthy  
and   question-­worthy   aspects   of   our   existence.   Reflection   is   about  
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opening   the   pathway   into   the   essence   of   the   age,   its   politics,  
economics,  sciences,  and  institutions  of  education  (2015,  p.17).    
  
The  not-­yet-­satisfaction  for  which  I  am  arguing  here  is  characterised  by  this  
kind  of  meditative,  po(i)etic,  and  reflective  thinking.  It  is  important  to  
emphasise  here  that  meditative  thought  is  not  elitist,  nor  is  it  confined  to  
philosophy;;  rather,  that  which  could  encourage  meditative  thought  is  
relatively  straightforward.  Magrini  picks  out  several  ‘marginal  practices’  as  
examples  including  ‘simple  natural  pleasures  of  the  home  and  hearth,  a  
sojourn  along  a  wooded  path  in  communion  with  nature,  or  creating  and  
participating  in  local  works  of  literature,  poetry,  and  art’  (2012,  p.513).    
  
Encouraging  students  to  seek  a  ‘not-­yet-­’  or  ‘to-­be-­attained’  satisfaction  from  
their  university,  and  to  engage  in  meditative  thinking  will  not  be  easy  to  do.  
Meditative  thought  can  be  encouraged  through  an  attentiveness  to  literature,  
art,  film,  poetry,  and  philosophy  among  other  subjects.  Magrini  sees  the  
potential  for  meditative  thought  explicitly  come  to  the  fore  in  the  humanities,  
the  importance  of  which  he  describes  as  follows:    
As  opposed  to   transmitting  pre-­packed  truths,  values,  and  goals,   the  
humanities   provide   instances   wherein   students   embark   on   the   all-­
important  quest  for  truth  [the  truth  of  Being],  a  quest  that  is  intimately  
bound  up  with  the  assessment  and  re-­assessment  of  our  values  such  
as  justice,  equity,  and  equality  (2012,  p.520).    
  
This  can  be  seen  as  one  instance  of  the  kind  of  not-­yet-­satisfaction  I  am  
arguing  for,  but  I  am  not  claiming  that  this  is  limited  to  the  humanities  alone.  
Meditative  thought  can  also  be  realised  in  the  natural  and  social  sciences;;  
the  recent  drive  to  include  ethics  modules  as  part  of  medical  degrees  is  one  
such  example  (Li,  2000;;  Robinson  et  al.,  2014;;  Ruitenberg,  2016).  It  is  my  
contention  that  meditative  thought  is  not  only  achievable  in  Higher  
Education,  but  it  should  be  afforded  time  and  space  in  the  curriculum  to  
develop.  If  a  Higher  Education  should  enable  one  to  ‘take  a  stance’  on  their  
own  Being  (Gibbs,  2015,  p.59),  then  it  follows  that  meditative  thought  is  
integral.  This  is  not  to  say  that  one  mode  of  thinking  could  come  to  replace  
the  other,  but  I  am  asserting  here  that  meditative  thought  –  a  mode  of  
thinking  that  is  often  elusive  in  contemporary  life  –  has  educative  and  
transformative  potential.    
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As  meditative  thought  can  release  a  thinker  to  the  nature  of  truth  and  Being,  
this  way  of  thinking  is  clearly  tied  to  ontological,  rather  than  ontic,  
knowledge.  That  a  not-­yet-­satisfaction  is  characterised  by  an  ontological  way  
of  understanding  the  world  may  be  the  result  of  its  meditative  thinking,  but  
equally  its  lack  of  goal-­directedness.  What  marks  out  a  not-­yet-­satisfaction  
as  ontological,  rather  than  ontic,  is  its  lack  of  instrumentalism  and  the  fact  
that  its  characteristic  mode  of  thinking  is  meditative.  While  a  not-­yet-­
satisfaction  may  also  involve  ontic  concerns,  the  open-­endedness  of  this  
form  of  satisfaction  allows  room  for  ontological  questions  to  emerge.    
  
In  the  HE  sector,  such  ontological  questions  may  include  ‘what  makes  me  a  
student?’,  ‘what  does  it  mean  to  be  a  student?’,  and  ‘what  marks  out  my  
becoming  a  teacher?’  (in  the  case  of  teacher  training).  The  ontological  
dimension  of  Higher  Education  is  that  which  deals  with  questions  of  this  
kind,  questions  which  are  not  only  about  being  but  also  about  becoming.  A  
consideration  of  ontology  will  always  incorporate  aspects  of  the  ‘now-­’  and  
the  ‘not-­yet-­’,  but  the  everyday  inauthenticity  of  Dasein  is  consummate  with  
the  current  emphasis  in  Higher  Education  on  attaining  a  kind  of  now-­
satisfaction.    
  
A  not-­yet-­satisfaction,  as  the  ‘not-­yet-­’  would  suggest,  is  forward-­looking.  
These  different  forms  of  satisfaction  are  not  mutually  exclusive,  and  both  
ontic  and  ontological  knowledge  are  valuable  and  should  be  within  the  remit  
of  Higher  Education.  But  ontic  knowledge,  helpful  as  it  may  be  for  gaining  
graduate  employment,  will  not  always  be  edifying  and  transformative  in  itself.  
This  is  what  an  attention  to  ontology  adds  to  one’s  education.    
  
Another  feature  which  marks  out  a  not-­yet-­satisfaction  is  its  deeper  relation  
to  knowledge,  in  which  what  it  is  to  ‘know’  is  intimately  tied  to  what  it  means  
to  ‘be’.  In  contrast  to  the  epistemology  of  a  now-­satisfaction,  a  not-­yet-­
satisfaction  is  characterised  by  a  kind  of  knowing  which  is  ‘a  process  of  
living’  (Shepherd,  1977/2011,  p.1).  Coming  to  know  in  working  towards  a  
not-­yet-­satisfaction  is  less  about  consuming  and  processing  facts,  and  more  
about  living  with  one’s  knowledge,  embodying  this  in  one’s  daily  life.    
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Here,  I  will  draw  on  Nan  Shepherd’s  The  Living  Mountain  to  elucidate  the  
ways  in  which  our  relationship  to  knowledge  can  be  ontological  rather  than  
ontic,  and  relational  rather  than  consumptive  and  transactional.  The  Living  
Mountain  is  an  autobiographical  and  deeply  personal  piece  of  ‘mountain  
literature’  (Macfarlane,  2011,  xvi),  charting  Shepherd’s  exploration  of  the  
Cairngorm  Mountains  in  Scotland  over  a  number  of  years.  In  it,  Shepherd  
expresses  her  wish  to  come  to  ‘know’  the  mountain  and  its  plateau  ‘deeply  
rather  than  widely’  (1977/2011,  p.1).  What  the  book  emphasises  throughout  
is  that  one’s  knowledge,  rather  than  information,  can  only  ever  be  partial  and  
yet  the  depth  of  knowledge  enhances  its  value.  As  Fulford  and  Skea  write  in  
relation  to  Thoreau’s  Walden  and  Shepherd’s  Living  Mountain:    
What  Thoreau  and  Shepherd  both  highlight  is  that  one’s  knowledge  of  
the  outdoors  [or  one’s  knowledge  of  any  subject]   is  not  something  to  
be  grasped  quickly  and  then  ‘shelved’  as  appropriate;;  they  do  not  focus  
on  the  ‘usefulness’  of  knowledge  per  se,  but  on  how  it  can  be  revelatory  
for  the  self…  the  kind  of  education  this  implies  is  one  which  cannot  be  
evaluated   in   terms   of   content   knowledge   and/or   measured   in  
accordance  with  ‘learning  outcomes  (2018,  p.6).  
  
The  privileging  of  certain  kinds  of  knowledge  and  approaches  to  knowing  
exemplified  in  Shepherd’s  work  is  characteristic  of  a  not-­yet-­satisfaction.  It  
implies  an  epistemological  relationship  that  is  always  partial,  ontological,  
unsettling,  and  edifying.  While  acquiring  readily  transmittable  information  is  
important  in  Higher  Education,  students  should  also  come  to  realise  that  
knowledge  of  their  degree  subject  is  only  ever  partial,  and  that  the  quest  for  
knowledge  should  not  be  extricated  from  ontological  concerns.    
  
As  Shepherd  describes  the  depth  and  partiality  of  her  knowledge,  she  writes  
that  ‘one  never  quite  knows  the  mountain  [or  any  subject  for  that  matter],  nor  
oneself  in  relation  to  it’  (1977/2011,  p.1).  Reframing  epistemology  as  a  
‘process  of  living’  (Shepherd,  1977/2011,  p.1)  rather  than  a  process  of  the  
mere  acquisition,  consumption,  and  transmission  of  information  is  cognisant  
of  the  not-­yet-­satisfaction  I  am  advocating.        
  
If  knowing  is  to  be  seen  as  a  ‘process  of  living’  (Shepherd,  1977/2011,  p.1),  
and  if  Higher  Education  is  to  fulfil  its  edifying  potential  through  encouraging  
students  to  ‘take  a  stance’  on  their  Being  (Gibbs,  2015,  p.59),  then  
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elucidation  of  a  not-­yet-­satisfaction  is  much  needed.  If  knowing  is  conceived  
of  in  this  way,  it  is  not  only  tied  to  ontological  concerns,  but  this  also  implies  
that  one’s  search  for  knowledge  cannot  be  ‘complete’  at  any  particular  point.  
This  means  that  a  not-­yet-­satisfaction,  with  its  characteristic  features  of  
meditative  thought,  ontological  questioning,  and  its  more  open-­ended  
epistemological  approach,  cannot  be  considered  perfectible.    
  
Despite  the  word  ‘perfection’  being  linguistically  related  to  perfection-­ism,  
Cavell  clearly  states  that  perfectionism  is  an  ongoing  journey  rather  than  one  
with  discrete,  perfectible  ‘ends’.  The  perfection  of  the  self  is  neither  finite  nor  
infinite;;  rather,  it  would  be  more  accurate  to  say  that  there  are  ‘ends’  to  be  
found  in  the  closing  of  one  circle  and  the  drawing  of  another,  though  these  
‘ends’  are  still  to  be  transcended.  The  distinction  I  have  drawn  here  between  
‘now-­’  or  ‘attained’,  and  ‘not-­yet-­’  or  ‘to-­be-­attained’  forms  of  satisfaction,  is  
premised  upon  a  guiding  theme  of  perfectionism,  in  essence,  that  one  is  
always  moving  towards  one’s  ‘unattained,  but  attainable  self’  (Cavell,  1990,  
p.12).  This  highlights  that  any  epistemological  claim  to  ‘know  oneself’  cannot  
be  settled  and  fixed,  for  example,  when  graduating  from  university,  but  
rather  it  is  something  that  must  be  continually  sought  in  the  perfectionist  
quest  towards  conversion  and  transformation.    
  
A  not-­yet-­satisfaction  is  perfectionist  precisely  because  it  requires  a  position  
of  ‘doubleness’  and  may  be  prompted  by  experiencing  crises,  meaning  that  
one  is  able  to  evaluate  who  they  are  now  and  who  they  want  to  be.  This  can  
create  a  sense  of  uneasiness  reminiscent  of  Heidegger’s  das  Unheimliche,  
for  as  Cavell  explains  ‘any  perfectionism—democratic  or  aristocratic,  secular  
or  religious,  philosophical  or  debased—will  claim  to  have  found  a  way  of  life  
from  whose  perspective  all  other  ways  of  life  are  judged  as  wanting’  (1990,  
xxiii).  But  what  is  particular  to  Emersonian  moral  perfectionism  is  that  one  
learns  for  oneself  what  ‘counts’  as  moral  conduct,  and  where  their  lines  of  
(dis-­)agreement  in  criteria  are  drawn.  Moving  from  a  ‘now-­’  to  a  not-­yet-­
satisfaction  depends  not  on  dissatisfaction  per  se,  but  on  discomfort,  that  is,  
a  growing  sense  of  one’s  separation  from  the  language  community,  or  of  
one’s  words  not  meeting  their  needs.    
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That  a  not-­yet-­satisfaction  is  perfectionist  means  there  are  no  discrete,  pre-­
determined  ‘ends’  to  be  sought,  unlike  those  of  a  now-­satisfaction.  In  turn,  
this  implies  that  the  search  for  one’s  ‘next’  self  cannot  be  goal-­directed  
and/or  confined  to  calculative  thought.  Moving  towards  a  not-­yet-­satisfaction  
is  not  some  utopian  concept  entirely  cut  off  from  the  ‘now’,  but  rather  as  
Cavell  explains  ‘the  next  self  is  [always]  (already)  present…[and  this  is]  the  
reflexiveness  of  the  self’  (1990,  xxxv).  Thus,  one’s  perfectionist  ambitions  
and  capacity  to  exercise  moral  judgment  stand  in  need  of  releasement  
(Gelassenheit)  –  with  the  academic  guiding  a  student’s  perfectionist  journey  
–  rather  than  redefinition.  While  the  democratic  nature  of  perfectionism  does  
entail  that  persons  should  make  themselves  intelligible  to  their  language  
community,  first  and  foremost,  this  also  requires  that  one  becomes  
intelligible  to  oneself.  As  Cavell  aptly  describes:    
Moral  Perfectionism’s  contribution  to  thinking  about  the  moral  necessity  
of   making   oneself   intelligible   (one’s   actions,   one’s   sufferings,   one’s  
position)  is,  I  think  it  can  be  said,  its  emphasis  before  all  on  becoming  
intelligible  to  oneself,  as  if  the  threat  to  one’s  moral  coherence  comes  
most   insistently   from   that   quarter,   from   one’s   sense   of   obscurity   to  
oneself  (1990,  xxxii).    
  
Whether  the  emphasis  is  placed  on  a  releasement  towards  Being,  or  on  
becoming  intelligible  to  oneself,  clearly  the  role  of  the  academic  is  to  guide  
students  towards  themselves,  entreating  them  to  consider  what  they  want  
from  life,  from  their  education,  and  how  they  wish  to  position  themselves  in  a  
community  (of  scholars,  of  democratic  citizens).  While  a  not-­yet-­satisfaction  
may  consist  of  instances  of  a  now-­satisfaction,  what  distinguishes  the  ‘not-­
yet-­’  from  the  ‘now-­’  is  that  it  involves  looking  beyond  short-­term  desire  
satisfactions.    
  
I  fully  acknowledge  that  the  dominance  of  economic  imperatives  and  the  
emphasis  placed  on  a  now-­satisfaction  in  current  HE  policy  cannot  be  
ignored,  but  the  notion  that  one  can  be  ‘satisfied’  with  one’s  education  
implies  that  ‘education’  is  perfectible  and  can  be  complete.  Clearly  students’  
Higher  Education  is  ‘complete’  upon  graduation  and  this  marks  a  tangible  
‘end’  to  their  pursuit  of  knowledge.  But  if  in  speaking  of  ‘education’,  we  were  
to  include  the  journey  of  the  self  towards  its  next,  higher  self,  then  
graduation  would  simply  be  one  ‘end’  among  many,  rather  than  a  
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teleological,  final  endpoint.  This  reframing  of  Higher  Education  and  student  
satisfaction  in  perfectionist  terms  is  more  cognisant  of  ontological  questions,  
and  it  aligns  with  the  conception  of  knowing  as  ‘a  process  of  living’  rather  
than  mere  consumption  (Shepherd,  1977/2011,  p.1).  That  a  not-­yet-­
satisfaction  is  perfectionist  also  implies  certain  kinds  of  relationships  and  
dialogue  between  the  person  undergoing  a  moral  crisis  and  working  towards  
their  next  self,  and  those  in  their  language  community.    
  
An  individual’s  perfectionist  journey  may  be  provoked,  but  must  be  guided,  
by  others.  Hence  perfectionism  is  ultimately  a  communal  endeavour,  and  
this  is  inimical  to  the  individualistic  pursuit  of  a  now-­satisfaction.  The  role  of  
‘the  Friend’  in  one’s  perfectionist  education  of  the  self  cannot  be  overstated,  
while  an  individual’s  perfectionist  journey  is  inseparable  from,  indeed  it  is  
informed  by,  the  democratic  ideals  of  their  society.  While  perfectionism  may  
initially  call  for  an  Emersonian  aversive  thinking,  in  which  one  turns  away  
from  one’s  community  to  pursue  the  bent  of  one’s  own  genius,  this  then  
brings  one  back  to  the  community  –  although  potentially  on  different  terms.  
When  Emerson  writes  that  ‘I  shun  father  and  mother  and  wife  and  brother  
when  my  genius  calls  me’,  this  should  not  be  taken  as  advocating  for  
individuation,  but  rather  as  encouraging  his  readers  to  see  that  one’s  ties  to  
a  language  community  and  consent  in  criteria  can  be  (re)negotiated.    
  
Whether  one  chooses  to  consent  to,  or  dissent  from,  the  criteria  of  a  
language  community  will  effect  different  relationships  with  that  community.  
As  I  suggest  here,  a  not-­yet-­satisfaction  is  more  likely  to  consist  in  I-­Thou  
relationships  and  genuine  dialogue,  than  a  debased  I-­It  relation.  This  is  due  
to  its  lack  of  instrumentalism  and  the  fact  that  it  is  not  underpinned  by  an  
economic,  calculative  rationality.  A  not-­yet-­satisfaction  opens  up  dialogue  
rather  than  closing  it  down  and  drawing  its  boundaries.  This  openness  is  
envisaged  in  Cavell’s  statement  that  ‘in  the  mode  of  passionate  exchange  
[an  exemplar  of  genuine  dialogue],  there  is  no  final  word,  no  uptake  or  
turndown,  until  a  line  is  drawn,  a  withdrawal  is  effected,  perhaps  in  turn  to  be  
revoked’  (2005b,  p.183).    
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In  genuine  dialogue,  of  which  Cavellian  passionate  utterance  is  an  example,  
there  is  a  distinct  lack  of  finality  to  one’s  words  which  deepens  rather  than  
protracts  one’s  relationships  with  others  (it  is  perfectionist  rather  than  
perfectible,  you  could  say).  Each  relationship  built  upon  genuine  dialogue  is  
founded,  and  is  thus  at  risk,  in  every  word.  Such  risk  is  another  feature  that  
distinguishes  genuine  dialogue  from  its  analogues;;  Buber  refers  to  ‘mutual  
surprises’  and  the  danger  of  an  ‘unpredictable  reply’  as  signalling  a  real  
conversation,  in  contrast  to  the  mere  rehearsal  and  regurgitation  of  
information  in  technical  dialogue  (1947/2002,  p.241).  While  genuine  dialogue  
may  also  feature  in  a  now-­satisfaction,  it  does  seem  as  if  risk,  surprise,  and  
unpredictability  are  at  odds  with  the  calculability  of  this  form  of  satisfaction.    
  
The  relationships  involved  in  aiming  for  a  not-­yet-­satisfaction  are  more  akin  
to  an  I-­Thou  than  an  I-­It.  This  is  partly  due  to  its  being  characterised  by  
genuine  dialogue,  but  also  because  the  communal  ties  associated  with  a  
not-­yet-­satisfaction  give  new  meaning  to  the  idea  that  ‘I  require  You  [Thou]  
to  become;;  becoming  I,  I  say  You  [Thou]’  (Buber,  1970,  p.62).  An  I-­Thou  
relationship  is  much  more  conceivable  for  a  ‘not-­yet-­’  rather  than  a  now-­
satisfaction,  as  the  ‘not-­yet-­’  moves  beyond  everyday  concerns,  such  as  the  
acquisition  of  material  goods  and  services,  which  could  otherwise  reduce  the  
other  to  an  ‘It’.    
  
Without  the  pressures  of  obtaining  calculable,  economically  beneficial  ‘ends’,  
a  not-­yet-­satisfaction  does  allow  room  for  ‘experiencing  the  other  side’  of  
one’s  relationships  with  others  (Buber,  1947/2002,  loc.158),  and  in  turn  this  
leads  to  genuine  dialogue.  That  a  not-­yet-­satisfaction  is  perfectionist  not  only  
means  that  the  individual  on  a  perfectionist  journey  will  be  tied  to  a  language  
community,  but  also  that  this  form  of  satisfaction  is  apt  to  foster  relationships  
premised  upon  encounter  rather  than  exchange.    
  
Having  now  explained  what  characterises  a  not-­yet-­satisfaction,  I  will  offer  
several  examples  of  this  form  of  satisfaction  from  the  melodramas.  Typically,  
the  heroines’  not-­yet-­satisfaction  is  pictured  at  the  end  of  these  films,  
whereby  the  closing  scenes  represent  the  closing  of  that  particular  circle,  
around  which  another  is  to  be  drawn.  As  the  credits  roll,  there  is  a  sense  of  
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completeness  to  these  films,  but  the  audience  is  also  left  with  a  sense  that  
the  principal  women’s  journeys  have  only  just  begun.    
  
When  Paula  says  to  Cameron  in  the  final  scene  of  Gaslight  ‘this  night  will  be  
a  long  night’,  she  means  that  it  will  take  a  long  time  for  her  to  make  a  
statement  to  the  police,  for  evidence  of  Gregory’s  wrong-­doings  to  be  
collected,  and  so  on.  But  Cameron’s  reply  that  ‘it’s  already  starting  to  clear’  
is  not  only  referring  to  the  weather,  he  is  also  acknowledging  that  it  will  take  
a  long  time  for  Paula’s  mind  to  clear  from  Gregory’s  manipulations,  such  that  
she  can  finally  start  to  enact  her  ‘cogito’  which  was  glimpsed  in  the  powerful  
‘aria  of  revenge’  just  scenes  before  (Cavell,  1996,  p.59).  The  now-­
satisfaction  of  Paula’s  ‘aria’  gives  way  to  a  more  ontologically-­focused  and  
perfectionist  not-­yet-­satisfaction  in  the  final  scenes  of  Gaslight,  as  Paula  is  
then  able  to  reflect  on  her  own  Being  without  Gregory’s  undue  influence.  
  
Charlotte  Vale’s  not-­yet-­satisfaction  is  also  evinced  in  the  final  scene  of  
Now,  Voyager  when  Jerry  questions  Charlotte  as  to  her  motives  behind  
taking  on  his  daughter,  Tina,  as  her  own.  Jerry  wrongly  assumes  that  
Charlotte’s  caring  for  Tina  is  some  way  to  get  back  at  him  for  his  
unavailability  for  marriage  or  as  a  way  of  maintaining  ties  with  him.  Here  
again,  a  man’s  fundamental  misunderstanding  of  a  woman  –  a  central  theme  
to  all  of  the  melodramas  –  comes  to  the  fore.  In  the  end  Charlotte  realises  
that  the  life  she  thought  she  wanted,  a  home  and  husband  of  her  own,  
cannot  assure  her  of  a  voice.  While  Charlotte’s  metamorphosis  throughout  
the  course  of  the  film  is  clear  to  see  and  consists  in  several  instances  of  
now-­satisfaction,  her  not-­yet-­satisfaction  is  expressed  when  she  says  to  
Jerry  ‘Oh,  Jerry,  let’s  not  ask  for  the  moon.  We  have  the  stars’.  I  take  this  as  
signalling  an  acknowledgement  of  what  Charlotte  has  already  attained,  
chiefly  a  sense  of  self-­reliance,  but  also  what  is  still  to-­be-­attained.      
  
These  selected  Hollywood  films  showcase  that  the  search  for  a  voice,  a  
sense  of  self,  and  an  education  is  complex.  While  these  heroines  may  seek  
solace  in  attaining  a  kind  of  now-­satisfaction,  often  this  leads  to  a  
reconsideration  of  what  it  means  to  be  ‘satisfied’,  and  in  turn  the  ‘now-­’  gives  
way  to  the  ‘not-­yet-­’.  The  distinctions  I  have  discussed  here,  which  are  
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illustrated  in  Table  1,  are  meant  to  evoke  meditative  thought  about  the  
student  satisfaction  agenda  in  Higher  Education.  There  is  no  strict  dichotomy  
between  the  ‘now-­’  and  the  ‘not-­yet-­’,  or  say,  between  ontic  and  ontological  
knowledge,  but  the  categorisations  offered  above  should  be  seen  as  a  
heuristic  tool  for  thinking  through  what  it  means,  or  could  mean,  to  be  
‘satisfied’  with  one’s  Higher  Education.      
  
6.6  Educational  Principles  of  a  ‘not-­yet-­satisfaction’  
Given  the  ‘method’  of  this  thesis,  it  would  be  disingenuous  to  talk  of  the  
‘outputs’  or  ‘results’  of  my  research  in  terms  most  commonly  associated  with  
empirical  research.  But  the  ideas  presented  here  do  have  very  real,  practical  
implications.  My  concern  here  is  not  to  fall  into  the  same  ‘trap’  of  current  
student  satisfaction  measures,  namely  that  ‘satisfaction’  has  been  
commodified  and  evaluated  through  a  mere  tick-­box  exercise.  What  I  do  not  
provide  in  this  section  is  any  formal  kind  of  ‘curriculum’  for  a  not-­yet-­
satisfaction.  I  am  also  not  advocating  for,  or  envisioning,  some  large-­scale  
revolution  in  the  HE  sector;;  as  stated  above,  student  satisfaction  measures  
cannot  simply  be  done  away  with.    
  
What  I  will  do  here  is  elucidate  several  principles  that  arise  from  the  ideas  
pursued  throughout  this  thesis,  and  the  distinction  made  between  ‘now-­’  and  
‘not-­yet-­’  forms  of  satisfaction.  These  principles  should  not  be  seen  as  a  list  
of  necessary  conditions  (or  felicity  conditions)  for  ensuring  a  not-­yet-­
satisfaction,  but  rather  as  markers  of  what  a  not-­yet-­satisfaction  –  and  hence  
a  perfectionist,  ontologically-­oriented,  meditative  Higher  Education  –  might  
consist  in.  It  will  be  to  the  responsibility  of  individual  academics  and  
universities  to  consider  ‘how  to  go  on’  with  these  principles  (Cavell,  1979a,  
p.122),  taking  into  account  their  institutional  context  and  evolving  
government  policies.  The  space  for  doing  things  differently,  and  for  
encouraging  students  to  look  beyond  a  consumerist  now-­satisfaction,  is  to  
be  found  in  the  ordinary,  everyday  practices  of  teaching  and  learning.    
  
The  principles  I  will  present  cannot  be  taken  up  wholesale  and  developed  
into  some  new  measure  of  a  not-­yet-­satisfaction,  but  rather  they  may  be  
enacted  in  the  HE  classroom.  For  me,  the  question  is  not  so  much  ‘what  do  
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we  do  now?’,  but  ‘how  do  we  talk  about  these  concepts  now?’  The  centrality  
of  language  to  ways  of  thinking  and  acting  in  HE  has  already  been  
discussed,  but  one  way  to  resist  a  whole-­scale  proceduralisation  of  Higher  
Education  may  be  to  reframe  satisfaction  in  terms  of  the  ‘now-­’  or  ‘attained’,  
and  the  ‘not-­yet-­’  or  ‘to-­be-­attained’.  Such  a  distinction  does  not  negate  the  
very  real  pressures  placed  on  academics  and  universities  to  fully  meet  
student  expectations,  but  it  offers  a  different  form  of  satisfaction  that  
transcends  the  economic,  ontic,  and  calculative  now-­satisfaction.        
  
Listing  the  following  principles  as  I  do  is  an  approach  employed  by  Staddon  
and  Standish  (2012),  who,  in  their  exploration  of  the  student  experience,  end  
with  a  list  of  guiding  precepts.  The  principles  developed  there  are  meant  to  
‘prompt’  or  ‘stand  as  a  stimulus’  for  academics,  guiding  them  towards  ‘a  
more  responsible  and  more  critically  alert  pedagogical  practice’  (Staddon  
and  Standish,  2012,  p.645).  My  argument  here  is  in  a  similar  vein:  
academics  and  Higher  Education  Institutions  might  move  towards  being  
more  ‘critically  alert’  in  their  teaching  practices  (Staddon  and  Standish,  2012,  
p.645),  but  this  does  not  imply  that  ‘student-­led’  or  ‘student-­centred’  learning  
should  replace  the  traditional  lecture  (Fulford  and  Mahon,  2018).  The  
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Principle  1:  Higher  Education  could  better  promote  students’  
recovery  and/or  discovery  of  voice.    
A  perfectionist  education  of  the  self  is  intimately  tied  to  the  search  for  a  
voice.  The  discovery  or  recovery  of  one’s  voice  is  by  its  very  nature  an  
ongoing  process,  as  well  as  being  tied  to  one’s  sense  of  self  and  invoked  by  
crises  (Cavell,  1996;;  2005a).  Accounting  for  student  voice  in  this  richer  
sense  would  mean  that  universities  come  to  recognise  that  students’  
expression  or  withholding  of  voice  is  tied  to  the  language  community.  If  
Higher  Education  is  to  contribute  to  the  development  of  genuine  student  
‘voice’  rather  than  ‘feedback’,  then  academics  should  take  up  the  role  of  
‘voice  coach’  (Cavell,  2005a,  p.27),  encouraging  students  to  ‘find  out  and  
pursue  his  [or  her,  their]  own  way’,  and  giving  them  the  confidence  to  follow  
the  ‘bent’  of  their  own  genius  (Thoreau,  1854/1997,  p.51).  Through  
introducing  students  to  new  and  conflicting  ideas,  raising  questions  of  
consent  and  dissent,  and  academics  positioning  themselves  as  exemplars  of  
what  it  is  to  ‘have’  a  voice,  students  will  not  simply  be  initiated  into  a  pre-­
established,  conservative  form  of  life:  they  will  come  to  recognise  their  stake  
in  it,  that  is,  their  capacity  to  change  and  shape  their  community.    
  
Principle  2:  Higher  Education  could  allow  room  for  and  
encourage  students  to  take  a  stance  on  their  Being.  
An  aim  of  HE  could  be  to  make  students  aware  that  they  are  ‘always  
already’  on  the  way  to  becoming  (Thomson,  2016,  p.847),  and  that  their  
education  may  be  ‘complete’  at  certain  points  but  is  never  really  ‘finished’.  
What  it  might  look  like  or  mean  to  ‘take  a  stance’  on  one’s  Being  in  Higher  
Education  is  exemplified  in  the  example  of  Williams’  Stoner.  Through  being  
confronted  by  difficult  subject  material,  Stoner  is  forced  to  question  who  he  is  
and  what  he  wants  from  life.  While  this  is  initially  experienced  as  a  kind  of  
dissatisfaction,  as  it  means  departing  from  his  family’s  wishes,  Stoner  knows  
that  the  path  he  treads  in  studying  English  literature  will  lead  to  the  kind  of  
not-­yet-­satisfaction  I  have  outlined  above.    
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Principle  3:  The  university  can  be  a  space  for  meditative  thought.  
Meditative  thought  is  that  which  brings  the  thinker  closer  to  ontological  
questions,  thus  contributing  to  the  un-­concealment  of  Being.  In  order  to  
move  towards  the  kind  of  not-­yet-­satisfaction  I  have  elucidated  above,  
academics’  thinking  together  with  students  might  be  characterised  by  a  
resistance  of  the  merely  calculative  or  technical.  In  order  for  Higher  
Education  to  encourage  students  to  ‘take  a  stance  on  their  Being’  (Gibbs,  
2015,  p.59),  what  is  needed  is  releasement  (Gelassenheit).    
  
Students  not  only  need  to  be  released  from  their  everyday  concerns  in  order  
to  consider  ontological  questions,  but  their  thinking  also  needs  to  be  
released  from  the  grip  of  performativity,  wherein  thinking  is  seen  as  a  means  
to  an  end  rather  than  a  valuable  process  in  itself.  Encouraging  meditative  
thought  would  then  involve  a  passing  on  to  students  of  an  appreciation  of  
knowledge  for  its  own  sake.  Meditative  or  poetic  thinking,  while  it  may  imply  
‘a  tale  too  slow  for  the  impatience  of  our  age’  (Shepherd,  1977/2011,  p.1),  
should  be  preserved  in  HE  despite  the  pressures  of  accountability  and  
discourses  of  student  satisfaction  eschewing  the  virtues  of  calculative  
thought.  
  
Principle  4:  Risk,  confrontation,  angst  and  unknowing  are  
valuable  aspects  of  a  Higher  Education.    
Angst  and  unknowing  are  integral  to  what  it  means  to  be,  and  to  be  the  
cases  of  Dasein  we  are;;  Higher  Education  might  properly  help  students  to  
feel  comfortable  and  settled  with  being  unsettled  in  this  way.  This  marks  out  
the  ontological  dimension  of  a  not-­yet-­satisfaction.    
  
Risk,  angst,  confrontation,  and  unknowing  should  not  only  be  advocated  in  
the  HE  sector,  but  also  lived  out  in  the  classroom.  One  way  forward  would  
be  for  academics  themselves  to  highlight  that  angst  and  unknownness  are  
fundamental  to  what  it  is  to  be  human  and  to  be  a  case  of  Dasein.  Students  
might  be  encouraged  to  take  risks,  for  example,  contributing  in  class  even  if  
they  feel  unsure  of  the  answer,  while  unknownness  –  a  recognition  of  the  
partiality  of  knowledge  –  should  be  afforded  value.    
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Principle  5:  Academic-­student  relationships  should  be  sites  of  
genuine  dialogue  and  encounter.          
In  the  HE  sector,  universities  could  foster  space  for  genuine  dialogue  and  
encounter  to  occur,  rather  than  mere  technical  dialogue  and/or  monologue  
(Buber,  1988).  Genuine  dialogue  can  be  encouraged  in  situations  where  
academic-­student  relationships  are  not  ‘managed’  and  accounted  for  in  the  
sense  of  charters  and  policies,  and  conversations  are  not  reduced  to  mere  
transactions.  There  should  be  recognition  of  those  spheres  of  academic  life  
that  are  amenable  to  technical  dialogue  (catering,  accommodation,  library  
facilities  etc.),  and  those  which  should  remain  resolutely  open  to  encounter,  
namely  the  practices  of  teaching  and  learning.        
  
Principle  6:  Universities  could  encourage  a  perfectionist,  rather  
than  perfectible,  relationship  to  knowledge.  
A  not-­yet-­satisfaction  and  perfectionist  ideas  are  integral  to  this  relationship  
to  knowledge.  That  one’s  Higher  Education  is  typically  completed  within  
three  years  has  no  bearing  on  the  timeliness  of  an  education  of  the  self.  A  
perfectionist,  and  hence  moral,  education  of  the  self  may  consist  of  a  series  
of  ‘ends’  but  there  is  no  final  ‘end’  to  be  reached.    
  
A  perfectionist  view  of  education  can  be  encouraged  through  guiding  
students  towards  a  kind  of  ‘lived  epistemology’,  whereby  knowledge  is  
appreciated  in  itself  rather  than  being  seen  as  something  to  be  ‘consumed’  
and  then  applied.  If  students  are  prompted  to  see  knowledge  acquisition  as  
a  perfectionist  process,  that  is,  as  a  ‘process  of  living’  (Shepherd,  
1977/2011,  p.1),  then  this  could  also  foster  a  reframing  of  education  as  a  
lifelong  process.  Here,  I  am  not  referring  to  the  recent  increase  in  ‘lifelong  
learning’  initiatives  but  to  a  kind  of  Thoreauvian  ‘experiment  of  living’  that  is  
educative  (1854/1997,  p.47).    
  
While  learning  outcomes  are  typically  narrow  and  instrumental,  emphasising  
that  which  can  be  easily  observed  and  measured,  a  perfectionist  relationship  
to  knowledge  could  be  recognised  as  an  ‘outcome’  of  Higher  Education.  If  
academics  were  to  highlight  that  the  curriculum  content  they  ‘deliver’  to  
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students  is  only  a  portion  of  their  disciplinary  knowledge,  and  that  they  
themselves  are  still  learning  new  things  through  research,  then  this  in  turn  
could  foster  more  meaningful  considerations  of  what  it  is  to  ‘know’.  If  coming  
to  know  is  reconceived  as  a  process  which  continues  outside  and  beyond  
formal  educational  contexts,  then  Higher  Education  should  not  simply  equip  
students  with  a  body  of  facts,  but  rather  should  be  concerned  with  cultivating  
an  appreciation  of  knowledge  in  itself  –  whether  it  has  immediate  practical  
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A  not-­yet-­satisfaction  is  unsettling  precisely  because  what  it  means  to  be  
‘satisfied’  is  inexpressible,  yet  the  movement  from  self-­obscurity  to  self-­
knowledge  characteristic  of  perfectionism  (Saito,  2012)  is  educative  in  itself.  
A  perfectionist  not-­yet-­satisfaction  exemplifies  the  kind  of  Higher  Education  I  
am  advocating  for  here,  that  is,  a  ‘genuine  education…[which]  takes  hold  of  
our  very  soul  and  transforms  it  in  its  entirety  by  first  of  all  leading  us  to  the  
place  of  our  essential  being  and  accustoming  us  to  it’  (Heidegger,  1998,  
p.167).    
  
As  student  satisfaction  cannot  be  done  away  with,  opening  out  its  meaning  
by  highlighting  the  ontological,  dialogic,  and  perfectionist  dimensions  of  
‘satisfaction’  as  I  have  done  exemplifies  one  way  of  living  and  working  
productively  with  this  concept  in  the  HE  sector.  The  principles  explicated  
above  should  be  seen  as  starting  points  from  which  academics  and  their  
students  must  learn  ‘how  to  go  on’  together  in  the  neoliberal  university  
(Cavell,  1979a,  p.122).    
  
Working  towards  a  not-­yet-­satisfaction  –  while  not  a  panacea  for  the  ills  of  a  
marketised  Higher  Education  –  could  mean  that  a  richer  conception  of  
student  ‘voice’  is  realised,  that  the  value  of  educative  unsettling  is  
acknowledged,  and  academic-­student  relationships  premised  upon  
encounter  are  promoted.  The  importance  of  this  distinction  between  now-­  
(short-­term  meeting  of  expectations)  and  not-­yet-­  forms  of  satisfaction  is  
aptly  stated  as  follows:    
The  achievement  of  human  happiness  [or  a  perfectionist  education  of  
the  self]  requires  not  the  perennial  and  fuller  satisfaction  of  our  needs  
as  they  stand,  but  the  examination  and  transformation  of  those  needs  
(Cavell,  1981b,  pp.4-­5).    
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